ML20042B315
| ML20042B315 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Saint Vrain  |
| Issue date: | 03/18/1982 |
| From: | Clark R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20042B313 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8203250210 | |
| Download: ML20042B315 (17) | |
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UNITED STATES y
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g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
>p WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555
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-l PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO DOCKET NO. 50-267
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FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSC Amendment No. 26 License No. DPR-34
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1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The app 1'.ation for amendment by Public Service Company of Coloraco (the licensee) dated January 8,1982, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commissi.on's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in confomity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering -the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
~D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to'the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's reJulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
8203250210 820318 l
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. 2.
Accordingly, Facility Operating License No. DPR-34 is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.0.(2) is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 26, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuan:e.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g
Robert A., Clark, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #3 Division of Licensing
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: March 18, 1981 4
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i ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT
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AMENDMENT NO. 26 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-34 DOCKET NO. 50-267 Replace the fo11 swing pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment nu.? er and contain vertical lines indicating the area of f
change.
Remove Insert 4.2-4a 4.2.4a 4.2-5 4.2-5 4.2-Sa repositioned 4.2-6 4.2-6 4.2-6a 4.2-7 4.2-7 repositioned 4.2-8 4.2-8 (no change) 4.2-11 4.2-11 4.2-11a 4.2-11b repositioned 4.2-12 4.2-12 4.2-12a
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4.2-12b 7.5-8 7.5-8 (corrected) 9 4
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4.204 A 2
Basis for Specification LCD 4.2.6 (continued)
In addition to the fire suppression function either of the fire pumps operating in conjunction with either fire water booster pu=p provides adequate capacity to operate a circulator water turbine and supply emergency cooling water for safe shutdown cooling. With the 325 gallons of fuel in storage, the engine driven fire pu=p can operate at rated conditions for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> which is adequate time to have more fuel delivered to the site. For further explana-
. tion, see Final Safety. Analysis Report, Sections 1.4,10.3, and 14.4.
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Amendment No. 26
Fort St. Vrain #1 Amendment 26 Page 4.2-5 Soecification LCO 4.2.7 - PCRV pressurization Limitino Conditions for Ooeration The PCRV shall not be pressurized to more than 100 psia unless:
a) The PCRV safety valve installation is operable and there is less than 5 psig between the rupture disc and relief valve, and both inlet block valves are locked open.
b) All primary and secondary penetration closures and hold-down l
plates are in place and operable per Specification LCO 4.2.9.
c) The interspaces between the primary and secondary penetration closures are maintained at a pressure greater I
than primary system pressure with purified helte las or; d) The interspaces between the primary and secondary
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penetration closures are maintained at a pressure greater-than primary system pressure with purified helium gas, with the exception of all or some of the steam generator; penetrations.
The interspaces between the primary and seco'ndary steam generator penetration closures for either er both loops may be maintained at a pressure greater than cold reheat steam pressure, but less than primary coolant pressura, wi'th purified helium gas.
e) One set of rupture discs and safety valves protecting each I
steam generator and circulator penetration is coerable, and there is less than 5 psig between the rupture ciscs and the relief valves.
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Fort St. Vrain +1 Amendment 26 Page 4.2-Sa When the PCRV is pressuri:ed to more than 100 psia, corrective action shall be initiated at the anset of any condition exceeding the limits.
If corrective action is not successful within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, the reactor, if operating, shall be put in a shutdown condition, followed by PCRV depressuri:ation to less than 100 psia.
Basis for Soecification 4.2.7 The PCRV safety valve installation (consisting of two parallel systems, each of which has a manual block valve and a rupture cisc mounted upstream 'of the safety valves and which discharge to the atmosphere via a single particulate filter) provides the ultimate protection against overpressuring the PCRV.
A single, manually-operated block valve is provided between the PCRV and each rupture disc so that necessary maintenance and/or testing of the discs and safety' valves can be performed after shutdown and depressurization of the plant. Redundant instrumentation, as well as me.chanical locks on _
the valve, ensure that the valves will always be open when the PCRV is pressurized.
The secondary closure normally serves two purposes related to plant safety: (1) to form an interspace between the, inner and outer cl e'sure s that can be maintained above primary coolant. pressure with-clean helium to positively prevent any small normal leakage of contaminated helium from the primary coolant system through the primary closure, and (2) to eliminate the possibility of a large primary coolant system leak as a result of any failure of a primary closure.
In this latter function, the secondary closures. are consicered to ce a form of seconcary, containment since, as in most a
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Fort St. Vrair. el Amendment 26 Page 4.2-6 power reactor plants, the secondary containment prevents escape of radioactivity in the event of a primary coolant system rupture corresponding to a failure of the pCRV primary closures.
Since no credible accident of the PCRV liner, reinforcement, and concrete can result in significant leakage, the secondary closures of the PCRV penetrations thus constitute secondary containment of the primary coolant system.
As long as penetration interspace pressure is maintained above l
l primary coolant pressure, any leakage into the Reactor Building will i
l be purified helium and will thus have no radiological consequences.
l penetration pressurizing gas is normally obtained from the helium 1
purification systen, or alternately, from the high pressure helium
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supply. tanks of the helium storage system.
Because of the potential of leakage of purified helium-gas from the steam generator penetration interspace into the cold reheat steam system within the penetration, the steam generator interspaces may be -
maintained at a pressure greater than cold reheat stea'm pressure, but l
l less than primary coolant pressure.
In this mode of operation, l
l reducing the driving force for leakage significantly reduces leakage of purified helium gas to the cold reheat system. Reducing the quantity of purified helium in the-cold reheat steam allows the maintenance of condenser vacuum required for normal plant power operation. The cold reheat steam pressure varies with plant load, but is always at least 50 psi below primary coolant pressure.
Therefore, there exists the potential for contaminated helium gas leakage across tne primary closure and into the reheat steam system.
i Port St. Vrain #1 Amendment 26 Page 4.2-6a Primarily, noble gases would be stripped from the steam by the condenser air ejector and ultimately exhausted out the plant stack.
Consequently, when operating in this mode, more stringent leak tightness has been specified for the steam generator primary closures in LCO 4.2.9.
With the radiation monitoring required by LCO 4.2.3, the integrity of the primary closure is adequately demonstrated.
The steam generator and helium circulator penetrations are provided with rupture discs and safety valves to prevent overpressure should a process l'ine rupture within the penetration.
(These are the only penetrations which contain process fluids at pressures high enough to require such protection.) Separate overpressure protection trains are provided for a) the six steam generator module penetrations of each loop and b) each of the four helium circulator penetrations.
Each train consists of a pair of rupture discs, each of which is upstream of a safety valve with the.two rupture disc-safety val,ve combinations piped in parallel.
A block valve i s provided at the inlet to each rupture disc. The block valves serving each pair of rupture discs and associated safety valves are mechanically interlocked so that only one valve can be closed at any. time. Design basis for the circulator penetration interspace safety valves is the rupture of a bearing water supply.line.
For the steam generators penetration interspaces, the design basis is the rupture of a subheader (35 lb/sec of superheated steam at 1000 F).
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h.2-7 Amendment 26
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_.. Specification LCO h.2.8 - Primary Coolant Activitv. Limiting Conditions for Oneration The primary coolant gaseous and plateout activity levels shall be limited to:
a) The product of pri=ary coolant noble gas beta plus ga==a activity, times 5, shall not exceed 2.40 euries-mev (where I is the weighted
- lb.
average of the beta and ga=ma energies per disintegration $n MeV),
vhen measured 15 minutes after sampling.
b) The pri=ary coolant circulating halogen-inventory shall not -
exceed an 131I thyroid dose equivalent of 2h curies.
13II c) The plateout halogen inventory shall not exceed an thyroid dose equivalent of 5000 curies / loop.
90 90Sr bone d) The plateout Sr inventory shall not exceed a dose equivalent of 1h0 curies / loop.
e) Determination of 5 vill be performed at least once a month, and in any event vill be performed each time the primary coolant radioactivity concentration changes by 25% frem the previous measurement at the same reactor power level. Calculations required to determineI will consist of the following:
1.
Quantitative measurement in units of Ci of radionuclides making lb up at. least 95% of. the noble gas beta plus gam:na decay energy in the primary coolant measured 15 minutes.after sact, ling.
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Amendment 26 h.2-8 2.
A determination of the beta and gamma decay energy per disintegration of each nuclide determined in (1) above, by applying known decay energies and schemes.
3 A calculation of I by appropriate weighting of each nuclide's beta and gamma energy with its concentration as determined in (1) above.
Basis for Specification LCO h.2.8 The whole body dose is a direct function of the gross ga=na activity in the primary coolant. The whole body skin dose is a direct function of the gas beta activity in'the primary coolant.
Measuring the primary coolant beta plus ga=ma activity 15 m'inutes ofter ssnpling would indicate that activity that would reach the EAB*
l following the postulated accident, taking into account the decay of short half life isotopes and short ter= atmospheric conditions. The I thyroid dose equivalent and the 9fSrbonedoseequivalentare 131 defined as a ratio of the rem / mil 11 curies effectivity values.for the respective isotopes ttnes the activity of the subject nuclide in mil 11 curies.
The limits on the primary coolant noble gas beta plus gesma concentrations are based on the maximum credible accident (FSAR Section lb.8) wherein the entire primary' circulating inventory is carried out of the PCRV and is released to the atmosphere through the plant vent system. The primary coolant noble gas beta plus gamma concentration is calculated based on a short-term atmospheric dilution factor of 2.7 x 10-d sec/m3 resulting frem devndraf t of the. exhaust plume at a vind speed of 0 3 m/see during atmospheric condition F, and based on a comoined total external beta plus whole body ga==a dose of 8.6 rem at the exclusion area boundary (EAB).
- Exclusion Area 3oundary L_
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- Fu.i. St. Vrain #1 Amendment 26 Page 4.2-11
..j Soecification LCO 4.2.9 - PCRV Closure Leakace. Limitine Conditions for Oceration a) When operating under paragraph 4.2.7.c. of LCO A.2.7, the total helium' leakage through all primary closure seals in any penetration group I through VIII shall not exceed an equivalent leak rate of 400 pounds per day at a differential pressure of 10 psi.
The total helium leakage through all l
secondary closure seals shall not exceed an equivalent leak rate. of 400 pounds per day at a differential pressure of 688 psi.
b) When operating under paragraph 4.2.7.d. of LCO A.2.7, the total helium leakage through all the primary closure seals l
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.m in any penetration group I, II, V, VI, VII, or VIII shall l
not exceed an equivalent leak rate of 400 pounds per day at a differential pressure of 10 psi.
.l The total helium leakage through all the primary. closure seals in steam generator penetration groiaps III and IV combined, which may be operated below primary coolant pressure, but above cold reheat steam pressure, shall not result in the release of greater than I.a curies per day.
These potential radioactive gas releases shall be monitored by the condenser air ejector monitor channel 31193. When either or both of.tsam generator interscace groues III and IV are being maintainec below primary coolant oressure, and the concenser air ejector monitor becomes incoeracie, effluent releases via tnis pathway may continue for up to
Fort 3c. Vrain 01 Amendment 26 Page 4.2-11a 30 days, provided grab samples are taken at least once per eight hours and these samples are analy:ed for noble gas gross activity within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. When determining tne curie per day leak rate, the flow rate of the condenser air efectors shall be assumed to be at its maximum capacity of 15 cfm for each of the operating, ejectors. Additionally, whenever either or both steam generator interspace groups III and IV are raintained below primary coolant
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pressure, the penetration shall be monitored 'for gross activity by the corresponding activity monitor 2263 or 2264 An unexplained increase in gross activity of greater than 257. shall be cause to determine the leak tightness of the primary closure seals. Should activity monitor 2263 or 2264 become inoperable while the corre'sponding loop steam generator penetration interspace is being operated below primary coolant pressure, then grab samples will be taken once every eight (8) hours and analyzed with,in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The equivalent leak rate in group III or IV shall not exceed 400 pounds per day'at a differential pressu,re of 10 psi in the absence of an interscace gas leak pathway to the rehea:
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steam system or 700 pounds per day with an interspace gas leak pathway to the reheat steam system.
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Fort St. Vrain 01 Amendment 26, Page 4.2-11b Basis for Scecification LCO 4.2.9 Penetration closure interspace volumes are normally maintained at a pressure greater than the primary coolant pressure by supplying them with clean helium from either the high pressure helium storage tanks or from the helium purification system; therefore, any leakage through either the primary or secondary closure seals will be clean helium.
The norm.al gas. supply to all the penetration closure interspaces is from the helium purification system and is continuously monitored for flow - so that an increase in closure leakage can be sensed and al a rmed. The penetration closure interspaces are supplied with pressurizing gas in groups through the arrangement of the purified
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helium piping. The grouping of the penetrations,is as follows:
Group I:
All penetrations in the top head of the PCRV (37 - control red drive, 2 - high temperature filter-adsorcer, and 1 - top access).
Group II:
All instrument penetrations (20) plus the bottom access penetration.
Grouc III:
The six steam generator penetrations, Loop I'.
Group IV:
The six stear generator penetrations, Loop II.
Group V-VIII:
Each helium circulator penetration.
To prevent the possible loss of all helium coolan by way of the helium purification system due to a complete failure of a secondary
- closure, the piping supplying pressurizing gas to the failed closure is automatically isolated if the pressuri:ation gas flow exceecs 275 :ouncs cer hour.
. ort St. Vrain #1 Amendment 26 Page 4.2-12 The leakage rate limitations for the primary closures are based on a differential pressure of 688 psi, which would be the differential pressure across a primary closure in the event a secondary closure should fail.
The calculated permissible leakage rate across the primary I
closure would be well in excess of 1145' pounds per hour at a differential pressure of 688 psi.
Converting the 1145 pounds per hour leakage. rate to normal operating conditions of 10 psi differential pressure incicates an operating limiting leakage rate of 400 pounds per cay, or 16.7 pounds per hour. This leakage flow can l
reacily be detected on the pressurizing ga's flow indicator.
It is 1
assumed that under these conditions, the entire inventory of primary coolant would leak
.nrough the primary clos,ure.
(The associated l
activity release W' J.d be similar to that release resulting from the in 5'ction 14.8 of the maximum credible accident (MCA) discussed e
FSAR.) Assuming the design primary coolant activity, and assuming - a
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dilution factor of 2.7 x 10 sec/m, the resultant dose is at least an order of magnitude less than the limits of 10 C:R 200 at the exclusion area boundary.
Because of a potential leak pathway of steam generator penetration interspace gas to the reheat steam system within a steam generator penetration, the steam generator penetrations may be operated below primary coolant pressure but above cold reheat steam pressure.
Cold reheat steam pressure varies with piant load, but will be at least 50 psi below primary coolant oressure.
When coertting in-thig.coce, tnere exists a potential effluent pathway of e
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Fort St. Vrain #1 Amendment 26 Page 4.2-12a prin.ary coolant leakage across the primary closure and into the The helium, plus primarily noble gases, would reheat steam system.
be removed by the condenser air ejector and exhausted out the plant stack.
The release of noble gases via this effluent pathway shall be limited to 10*.' of the design objective fo-the plant's radioactive as stated in the $ asis for gas releases of 4160 curies per year Specification LCO 4.8.1.
This equates to 1.4 curies per day based upon a plant capacity. factor of 0.3 (292 days oceration per year).
The quantity of primary coolant leakage to stay within this limit will vary with the magnitude of circulating activity. At design circulating activity, about 0.6 pounds per day could leak via this leakage path.
At circulating activity levels at which the plant has operated to date, about 60 pounds per day leakage could occur.
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Therefore, this activity release limit imposes a much more stringent leak tightness of the primary closures than 400 pounds per cay at The condenser air ejector radiation 10 psi di'ferential pressure.
monitor has a lower level of detectability, about 1/100-of the stated release limit.
Therefore, monitoring of any releases is assured, which in turn provides an adequate check on the integrity of primary closures.
Monitoring of the interspace gas with activity monitors 2263 and 2261 provides a check of the primary ' closure leak is not accomoanied tightness in the event a primary closure leaks but by a leak path into the reheat steam system.
Seconcary seal leakage curing normal oceration is leakage of clean helium. The secondary seal leakage is limitec to 400 councs a. tne normai ocerating differential pressure of c2S csi :o per cay
k Fort St. Vrain 01 Amendment 26 Page 4.2 12b 1
assure compliance with LCO 4.2.7, which specifies pressuri:ation of
- the penetration interspaces, except the steam generator penetration-interspaces, to a pressure greater than primary system pressure.
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7.5-8 event. A copy of the written report shall a' Iso be sent to the Document Control Desk, U. S. fluclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555.
The written report shall include, as a mini =um, a completed copy of a licensee event report form. Information provided on the licensee event report form shall be supplemented, as needed, by additional narrative material to provide complete explanation of the circumstances surrounding the event.
1.
Reactor protection system or engineered safety feature instrument settings which are found to be less conserva-tive than those established by the Technical Specifications, but which do not prevent the fulfillment of the functional requirements of affected systems.
2.
Conditions leading to operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation or plant shutdown required by a limiting condition for
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operation.
Note: Routine surveillance testing, instrument calibration, or _
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preventative maintenance which require system configura-- -
tions, as described in items b.1. and b.2.,need not be reported except where test results themselves reveal a degraded mode as described above.
3.
OEserved inadequacies in the imple. mentation of administrative or procedural controls which threaten to cause reduction of degree of redundancy provided in reactor protection systems or engineered safety feature systems.
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