ML20042B619
| ML20042B619 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07000036 |
| Issue date: | 03/09/1982 |
| From: | Greger L, Peck C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20042B599 | List: |
| References | |
| 70-0036-82-01, 70-36-82-1, NUDOCS 8203250460 | |
| Download: ML20042B619 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III Report No. 70-036/82-01(DETP)
Docket No.70-036 License No. SNM-33 Licensee: Combur, tion Engineering, Inc.
Nuclear Power Systems Windsor, CT 06905 Facility Nsme: Hematite Inspection At: Hematite, MO Inspection Conducted: February 16-19, 1982 h
Ly~ hu Inspector:
C. C. Peck dI/ s 92-j!N!8E Approved By:
R C lef Facilities Radiation Protection Section Inspection Summary:
Inspection on February 16-19, 1982 (Report No. 70-036/82-01(DETP))
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of radiation protection, radioactive waste management, criticality safety, facility changes, audits, training, transportation activities, emergency planning, and environmental monitoring. The inspection required 26 hours3.009259e-4 days <br />0.00722 hours <br />4.298942e-5 weeks <br />9.893e-6 months <br /> onsite by one NRC inspector.
Results: No violations were identified.
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8203250460 820310 PDR ADOCK 07000036 C
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- J. A. Rode, Plant Manager
- H. E. Eskridge, Nuclear Licensing, Safety, and Accountability Supervisor
- L. J. Swallow, Quality Assurance Manager R. C. Miller, Production and Materials Control Supervisor
- A. J. Noack, Production Superintendent
- J. G. Abernathy, Radiation Specialist
- L.
F. Deul, Engineer
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
General The inspection began at 8:00 a.m. on February 16, and was concluded on February 19, 1982. Normal production of uranium oxide powder and pellets was in progress.
3.
Facility Changes and Criticality Control Amendment 7 to License SNM-33 was issued in October 1981 authorizing the storage of cans of dry and agglomerated uranium oxide on conveyors and on a mezzanine in the pellet plant. The design was subjected to a KENO analysis by criticality specialists at Windsor.
Installation of the conveyors was in progress during the inspection.
A steel mezzanine was constructed in Building 255-3 (Item Plant) for safe storage of oxide containers which were formerly stored on the floor beneath. The floor storage space is now used for non-radio-active materials and equipment. The mezzanine was designed and built by a contractor. The arrangement of the storage spaces which are on two foot centers was analyzed for criticality safety.
i A new oxidation reduction furnace and wet scrubber system was installed in the dry scrap recovery area. The system is similar to the existing furnace and scrubber units in the area.
4.
Radiation Protection a.
External Exposure Control Records disclosed that exposures for 1981 were well within regulatory limits. Film badge records indicated that the highest whole body exposure to any individual for the year was 180 milli-rems. The highest skin exposure was 990 millirems.
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b.
Internal Exposure Control An examination of lapel sampler measurements, the licensee's primary method of determining internal exposures to uranium, disclosed that no individual received more than 40 MPC-hours in any week. However,.there were eight instances in the second half of 1981.in which individual weekly exposures exceeded 30 MPC-hours. Most of these exposures were incurred during work at the pellet pressing and powder agglomeration stations which were activated about.the middle of the year. The licensee is aware of the exposure potential in these areas and is evaluating methods of reducing the airborne uranium concentrations. When exposures exceed 20 MPC-hours, supervision is notified and work restrictions may be imposed at 32 MPC-hours. Efforts are being made to improve housekeeping and contamination control in these areas.
Monthly urinalyses during the second half of 1981 were all within limits. The highest individual sample had a uranium concentration of 16 ug/1. The average for all samples was only slightly above the detection limit of 5 ug/1.
The licensee has lowered the urinalysis action point from 50 ug/l to 25 ug/l and has requested their contractor laboratory to report promptly results e.xceeding 25 ug/1. Concentrations exceeding this action point would be indicative of process problems requir-ing evaluation. The MPC-hours of exposure represented by 25 ug/l would be highly dependent on the solubility of the uranium involved.
In vivo counting of employees with a potential for exposure to airborne uranium is usually performed twice a year, so that each employee may be counted at least once. The mobile counting service was -unavailable for the second series of counts in 1981, so counts were performed in January 1982. None of the counts exceeded 130 ug of uranium-235, the level at which work restrictions are imposed.
This is equal to half the equilibrium mass of uranium-235 in the lung equivalent to one maximum permissible ~ lung burden. Counts above 130 ug would be indicative of airborne radioactivity or process problems and would require an evaluation.
c.
Air Sampling The licensee maintains a program of continuous air sampling at about 30 operating locations.
Samples are counted daily. Examin-ation of records for the second half of 1981 disclosed no serious problems. Concentrations above MPC (1E-10 uCi/ml for insoluble uranium) occurred briefly on a few occasions as a result of equip-ment leaks.
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d.
Instrument Calibration Records indicated that all portable survey instruments are being calibrated quarterly over the instrument range.
The efficiency of the instrument used,for counting air samples and smear surveys is measured weekly against alpha and beta standards.
5.
Radioactive Waste Management a.
Solid Wastes There have been no shipments to waste burial since April 1981.
The licensee's waste packaging program was recently inspected and approved by a contractor of the State of Nevada, a prere-quisite to use of the Beatty burial. site.. Restrictions against special nuclear material and quantity limitations prevent ship-ments to the Richland and Barnwell burial sites.
The licensee has developed a process for reducing the volume of contaminated HEPA filters designated as waste. The filter medium-is reduced to ashes by a chemical treatment followed by incinera-tion. Engineering data indicate a volume reduction of about 99 percent. The process also permits recovery of a significant. amount of uranium.
b.
Liquid Wastes Waste water from the laundry containing uranium continues to be the only liquid radioactive waste intentionally discarded. The water is collected in a hold tank, sampled, and released to a-storm sewer which discharges into a site pond outside the re-stricted area.
Sample results disclosed that 166 grams of-uranium were discharged in 1981, less than the total for any previous year. The reduction is attributed to the installation in 1980 of a filter press in the pipeline between the laundry i
and the hold tank.
t Concentrations of uranium in the laundry water are less than the MFC for release to an unrestricted area. Routine site pond outflow samples confirm that effluents to the creek are within unrestricted area concentration limits.
c.
Airborne Effluents Ten stacks are continuously exhausted when their associated operat--
ing equipment is in use.
Samples of the exhaust are continuously l
collected and counted weekly. Counting data are combined with exhaust volumes, which are determined at least annually, to cal-culate radioactivity concentrations and stack loss quantities.
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e Examination of data disclosed that concentrations from each stack were less than MPC for release to an unrestricted area. Concen-trations generally are less than IE-12 uCi/ml.
4 License Condition 19 requires that the dry scrubber exhaust stack be continuously sampled and samples analyzed weekly to determine the non-radioactive fluoride release. Data disclose that the total quantity released in 1981 was 13,700 pounds, about the same as in previous years.
6.
Transportation Activities Radioactive materials received consist primarily of uranium hexafluoride cylinders from government enrichment facilities and scrap materials for recovery from the Company's Windsor plant. Shipments consist primarily of uranium oxide powder and pellets to Windsor.
The inspector examined records of 1981 shipments for compliance with packaging, contamination control, labeling, marking, and placarding requirements. No discrepancies were found.
7.
Internal Audits Auditors from the Windsor facility conducted an annual nuclear safety audit in October 1981. Among other findings, the audit called atten-tion to the presence of empty containers lacking empty signs, a recurrent criticality control problem.
In response, the licensee installed a number of metal cages designated for the storage of empty containers.
A semiannual audit of radiation safety was also conducted in October by Windsor representatives.
The inspector also reviewed the reports of weekly safety inspections by the Nuclear Licensing Safety and Accountability Supervisor and monthly criticality inspections of the Quality Assurance Manager.
8.
Training New employees receive at least five hours training in radiation and industrial safety followed by a quiz. Records indicated all new employees hired in 1981 received this training.
When assigned to the oxide plant conversion process, operators receive detailed instruction in process chemistry and operations followed by a written examination, i
Retraining is accomplished through monthly safety meetings. Radiation safety, criticality safety, and respiratory protection-are specific subjects reviewed at least annually. Meeting records indicated these i
topics were included in the 1981 meetings.
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e 9.
Environmental Monitoring Surface water, well water, soil, and vegetation are sampled periodically by the licensee for analysis by a contractor laboratory. The air is sampled continuously at two stations outside the restricted area and analyzed in the licensee's laboratory.
Samples taken in 1981 from Joachim Creek, onsite and offsite wells, and from soil and vegetation samples contained no significant radio-activity.
The two retention ponds or lagoons onsite, which were used for disposal of liquid radioactive waste until 1978, are monitored by three sample wells located in the direction of groundwater flow. Monthly samples from the wells are analyzed for gross alpha and beta radioactivity.
Samples in 1981 from the well nearest the lagoon showed ne significant alpha ~ activity.
Beta concentrations, assumed to be technetium-99 based on previous analyses, averaged about 350 pCi/1, about the same as in previous years.
Sampics from the wells farther from the lagoons contained no significant radioactivity.
10.
Emergency Planning a.
Drills Emergency evacuation drills, usually unannounced, are conducted twice a year. Drills are inititated by activation of the crit-icality alarms. Personnel assemble in tha tile barn, a short distance outside the restricted area fence, where emergency supplies and equipment are kept.
Drills were conducted in January and November of 1981. Records indicated that evacuations, personnel accountability, and re-entries were accomplished expeditiously b.
Emergency Equipment Emergency supplies in the tile barn are inventoried weekly. The inventory includes radiation instruments, film badges, dosimeters, protective clothing, respirators, SCBA equipment, and first aid supplies.
In addition, SCBA equipment and first aid supplies are available at two locations in the plant.
c.
Agreements With Emergency Support Organizations The licensee has agreement letters dated in January 1982 with the physician who normally provides medical assistance to plant personne1'and with Barnes Hospital in St. Louis, which is 4
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O equipped to handle emergency radiatio;. injuries. Written agree-monts with the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department and the Hematite Fire Department were dated in 1980. These agreements have since been verbally renewed. The licensee said that the written agreements would be updated in 1982, d.
Fire Protection Fire extinguishers are available in all operating and storage areas of the plant. Tags indicated that the extinguishers are visually inspected monthly for seal integrity. The extinguishers are weighed quarterly. The inspector observed that the quantities of combustible materials in operating areas'are small.
Semiannual fire protection inspections by American Nuclear Insurers
- continue, e.
Emergency Training Fire extinguishers and SCBA equipment usage are annual subjects in safety meetings. Many employees have received training pre-sented by the St. Louis Fire Department. The most recent train-ing session was in 1979.
Safety technicians, foremen, and some operators have received Red Cross first aid training.
11.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives identified in Section 1 at the conclusion of the inspection. The inspector described the scope of the inspection and said no violations had been identified.
The representatives acknowldeged the-inspector's comments concerning the need for reducing employee exposures in the pellet pressing and agglomeration areas consistent with ALARA principles and said the efforts to reduce exposures would continue.
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