ML20041F358
| ML20041F358 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 02/05/1982 |
| From: | Pilant J NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| To: | Jay Collins NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041F353 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8203160425 | |
| Download: ML20041F358 (13) | |
Text
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t COOPER NUCLE AR S T A floN Nebraska Public Power Distr =ict P.o. BO X 98, HHoWNVILLE. NCUR ASKA 68321 it<<Peont i o23 2s.2 11
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=== 1 :_an=m =m February 5, 1982 Mr. John T.
Collins Regional Administrator US Nuclear Regulatory Cominission Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive Suite 1000 Arliagton, TX 76011 Subj ec t :
Emergency Preparedness Exercise
Reference:
1.
Letter from J. M. Pilant to J. T. Collins dated January 29, 1982, " Emergency Preparedness Exercises".
2.
Letter from J. M. P11 ant to K. V.
Seyfrit dated November 19, 1981, " Joint Exercise Objectives".
Dear Mr. Collins:
Pursuant to our commitment dates in Reference 1, enclosed, please find a description of the exercise scenario and anticipated response actions.
Work is underway to develop the specific information to be provided for the exercise players and will be forwarded as specified in Reference 1.
If you should have any comments on the scenario, please advise us as soon as possible.
Enclosed, also, is a more specific identification of objectives for the exercise that expands upon those provided in Reference 2.
If you should have any comments regarding these objectives please advise us accordingly.
We hope you will find the enclosed information satisfactory for your needs.
Sincerely,
$7A D ~'n_~1
-t!;,l p-f li li k
'A
- 1. Pilant Division Manager of Licensing and Qua1ity Assurance j_
JMP/LCl./DLR/vka cc:
Ilrian K. Grimes, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness of fIce of Inspect ion and Enforcement US Nuclear Regulatory Commission hhhhg KO PDR
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b CNS EXEI;CISE'SCCNARIO A.
Introduction k'hile a number of objectives have been established for the annual exercise by CNS and the State of Nebraska, the overall objective is to evaluate the capabilities of all emergency response organizations which may be required to respond to an event at CNS and to identify those~ aspects of emergency preparedness where improvements can be made. This latter consideration is of primary importance since each of the response organizations has developed, over the past year or so, revised emergency plans and procedures which conform to the guidance published in NUREG 0654 FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power ~ Plants." 11ence,
an over-riding consideration during this initial annual exercise is-to " shakedown" the new plans, checkout the operation of new facilities and equipment, and determine the extent:to which coordination and control of the various organizations has been enhanced as a result of the substantial effort expended during the past several years.
The CNS event sequence has been selected with several considerations in mind.
1.
Events selected, at least on an individual basis, are 1
representative of those which have some finite probability of occuring or are similar to those which might occur at t"oical BWR installations.
It should be noted however, that for purposes of the scenario, many of these " isolated" events have been grouped together to form the basis for projecting deterior-e
3 9
ating station conditions and creating significant offsite releases.
To this extent, the scenario is not realistic.
2.
11ie events have been staged to " step" each of the emergency response organizations through each of the four emergency classifications; i.e., Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency. This option was purposely chosen - as opposed.to simply creating a General Emergency situation - so that each organization could demonstrate their level of response during each of the respective classifications.
It should be noted that the time sequence, as well as operational and radiological parameters, may well be stretched to the limit of credibility or in fact, distorted so that the events
" fit" sequentially and to permit completion of the exercise within a period of approximately eight hours.
3.
.The events selected and their sequence embody the requirements of two separate scenarios, the first of which checks out a range of onsite station activities and the second of which checks out the operation of.the offsite response organizations and offsite actions by CNS.
A scenario could have been developed to address only the offsite radiological problem.
In such a s itua tion, significant offsite releases would most probably be created by core conditions which result in substantial onsite radiological problems. If in developing such a scenario a l
degree of " realism" related to station radiological conditions was injected, an effective " checkout" of the station's onsite emergency response might well be precluded.
llence, such a scenario would address only one of the two desires.
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B.
Overview of Scenario Eventr.
.lhe scenario events have been staged to get the station to a site s
._ Area Emernency within a 1.1/2 hour time frame.
The basis'for
"' declaring such an emergency condition will be a coincident loss of
, both of f site and onsite AC power for greater than 15 minutes.
Conditions will then be stable for an approximate ' 2 1/2 hour l'
.s ;
perJod.
It is during this period _of D e that._the-coungy_and state s
N.
responseagenciesphr~upforaGeneralEmergencycondition.
2-
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At,approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> into the emergency, a substantial. Reactor Coolant System Icak'in the Drywell becomes evident.
The Drywell iybeginsito pressurize rapidly and in order to prevent reaching.
design pressure, theJ'rywell is vented through the SBGT path to the
~
elevate!! releasr point. -P.cwever,-shortly after opening the vent.
t.'
path, Icvel control is lost:.(HPCI is disabled) and the core is
?
s eventually uncovered.
Significant offsite-releases begin.
'k At that stage, %pleroximately 4 3/4 hours into the event, power is restored to one of the critical buses.
LPCI is initiated and refloods the vessel.
Offsite, monitoring teams begin to see substantial radiationleve(sintheenvironment. The release cannot be stopped however due to'.a purge control.; valve logic circuitry malfunction.
Once corrected at approximately 6 1/2 hours into the event, the release is terminated.
At 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> i::o the event, the lack of any
)
on-going-releases from the elevated release point.is established.
At approximateIy 7'1/2 Inours into the event the State of Nebraska confirmsnoon-hping'releaseandtheexerciseisterminated, u
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5 a
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. C.
.init f al Statlon rondit tons A three week scheduled maintenance out age is due to begin the following day.
During the mid-shift a purge of the Drywell is commenced, as permitted by the Technical Specifications, in advance of removing the station from service during the evening after the peak.
Since the maintenance outage wi)) require extensive use of service air, the gasoline powered air compressor in the Poiler llouse has been checked out, connected to the Service Air System, and considered operable.
All major components and engineered safeguards equipment is in service or operable with the following exceptions:
1.
The Emergency Transformer is out of service at the request of the Omaha Public Power District.
The unit had been scheduled out for maintenance on the previous day at 10 a.m.
for approximately four hours but subsquent problems precluded its restoration.
Return to service is projected at noon.
2.
The RCIC turbine is out of service, having failed its monthly surveillance test earlier in the week.
Spare parts have been air freighted and expected to arrive at the station by 10 a.m.
In the morning.
Approximately six hours are projected to be required for maintenance upon receipt of the spare parts.
3.
Core Spray Pump B is out of service due to a wiped thrust bearing. The pump is scheduled for repair during the maintenance outage.
4.
Finally, winter storm conditions have been particularly bad for the past several dsys and icing has become a problem.
1 D.
, Sequence of l'ven,ts
'lhe event sequence thich follown has been developed in tabular form, generally in 15 minute increments.
Indicated on the table are the specific events, an identification of key plant conditions and a description of anticipated response. While the event sequence can be considered " fixed", the following items may be changed as detailed messages are developed and exnerience gained with the reviced plan and procedures during the conduct of training drills.
All such changes made will be for the purposes of injecting realism into station conditions.
1.
Time - The current time frames are simply stated in 15 minute increments for the nost part.
Some adjustment will be required; however, no significant adjustments are anticipated for major items.
2.
para.eters - The current parameters are simple estimates made without any detailed calculations. Where appropriate, such refinements will be made.
3.
Response Actions - The current actions reflect anticipated responses without the benefit of traiaing drills.
As experience is gained with the revised procedures, modifications and/or additions / deletions to these response actions may be desired.
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SCENARIO EVENT SEQUENCE & EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTIONS Tire Event Key Plant Condition Expected Response Action 7:30am Loss of offsite power.
Declare NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT Critical buses energized by due to loss of offsite power.
both Diesel Cencrators.
Respond to transient.
Reactor vessel level recovered Conduct required notificatiens.
and maintained by HPCI.
8:05am Fire, in critical Loss of C critical bus.
Declare ALERi due to fire with potential bus G.
to cause degradation of safety syste=s.
Activate Fire Brigade.
Initiate manning of E=crgency Response Facilities.
Conduct follow-up notifications.
8:35am Fire confirmed to be out.
No change frem above.
Complete accountability check for all onsite personnel.
Transmit report from Fire Brigade.
8:40am Loss of operating Diesel Total loss of AC power.
Dispatch repair team to investDgate Generator.
problem.
Conduct operator reponse as appropriat..
Evaluate blowdown of vessel with only HPCI available.
8:55am No change from above.
Total loss of AC Power for Declare _ SITE ^?r^ FMFRCr':CI.
>15 minutes.
Activate the EOF.
Evaluate need to evacuate nonessential personnel frc= the site.
Conduct follow-up notifications.
9:15a=
No change from above.
No change from above.
Prepare and transmit initial press release to GOEC.
SCENARIO EVENT SEQUENCE & EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTIONS Page 2 Time
_ Event Key Plant Condition Expected Response Actien 9:30am Initiate reactor vessel No change from above.
Actuate relief valves as required,t6 depressurization, conduct blowdown.
9:45am No change from above.
Depressurization continuing.
Receive reports from repair teams regarding critical bus G and Diesel Generator 1.
10:00am Reactor vessel depres-Reactor vessel pressure reduced Reclose relief valves.
surization completed, to %400 psig.
Pressurization of drywell Drywell pressure increases to initiated.
%2 psin.
10:15am No change from above.
Drywa.'.1 pressure increases to Initiate action to evaluate reasca
%4 psig.
for increase in drywell pressure.
Prepare and transmit follow-up press release to GOEC.
10:30am No change from above.
Drywell pressure increases to Receive report from repair team
%8 psig.
regarding return of G bus to service.
10:45am Critical bus G reenergized.
Drywell pressure increases to SGTS initiated.
N16 psig.
Restart Diesel Generator 2.
Start of RHR Pumps C and D unsuccess-ful.
j Initiate action to determine LPCI i
actuation problem.
l Initiate action to evaluate options available to terminate drywell pressure increase.
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11:00am Drywell pressure increase Drywell pressure increases to Decision made to open drywell vent
' continuing at 3/4
%26 psig.
exhaust valves and vent via psig/ min.
SBCT path.
Initiate action to dispatch offsite monitoring teams.
Arrival of State of Nebraska emergency response personnel and integration with EOF staff occurs.
SCENARIO EVENT SEQUENCE & EXPECTF.D RESPONSE ACTIONS Page 3 Time Event Key Plant _C,on l_i,t_ijm Qtpected Response Action 11:15am Drywell pressure increase Drywell pressure increases to Drywell vent exhaust valves' continuing at 1 psig/
%40 psig.
opened.
min.
Prepare and transmit follow-up press.
release to GOEC.
Commence offsite radiation monitoring.
Note: to continue through duratlon of the exercise.
11:30am HFCI trip.
Reactor vessel Icvel rapidly Attempts to restart HPCI fail.
decreasing.
Declare G 'ERAL EMERGENCY Drywell pressure decrennes.
Initiate action to determine HPCI ERP monitor trending upscale.
problem.
Conduct follow-up notifications.
11:45am No change from above.
No change from above.
Reclosure of drywell vent exhaust valves unsuccessful.
Investigation initiated.
12:00 No change from above.
Core uncovered.
Transmit report from IIPCI repair team that they are evacuating due to noon local ARM alarms.
12:15pm Critical bus F reener-ECCS initiated.
Diesel Generator 1 restarted.
gized.
Reactor. vessel water level LPCl initiated.
begins to increase.
ERP monitors indicate full scale. Note: to remain full scale until purge exhaust valve closure i
is successful.
+
SCENARIO EVENT SEQUENCE & EXPECTED REPONSE ACTIONS Page 4 Time Event Key Plant Condition Expected Response Action 12:30pm Emergency transformer Reactor vessel water level Diesel Generators secured.
power restored.
increased to well above Prepare and transmit follow-up the core.
press release to COEC.
12:45pm No change from above.
Reactor vessel water level Initiate preparations for obtaining
- increased to normal range.
a Reactor Coolant sample using the Post Accident Sampling System.
. Ipm to No change from above.
No change from above.
Activities in progress include:
2pm Post accident sampling.
Dose projection and assessment.
Offsite radiological nonitoring.
1.
1 j _2gm Release terminated.
Purge valves successfully reclosed.
Deescalata to SITE _ AREA EMERGENCY.
Conduct required follow-up notifications.,
~
Prepare and transmit follow-up press release to GOEC.
2:15pm Normal offsite power ERP monitors indicate onscale Condensate System restored.
restored.
and trending down.
ECCS returned to standby.
4 Normal power restoration activities occur.
2:30pm No change from above.
ERP monitors indicate normal Deescalate to ALERT.
levels.
Conduct required follow-up notifications.
Initiate long term environmental sampling' effort.
2:45pm No change from above.
No change from above.
Advise state of desire to-terminate the exercise.
4 I
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e
SCENARIO EVENT SEQUENCE & EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTIONS Page 5 Tima Event Key Plant Condition Expected Response Action 3:00pm No change from above.
No change from above.
Sound "All Clear" upon state confir=atien of terminated release.
Prepare and transmit final press release.
Initiate "close out" messages to off-site agencies.
e
1:XERCISE OBJECTIVES Specific objectives developed for CNS and NPPD corporate support personnel and organizations for the exercise have been subdivided into five categories:
Accident Assessment, Emergency Operations, Communications, Public Information, and Emergency Management.- During the course of the scenario the degree to which each objective is met will be assessed.
A compilation of the objectives follows:
A.
Accident Assessment 1.
Relationship of parameters, equipment status and station conditions to the conditions which define each Emergency l
Action Level.
2.
Evaluation of changes in station conditions, status and trends and reclassification of the emergency including protective action recommendations based upon deteriorating core conditions.
3.
Dose projection methodology and development of protective action recommendations based upon radiological. considerations.
4.
Engineering evaluation and assessment of station conditions including contact and coordination of assistance availabic from industry support groups and contract organizations.
B.
Emergency Operations 1.
Fire Brigade activation, practices and communication flow.
2.
Initiation, direction and control of both on and offsite radiological monitoring teams.
_1_
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3.
' Radiological monitoring team plume t racking techniques including
, radiological measurements, equipment operation, environmental sampling and reporting.
4.
Hadiological practices in high radiation areas including, as approprinte, exposure limit increase authorizations.
5.
Initiation, direction, control and practices of maintenance and repair teams.
6.
Operation of the Post Accident Sampling System.for reactor coolant sample analysis.
~
7.
Simulated evacuation of personnel from the site, including direction and control for monitoring of evacuees away from the i
station and coordination with county and state officials.
C.
Communications 1.
Initial and follow-up notifications of station and corporate f
personnel and offsite authorities.
l 2.
On-going cor.nunications between Control Room, TSC, and EOF regarding station conditions, events and status and subsequent dissemination of appropriate information to all members of the Emergency Response Organizations.
3.
Follow-up communications to offsite authoritics.
D.
Public Information 1.
Press release development and authorization for release.
i l
2.
Activation and operation of the Media Release Center in Omaha in conjunction with the Information Authentication Center at the EOF.
I
~
C.
Eye,rygeng !hnar.emen_t, r
1.
Assembly and accountability of all individuals at the station within 30 minutes and continuing accountability maintenance thereafter.
2.
Activation of the onsite emergency response centers and assignment of tasks to Emergency Response Organization personnel.
3.
Protective action decision making and bases, including recommendations associated with activation of the prompt notification system and EBS.
4.
Coordination of CNS offsite radiological monitoring activities with those accomplished by governmental agencies.
5.
Deactivation / deescalation decision making and bases.
6.
CNS utaff augmentation with corporate support personnel..
O