ML20042F782

Insp Repts 50-369/90-04 & 50-370/90-04 on 900224-0326. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations Safety Verification,Surveillance Testing & Maint Activities, Facility Mods & Followup on Previous Insp Findings

ML20042F782
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	04/20/1990
From:	Cooper T, Son Ninh, Shymlock M, Van Doorn P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20042F777	List: ML20042F776 ML20042F780 ML20042F782
References
50-369-90-04, 50-369-90-4, 50-370-90-04, 50-370-90-4, NUDOCS 9005090383
Download: ML20042F782 (10)

See also: IR 05000369/1990004

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:' , , u UNITED stair S [km alo o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION .y REGloNil. n -g j 101 MARIETTA STREET,N A e ATLANT A, GEoHGI A 30323 i=

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....+ ' Report Nos. 50-369/90-04 and 50-370/90-04 Licensee: Duke Power Company ' 422 South Church Street l Charlotte, NC 28242 l Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station 1 and 2

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Docket Nos: 50-369 and 50 370 !.icense Nos: NDF-9 and NPF-17 V . February 24, 1990 - March 26, 1990 . Inspection Conducted: L j j--9/) Inspectors - niorlesident Inspector Date Signed n Doorn, . k' . h _J h 00-fD

' T. C oper, kesiae nspector Date Signed , & YS0*PO ,esicen[ Inspector Date Signed , Approved by: I ttunIdd 4-20-90 t M. B. Shpmlog)(, Section Chief Date Signed

, L Division of Weactor Projects SUMMARY , E Scope: This routine, resident inspection was conducted on site inspecting in ' the areas of plant operations safety verification, surveillance

. testing, maintenance activities, f acility modifications, followup-on previous inspection findings, and followup of event reports. P Results: In the areas inspected, one violation was identified involving

failure to follow procedure for control of a required fire door (paragraph 2.f.), one violation was identified involving failure to , follow procedure during a modification (paragraph 6), one non-cited - violation was identified

nvolving

unapproved overtime (paragraph 2.e.), and one unresolved item was identified invol/ing

. apparent floor penetrations without firestops (paragraph 2.b.) , Q[30%,[[h$Cgg9 ~ Q ,

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1. Persons Contacted , w . . Licensee Employees

..G.:Addi5, Superintendent of Station Services' , , D. Baxter, Support Operations Manager-

• J. Boyle, Superintendent of' Integrated Scheduling

g' D. Bumgardner; Unit 1 Operations Manager 1 J. Foster' Station Health Physicist

D. Franks,'OA Verification Manager .

• G. Gilbert, Superintendent of Technical' Services -

.! V C. Hendrik,iMaintenance Engineering Services Manager !

• T. Mathews, Site DesigniEngineering Manager
• T. McConrell,' Plant Manager-

'j R. Michael. Station Chemist

• D'. Murdock, McGuire Design Engineering Division Manager

- R. Pierce, IAE Engineer i W. Rees1de, Operation Engineer <' R. Rider, Mechanical Maintenance Engineer i M. Sample, Superintendent of Maintenance .

• R. Sharpe, Compliance Manager

,J. Snyder, Performance Engineer J.= Silver,' Unit 2 Operations. Manager

• A. Sipe,'McGuire Safety Review Group Chairman
• B..iravis, Superintendent of Operations

Other ' licensee employeas contacted included craftsmen, technicians, x operators, mechanics, w urity force members, and office personnel.'

• Attended exit. interview

, NRC Resident inspectors: Pi K. VanDoorn T, : A.--Cooper , '$.1Ninh 3 , 2. Plant Operations (71707,-71710) if La. The ' inspection staf f reviewed plant . operations during the report: period to verify conformance , applicable regulatory. requirements, 3 u> Control room logs, shif t supervisors' logs, shif t turnover records . .m . and equipment removal,and restoration records,were routinely perused. ] 'i' Interviews were -conducted with plant operations, -maintenance,

chemistry, health physics, and performance personnel. ' .. \\ g ' 9 YI L t

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,: , .g 4-, 2. y I A tivities;within .the control room were monitored during shif ts.and " fet shif t changes.. ; Actions and/or activities observed were conducted , as prescribed 'in applicable station administrative' directives, . The complement of licensed personnel on each'shif t met or exceeded the minimum required by Tcchnical Specifications (TS). b. Plant tours taken during the reporting period ' included, but were not- limited to, the turbine buildings, the auxiliary building, electrical , p equipment rooms, cable. spreading rooms, and- the' station yart! zone ' inside the protected area. , L During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security; y equipment status and; radiation control practices were observed. The inspector noted that a eral.. floor penetrstions on the 750-foot'. elevation of the. Auxiliary Building were clogged with debris and did not contain firestop material. Preliminary review by the licensee ' indicated that these may be spare penetrations which may require: , L 'firestops. Therefore firestop . covers were placed over the holes, Complete- evaluation .for technical significance or generic implica- . tions:had not been completed at the end of the inspection period. . . . "" Therefore- this is Unresolved item 369,370/90-04-01: Evaluation of ~ r Apparent Penetrations'Without Firestops. .c. ' Unit'l Operations The unit began the~ inspection-period in a refueling outage, with the fuel removed - f rom the . core. Eddy Current oTesting in the steam- generators (S/G) determined that 582 tubes met the plugging / sleeving- . criteria. The majority of-the defects are axially oriented and are l in the expansion transition zone just above the tube sheet, The licensee . plans to sleeve approximately- 400 of; these tubes and will- t- plug the remainder. Twelve tubes were' removed to undergo metallurgical evaluation. On March 15,1990,. maintenance was being performed on a Residual Heat Removal drain valve, IND-58. The valve had been isolated and the line drained but = a system hydro had allowed water to leak into the line due to a faulty isolation valve. Communications: between- operations and maintenance did not make maintenance personnel . aware that there was a possibility of -water in the line. When the valve was removed, approximately 750 gallons _of water was spilled into the ( pipe chase. No personnel were contaminated. _ d. Unit 2 Operations " The unit remained on line the. entire period, power was reduced to u approximately 10 percent on March 3, 1990 for a containment entry to add oil to the ' A' reactor coolant pump lower oil reservoir. The unit was returned to 100 percent power on March 5, 1990 and was on a licensee record run for Westinghouse units at the end of the peri >d, a % ~ ,. 4 & E.'

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' ! i e. .The. Performance group's ove" time records for the current Unit 1 outage period of January ttrough February 1990 and the last Unit 2 outage period. of June through September 1989, were examined to determine the effectiveness of the licensee's program to contro1~ the - werking hours of~ staff who gerform safety-related functions. The time records of 10 non-exempt, 16 exempt-staff and 2 first - line- supervisory personnel in it e Performance group were selected to b review and found to be in compliance with the TS requirements except' L in one instance. On September 23 and 24,1989 an individual worked 29.5. hours 'in a 48 hour period without obtaining an assessment and ' E approval from management. Section 5.0 of Station Directive 2.0.10, j; Overtime Authorization for personnel : Performing Safety _ Related " Functions, states in part that an individual who works more than 28 F' hours in any 48 hour period shall obtain an assessment and approval l from appropriate management. Failure to obtain overtime approval is .i % tified as a non-cited v olation, NCV 369,370/90-04-02: Failure L to- Follow Procedure for Control of Overtime. This NRC identified -violation is not being cited because criteria specified in section !_ V.A. of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied. n f. The inspectors performnd a wikdown of the accessible portions of the Unit 2 Auxiliary Feo. Water bystem (CA). The walkdown consisted of confirming that _ the system lineup procedure matched the pla_nt

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drawings and the as-built configuration; identifying equipment condition 'and items that might-degrade plant performance; verifying ' L that valves in the flow path were in the. correct position as required by procedure and that local and remote position .iwications were functional; and verifying' the proper breaker position at local electrical panels and indications on control room panels. During the walkdown of the >Jnit '2 CA system, the inspectors noted that fire door 601G (door, ta the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwatep

' pump Room)- was : blocked open. The inspectors determined that operations was unaware that-the door was blocked open and, therefore, no. fire watch had been pos ted or an hourly fire watch patrol established. Selected Licensee Commitmer t 10 9.5, Fire Barrier penetrations, requires that witn one or more ' ' re barrier penetrations inoperable ' B the licensee must within I hour either establish a continuous fire L watch on at least one side of the affected' assembly, or verify the operability of fire detectors on at least one side of the inoperable e assembly ano establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Failure to comply with tais Selected Licensee Commitment, is identified as violation 37U90-04-03: Failure to Follow Procedure. It was noted that this violation is similar to a violation cited in Inspection Report 369,370/8B-12 1 One cited and one non-cited. violation were identified. N k ! a

m ew yQ , 7 o ~r s - ti , - , - < . 41 < 3.- Surveillance Testing (61726) s . 4. . Selected surveillance tests were analf'cd and/or wi+,nessed by the inspector f to ascertain procedural 'and performance adequacy and< conformance with applicable. Technical Specifications. . Selected tests were witnessed to ascertain that' currentlwritten. cc approved procedures were available1and in use,1+, hat. test equipment in. . use was icalibrated, that test- prerequisites were met, that system - ~ restoration was completed and acceptance criteria were met. , The following' selected tests were either reviewed' or witnessed:- p PROCEDURE EQUIPMENT / TEST , PT/2/A/4200/28A CF Isolation Train. A Slave = Relay Testing TT/1/A/9200/279 DG 1A Header Supply to Instrument Air Tank Isolation Valve leak Rate- Test , OP/1/A/6350/02 Diesel Generator Startup . MP/0/A/7650/55 Perform NV system Hydro #1' for 10 year ISI , .PT/2/A/4450/06B VX System Train'2B Performance Test PT/2/A/4205/02B' ~NF Train B, Valve Stroke T4Hing - ' Quarterly 1 < i PT/2/A/4205/02A NF Train A-V'alve Stroke liming - . Quarter 1'y '" No' violations or deviations were identified.

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' Maintenance Observations (62703) a. Routine maintenance activities were reviewed and/or witnessed by the

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' resident inspection staff to ascertain procedural :and performance q ,e ' adequacy >and conformanceLwith applicable Technical Specifications. LThe selected activities witnessed were examined to ascertain. that, where applicable, current. written approved procedures.were available and in use, that prerequisites were met, that . equipment . restoration was completed and maintenance results were adequate. La b f( , h' t .. -- I d

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Activity

Work Request Investigate / Repair cause WR# 138690 OPS , ofileakage on.1A2 KC pump

F inboard seal. R'epair Valve Seal IKC-3A WR# 135383' OPS 4 . . .# . .. . \\ Repair;) A D/G 011 Leak WR# 14D891.0PS < Lon Drain Line. o Replace Triaxial Connectors WR# b9805-IAE

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on Triaxial- cable-at the. NI3

. cabinet, drawings N-31, N-32, N-35, N-41, N-43 and N-44 with crimp-on-type. connectors. , , si Rodiout; tubes on Component WR# 08635A PM Cooling pump motor cooler IAI / Torqua.the bonnet on Y-type WR# 890162 PRJ , .

Kerotest valve 1RN319,'

' Torque the bonnet-on Y type WR# 890161 PRJ " Y 6, Kerotest valve IRN316: ' Repair gains for-Steam Dump- WR# 140531 OPS ' f -Controller. - Repair 1B RA Pump -WR# 140788.0PS X iThermocouple. ~ J . Diesel Generator 2A Ai'r WR# 9945A pM " ~ Filter Maintenance. Disassemble / Reassemble Valve WR# 89194

LIVG89 for Temporary Test. Disassemble / Reassemble Valve WR# 89203 - y

IVG90 for Temporary Test,

s No violations or deviations were identified. . , . F 2 5, . Licensee. Event Report (LER) Followup (90712,92700) . - f The--below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed to detertrine i if the Linformttion provided met NRC; requirements. The determination included: ade quacy of ' description, verification. of compliance with l Technical. Specifications and regulatory requirements, corrective action taken, exister.ce of potential generic problems, reporting requirements satisfied,.and the relative safety significance of each event. Additional w , m: ., l .- a . m _ _ a 4

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, .' t n , ,h <W' inplant reviews and discussion with plant personnel, as appropriate, were l . , F conducted for those reports indicated by an (*). The following LER is 4 closed: l h 369/89-31, Rev,3 Technical Specification 3.0.3 Entered

Due to an Inappropriate Action During Maintenance - on the Control Area Ventilation System. 3 t " 6. g? ' Installation and Testing of Modifications (37828) .! a . .

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J, The inspector observed and reviewed Nuclear Station Modifications (NSM) to 1 determinecthe. adequacy of the safety evaluations performed to meet- 10CFR t 50.59 requirements;Lto ensure the work was being performed Dy qualified .. 4 workers; the' modifications were installed in accordance with approved 7 instructions, procedures, and drawings contained in the work packagos and 4 , the installation- test requirements were specified- and adequately

performed. ! 1 Station Problem Report (SPR) 1458 documents that the inlet and outlet , isolation valves for Nuclear Service Water (RN) to the Containment Spray

' a. '(NS)- beat exchangers and for RN to the Component Cooling. (KC) neat t ' ' E exchangters leak by: constantly when- the heat exchangers are in standby. The-low flow resulting from the leaking isolation valves. causes mad and , silt deposition in the NS and KC heat exchangers on the RN side. The recomm9nded resolution for: this problem was to replace the Weld-End -

>N butterfly isolation valves with. Wafer-End Posi-Seal butterfly valves. .NSMs MG-12107. and 12129, were developed and 1nstalled in response to. the 7 J problems identified in.SPR 1458. . The design' objective of the NSMs was to replate the isolation valves,

'. .1M 134A,- IRN 235B, IRN 86A and '1RN 187B. The inspector . reviewed . . documentation ano observed valves,1RN 134A and ~1RN P6A being installed. , l Installation of the valves required implementation of. WRs 953830, 95450,

97324,. 953814 and 953452. .The WR5 were r0 viewed by the inspector to i verify that specified QA controls were included in - the . work plans . to j implement all quality requirements of the.NSMs. The quality. and technical.' . fi ' control of the information contained and referenced in the NSMs reviewed -wa sL good. The safety evaluations were adequately performed and detai. led, 1 The inspector verified that relief from hydrostatic test requirements for - the' isolation valves were granted by'NRC letter dated'on June 29, 1989. . , ' The inspector determined that procedure MP/0/A/7600/31, Limitorque HBC. [ Gearboo for Butterfly Valve in Corrective Maintenance, had not been. y followed on valve IRN 134A. A manufacturer recommended torque value o' ' , 130 ft-lb had bee 9 used to to que the gearbox to the. valve yoke instead of . 7 175 f t-lb required by the procedure. Step 11.8.6 of the mainte.iance ' l procedure states-in part that gearbox bolting conforms to MCM 1205.19-19' ' , ~ Electric Motor Operator Mounting Guidelines-Rotork and Limitorque- Operators. Section II and'IV of MCM 1205.19-19 requires that 175 ft-lb ' ' & >

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torque be used and notes that this may be higher than recommenLations found on .the. valve manufacturer's drawing or instruction fianuals but that this requirement will override any found in other sources.- The inspecter 1 L' verified that the actual work had been completed and that the procedure had been. signed off by a QC inspector and approved by the maintenance supervisor. on February 24. 1990 prior.to a procedure change approval. It 1 was noted that a 50.59 safety evaluation.for the _ procedure major change, from 175 f t-lb to 130 f t-lb torque, was completed and approved on February 28,:1990. Stat on Directive 4.2.1, Handling of Station Procedures, states in: part that each major change to a procedure shall be approved prior to. use and' ' that if a discrepancy. affects. the acceptance criteria of a procedure or prevents -satisfactory completion of a procedure,. a deficiency exists and , shal.1 be corrected prior- to signing off the procedure. Failure of the licensee to follow. the plant approved procedure is identified as violation, 369/90-04-03: Failure to Follow Procedure Ouring Modification Installation. One violation was identified as described above. 7. Reactor Vessel Pressure Transient Protection. for Pressurized Water Reactors.(TI 2500/19). < The . inspector reviewed the licensee requirements and documentatien for reactor . coolant system overpressure protection for low . pressure and. temperature ' water solid conditions. Reviews determined that the system was designed to prevent exceeding Technical Specification and 101CFR 50,. Appendix -G limits during plant cooldown or startup. . Prawings and . FSAR- figures were complete demonstrating that the system is designed to prote:t the vessel given a single failure in addition to the initiating f ailure. The system does not demonstrate vulnerability to an event that causes y . pressure - transient -and a failure of equipment needed to terminate the, . t ransient'. The ' low temperature overpressure protection system utilizes two . power-ooerated relief valves (PORV) which - are armed by the - reactor operator following ' receipt of an annunciator indicating that plant ' conditions require low temperature overpressure protection. The operator places each key-lock switch to the LOW PRESSURE position to enable the - PORV low pressure setpoint. Should a: pressure excursion occur while in - the low pressure mode with plant temperature below the temperature setpoint, system pressure in excess of the PORV low pressure setpoint would be relieved to the pressurizer relief tank. . Operations procedures exist to control operations in a water-solid . condition, including restrictions to .be in place during the operation in

this condition.

Licensee procedure OP/1 & 2/A/6100/01, Controlling Procedure .for Unit Startup, and OP/1 & 2/A/6100/02, Controlling Procedure .-for Unit Shutdown, provide' instructions for operation of the system. ! !

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.,w , 's- , y' ' g y y , ! ' Operators have received training in low-temperature overpressure events. The inspector' reviewed the lesson plansL and noted that the type 01'. event, l , event history at other plants, and the function of - the plant - specifici . qf system? was covered. All modifications necessary to providi mitigation

' L capabilitiet, for a low-temperature overpressurization event were installed

, ' per . the appropriate design control procedures, including evaluations g, f' performed to assure that all: safety evaluations were performed prior to ' the installation. - i " The' system is included in the periodic / preventative maintenance program, , with the PORV. control logic being verified to actuate within the . design < f ' basis.- Procedure PT/1 & 2/A/4150/09 verifies logic actuation at any. - , . condition. Subsequent _ to any mainter dnce being performed on the system or ' ' b associated components, post maintenarce testing is completed prior to - I restoration and return to operation. ,

L < " No vio1'ations'or deviations were identified, l a r '8.- Licensee'Self-Assessment (40500)' The - inspectors reviewed the licensee Quality ' Assurance Perfornance- ' , , Assessment _(QAPA), the QA Assessment of .the' plant for the last $ ALP i period. The basis for this assessment consisted of'a review of Licensee

' P Event Reports, Problem- Investigation Reports, and QA audit and - surveillance activities. Lua was sorted according to applicable areas eP '(Operations,' Performance,-Mechanical ~Maintenan:e, etc.) and was then rated . L based on relative importance to nuclear safety. _ Following each area . ,

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rating, _the findings were reconciled to the NRC Systematic Assessn.ent of ' Licensee Performance (SALP)_ findings in _the same-area.

m .. " N The- QAPA ratings in the various areas basically agreed with the SALP . atings. 'In ~several areas, notably ' Operations, ~ Performance,- and- r Instrument _ and ElectHeal, the QAPA-determined that increased attention

was warranted due to the number and types of events fout.d. The inspector noted the ~ increased . significance and. level of. expertise -evident .in this and then recent-QA products,

pU The .nspector -also : reviewed several recent"McGuire Satety Review Group 7 E .Inplant Review Reports ' and verified that adequate reviews of plant ' - F , safety-related._ procedures and plant events were being performed. These " { reports demonstrate that an adequate level of review -is being performed. 19. ExiiInterview(30703)

. ..m The inspection scope and findings identified below were summarized on . F -March 26,_1990, with those persons indicated in paragraph I above. The i following items'were discussed in detail:

' Unresolved Item 369,370/90-04-01: Evaluation of Apparent Penetrations 1 Without Firestops (paragraph 2.b.). > i l 1 yc , W1 '_

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Control of. Overtime-'(paragraph 2.e.).

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Doori(paragraph 2.f..

' N'. LViolationi369/90-04-03i Failure to Follow Procedure .During Modificati.o_n a + ~ i%m + A LInsta11ation;(paragraph 6.).. ' ' J ~ ' W, y, - 3 pp i ' M;I. i..l The flicenseel representatives; present' offere'dinor dissenting comments, nor - -

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