ML20041G336
| ML20041G336 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07109135 |
| Issue date: | 03/04/1982 |
| From: | Richardson H NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041G335 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8203220090 | |
| Download: ML20041G336 (100) | |
Text
i APPLICATION For NRC CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE Authorizing SHIPMENT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL in GAMMA INDUSTRIES RADIOGRAPHY EXPOSURE DEVICES 1.
MODEL CENTURY S 3.
MODEL CENTURY UNIVERSAL S 2.
MODEL CENTURY SA 4.
MODEL CENTURY UNIVERSAL SA as t
TYPE B SHIPPING CONTAINERS O
March 4, 1982 i
GAMMA INDUSTRIES Division of Nuclear Systems, Inc.
P. O.
Box 2543 2255 Ted Dunham Avenue Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70821
[
/s Harrh.Richahdson, President Nuclear Systems, Inc.
l O
8203220090 820304 PDR ADOCK 07109gg C_
l TABLE OF CONTENTS g
b Page f
Chapter 0.0 GENERAL INFORMATION 0.1 l
0.1 Introduction 0.1 I
0.2 Package Description 0.2 1
0.2.1 Packaging [10 CFR 71.223 0.3 0.2.2 Features of Century Models O.4 0.2.3 Contents of Package 0.5 0.2.3.1 Drawings and Specifications 0.6 ll Chapter 1.0 STRUCTURAL EVALUATION 1.1 1.1 Structural Design 1.1 1.1.1 Discussion 1.1 1.1.2 Design Criteria 1.1 1.2 Weights and Centers of Gravity 1.2 1.3 Mechanical Properties of Materials 1.2 s/
1.4 General Standards for Packaging i
[10 CFR 71.31]
1.3 1.4.1 Chemical and Galvanic Reactions
[10 CFR 71.31(a)]
1.3 1.4.2 Positive Closure
[10 CFR 71.31(b)]
1.3 1.4.3 Lifting Devices
[10 CFR 71.31(c)]
1.3 1.4.4 Tie Down Devices
[10 CFR 71.31(d)]
1.3 1.5 Standards for Type B Packages l
[10 CFR 71.32]
1.4 i
1.5.1 Load Resistance
[10 CFR 71.32(a)]
1.4 1.5.2 External Pressure
[10 CFR 71.32(b)]
1.5 1.6 Normal Conditions of Transport
[10 CFR 71.35]
1.5 1.6.1 Heat 1.6 1.6.2 Cold 1.6 l
1.6.3 Pressure 1.6 1.6.4 Vibration 1.6 1.6.5 Water Spray 1.6
(",')
i
l Page 1.6.6 Free Drop 1.6 1.6.7 Corner Drop 1.6 1.6.8 Penetration 1.6 1.6.9 Compression 1.6 l
1.7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions
[10 CFR 71 Appendix B]
1.7 Chapter 2.0 THERMAL EVALUATION OF CENTURY MODELS 2.1 e
2.1 Discussion 2.1 Chapter 3.0 CONTAINMENT 3.1 3.1 Containment Boundary 3.1 3.1.1 Containment Vessel 3.1 3.1.2 Containment Penetrations 3.1 t
3.1.3 Seals and Welds 3.1 3.1.4 Closure 3.1 t
3.2 Requirements for Normal Conditions of Transport 3.1 O
3.2.1 Release of Radioactive Material 3.2 3.2.2 Pressurization of Containment Vessel 3.2 3.2.3 Coolant Contaminant 3.2 3.2.4 Coolant Loss 3.3 3.3 Containment Requirements for the Hypothetical Accident Conditions 3.3 3.3.1 Fission Gas Products 3.4 3.3.2 Release of Contents 3.4 Chapter 4.0 SHIELDING EVALUATION 4.1 4.1 Discussion and Results 4.1 4.2 Source Specification 4.1 4.2.1 Gamma Source 4.1 4.2.2 Neutron Source 4.1 4.3 Model Specification 4.1 4.3.1 Description of the Radial and Axial Shielding Configuration 4.1 4.3.2 Shield Regional Densities 4.2 4.4 Shielding Evaluation 4.2 I
?
l
Page Chapter
5.0 CRITICALITY EVALUATION
5.1 Chapter 6.0 OPERATING PROCEDURES 6.1 6.1 Procedure for Loading the Package 6.1 6.1.1 Factory Loading 6.1 6.1.2 User Source Exchange 6.1 6.2 Procedure for Unloading the Package 6.2 6.2.1 Factory Unloading 6.2 6.2.2 User Source Exchange 6.2 6.3 Preparation of an Empty Package for Transport 6.2 6.4 Shipping the Package 6.2 6.5 Periodic Inspection and Maintenance Procedures 6.2 6.5.1 General 6.3 6.5.2 Safety Cap 6.3 6.5.3 Outlet Nipple 6.3 1
6.5.4 Lock Plunger 6.3
{
6.5.5 Labeling 6.4 Chapter 7.0 ACCEPTANCE TESTS AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS 7.1 7.1 Acceptance Tests 7.1 7.1.1 Visual Tests 7.1 7.1.2 Structural and Pressure Tests 7.1 7.1.3 Leak Testing 7.1 7.1.4 Component Tests 7.1 7.1.4.1 Valves, Rupture Discs and Fluid Transport Devices 7.2 7.1.4.2 Gaskets 7.2 7.1.4.3 Miscellaneous 7.2 7.1.5 Test for Shielding Integrity 7.2 7.1.6 Thermal Acceptance Tests 7.2 7.1.6.1 Discussion of Test Setup 7.2 7.1.6.2 Test Procedure 7.2 7.1.6.3 Acceptance Criteria 7.2 7.2 Maintenance Program 7.2 7.2.1 Structural and Pressure Tests 7.3 7.2.2 Leak Tests 7.3 7.2.3 Subsystems Maintenance 7.3 7.2.4 Valves, Rupture Discs, Gaskets 7.3
(~-)
I I
l Page i
C) i 7.2.5 Shielding 7.3 i
7.2.6 Thermal 7.3 7.2.7 Miscellaneous 7.3 7.3 Testing Protocol 7.3 7.3.1 Testing and Results Discussion 7.3
~.3.2 Performance Testing of Devices i
as Type B Packages 7.4 7.3.2.1 Performance Tests, Normal Conditions of r
Transport
[10 CFR 71 Appendix A]
7.4 7.3.2.2 Hypothetical Accident Conditions 7.5 7.3.3 Tests for Special Form Licensed Material 7.6 Chapter 8.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE 8.1 8.1 Establishment and Maintenance of a Quality Assurance Program
[10 CFR 71.51]
8.1
()
APPENDIX A----------Photographs APPENDIX B----------Tables of Selected Data APPENDIX C----------Drawings and Bill of Materials APPENDIX D----------Source Capsule Designs and Regulatory Approvals APPENDIX E----------Stress Analysis APPENDIX F----------Source Changing Instructions i
9 I
1 I
L r
l APPLICATION for NRC CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE authorizing SHIPMENT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL in GAMMA INDUSTRIES RADIOGRAPHY EXPOSURE DEVICES 1.
MODEL CENTURY S 3.
MODEL CENTURY UNIVERSAL S 2.
MODEL CENTURY SA 4.
MODEL CENTURY UNIVERSAL SA as TYPE B SHIPPING CONTAINERS Chapter O O.0 GENERAL INFORMATION O.1 Introduction This Application has been prepared in accord with the LICENdING GUIDE FOR TYPE B, LARGE QUANTITY, AND FISSILE MATERIAL SHIPPING CONTAINERS in accord with instructions from Mr. Charles MacDonald.
Chapter and section numbers and names correspond to those in the Guide except where changes would improve presentation.
Gamma Industries manufactures a variety of shipping containers and radioactive sources.
Devices identified as (1)
Mcdel Century S, (2) Model Century SA, (3) Model Century Universal S, and (4) Model Century Universal SA have been designed by Gamma Industries for radiation exposures required for radio-graphic nondestructive testing.
These devices also have been designed and fabricated as Type B Packages to permit shipping encapsulated radioactive materials.
Gamma emitting radioisotope sources, such as Iridium-192, are most commonly used in these units.
Radioactive material would be contained within capsules designed and tested as Special Form Material.
These Models are similar in construction and operation with the exceptions of the lock boxes which are described in Section 0.2.
-0.1-v
0.2 Package Description All devices presented in this report are similar.
They are comprised of common major items (please refer to Drawings 821-1001-439A and 821-1001-441A, pages C.1 and C.2.):
1.
Depleted uranium shielding containing an "S" tube.
2.
Steel cylindrical casing.
3.
Cellular polyurethane foam to fill cavity between the casing and uranium.
4.
Lock box assembly.
5.
Handle.
6.
Nameplate.
Nominal weight of the package in the proper shipping configuration is 45 pounds.
"S" tube is located within the shield. This tube prevents abrasion of uranium and spreading uranium contamination.
It also serves as a guide path for the control cable to selectively move the source assembly between the shielded and exposed positions.
One end of the S-tube terminates within a lock box having the primary function to retain the source assembly in a secure and safely shielded position when not required for gamma exposures.
The other end of the S-tube
(~T terminates at an outlet nipple.
This nipple serves as a receptacle
(_)
for attaching a source guide tube.
As thrust forces from the control cable move the source assembly between the shielded and exposed locations, the source tube serves to retain the source within a confined and predetermined region.
Each end of the S-tube can De " capped" when the unit is not being used for radiography.
A lock box safety cap covers the source assembly and prevents dirt or other foreign material entering the lock box.
A safety plug assembly attached to the outlet nipple prevents moving the source assembly forward from the shielded location in the event the lock plunger is released from the secured position.
Also, the safety plug assembly prevents dirt or other foreign matter entering the S-tube.
Polyurethane cellular foam serves to (1) prevent moisture from reaching the uranium and (2) provide a cushion effect from impact loads imposed upon the devices.
Models for radiography referenced in this document have been designed for minimum weight that provides adequate shielding permitting easy movement during operations and shipping.
These units are equipped with a handle constructed of one inch steel pipe.
Selected specifications are contained in Table 1, Appendix B.
%J
-0.2-u
Nameplates are made of etched stainless steel.
Manufactur-()
ing data are steel stenciled into the stainless steel.
A photograph (T-7, Appendix A, page A.7) attests these nameplates are legible after the fire test.
Two lock box arrangements identify differences in the Models:
1.
Model numbers which do not contain the suffix "A"
have a lock box with features:
a.
The source assembly can be retained by a plunger lock in a position for security and shielding the radioactive material.
b.
The source assembly cannot be removed from the back of the lock box.
2.
Model numbers containing the suffix "A" have a lock box with features:
a.
The source assembly can be retained by a plunger lock in a position for security and shielding the radioactive material.
b.
The source assembly cannot be removed from the back of the lock box.
c.
The lock plunger will release the source assembly ONLY after the source assembly is properly attached to the control cable.
d.
The lock plunger can be depressed ONLY when (s^)g the source assembly is in a position for properly securing and shielding the radio-active material.
0.2.1 Packaging [10 CFR 71.22]
(a)
With Respect to the Packaging (1)
Gross Weight - Re:
Table 1, Appendix B.
(2)
Model Number - Re:
Table 1, Appendix B.
(3)
Specific Materials - Re:
Bills of Materials and Drawings in Appendix C.
Generally described, a mild steel cylinder contains and protects the depleted uranium shield.
Structural members hold the uranium in proper location relative to the lock box and outlet nipple.
Steel components are welded in place to form a solid unit.
The brass lock box is attached to the unitized steel body with stain-less steel mounting bolts.
(i)
Receptacles - The containment vessels for retaining the radioactive materials are in accord with the capsule drawings, Appendix D.
These configurations conform to "special form" designation.
During transportation, 7,
LJ
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the capsule, as a component of the source
()
assembly, would be fixed by the lock box assembly in a secure and shielded position within the "S tube" inside the depleted i
uranium casting.
i (ii)
Not Applicable (NA)
(iii)
Internal and external structures supporting 4
or protecting receptacles are delineated in drawings 821-1001-439A and 821-1001-441A.
(iv)
No valves or sampling ports are involved in l
these devices.
A lifting device and tie down device is provided in the form of a welded steel handle, shown in the drawings (Item 11).
(v)
NA l
(b)
With respect to the contents of the package:
(1)
Identification and design maximum radioactivity
[
of radioactive constituents.
(Re:
Table 1, Appendix B.)
(2)
NA i
(3)
Chemical and physical form:
Metallic Iridium-192 l
and other Beta-Gamma emitters in special form sncapsulation.
(4)
NA l
(5)
Maximum weight is a small fraction of an ounce.
l (6)
Maximum amount of decay heat is low enough to be i
p-)
insignificant.
s.
O.2.2 Features of Century Models These devices are uranium-shielded industrial i
radiography devices for the making of panoramic and similar exposures with Iridium-192.
The units are distinguished by the following features:
(a)
Capacity These have been designed for 100 Ci Ir-192 nominal capacity or 120 Ci Ir-192 maximum capacity, (Table 2, Appendix B).
Other Beta-Gamma emitters may be used with activity limited to that which will not exceed radiation profiles specified in Hazardous Materials Regulations of the U.
S.
Department of Transportation (Part 173.393).
(b)
Remote Control Positive mechanical control of the source is provided by a control assembly and matching source guide tube.
No external power supply is required.
(c)
Mobility The devices are compact and entirely self-contained.
They are easily carried by one person.
The handle on the shield housing permits crane lifting and tie down for shipping.
i l
-0.4-
(d)
Construction
(~'
Drawings number 821-1001-439A and 821-1001-441A show cross-sectional views with the source in the shielded position, the depleted uranium metal shield, the steel case and end plates with provi-sions for crane handling, the outlet nipple, and the lock box.
Polyurethane foam envelopes the shield and fills the cavity within the steel shell.
The polyurethane foam protects the uranium from moisture and provides a protective cushion against impact loads.
The carefully engineered simplicity of construction and skilled workmanship minimize maintenance.
(e)
Safety Features A lock plunger depressed upon the source assembly assures that the source assembly cannot be inadver-l tently moved from the shielded position.
A safety plug in the outlet nipple and a safety cap in the lock box assure the security of the source when not in use.
The source cannot be withdrawn backward from the exposure devices through the lock box even when the lock is open.
The Type A lock box prevents opening the lock when the source assembly is not attached to the control cable.
In the Type A, the O.
lock plunger can be depressed into a locked position only when the source assembly is in a secure position.
(f)
Model Differences The Century Universal Models S and SA differ from the standard Century Models S and SA only in the reversed locations of lock box and outlet nipple.
Internal construction and operation is otherwise identical.
The Century Universal Models allow use of the device for special applications involving physical geometric constraints at certain job sites.
I i
0.2.3 Contents of Package i
Sealed radioactive material (Iridium-192, and other Beta-Gamma emitters) will be used or transported in the Century or Universal S or SA.
Radioactive materials will be contained within capsules fabricated from Series 300 stainless steel.
Quantities to be used are presented on Table 1, Appendix B.
i l
No fissile material is involved.
l No significant decay heat could exist in these devices.
(~~)
t
\\-
No pressure buildup will occur.
l
-0.5-I l
l l
\\
l
\\
v
Acceptance discussions are presented in Chapter 7.0.
j Loading restrictions for these devices are presented on Table 1, Appendix B.
0.2.3.1 Drawings and Specifications In Appendix D is a selection of items from the Sources and Devices Catalog which were prepared and approved by the appropriate government regulatory agency.
Also included is a selection of source capsule drawings which are representative of source " containments" manufactured by Gamma Industries.
Representative samples of all of these have been tested in accord with requirements for Special Form Materials.
All samples successfully met all test condi-tions imposed as described in Chapter 7.
The capsules listed below are representative of those used by Gamma Industries in Century Model devices.
Source Designs Tested for Designation SPECIAL FORM RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Capsule s
Model No.
Drawing No.
A-X-G 607-8001-001 A-X-A 607-8001-002 Single Encapsulation 602-7001-006 Double Encapsulation 602-7001-007 Single Encapsulation Sideweld 602-7001-008 These capsule designs have been used for many years.
Thousands of sources have been manufactured with radio-activity in specified sources as low as millicurie quantities and others having activity exceeding a kilocurie.
They have successfully contained radioactive materials in many environ-ments.
There are no data known to Gamma Industries which indicate that capsules manufactured in accord with these designs have caused (or would be likely to cause) difficulties in transportation modes.
O
-0.6-
Chapter 1 1.0 STRUCTURAL dVALUATION
[10 CFR 71.23]
1.1 Structural Design 1.1.1 Discussion These devices have been used for many years.
Even though no significant difficulties have been reported by licensed users, minor changes have been made in their structures.
Radioactivity is contained within capsules as the primary protection against release of contamination.
Source assemblies are made from 300 series stainless steel.
Descriptions of these are on selected Sources and Devices Catalog sheets as evaluated by appropriate regulatory agencies (Appendix D).
These capsules and contents have been designed to qualify as "special form" radioactive materials.
Secondary protection
~
against gamma radiation is provided by the depleted uranium castings rigidly supported within these devices.
During operations and transportation, the capsule source assembly is adequately secured in the proper shield location by the lock box assembly.
There are no incidents related to transportation
/'k-]
which have been reported to Gamma Industries to indicate fail-ures have occurred in existing configurations.
While no difficulties have been experienced, it is presumed that a sufficiently intense impact upon the lock box could cause shearing or tensile rupture of bolts which secure the lock box to the cylindrical housing.
If this were to occur, the source could be moved from its optimum shielded location.
Subsequent material presents information concerned with design criteria and performance standards which assure these devices satisfy 10 CFR 71 Subpart C--Package Standards.
1.1.2 Design Criteria The major design criterion was to establish structural capability and fabrication techniques that would assure safe conditions during operations and transportation of specified quantities of special form radioactive materials.
The main purpose of qualifying these devices as Type B Packages is to assure that in hypothetical accident conditions during trans-portation there would be little likelihood of (1) release of radioactive materials into uncontrolled environments nor (2) release of undesirably high intensity beams of gamma radiation.
(s-
-1.1-
Significant areas of concern in the prescribed tests are:
O' 1.
Tests upon or analyses of these devices:
Impact from 30 foot drop 6 (analysis) a.
b.
Thermal exposure at 1475 F.
(analysis) c.
Penetration when dropped 40 inches upon a steel pin. (test) 2.
Tests upon capsules a.
Thermal exposure at 1475 F.
b.
Crushing by dropping a 3 pound weight upon the capsule through a 40 inch distance.
c.
Leak tests.
These devices have irregular configurations.
Dropping these devices upon unyielding surfaces would cause stresses which would be very difficult (probably impossible) to predict because of the lack of uniformity.
Due to limited internal space, it was not anticipated that the uranium casting could move a distance sufficient to cause significant changes in the external gamma radiation intensity.
The capsule is held within the casting S-tube in such position that no stresses could bear upon the capsule.
To verify this, an analysis has been made of Century Model SA as though it had been dropped.
Refer to the analysis which was prepared by Professor Dale R. Carver, P.E.,
Ph.D.,
Louisiana State r
University, Appendix E.
\\
1.2 Weights and Centers of Gravity Weights of each device are shown on Table 1, Appendix B.
Each device has its center of gravity approximately at the geometric center of the steel housing.
Ret Appendix C, Drawings No. 821-1001-439A and 821-1001-441A.
1.3 Mechanical Properties of Materials (Note--Refer to Bill of Materials on Drawings No. 821-1001-439A and 821-1001-441A for material specifications.)
a.
Stainless steel items are fabricated from those in the 300 series.
b.
All steel parts providing structural support would be classed as mild steel.
c.
Brass parts have been specified to have melting temperatures exceeding 1,500 F.
(Note--There are no exotic environments anticipated for these devices.
Therefore, materials which are readily available have been selected with the major criteria to
(~)'
withstand conditions of industrial plant and common carrier
\\-
environments.)
-1.2-t.
1.4 General Standards for Packaging (3)
[10 CFR 71.31]
1.4.1 Chemical and Galvanic Reactions [10 CFR 71.31(a)]
These devices have been designed and constructed of such materials that there will be no significant chemical, galvanic, or other reaction between packaging components or between packag-ing components and the package contents.
(Re Page 2.1 for list of materials and drawings in Appendix C for detailed specifications.)
1.4.2 Positive Closure [10 CFR 71.31(b)]
These devices have been equipped with a lock box assembly which provides a positive closure upon the locking ball of the source assembly.
A key operated plunger lock prevents inadvertent release of the source assembly from its locked position.
1.4.3 Lifting Devices [10 CFR 71.31(c)]
(1)
A lifting handle has been provided on these devices.
They have been designed so that there is capability
{N, to support three times the weight of the loaded s/
device without generating stress in any material of the package in excess of its yield strength.
(2)
NA [10 CFR 71.31(2)]
(3)
NA [10 CFR 71.31(3)]
(4)
Lifting Device Failure [10 CFR 71.31(4)] Failure of the lifting handle would not impair containment or shielding properties of the device.
1.4.4 Tie Down Devices [10 CFR 71.31(d)]
(1)
The handle could be used as a tie-down device.
It is fabricated from a piece of one inch diameter pipe attached to the steel housing by fusion welding to bars which are one inch wide and 1/4 inch thick.
(Re:
Dwg. No. 821-1001-439A and 821-1 Cat-441A.)
Stress generated from the hypo-thetical loading is estimated as follows:
(a)
Maximum weight = 45 lbs.
(b)
Vertical component (V) = 2 x 45 = 90 lbs.
(c)
Horizontal component (H) = 10 x 45 = 450 lbs.
(d)
Transverse component (T) = 5 x 45 = 225 lbs.
-1.3-
Vector sum of components:
7, L = NV
+ 11
+T
= 'd902 + 4502 + 2252
= 511 lbs.
Maximum Load Only one 1-inch by 1/4-inch bar will be assumed to carry the entire 511 pound load.
The resultant stress will be P
511 lbs.
lbs.
,044 S = g = 1" x 0.25"
=
2 in CONCLUSION Since mild steel has a yield strength approximately 60 Kips, the 2,044 lb/in stress would not be a sig-nificant hazard.
(2)
NA (3)
Failure of this tie-down (handle) is not likely to occur under the hypothetical accident conditions.
Failure of the handle would not impair the ability of the Century to meet containment or shielding requirements.
1.5 Standards for Type B Packages
[10 CFR 71.32]
1.5.1 Load Resistance [10 CFR 71.32(a)]
The device, regarded as a simple beam supported at its ends along any major axis, will withstand a static load, normal to and uniformly distributed along its length, equal to five times its fully loaded weight, without generating stress in any material of the packaging in excess of its yield strength.
A test was performed by having two persons weighing approximately 400 pounds stand on the Century while it was lying on a concrete slab.
Photo T-18 in Appendix A depicts this with the cylindrical axis vertically oriented.
Photo T-17 in Appendix A depicts this with the cylindrical
()
axis horizontally oriented.
The Century, fully loaded, weighs approximately 45 pounds.
-1.4-
Weight of Man, Pounds 400
(}
Weight of Century, Pounds " 45- " O*9 Results--A weight of 8.9 was used in the test compared to a weight ratio of 5 required.
No damage could be observed.
This test indicates the Century structure will withstand the conditions prescribed in 10 CFR 71.32(a).
't 1.5.2 External Pressure [10 CFR 71.32(b)]
The devices are vented to the atmosphere through openings around each end of the S-tube.
Decomposition products from the polyurethane can readily escape and avoid pressure increases in the housing.
The openings permit gas flow into or out of the casing and prevent exedssive internal or external pressure.
Never theles s, a 3/4 inch diameter vent hole, located behind the stainless steel nameplate, has been provided as a positive pressure relief feature.
1.6 Normal Conditions of Transport
[10 CFR 71.35]
O (a)
These devices have been designed and fabricated to acceptably contain radioactive materials and shield gamma radiation during transport.
Performance analyses and tests and results are included in Chapter 7.0.
During transportation and performance testing, it is anticipated that:
(1)
There will be no release of radioactive material from the containment vessel (capsule).
(2)
The effectiveness of the package will not be substantially reduced.
(3)
There will be no mixture of gases or vapors in j
the package which could, through any credible increase of pressure or an explosion, signifi-cantly reduce the effectiveness of the package.
(4)
NA (5)
NA (b)
NA (c)
The containment vessel (radioisotope capsule) is not anticipated to be vented directly to the atmosphere under conditions specified in Appendix A, 10 CFR 71.
Ov
-1.5-w
1.6.1 Heat O
Refer to Chapter 2.0 for a thermal evaluation of these devices.
1.6.2 Cold No liquids or gases are involved so phase changes would not occur nor have any effect.
1.6.3 Pressure Refer to Section 7.3.2.1 for effects of 0.5 atmosphere external pressure.
The capsules were subjected to 25 inches mercury vacuum and helium leak tests.
No adverse effects were observed.
1.6.4 Vibration Refer to Section 7.3.2.1 for discussion of vibration.
1.6.5 Water Spray Water spray would have no effect upon these devices.
1.6.6 Free Drop NA--More severe 30 foot drop required by 10 CFR 71, Appendix B.
Re Section 7.3.2.2.
1.6.7 Corner Drop NA 1.6.8 Penetration NA--More severe test analyzed in accord with 10 CFR 71, Appendix B, paragraph 2.
Re:
Section 7.3.2.2.
1.6.9 Compression Refer to 1.5.1 for stress and calculated margin of safety as substitute for physical test.
Also, re:
7.3.2.1.
m
-1.6-us-
1.7 Ilypothetical Accident Conditions j
[,10 CFR 71 Appendix B]
Re:
Chapter 7.0, Section 7.3.2.2.
O O
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h Chapter 2
\\_/
2.0 THERMAL EVALUATION OF MODEL CENTURY S, CENTURY SA, CENTURY UNIVERSAL S, AND CENTURY UNIVERSAL SA.
l 2.1 Discussion No fire tests have been performed on completed expo-
[
sure devices, source changers, transport packages and similar l
equipment manufactured by Gamma Industries which are fabricated from mild steel or stainless steel housings and using depleted I
uranium as the radiation shield.
The reasons for omitting this
[
test are:
i 1.
No adverse thermal effects on Gamma Industries' transport f
packages will occur under normal transportation condi-tions or hypothetical accident conditions.
l 2.
All materials of construction that would be related to i
safety and radiation shielding have melting temperatures
[
above the 1475 (804 C) prescribed in 10 CFR 71, as shcIn in the following table:
i MATERIAL MELTING TEMPERATURE (1)
Depleted Uranium 1133 C 2071 F (2)
Zircaloy 2 1843 C 3350 F
[
(3)
Titanium 1668 C 3035 F i
(4)
Brass 1005 C 1841 F I
(5)
Steel 1345 C 2453 F 3.
Polyurethane cellular foam is used to fill spaces between the depleted uranium and the steel shell on many devices manufactured by Gamma Industries.
In the event an intense fire occurs, this material would be expected to decompose.
Space around the "S" tube at the lock box i
and outlet nipple would permit gases to escape.
Also, a 3/4" diameter hole is drilled through the shell and r
covered by the name plate.
Re:
Dwg. 821-1001-439A and 821-1001-441A.
This will prevent increasing internal pressures which might affect the structure and position l
of the depleted uranium shield.
4.
Reports in the literature indicate formation of a 1340 F t
iron-uranium eutectic under certain conditions.
These conditions have been reported as (1) metallurgically clean contact surfaces and (2) being heated within a
- vacuum, i
These special conditions do not exist in the fabrication of Gamma Industries' devices.
The uranium is in an "as cast" form
()
or " machined surfaces."
Iron surfaces contacting the uranium are
-2.1-w
"as hot rolled surfaces," are "as cast, " or " machined."
No 7s(_)
special cleaning has been used nor deemed necessary on any of the contact surfaces.
Tests were made to determine if the eutectic could be demonstrated in the Gamma Industries' laboratory.
Photo T-ll shows (1) a cylinder of uranium containing a pressed steel insert used as a source capsule receptacle, (2) a mild steel disc, and (3) a stainless steel disc.
Each of these three items has a hole drilled through its center.
A bolt and nut were used to hold the three items in contact.
This assembly was placed into an electric furnace at a temperature of 1475 F.
This temperature was sustained for 30 minutes.
Slow cooling was permitted in air.
Photo T-12 indicates black powdery oxide was formed.
After cleaning, Photo T-13 indicates there was no significant dimen-sional change.
No indication of melting or deformation of any kind could be seen.
Communications with Mr. John Powers, Nuclear Metals, Inc.,
confirms that similar experiments have been performed within their facilities with results similar to those observed by Gamma Industries.
Nameplates are made of etched stainless steel.
Photo T-7 ghows nameplates after being subjected to a furnace heated to 1475 F for a 30 minute period.
The data remain legible after O~-
the test, even though the colored pigments have been burned.
Nameplates are attached to the shell with screws or rivets which have melting temperatures above 1475 F.
Thermal tests at 1475 F will not affect the lock box assembly, lock plunger, or the outlet nipple, since all compo-nents have melting temperatures above 1475 F (Photo T-8, Photo T-9, and Photo T-10).
In the event spring temper is impaired, the lock plunger would remain in the locked (down) position and retain the locking ball on the source assembly in its properly secured position.
Special form capsules were subjected to temperatures up to 1550 F for one hour; no adverse effects were noted (Photo T-6).
Using the foregoing data and tests as related to devices that might be used as transport packages for special form radio-active materials, Gamma Industries concludes that its designs and fabrication techniques will satisfactorily meet thermal require-ments of 10 CFR 71, Appendix B, Paragraph 3.
(~\\
U
-2.2-a _., _ _ _ _
= - _ _
i i
Chapter 3 g-V 3.0 CONTAINMENT 3.1 Containment Boundary j
Containment is accomplished by capsules which are an integral part of the source assembly.
Capsules have been designed to conform to requirements for designation as special form radioactive materials.
Descriptions, tests, photographs, and drawings of many capsules are presented in Chapter 7, Appundix A and Appendix D.
The source assemblies use capsules for containn.ent as described in Appendix D.
3.1.1 Containment Vessel Section 0.2.3 presents design details of the capsules (or containment vessel).
3.1.2 Containment Penetrations There are no containment penetrations in these devices.
O 3.1.3 Seals and Welds Drawings present welding locations on the capsule.
Capsule materials used are selected from series 300 stainless steel (re:
Section 0.2.3 and Appendix D).
3.1.4 Closure Closure of the capsule is accomplished by welding.
Inert gas enshrouds a high frequency tungsten arc during the preheating, welding and cooling phases.
Close tolerances and good machined surfaces forego requirements for filler metal.
No bolts are used on the closure.
3.2 Requirements for Normal Conditions of Transport Discussions in Chapter 1, Section 1.6 and Chapter 7, Section 7,3, verify that the containment vessel within these devices meets all requirements of 10 CFR 71, Appendix A.
-3.1-
3.2.1 Release of Radioactive Material Re:
Chapter 7.
3.2.2 Pressurization of Containment Vessel There is no explosive mixture of vapors or gases which could form in the containment vessel since metallic iridium is probably the only substance within the capsule.
Air within the hot cell or inert gas used in the welding process might be contained within the containment vessel.
Entrapped gas could be at atmospheric pressure.
It is more reasonable to assume the very, very small quantity of gas within the containment vessel would be less than atmospheric pressure because high temperatures required during the welding process would cause gas to expand and escape.
Next, the weld would seal the vessel, entrapping residual gas molecules.
During the cooling process, according to Charles' Law, the pressure would decrease.
Using the most critical case:
1.
No explosive vapor or gas inside the vessel.
2.
One atmosphere pressure within the vessel at ambient
(~}
temperature 70 F.
(_/
3.
Maximum temgerature during normal conditions of trans-port is 130 F (10 CFR 71, Appendix A, paragraph 1).
P2 = Pressure at 130 F P
T P
1 2
2=
Py = 1 Atmosphere T 1 Ty = 70 F Ambient Temperature T2 = 130 F Test Temperature (14.7) (130 + 460) = 16.4 lb/in Maximum pressure under 2
p 2
(70 + 460) normal conditions of transport.
Pressure increase = 16.4 - 14.7 = 1.7 lb/in This pressure is not deemed to present a hazard during transportation of the special form radioactive material under normal conditions of transport.
3.2.3 Coolant contaminant
(~}
NA v
-3.2-
l 3.2.4 Coolant Loss NA 3.3 Containment Requirements for the Hypothetical Accident Conditions Containment vessels (capsules) containing radioisotopes qualify as special form radioactive materials.
The vessels i
(capsules) tested for purposes of qualifying as special form radioactive materials are described in Appendix D.
Included are selected Sources and Devices Catalog pages as prepared and approved by appropriate government agencies.
Also, some design drawings are included.
4 All capsules successfully passed all tests in accord with 10 CFR 71 Appendix B, Hypothetical Accident Conditions.
NOTE:
The Licensing Guide specifies tests according to 10 CFR 71, Appendix B, Hypothetical Ace '. dent Conditions.
The dimensions and weight of the " containment" vessels suggest that tests in 10 CFR 71 Appendix D would more severely stress the containment.
Tests actually performed to determine " containment" were:
O 1.
Free drop--30 feet on a flat essentially unyielding horizontal surface.
2.
Percussion (in lieu of puncture)--3 pound, 1 inch diameter bar dropped 40 inches onto capsule (Photo T-2, page A.3).
3.
Heating--One hour at 1500 F (Photo T-6, page A.6).
4.
Immersion--Immersion for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in water at room temperature, pH 6 - pH 8, maximum conductivity 10 micromhos per centimeter (Photo T-5, page A.5).
5.
Vacuum Test--Before and after each test (Photo T-1, page A.3).
Re:
Section 3.3.2.
SUMMARY
OF RESULTS 1.
Free drop--No damage was observed on any item.
After the free drop test, containment was proved intact by a water bubble test.
2.
Percussion--Each capsule retained an abrasion at the area impacted by the steel bar.
Model A-2-A was deformed in the open section which would be swaged upon the cable of the source assembly (Photo T-3, page A.4).
After the percussion test, containment was proved intact by a water bubble test.
3.
Thermal--Each capsule shows a thin, uniform oxide coating resulting from high temperature in s
atmosphere.
Containment was proved intact by a
-3.3-
l water bubble test.
Photo T-6 shows the results of the thermal test.
4.
Water Immersion No change was observed.
5.
Vacuum Test Re:
Section 3.3.2 below.
3.3.1 Fission Gas Products i
NA 3.3.2 Release of Contents Before tests were implemented and after each test, every capsule was subjected to a water bubble test.
A 25 inch mercury vacuum was used.
After all tests were completed, the capsules were subjected to helium leak tests.
There were no contra-indications to containment.
(Photo T-1 presents the arrangement used for the vacuum bubble test.)
A copy of the helium leak test report is shown on page 3. 5.
CONCLUSION
()
The source capsules designed, fabricated, and tested as described in this report meet the requirements to be designated as Special Form Radioactive Material.
O
-3.4-1 l
~
R & D TECHTONICS e.,.
- f HEllUM LEAK TEST REPORT t
SPeci AL f'oEM O -- c - -- - --, c 5 c,
ov, oheseu.es w3RR ORDER NUMBER DR AWING NUMBER EcusPMEN T N AME M A T E RI AL ALLOW A SLE LE A R R A T E M r C ONDITIONS
- /kL/UU hteBE kb[- E3 = /LT EQUIPMENT LEAM DET EC TOR. Ma n E AND MODEL CEf' - 2.9 - bz4A sERI AL NuMBE R R A T ED S EN 51 TIVIT Y C13G 2,2 x ja
'O RESULT 5 ST AND ARD LE AK (C C # set)
LM X]d~E
(,g')C AllB R AT ION ST AND ARD LE A K RE SPON5E (sCole deves sons)
E$$$3 $$
SYST EM sENSITIvtT V (C C /s eC /d e v)
/, 9 x lb '"
T E5'T sy sT Eu PREssuR E (Metron) hl o AC uoRouMD (Stol. Divisions)
[
all s e s T EM R C sRoNs E (5Cel. Davissens) 2 T Es t Out put (5 Cole Divisions)
O sy s T E M L E A M R A T E (C C / set)
No Acam > I. 9x 16 " "
T E S T C ONDUC T Sv WIT S
O BY DATE MAY6 1981 STANDARD LEAK N3TES: 1. SYSTEM SEN5tTivlTY =
J
- 2. TEST OUT PUT = SYSTEM RESPONSE - BACKGROUND
- 3. SYSTEM LEAK RATE = TEST OtfTPUT x SYSTEM SENSITIVITY r~g I
e
-3.5-
~~
f l
Chapter 4 4.0 SHIELDING EVALUATION 4.1 Discussion and Results
[
Depleted uranium castings provide gamma radiation shielding for these devices.
Configurations of these castings are shown on Dwgs.
821-1001-439A and 821-1001-441A.
Gamma radiation profile measurements were measured with a GI Survey Meter Model 200 using a geiger tube model LND 714.
This instrument was standardized on a calibration bench having a source calibrated using a Victoreen R Meter Model 570 and ion chamber with certificates traceable to the U.
S.
Bureau of Standards.
Gamma radiation profile data are presented on Table 2, Appendix B.
These data are within criteria established for Type B packages.
r 4.2 Source Specification Iridium-192 sources prepared as special form radioactive material were used for gamma emitters when measuring the profile data.
4.2.1 Gamma source The sources were considered as point sources for these measurements.
Sources were calibrated by measurements with a Victoreen Instrument Model 555.
This instrument was calibrated with a sousce and Victoreen R Meter Model 570 and ion chamber having calibration certificates traceable to the U.
S.
Bureau of Standards.
4.2.2 Neutron Source NA 4.3 Model Specification No models were used.
4.3.1 Description of the Radial and Axial Shielding Configuration Shielding measurements were made upon devices fabricated by normal shop procedures and quality assurance practices.
Radiation profiles were measured in X, Y, and Z planes.
Profile measurements
()
were made after each of the following:
-4.1-a
l.
Prototype was loaded with Iridium-192 source and profile f'/)
measured.
2.
Profile measured after 30 foot drop onto an essentially unyielding horizontal surface.
3.
Profile measured after 40 inch drop onto 6 inch diameter steel pin.
4.3.2 Shield Regional Densities NA 4.4 Shielding Evaluation (a)
Normal Conditions of Transport Profile data were measured at selected surface locations described in Table 2, Appendix B.
Also, dose rates were measured at three feet from each of these points.
All data indicate that gamma shielding in these devices is acceptable for Type B packages.
(b) 11ypothetical Accident Conditions All radiation profile measurements are within limitations for Type B packages.
()
Note:
Although radiation profiles were measured at three feet from the surface in accord with current U.
S.
Department of Transportation regulations, it is clear that radiation levels at one meter from the surface are within allowances specified by IAEA for Type B packages.
(Reference 1973 Revised Edition, Safety Series No. 6,
" Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials.")
-4.2-C
Chapter 5
5.0 CRITICALITY EVALUATION
Not Applicable.
O i
l O I
-5.1-
\\
1 i_o
1 i
Chapter 6 C:)
6.0 OPERATING PROCEDURES I
[ Reference 10 CFR 71.51, 71.53]
Century Models manufac-
{
tured by Gamma Industries are produced in strict compliance j
with the approved company Quality Assurance Program (Chapter 8 of this application).
Prior to the first use of these devices for the shipment of licensed materials, applicable O.A. checks l
are performed to ascertain that there are no cracks, pinholes, i
i uncontrolled voids, or other defects which could significantly
[
reduce the effectiveness of the packaging.
Pressure tests are i
not applicable, since the devices are operated at normal j
ambient atmospheric pressures.
Marking of each package is conspicuously and permanently attached only when fabrication t
has been verified to be in accordance with Gamma Industries approved Quality Assurance Program.
[
[ Reference 10 CFR 71.54]
Manufacture of Century Models i
in strict accordance with the approved Quality Assurance Program assures that applicable requirements of 10 CFR 71, Subpart C, have been satisfied.
This includes confirmation that:
3 (1) the packaging has not been significantly damaged; (2) the closure and locking mechanism are free from
()
defects; and (3) the packaging is loaded and closed in accordance with written procedures.
i 6.1 Procedure for Loading the Package 6.1.1 Factory Loading i
A new device is usually shipped containing a radiography source so that the device is ready for operations when it is received by the user.
Loading operations at Gamma Industries are performed in the Hot Cell Shop in accordance with the company's approved O.A. program.
i j
6.1.2 User Source Exchange i
A user may wish to exchange a decayed source with a fresh i
source "in the field" instead of returning the Century device to Gamma Industries.
In this event, the fresh source will be shipped from Gamma Industries to the user in a Gamma Industries Model C-10 Source Exchanger.
Exchanging the new source for the old source and returning the decayed source to Gamma Industries can be accomplished safely in accordance with the SOURCE
{}
CHANGING PROCEDURE, Appendix F of this application.
i l
l
-6.1-1
.w
A copy of this procedure accompanies each shipment of sources
(}
in a Model C-10 Source Exchanger.
6.2 Procedures for Unloading the Package 6.2.1 Factory Unloading Unloading operations (removing a radioactive source capsule) at Gamma Industries are performed in the Hot Cell Shop in accordance with the company's approved O.A. program.
6.2.2 User Source Exchange A user wishing to exchange a decayed source for a fresh source "in the field" would follow the previously referenced SOURCE CHANGING PROCEDURES (Appendix F of this application).
6.3 Preparation of an Empty Package for Transport A visual inspection should be performed to verify that the device is structurally sound and properly labeled.
a.
Inspect for damage such as cracks, punctures, holes, broken welds, or deformations that 7-)
(_j might allow depleted uranium to escape from inside the device.
Any defects must be corrected before the device can be used for any purpose.
b.
Inspect stencils, nameplates, and labels for legibility and visibility.
c.
Confirm that the lock box Safety Cap (Item 19, Dwg. 821-1001-439A and 821-1001-441A) and Safety Plug (Item 1, Dwg. 821-1001-439A and 821-1001-441A) are finger tight.
These pro-tective caps or plugs prevent foreign matter from entering the S-tube while the device is being transported or stored.
6.4 Shipping the Package Whether empty or loaded, devices are shipped following currently effective Department of Transportation regulations covering shipment of hazardous materials, to include proper documentation (shipping papers), seals, marking and labeling.
6.5 Periodic Inspection and Maintenance Procedures (Note--Maintenance involving dismantling Century components, ON repairs, replacing components, etc., must be accomplished ONLY by persons having appropriate training and experience.)
l
-6.2-
6.5.1 General Periodic inspection of Century devices should be performed N-at intervals not to exceed 90 days or whenever operation of the device appears to be impaired through abuse or wear.
- However, it should be emphasized that this applies only to the device.
DO NOTHING TO THE RADIOACTIVE SOURCE.
The Century Models are very rugged mechanisms.
The lock plunger is the only moving part.
This part, if kept clean, will require very little maintenance.
More important, the exterior of the package must be intact to provide spacing for radiation intensity control.
6.5.2 Safety Cap Assure that the lock box safety cap (Item 19, Dwg. 821-1001-439A or 821-1001-441A) is in place.
6.5.3 Outlet Nipple Inspect the source outlet nipple by first removing safety plug.
The outlet nipple should be round and smooth so that it will match the I.
D.
of the source tube.
a.
Maintenance:
If the outlet nipple should be out-of-round, it can sometimes be straightened by using a punch or round bar on the inside of the outlet.
If it cannot be straightened, or if the nipple has been broken, it must be replaced.
This replacement can be done in the field shop or returned to Gamma Industries, b.
Replace the outlet safety plug assembly (Item 1, Dwg.
821-1001-439A or 821-1001-441A).
6.5.4 Lock Plunger The lock plunger should be inspected and checked for ease of operation.
Foreign matter may at times foul the plunger and make it inoperative.
The lock plunger may not retract to its fullest extent (approximately 1/2 inch).
This would prevent free travel of the source in and out of the lock box.
a.
Maintenance:
The lock plunger may be removed by removing the two 8-32 set screws in the lock box.
Wash lock in solvent to remove dirt or other foreign
-6.3-
matter.
Lock may also be cleaned and lubricated by
((~}
spraying a lubricant (such as WD-40) into the lock.
_/
(Note s Even with the lock plunger removed, the radioactive source cannot be moved out of the shielded position as long as the outlet safety plug assembly is in place.)
b.
Reinstall the lock plunger in the lock box, and secure it with the two 8-32 set screws.
6.5.5 Labeling Inspect labeling on the Century.
The warning signs, name-plate, and source identification tags should be distinct, legible, and visible.
(Replacements are available from Gamma Industries.)
i O
i r
I
-6.4-
Chapter 7
('T U
7.0 ACCEPTANCE TESTS AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAM 7.1 Acceptance Tests 7.1.1 Visual Tests Before using, the device should be visually inspected by a responsible employee of the licensee.
(a)
The inspection is to assure there has been no significant damage including such items as cracks, punctures, holes, broken welds, or deformations that could adversely affect shielding, contain-ment, or normal operations.
In the event visual l
inspection reveals untoward circumstances, the Radiation Safety Officer or other responsible supervisor must be informed.
Appropriate corrective actions must be implemented before using the device for any purpose.
(b)
Exterior stencils, nameplates, and labels must be legible and properly located.
()
7.1.2 Structural and Pressure Tests Tests were performed on device prototypes in accord with 10 CFR 71, Appendix A and Appendix B.
Tests were per-formed on radioactive material capsules in accord with 10 CFR 71, Appendix D.
Manufacturing quality assurance has been performed by Gamma Industries in accord with Chapter 8.
7.1.3 Leak Testing Special form capsules have been tested for external contamination using techniques which will detect 0.005 micro-curies of removable contamination.
Excess removable contami-nation will be cleaned from special form capsules until subsequent tests indicate removable contamination is less than 0.005 microcuries.
7.1.4 Component Tests A 180 pound tensile test has been performed on source assemblies which have swaged parts.
Components which fail this test will be discarded or repaired.
A subsequent 180 pound test will be applied to repaired assemblies to assure
(~/}
that the completed assembly is acceptable for this tensile w_
test.
-7.1-L
7.1.4.1 Valves, Rupture Discs, and Fluid Transport Devices e(m)
NA 7.1.4.2 Gaskets NA 7.1.4.3 Miscellaneous NA 7.1.5 Test for Shielding Integrity No neutron sources are involved.
Devices containing gamma sources will be surveyed to determine gamma intensities on surfaces and at 3 feet from surfaces.
These measurements will determine the type label required for transportation.
In the l
event the survey exceeds 200 mR/hr on any surface or 10 mR/hr at three feet from any surface when the device is properly loaded with radioactive material--the device will be removed from service.
The device will be repaired to provide adequate shielding before being used for any purpose.
O
,7 ?. 6 Thermal Acceptance Tests NA 7.1.6.1 Discussion of Test Setup NA 7.1.6.2 Test Procedure NA 7.1.6.3 Acceptance Criteria NA 7.2 Maintenance Program NA
/
-7.2-v
7.2.1 Structural and Pressure Tests NA 7.2.2 Leak Tests NA 7.2.3 Subsystems Maintenance NA 7.2.4 Valves, Rupture Discs, and Gaskets NA 7.2.5 Shielding Refer to 7.1.5.
This test must be performed EACH and l
EVERY time the device is used.
7.2.6 Thermal O
NA 7.2.7 Miscellaneous Refer to Chapter 6, Section 6.5, Periodic Inspection and Maintenance Procedures.
7.3 Testing Protocol 7.3.1 Testing and Results Discussion Several tests or analyses were performed:
Shielding Integrity Tests--Several Century type devices were tested.
These were selected because of their heaviest weight--assuming this would cause the most damcge.
Also, minor shielding t..anges and dimension changes were considered.
Results indicate that all devices tested will satsifactorily meet requirements of maximum external (V
radiation, 1000 mR/hr at 3 feet, after completion of
~T all tests.
-7.3-
,.s
Containment Integrity Tests--These are discussed in Section 7.3.3.
7.3.2 Performance Testing of Devices as Type B Packages t
Type B Packages must successfully meet all requirements for Normal Conditions of Transport, 10 CFR 71 Appendix A, and Hypothetical Accident Conditions, 10 CFR 71 Appendix B.
7.3.2.1 Performance Tests, Normal Conditions of Transport
[10 CFR 71 Appendix A]
l (1)
Heat Test--Direct sunlight at an ambient temp-erature of 130 F in still air.
RESULT--Test not performed because materials i
and fabrication techniques are sufficiently rugged that it is not anticipated this test would have an adverse effect upon these l
devices.
(2)
Cold Test--An ambient temperature of -40 F in still air and shade.
A Century device was i
packed in dry ice at -70 F.
RESULT--No adverse indications were observed.
l (3)
Pressure--Ambient atmospheric pressure of 0.5 atmosphere (absolute).
()
RESULT--Test not performed because materials and fabrication techniques are sufficiently rugged l
that it is not anticipated this test would have an adverse effect upon these devices.
Also, the steel housing and S-tube are open to external pressura.
Therefore, no significant pressure differences can occur.
(4)
Vibration--Vibration normally incident to transportation.
RESULT--Test not performed because these devices have been used for several years in normal trans-portation environments.
Numerous observations of devices in (1) actual field conditions, (2) return to Gamma Industries for source replace-ment, and (3) return to Gamma Industries for repairs, have not revealed any adverse effects resulting from normal transportation vibrations.
(5)
Water Spray--NA (6)
Free Drop--NA since more severe 30 foot drop is required in 10 CFR 71 Appendix B.
(7)
Corner Drop--NA (8)
Penetration--NA--More severe test performed in accord with 10 CFR 71 Appendix B, paragraph 2.
(Photos T-14, 15, 16.)
i
\\
-7.4-l
(9)
Compression--A compressive load 5 times the
/~T weight of the package or 2 pounds per square
/
inch multiplied times the maximum cross section of the package, whichever is greater.
Load applied for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> uniformly against the top and bottom of the package in the position of normal transportation.
RESULT--This test was not performed because:
(a)
Package weight (45) x 5 = 225 lbs.
2 (b) 2 lb/in x cross section:
(7 in. x 5.5 in.) = 79 lbs.
(c)
Observation--Using largest load (10 CFR 71 Appendix A, paragraph 9) determine compressive load--
P 225
75 psi Stress
(2 L +
x 5).125 This is not a significant compression load.
7.3.2.2 Hypothetical Accident Conditions The following hypothetical accident conditions were applied sequentially to determine their cumulative effect upon these devices:
i (1)
Free drop--Radiation profiles were measured before the drop test.
The device was subjected to a free drop through a distance of 30 feet onto a flat essentially unyielding horizontal surface.
(A dummy source assembly was used during the drop.) The surface used was a one inch thick steel plate on a six inch thick horizontal concrete slab. A harness suspended the device from a crane hook in such attitude that first impact would be upon the lock box (which was deemed to be the most sensitive position).
After the drop, a 68 curie Iridium-192 source was inserted into a locetion determined by the location of the lock box.
Radiation profiles were again measured.
No significant change in the profile occurred.
An analysis was prepared to determine stress in the bolts which secure the lock box to the cylindrical housing.
This analysis was prepared oy Professor Dale R.
- Carver, P.E.,
Ph.D.,
Louisiana State University.
A copy of his work is included in Appendix E.
Drawings on pages C.1 and C.2 and Figure 2, page E.9, j
show the method for attaching the lock box to 7s()
the housing.
Dr. Carver concludes that this
-7.5-l
arrangement will withstand the stresses that
{}
might be imposed by the 30 foot drop test.
(2)
Puncture--A free drop through a distance of 40 inches striking the top end of a vertical cylindrical mild steel bar mounted on an essentially unyielding horizontal surface.
The bar shall be 6 inches diameter, with the top horizontal and its edge rounded to a radius of not more than 1/4 inch and of such length as to cause maximum damage to the package, but not less than 8 inches long.
The long axis of the bar shall be perpendicular to the unyielding horizontal surface.
Photo T-14 shows a 6 inch diameter steel bar sitting upon a 1 inch plate which was lying upon a 6 inch thick concrete slab--assumed to be an essentially unyielding horizontal surface.
This photo shows the 40 inch vertical distance being established.
The harness holds the device in such attitude to determine the impact location.
This location was selected to determine if the internal structures would resist the load and hold the shield in a position relative to the lock box so that the capsule remains in a position having acceptable gamma absorption.
( -)
This drop test was performed upon the Century.
Results can be observed in Photos T-15 and T-16.
A dummy source was used during each drop.
After the drop a 68 Ci Iridium-192 source was inserted.
The source location was determined by the lock box.
Radiation profiles were measured before and after each drop.
Re:
Appendix B, Table 2.
RESUL.TS--There was no significant change in external radiation before and after the penetra-tion test.
The results are within the criteria specified in 10 CFR 71.
(3)
Thermal--Re:
Chapter 2.
(4)
Water Immersion--NA 7.3.3 Tests for Special Form Licensed Material A group of capsules were simultaneously tested. Many types of radioactive materials could be contained within these
- capsules, e.g.,
Co60, Csl37, Ir192, Am241, Am-Be.
In accord with enclosed drawings (Appendix D), these capsules may have
(}
different dimensions to accomodate radioactive materials having
-7.6-
.d
L different specific activities and pellet dimensions
{}
and total activity (Section 0.2.3).
These capsule designs have been used for many years.
Many thousands of uources have been manufactured with radioactivities varying from millicuries to kilocuries.
They have been used in many environments.
There are no observations known to Gamma Industries which indicate design or fabrication techniques should be altered.
Containment of radioactive materials is the major function of the capsules.
The multitudes of source attachments and source assemblies have been omitted from this report since these components are not related to the containment function of capsules.
The following tests were performed upon all capsules presented in this report.
To prove containment integrity, a 25 inch mercuty vacuum test was performed on every capsule before and aftec each test (Photo T-1).
RESULT--There was no indication of leaks.
1.
Free drop--A free drop through a distance of 30 feet onto a flat essentially unyielding horizontal
(
surface, striking the surface in a position as to suffer maximum damage.
RESULT--After dropping 30 feet onto a concrete slab, there was no indication of damage to the containment function of the capsules.
2.
Percussion--Impact of the flat circular end of a 1 inch diameter rod weighing 3 pounds, dropped through a distance of 40 inches.
The capsule shall be placed on a sheet of lead, of hardness number 3.5 to 4.5 on the Vickers scales, and not more than 1 inch thick, supported by a smooth unyielding surface.
(Refer to Photo T-2.)
A lead plate 1/2 inch thick was placed upon a smooth concrete floor.
Each capsule to be tested was placed upon the lead in such location that the 1 inch diameter, 3 pound rod could be dropped a forty inch distance and impinge upon the capsule.
RESULT--Photo T-3 shows all capsules after the percussion test.
No damage was indicated to any capsule except the one located third from the left in Photo T-3.
This shows deformation of the open end which had been predrilled for 1
attachment to a source assembly.
Containment integrity was not impaired.
-7.7-p
3.
Heating--Heating in air to a temperature of 1475 F
()
and remaining at that temperature for a pgriod of
(/
10 minutes.
(The actual test was at 1550 F for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.)
RESULTS--No effects were noted except formation of a thin oxide coating.
4.
Immersion--Immersion for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in water at room temperature.
The water shall be at pH 6 - pH 8 with maximum conductivity of 10 micromhos per centimeter.
RESULTS--No damage observed.
CONCLUSION--The source capsules designed, manufactured, and tested as described in this report meet requirements to be designated as Special Form Material.
(:)
P e
l I
-7. 8-
,?
t i 3
Chapter 8 8.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE l
8.1 Establishment and Maintenance of a Quality Assurance Program
[10 CFR 71.51]
The Century Models for which this application is submitted are produced in accordance with the previously approved Quality Assurance Program.
Please refer to Gamma Industries' O.A.
Program Application, filed under i
Docket Number 71-0010, which was approved September 7, 1979, with expiration date November 30, 1984, for details.
A copy of NRC Form 311 is included on the next page.
4 r
i e
L i
5 r
-8.1-i 1
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NRC FORM 311 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- 1. APPROV AL NUMBE R 0010 omas' QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM APPROVAL REVISION NUMBER Il FOR RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PACKAGES
'O O
Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter 1, Part 71, and in reliance on statements and representations heretofore made in item 5 by the person named in item 2,the Quality Assurance Program identified in item 5 is hereby approved. This approval is issued to satisfy the requirements of Section 71.51 of 1o CF R Part 71. This approval is subject to all applicable rules, regulations, and orders of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission now or hereafter in effect and to any conditions ;,mcified below.
- 2. N AM E
- 3. EXPlR ATION D ATE Gamma Industries m
November 30, 1984 STREET ADDnESS P.O. Box 2543
- 4. DOCKET NUMBER CIT Y STATE ZIP CODE 71-0010 Baton Rouge LA 70821
- 5. QUALITY ASSUR ANCE PROGRAM APPLICATION DATE(5) d May 29,1978, July 4,1979, and July 16. 1979
- 6. CO N DITIO NS A.
Activities conducted under applicable criteria of Appendix E of 10 CFR Part 71 to be executed with regard to transportation packages by November 1,1979.
B.
Items controlled by the QA program include the materials and components shown on drawings approved by the NRC.
(3 V
C.
The "should" (page 8.11, item III.5) means "shall."
D.
"Where Quality Assurance is important" (page 8.14, item IX.2) is deleted.
E.
This QA program is limited to design, fabrication, assembly, testing, procurement, maintenance, repair, modification, and use of transportation packages for sealed sources used by industrial radiographers.
j g
A igLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Na"r*Ies
. Mac onald, Chief, Transportation Certification Branch, Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety, NMSS SEP 0 71979
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Appendix B g-N, )g TABLE 1 Selected Specifications for Models Century S Century Universal S Century SA Century Universal SA Gross Weight, pounds 45 Uranium Shield, pounds 26 External Dimensions, inches Shell diameter 5.5 Shell height 7.0*
Handle height 2.5 Overall height 9.5*
Isotopes used**
Iridium-192 Physical form of isotopes Metallic wafer Design Activity, nominal 100 curies Design Activity, maximum 120 curies
- Excluding 1/4 inch high boss feet
- 0ther beta-gamma emitters (e.g.,
Cs-137, Co-60, Yb-169) may be used in special form encapsulation.
Quantities will be limited so as not to exceed radia-tion profiles defined in Part 173.393 of Hazardous Materials Regulations of the U.
S.
Department of Transportation.
Materials of construction are the same for all models.
See drawings in Appendix C for itemized specifications.
($)
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U TABLE 2 Radiation Profiles for Models Century S & SA, Century Universal S & SA mR/hr Measured With 111 Ci Ir-192 Inside Device, Extrapolated To 120 Ci Ir-192 Over Top Cover Below Btm Cover Elevation 1 Elevation 2 Elevation 3 Elevation Elevation DISTANCE Sfc.
6" 36" Sfc.
6" 36" Sfc.
6" 36" Sfc.
6" 36" Sfc.
6" 36" A
66 7
0.6 P
B 71 27 1.6 137 29 2.7 82 27 2.2 22 10 1.6 24 11 1.8 O
C 115 28 1.6 148 27 1.6 50 7
1.6 55 6
1.6 58 8
1.6 S
D 44 10 0.6 77 17 0.6 44 9
0.6 61 12 1.6 17 11 1.7 I
E 82 30 2.2 165 41 2.7 104 33 2.2 55 10 1.6 14 12 1.6 T
F 77 21 1.6 155 27 1.6 83 22 1.6 38 11 1.6 35 13 1.6 I
G 66 14 0.6 44 27 1.6 55 22 1.6 38 17 1.6 34 15 1.7 O
H 82 17 1.1 99 24 1.6 71 17 2.2 49 10 1.6 46 11 1.6 N
I 93 27 1.6 154 31 1.6 88 28 1.6 44 9
1.6 42 10 1.6 J
53 9
0.7 NOTES
- a. Measurements made before and after each test were identical.
- b. Measurements were made with two different Century Models to obtain typical external dosage.
c.
Measurements made with Gamma Survey Model 200 instrument using GM tube Model LND 714.
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OFFICIAL USE ONLY
'T SEALED SOURCE EVALUATION
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LOUISIANA DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL Manufacturer:
Distributor:
Model:
Gangma Industries, A Division Gamma Industries "A" Series of Nuclear Systems, Inc.
Isotope:
Use:
Co60
-up to 200 Ci Industrial Radiograph)
Ybl69 - up to 30 Ci Source Assembly for Ir192 - up to 100 Ci Use in Gamma Industric Exposure Devices A.
DESCRIPTION:
The. Model " A" series (formerly.S-16) source assemblics are designed for use in Gamma Industries exposure devices shown in the pigtail selection chart.
The third (last) character in the source model designates the type of connector.
The "A"
indicates the long (new)
Saf-T-Key connector, while the "G"
indicates the short (old)
N Saf-T-Key connector.
An attempt has been made by Garr.ma Industries.to standardize source assemblies for all Gamma 35 and Century models.
Consequently, if the control cable has a modified " swivel adaptor" (countersunk to accommodate the longer pigtail) and a long protector cap on.the lockbox, an A-2-A source may replace an A-1-A source, an A-2-G source :r.ay replace an A-1-G cource, or an A-12-A source may replace an A-1-1-A -source.
Most of-the old Gamma 35 and Century equipment has been so_ modified, but a-notable-exception.is the equipment-owned by Pittsbdrgh-Testing-' Laboratory.
Iridium sources have-a single encapsulation -while ytterbium and cobalt sources have double encapsulation.
Single encapsulation may use either.an end cap or side circumferential weld, double encap-sulation will use only an end cap weld, and all encapsulation is accomplished using a Heliarc (TIG) welding technique.
Cobalt and iridium sources are encapsulated in either Type 304 or 316 stainless steel, but ytterbium sources are encapsulated in Type 7075 aluminum.
Capsule wall thickness is maintaine,d at a minimum of'O.030 inch, and the connector, ball stop and source capsule are crimped to 1/8" diameter stainless steel cable.
Overall pigtail dimensional tolerance is $1/16 inch.
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OFFICIAL'USE_ONLY
,A LOUISIANA DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL (ll'~'%
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CLASSIFICATION:
The manufacturer states that prototype sources have met the criteria specified in ANSI publication N5.10-1968 for the following classifications:
cobalt and iridium - E32515 ytterbium
- C32515 C.
QUALITY CONTROL:
The primary Yb-168 (stable ytterbium) capsule shall be subjected to a hot water bubble test prior to reactor irradiation and to a wipe test on return.
Each pigtail assembly shall be subjected to a 100 pound pull test prior to radioactive material insertion and shall be subjected -to a wipe test after-the material is sealed"in -
'the capsule.
If the wipe test indicates contamination greater than 0.001 pCi, a hot water bubble test shall be performed.
If the bubble test is positive, then the source s'iall be disposed of or reworked, as appropriate.
D.
MODEL "A" SERIES PIGTAIL SELECTION CHART:
9 43ource Isot_ ope Gamma Industries Source
, del No.
Exposure Devices Changer A-1-A (A-2-A)
- Ir Gamma 35, Gamma Century, GI C-10, C-4' A-1-G (A-2-G)*
Gamma 35S, Gamma Century-S, GNI 130 Gansa Century S Universal A-2-A Ir Gamma'35SA, Gamma Century SA GI C-10, C-4 A-2-G Gamma. Century SA Universal.
GNI 130 A-3-A Co Gammatron 5 & Gammatron 10 C-8 A-3-G A-4-A Co Gammatron 20 & Gammatron 50 C-8 A-4-G A-5-A Co Gammatron 100 C-8 A-5-G A-6-A Co Gammatron SA & Gammatron 10A C-8 A-6-G A-7-A Co Gammatron 20A & Cammatron 50A C-8 A-7-G pf,
+
-D.2-i 1
.n,
-~
W-
,FFICIAL USE ONLY O
LOUISIANA DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL 3
l >,vl A-8-A Co Gammatron 100A C-8 A-8-G A-9-A Ir/Co Utility Twin 20, Utility Twin 50, C (Co)
,A-9-G Utility Twin 100 C-10 (Ir)
A-10-A Ir/Co Utility Twin 20A, Utility C-8 (Co)
A-10-G Twin 50A, Utility Twin 100A C-10 (Ir)
A-11-A (A-12-A)
- Yb Gamma 35, Gamma Century, GI C-10, C-Gamma 35S, Gamma Century S GNI 130 and Gamma Century S Universal A-12-A Yb Gamma 35SA, Gamma Century SA, GI C-10, C-and-Gamma Century SArUniversal GNI 130 t
With appropriately fitted controls and long pigtail protector cap on lock box.
See text.
NOTE:
= Gamma Industries GNI = General Nuclear, Inc. (now Gamr..a Industries, Houston)
( Al so, Cumberland Research Corporation is now Gamma Industries, Port Norris)
~
August,1974
' Ibis sheet supersedes the previous sheet dated November, 1973.
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DEhCRIPTIOU PART Q.
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' Co (20c.i) 602-7067-coel l
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Dale R. Carver, P.E., Ph.D.
1645 Ingleside Drive Baton Rouge, IA 70808 February 17, 1982 Mr. Harry D. Richardson Nuclear Systes, Inc.
2255 Ted Dunham Avenue Baton Rouge, louisiana 70821
Dear Mr. Richardson:
At your request, I have investigated the method of attachment of the lock box to the cylindrical steel shipping container which your firm uses in transporting radioactive specimens.
The container is required to mntain the specimen Mien dropped 30 ft.
ento a " rigid unyielding surface" striking the surface in any of the infinite number of possible orientations.
The connection will be most severely stressed when the container falls with an attitude such that the plane of symnetry through the container (through the vertical mid-plane of the lock box and the axis of the cylindri-cal portion) is vertical when the lock box safety cap tip strikes the surface. This is true because the axis of greatest naent of inertia, through the center of gravity, is perpendicular to this plane.
Considering the design of the mntainer-the irregularly shaped uranium core, the fit of this core in the steel cylinder, the polyurethane filler, the emplexity of the brass lock box design, the attachment, and the infinite ntanber of possible impact attitudes-the proble does not lend itself to cmpletely rational analysis. One sinply cannot construct a mathmatical model which can be used to predict hcw the container would be stressed and deforned in the prescribed drop test. The best that one can do is analyze the design using the basic principles of dynamics, stress analysis and material behavior and to use considerable jtrigement, trying always to be conservative.
O U
-E.1-
he principles of conservation of linear and angular mmentum yield considerable information. Conservation of angular mments allows one to predict the velocity of the center of gravity and the angular velocity innediately after impact. W e principle of linear impulse and m ment s then allcus one to ampute the linear inpulse Fdt (F is the inpact force and 6t the tine of inpact) but there is no way of ccmputin9 6t so that the impact force can be evaluated. Even if it were possible to compute the impact force, it would still not be possible to predict the elastic and plastic deformation it would produce because of its very short duration.
In spite of these facts, a dynamic analysis is in order.
Referring to Figure 1, I have assumed impact with the container's plane of syumetry vertical and at any angle (Lin this plane. he angle (L
is the angle with the horizontal trele by a line frm the point of impact to the center of gravity of the entire assembly. We length of this line is denoted by "L".
We center of gravity was taken to be at the gemetrical center of the cylinder (by far the greatest mass in the unit is that of the uranium shield).
I have assumed that the inpact surface is relatively smooth and hence the impact force is vertical. V denotes the velocity of the f
C.G. just before inpact, and V that just after impact. V and V F
f F
will be vertical and colinear and the impact point "A" will nove to the left as the unit loses linear nmentm and gains angular nmentun.
Vf = Y29h = "\\[64.4(30) = 43.95 ft./sec pJ -E.2-
V Just before inpact the angular nmentun.with respect to the impact point A will be V L M Q ) --
W f
in which W is the weight of tne container (45 pounds) and g is the acceleration due to gravity.
Inmediately after impact the angular momentun with respect to point A will be
'W' V L (00S G ) + I W (2) p g
In which I is the maximun principal acment of inertia about a gravity g
axis and is the angular velocity in radians per second.
Equating (1) and (2)
I W=
L (00S Q ) (Vg - V ) -- (3) g p
We apparently have two unknown quantities, V and W, and but one p
equation. But, assuming no rebound, point A will nove '.o the left and the C.G. will continue to move vertically.
'Ihus, point "O" will be the
(]
instantaneous center, and it follows that V = W L COS G (4)
F Substituting (4) into (3)
LV 00s Q 1
W=
(5)
I +Y L COS Q 2
9
,9i From Figure 1 G will range between (19.4 + 15.7 ) = 35.1 (for lesser angles the cylindrical canister will strike first) and (180 - 40.4 ) = 139.6 at which angle the top of the canister will strike first.
is not known precisely (it could be detennined by means of a I
9 torsional vibration frequency measurenent).
I have used the value.02 w,
r
,9, 2
slug-ft, which is 1/2 that of a honogeneous right circular cylinder with
' -E.3-
M height = 7 in, and diameter =5.5 in. 'Ihe 1/2 factor results frm the fact that the greater portion of the mass is that of the uranium which does not fill the entire cylinder.
First, I let Q = 40. 'Ihis incidence angle will give essentially the greatest mment lever ann frcm the impact force to the lock box connection to the cylinder (and the smallest punching force).
IX) (5) then yields 43.95 (OOS 40 )
y=
= 91 rad / cec
.02 +
00S 40 2
.1 V = 91 CDS 40 = 41.6 ft./sec frcm (4) p 2
This impact attitude reduced the velocity only about 44-41.6 or 2.4 ft./sec = 6 V.
Assuming little or no rebound the principle of impulse and mcmenttan then yields fat =
2.4 = 3.35 lb. see 32 2 The safety cap on the lock box is of brass and of relatively light construction. It will deform plastically during impact but one must estimate A t.
letting At =.002 sec (surely a conservative value)
F=
= 1675 lb.
'Ihe shearing exponent of F = F, = 1675 (COS 20.6 ) = 1567 lb.
Wile the punching ccmponent will be F = 1675 (SIN 20.6 ) = 589 lb.
P p b
-E.4-
The moment transmitted by a static force of 1567 lb. to the connection will be only 1567 lb. x 4 in. = 6268 in.-lb.
This attitude ( Q = 40 ) results in a very small nonent due to the fact that the impact force simply " flips" the canister and starts it rotating.
I'll now let Q = 60 43.95 (006 60 )
g=
= 65 rad /sec 6
.02 +
00S 60 At1D 6
V = 65 00S 60 = 19.4 ft./sec F
AV = 44 - 19.4 = 24.6 ft./sec O
fat = MAV FA t =
24.6 = 34.4 ft./sec 32 2 Again letting At =.002 sec F = 17,200 lb.
'lhe shearing omponent of F will be F = 17,200 (006 40.6 ) = 13,059 lb.
g While the punching emponent will be F = 17,200 (SIN 40.6 ) = 11,193 lb.
P i
'1he mcment which rntst be' carried by the connection will be M = 13,059 x 4 = 52,236 in.-lb. -E.5-
When Q, = 90 we have direct central impact and equation (5) yields, of course,
= 0.
'1 hen, assuming no rebound, V = 43.95 and fat = M A V =
(43.95) = 61 lb. see 3 2 Surely now the inpact time will be greater but, to be conservative, I'll still let At =.002 sec.
Then F=
= 30,500 lb.
2 o
F = 30,500 (coS 70.e ) = 10,130 1b.
s U
F = 30,500 (SIN 70.6 ) = 28,768 lb.
P
'1he punching omponent is of course quite large in this case, but it is of no great cxmcern.
It will simply deform the lock box and the 1/8 in, steel cylinder shell in ompression.
'1he shearing cxxnponent will produce an instantaneous mment M = 10,130 x 4 = 40,520 in.-lb.
To be thorough, I will now let Q = 139, so that the top of the canister is about to touch at impact.
43.95 (COS 139 )
g,
= -92 rad /sec
'I
.02 +
COS 139 2
'1his is essentially the same W (in opposite direction) as that caused when d = 40 and 1 need not go further.
1 4-
-E.6-
'1he connection design:
Op Figure 2 is a sketch of the conservative design we discussed.
Taking the ultimate strength in shear to be 1/2 the ultimate strength in tension, this connection will have an ultimate strength in shear of
(*
F S, ult The maximten value of F in the previous cmputations is 13,059 lb. at g
Q,= 60.
Assuming during (eformation that the brass lock box casting rotates about its upper edge, the ultimate resting mcznent will be 4 (.0522) (.375)
(85,000)
M
=
lt
+2 (.0522) (1.2917) (85,000)
+2 (.0522) (2.2084) (85,000)
+4 (.0522) (3.125)
(85,000)
= 85,000 (12) (.0522) (7) = 372,708 in.-lb.
This figure is 7.14 times the greatest mcznent (at (I, = 60 ) which I calculated. But considering the fact that the shearing force and the bending mcnnent will act simultaneously, the uncertainties in the dynamic analysis, and the danger involved if a lock box were knocked off, the design should be ultra conservative.
I will be happy to discuss this analysis with you.
Sincerely, h[hIN" W
Dale R. Carver, P.E., Ph.D.
f's d
Attachment l
-E.7-b,._
O L=7.lu' TOTAL WT =454F V; = 43.95 FT/SEC
't 6
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%%WhNXW%%%MVRTW$mh\\\\NWM F
SCALE: APPROXIMATELY k l
O FIGURE I
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I b
f e
O L
{ TYPICAL i TYPlCAL O \\
a" o.c.
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I g
g g_
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f ASTM 18-8,304 STAINLES5 STEEL ULTIMATE STRENGTH 85,000 PSI YlELD STREMGTH 35A00 P51 I
"/oELONGATION IM 2" = 60 %
i
% REDUCTIOM IN AREA = 70L THREAD ROOT STRE.55 AREA =.0522 SG.lM.
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v FIGURE E
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(_
OPERATING PROCEDURES IMPORTANT - READ CAREFULLY BEFORE CHANGING SOURCE SOURCE CHANGING INSTRUCTIONS FOR C-10 SHIPPING CONTAINER Revised 5-25-79 Attached is a cross-sectional view of the shipping container used for transporting a " pigtail" source.
The container has two lock boxes--one on each side.
The upper lock box is labeled "NEW SOURCE" and the upper tube contains the new source.
The lower lock box and the tube contain a safety plug when shippe.d.
The lower tube will be used to return the decayed source to Gamma Industries.
The following procedure should always be followed in the source changing operation:
ALWAYS USE A PROPERLY OPERATING SURVEY METER WHEN CHANGING SOURCES!
(1)
Survey Model C-10 shipping container with meter.
The rad-iation intensity should not exceed 200 mR/hr on any surface Os nor 10 mR/hr at 1 meter from any external surface of the Model C-10 shipping package when the end covers are closed and locked.
(2)
Remove the retainer, seal wire, wing nuts, and open the two ends of the Model C-10 shipping package.
( 3')
Open the lower lock of the C-10 shipping container.
Re-move the safety plug.
(4)
Connect one end of the short exchange tube (provided within the housing) to the lower lock box of the C-10 shipping container.
Attach the other end of the short exchange tube to the exposure device.
pra o
W ll
,/
i f
YOUR C-1O b
CAMERA h k_)s l
D l
P i
F.1
(5)
Crank the old source into the C-10 shipping container
/_)
until it reaches a definite stop.
G (6)
Survey to assure that the old source has reached a safe position.
(7)
Depress the lower lock plunger of the C-10 shipping con-tainer onto the old pigtail locking ball. (You must be aware that the source could be removed from the open end of the lock box if the lower lock plunger is not depressed to secure the source assembly.)
(8)
Remove the short exchange tube from the C-10 shipping container.
Disconnect the control cable from the old pig-tail.
(Attempt to move the pigtail into and out of the C-10 shipping container to assure the lock is depressed upon the pigtail locking ball.
If the pigtail can be moved, then open the lower lock, carefully move the pig-tail, and close the lock upon the pigtail locking ball.
This will assure that the old source will remain properly locked and shielded during the return shipment.)
(9)
Remove the source safety cap from the upper lock box and attach the source safety cap over the old source pigtail in the lower lock box.
(i (10)
Attach the control cable to the new pigtail which is in the upper lock box.
x (11)
Attach short exchange tube to the C-10 shipping container uocer lock box.
pg 1%
A YOUR C-10 CAMERA h,
(12)
Unlock the upper lock from the new source.
(13)
Standing as far away as possible, crank the new source from the C-10 shipping container into your camera.
(14)
Survey to assure the source has been moved into the proper chielded location within the camera.
O(,,)
(15)
Lock your camera lock upon the source assembly and assure the source assembly cannot,be moved.
F.2
m ly_)
(16)' Remove the short exchange tube from your camera. Re-move the short exchange tube from the C-10 shipping containe;.
(17)
Insert the safety plug into the upper tube of the C-10 shipping container.
Lock the upper lock of the C-10 shipping container.
(18)
Survey to assure the sources are properly shielded within the C-10 and the camera.
(19)
Close the end covers of the C-10 and secure the covers with the wing nuts.
(20)
Insert a safety seal into a bolt which secures the C-10 end covers.
(21)
Survey.
(The radiation intensity should not exceed 200 mR/hr at any surface or 10 mR/hr at one meter from any i
surface of the Model C-10.)
t END OF SOURCE INTERCIIANGE INSTRUCTIONS Be sure that you:
()
(1)
Measure and write the transport index upon the
" Yellow labels.
(2)
Attach two " Radioactive Yellow labels to the C-10.
These must be on opposite sides of Cae C-10.
(3)
Properly fill out all shipping documents.
NOTE:
Notify the Radiation Safety Officer or other appropriate supervisor:
1.
If external radiation intensity exceeds the measurements in item (21).
2.
If any damage to the C-10 would impair its ability to safety shield the source during transportation.
F.3
O O
SOURCES SsiePEo ca C-iO
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URANIUM SHIELD
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E C-lO SHIPPING CONTAINER a
DRAW 8NG NUMata REVISIONS TO DRAWING NO. 323
'.323-02 l
-