ML20042F763

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Proposed Tech Specs Re cold-leg Accumulator Instrumentation Surveillance
ML20042F763
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 05/04/1990
From:
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML20042F760 List:
References
NUDOCS 9005090362
Download: ML20042F763 (10)


Text

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t ENCLOSURE.1 .

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PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATICN CHANGE '

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS..'50-327 AND 50-328 .

(TVA-SQN-TS 13 ) - i t

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LIST OF AFFECTED PAGES

-Unit l' ,

3/4-5-l' 3/4 5

  • Unit 2 .'

....s

.- *'3/4 5-1 , i 3/4-5-2 .

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9005090362 900504 PDR ADOCK 05000327 PDC P

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3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS '

f3 f COLD LEG INJECTION ACCUMULATORS '

7, , '

t LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION - ' .

a- w 1 4 -

1 '3.5.1.1 ..Each cold leg injection accumulator shall De OPERABLE with: .

a. The isolation valve open, v

b.

A contained borated water, borated water volume of between 7857 and 8071 gallons of '

"' c'. ' Between 1900 and 2100 ppm of, boron, and '

d.

A nitrogen cover pressure of between 385 and 447 psig.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3

  • ACTION: ,

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' n.

a. With one cold leg injection accumulator.in. operable, except as a result ..  ?

of a closed isolation va1ve, restore the inoperable accumulator

  • to .

'( OPERABLE status within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDB the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUT 00WN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. '

, b.

, With one cold leg injection accumulator inoperable due to the isola- '

tion valve being closed, nither immediately open the' isolation valve  !

or thebe'in next 12 HOT hours, STANDBY within one hour ana be in HOT SHUT 00WN e .., . .. . -w . -

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  • Pressurizer pressure above 1000 psig, '

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.,,SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 124 August 11, 1989 '

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) s4 .

SURVE?ll.ANCE REQUIREMENTS 4 -

.t 4.5.1.1.1 Each cold leg injection accumulator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

t. D) ; -

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a. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by:

arw: x f, 1 ~

1. Verifying, 5 i

r f pr=: r =3 th; :b;;=: O f c h r= :: b; :==funt f 1:=h

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the contained borated water volume and nitrogen

'. . cover pressure in the tanks,.and f,' '

2.

4;c. Verifying that each cold leg injection accumulator isolation "

. g. r . valve is open.-

  • YdN' b.

. At least once per 31 days and within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after each solution

.-c volume increase of greater than or equal to 1% of tank voluirie by-

'dQ

n verifying solution. the boron' concentration'of the cold leg injection accumulator c.

. At least once per 31 days when the RCS pressure is above 2000 psig

,O ' by verifying that power to the isolation valve operator is disconnected-by removal-of the breaker from the circuit. -

d.

At least once per 18 months by verifying that each cold leg injection i accumulator isolation valve opens automaticq11y under each of the following conditions:

1. .

When an actual or a simulated RCS pressure signal exceeds the '

P-11'(Pressurizer P'r essure Block of Safety Injection) setpoint,

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2.  ;

'Upon receipt of a safety injection test signal. '

yy.y......_Cecli . uccumulater -;tcr 1;;;l =d , c.;;;.:r; chcr=1 ;h.li b; d==;tre.t;d

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f.t 1;;;t er.;; ecr 10 ; =th; bj tL y;.T ....m..;c er o C;;A = CL CAL';CAU ^A.

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SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. 12,124 R1

,, August 11, 1989

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, . - 10 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE C0dLING SYSTEMS C 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATOBS ,

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COLD LEG. INJECTION ACCUMULATORS

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION j

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3.5.1.1 Each cold leg injection accomulator shall be*0PERABLE with:

a. The isolation valve open, .

' ' pff ;

b.. .

A contained borated water volume of between 7857 and 8071 gallons of- "- '

borated water, '

c. Between 1900 and 2100 ppm of boron, and -

ac;9,

"'#1' d.

, A nitrogen cover pressure lof between 385 and 447, psig.

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APPLICABILITY: H0 DES 1, 2 and 3.f ', .

ACTION: .

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a.

With one cold leg inject. ion accumulator inoperable, except'as a ,

result of a closed isolation valve, restore the inoperable '

C accumulator to OPERABLE. status within one hour or be Jin at least H0T STANDBY following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.- within-the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the '

b. i With one cold leg injection accumulator inoperable due to the isolation valve being closed,e- ither immediately op;n the isolation valve cr be within'the next in 12 HOT STANDBY hours. "~ within

" one

hour and be in HOT SHUTDOWN

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" Pressurizer pressure above 1000 psig.

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Cj u i u 4 .;fu; ling cutage. m... som vu m ;

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Rll3 g.SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 113 August II, 1989 l

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'P EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS,  !

1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l mt >.s :

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4.5.1.1.1 Each cold leg injection accumulator shall be. demonstrated OPERABLE:

,j c '.- a. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by-

. 1.. Verifying, ' ' ' ' ---- ' " " --- -- " --------- ' ' '-- -

4 %~ Q'c,, .

~' ;r:::r^ . the contained borated water volume and ' nitrogen -

cover pressure in the tan,ks, and .. .

"r 2.- Verifying:that each cold leg injection accumulator isolation t'le , valve is open. ' ,

. y.

b. At least once per 31 days.and within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after each solution

. 2,lf;X

g..d.P volume increase of greater than or equal-to 1% of tank' volume by.

' @pr ,

verifying the boron concentration of the cold leg injection .

,m accumulator solution. ,

Nf c. At least once per 31 days when the RCS pressur.e is above 2000 psig.

i

...... by. verifying-that' power to.the isolation valve operator is

?? 4 disconnected-by removal of the breaker from the. circuit.

d. At least once per 18 months by verifying.that each cold' leg. injection accumulator isolation valve opens automatically under.each of the

. following conditions: "'

r

-1. When an actual or a' simulated RCS pressure signal exceeds the

c P-ll (Pressurizer Pressure Block of Safety injection) setpoint yy -
2. Upon receipt of a' safety injection. test signal.

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SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 5-2 Amendment No 113 R i l .r - 1, August 11, 1989  ;

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[s;i eq ENCLOSURE 2- .

PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE-'

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS'1 AND-2>

DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328. .

r (TVA-SQh*-TS-90-13 ) .

. DESCRIPTION AND JUSTIFICATION.FOR-DELETION OF THE SURVEILI.ANCE REQUIREMENTS .

FOR COLD-LEG ACCUMULATOR INSTRUMENTATION AND THE-ASSOCIATED ACTION STATEMENTS ~

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-ENCLOSURE 2 l

1 m \l Description of Change .

Tennessee Valley Authority proposes to modify the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Units.1 and 2 Technical Specifications (TSs) to revise TS 3/4.5.1 to. '

delete Action Statements e and d and the associated footnote. The-requested change will also delete Surveillance Requirement- (SR) 4.5.1.1.2

." J and the prescriptive statement of SR 4.5.1.1.1.a.1 as.to how to verify accumulat'or level and pressure. '

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)_ Reason for Change NRC issued by letter dated August 11, 1989, amendments to the SQN Units 1-and.2 TS 3/4.5.1 adding Action Statements e and d that provide actions to follow in the event SR-4.5.1.1.2 could not be met. NRC staff stated in its letter that the issuance of action statements governing the-operability of the monitoring instrumentation for the cold-leg i accumulators (i.e., level and pressure instruments) was a generic issue for Westinghouse Electric Corporation's pressurized water reactors-(PWR),-

and therefore these' amendments would only be effective until the restart of Unit 2 from its Cycle 4 refueling outage. This would provide approximately 18 months for the NRC staff to work with the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) to develop a generic solution to this issue that:is applicable for all Westinghouse PWRs. TVA has'beeh in contact with both WOG and NRC' staff concerning resolution of thisiissue and11s submitting.

, this proposed change to resolve this issue for the SQN Unit 2 Cycle 4 -

refueling outage. The requested change is consistent with the accumulator 3 specification proposed by the WOG MERITS program.

Justi(ication for Change  !

~The phrase "... . by absence of alarms or by measurement of levels and pressures. . ." has been deleted from SR 4.5.1.1.1.a.1 since this is - i specifying the method of determining accumulator cover pressure and volume. The method of determining these parameters is utility specific and should not be dictated by the' TSs.

The deletion of SR 4.5.1.1.2 is justified because of the fact that 4

' accumulator level and' pressure are control functions on Westinghouse plants and do not perform a protection function. In addition, the limiting condition for operation (LCO) only addresses the control

' parameters, not the instrumentation utilized 1to monitor the' parameters.

The purpose of the'LCO is to ensure the operability of the cold-leg accumulators and not the instrumentation channels since the LC0 does not-inc16de the channels' instrumentation.. The availebility of the instrumentation is indirectly controlled by the SR on the level and pressure that must be performed to comply with the LCO. Similar situations exist for other parameters, such as refueling wate.r storage tank level and temperature, where the parameters are required to be 4

verified to be within limits but the instrumentation is not subject to a-specification-dictated SR. The acceptability of the instrumentation is ensured by the normal instrumentation calibration.

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, Based on the' deletion of SR 4.5.1.1.2 for level and pressure- ' '

~ -

instrumentation. Action Statements c.and d of LCO 3.5.1.1 and the associated footnote have also been deleted. i nut . .

Environmental Impact Evaluation The proposed change request;does not involve an unreviewed environmental question because operation of SQN Units 1;and'2 in accordance with this change.wo,uld not: .,

1. -Result in a significant~1ncrease in any adverse environmental impact-previously evaluated in.the Final Environmental Statement-(FES) as .

modified by the Staff's testimony.to the Atomic Safety and Licensing .;

Board, supplements to the FES, environmental impact appraisals, or-decisions of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.

2. Result in a significant change in effluents or power levels.
3. Result in matters not previously reviewed in the licensing basis for i SQN. that may have a significant environmental' impact.

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i ENCLOSURE 3- ,,

1 PROPOSED TECHNICA.L SPECIFICATION CHANGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2~-

L DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 --

(TVA-SQN-TS-90-13) -

DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION <

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1 ENCLOSURE 3

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Significant Hazards Evaluction l

TVA has evaluated the proposed technical specification (TS) change and has  !

determined-that it does not represent a significant hazards consideration

  • based on criteria established in'10 CFR 50.92(c). Operation of Sequoyah' Nuclear Plant (SQN) in accordance with the proposed amendment will.not:

(1) . Indolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconaequencesof an accident previously evaluated. 3 The requested change does not require a physical modification to any:

plant system and does not affect any accident' analysis. The cold leg  ;

accumulators are a passive component in the emergency core cooling -l system and the TS requiring the verification of both accumulator  !

water level and pressure will remain. unchanged. Verification of these parameters ensures that accident analyses assumptions are not violated. Therefore,'the requested change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences.of an 1 accident previously evaluated.

(2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed. -

No physical modification is being made to.any, plant' system as a result of this change. Verification of the parameters (water level and pressure) ensures that accident analyses assumptions are not violated and no change in the analyses is being made.1 Therefore, the-possibility of a new or different kind of accident'is not created.

l l

(3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The TS that requires verification of'the accumulator-water volume:and pressure will remain unchanged. No changes to the accident analysis are being made and verification of these parameters ensuree that the accident analyses assumptions are not violated.1Therefore, there is no significant reduction in any margin of safety. s l'

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