ML20041E488
| ML20041E488 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 02/23/1982 |
| From: | Deyoung R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041E486 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-82-007, EA-82-7, NUDOCS 8203100617 | |
| Download: ML20041E488 (13) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION d
In the Matter of Docket No. 50-261 License No. DPRe23 H. B. Robinson Nuclear Facility EA 82-07 (Unit 2)
ORDER IMPOSING CIVIL MONETARY PENALTIES I
Carolina Power and Light Company, 411 Fayetteville Street, Raleigh, NC 27602 (the " licensee") is the holder of License No. DPR-23 (the " license") issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the " Commission"). Th'e license authorizes operation of the H. B. Robinson Unit 2 facility in Darlington County, South Carolina under certain specified conditions and is due to expire on April 13, 2007.
II An inspection of the licensee's activities under the license was conducted on August 25-26, 1981 at the H. B. Robinson Unit 2 facility in Darlington County, 1
As a result of this inspection, it appears that the licensee has not conducted its activities in full compliance with the conditions of its license and with the requirements of NRC regulations. A writtan Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties was served upon the licensee by letter dated December 1, 1981. The Notice stated the nature of the violations, the provisions of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations and license conditions which the licensee had violated, and the amount of civil 1
l 8203100617 820223 PDR ADOCK 05000261 G
penalty proposed for each violation.
Answers dated January 5, 1982 to the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties were received from the licensee.
III Upon consideration of the answers received and the statements of fact and explanation as set forth in the enclosure to this Order, the Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement determined that the penalties proposed for the violations designated as Items A and C in the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties, as amended in the Appendix to this Order, should be imposed.
The Director agrees in part with the licensee's i
denial of the violation designated as Item B in the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties and withdraws the survey portion of the violation, and mitigates the civil penalty for Item B to Five Thousand Dollars.
IV In view of the foregoing and pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as ar. ended (42 U.S.C. 2282, PL 96-295), and 10 CFR 2.205, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
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. The licensee pay a civil penalty in the amount of Forty Thousand Dollars within thirty days of the date of this Order, by check, draft, or money order, payable to the Treasurer of the United States and mailed to the Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
V The licensee may, within thirty days of the date of this Order, request a hearing.
A request for a hearing shall be addressed to the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, U.S.N.R.C., Washington, DC 20555.
A copy of the hearing request shall also be sent to the Executive Legal Director, U.S.N.R.C.,
Washington, DC 20555.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will issue an Order designating the time and place of hearing.
Upon failure of the licensee to request a hearing within thirty days of the date of this Order, the provisions of this Order shall be effective without further proceedings and, if payment has not been made by that time, the matter may be referred to the Attorney General for collection.
VI l
In the event the licensee requests a hearing as provided above, the issues to be considered at such hearing shall be:
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4-(a) whether the licensee violated NRC regulations and license conditions as set forth in the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties as amended by the Appendix to this Order; and (b) whether, on the basis of such violation, this Order should be sustained.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION Richard C. DeYpung, Di ector Office of Ir.spection and Enforcement Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 23 day of February 1982
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APPENDIX EVALUATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS For each violation and associated civil penalty identified in the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties (dated December 1, 1981) the original violation is restated and the Office of Inspection and Enforcement's evaluation and conclusion regarding the licensee's response (dated January 5, 1982) to each item is presented.
Item A STATEMENT OF NONCOMPLIANCE Technical Specification 6.8.1 states, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained that meet or exceed the requirements and recommendations of Appendix A of U. S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.33 dated November 3, 1972.
Section G and I of Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33 list procedures for repair of PWR steam generator tubes and for special radiation work permits.
Contrary to the above, on August 15, 1981, between 3:00 a.m. and 6:35 a.m., the licensee failed in conjunction with marking steam generator tubes to comply with required plant procedures for steam generator repairs and radiation permits.
The failure, which resulted in an overexposure (Item B below) is exemplified by the four departures from the procedures described below, any or all of which constitute a violation of TS 6.8.1.:
1.
Section 3.5.2 of HP-12, Revision 8, requires that the health physics technician ensure that high and low range dosimeters are worn by persons engaged in primary side steam generator work.
The dosimeters shall be worn on the body at or near the field of the highest dose rates.
Section 3.S.2 indicates that the highest dose rates occur in the region of the head, and self-reading dosimeters may be worn on the shoulders.
- However, the health physics technician on duty specified that high and low range self-reading dosimeters be worn on the chest and not on the shoulders or head of the person engaged in primary side steam generator work.
2.
Special Plant Procedure SP-319 incorporates Westinghouse procedure No. MRS 2.2.2 Gen-12 which in Section 7.2 requires that a minimum of two health physics technicians provide continuous health physics coverage.
However, during the time referenced above, only one health physics technician at a time provided coverap.
3.
Special Radiation Work Permit SRWP 815-6 and Section 7.2 of MRS 2.2.2 Gen-12 require continuous health physics coverage of steam generator marking operations.
Section 5.0 of MRS 2.2.2 states that steam generator tube marking is a "high exposure task and requires vigilance on the part
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of the health physics technicians to carefully monitor the marking team and to keep track of the exposure dose rate and total dose." However, the tube marking operation was neither' continuously nor vigilantly monitored by the assigned health physics technician since he did not maintain
Appendix (Continued) continuous visual contact with workers performing tube marking operations.
Additionally, he did not control and record entries into the steam generator.
4.
Section 3.2 of plant Procedures HP-12, Revision 8, requires the " Steam Generator Entry Log" to be filled in and completed whenever a steam generator entry is performed.
However, the health physics technician on duty did not record the four entries into the steam generator made by one worker.
This is a Severity III Violation (Supplement IV).
(Civil Penalty - $25,000).
NRC EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION The licensee admitted the violations identified in Items A.2 and A.4.
With respect to Item A.1, the licensee admitted failure to follow the procedure, but stated that although the Radiation Control Technician on duty had counte-nanced the improper placement of the worker's pocket dosimeters, he had not specified their placement.
We accept the licensee's factual correction.
The correction does not alter the basic fact that the licensee did not follow the required procedures.
Accordingly, the last sentence of paragraph A.1 is amended as follows:
"However, the health physics technician on duty did not ensure that high and low range self reading dosimeters were worn on the shoulders or head of the person engaged in primary side steam generator work."
With respect to Item A.3, the licensee presentd the following statements:
"The RC Technicians' vigilance in their coverage was evidenced by an RC Technician's continuous presence on the S/G platform and frequent moni-toring of the tube marker's pocket chamber throughout the tube marking operation to ensure the tube marker did not exceed his allowed dose of 500 mrem for that particular containment entry.
To ensure that the tube marker did not approach his allowed dose, the RC Technician directed the j
tube marker out of containment when the tube marker's pocket chamber reading approached 470 mrem.
After exiting the containment, the tube markers pocket chamber read 470 mrem.
CP&L believes that the job coverage rendered was both continuous and vigilant and does not interpret " con-tinuous" in this context to require direct line of sight coverage at all times.
Such an interpretation would require one RC Technician for each contract worker. By procedure, the contract worker had the responsibTTity of informing the RC Technician of each entry.
The exposure occurred due to the improper placement of pocket chamber dosimetry and not to the lack of vigilance on the part of the RC Technician."
i Inasmuch as the licensee had c'atermined that marking steam generator tubes was
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a high risk task that warranted assignment of not less than two health physics technicians to assure continuous monitoring of the job, it would be reasonable to assume that continuous monitoring ~ requires the HP technician to be in a position to monitor each worker while he is performing activities and does not necessarily require line of sight contact at all times.
However, the HP
Appendix (Continued) coverage must be capable of watching the total activity.
The HP technician may be looking at one worker, then another, but should at a minimum be able to monitor the workers.
In this case, on August 15, the health physics technician was also monitoring a two-man activity being conducted on a scaffold above the channel head manway through which the tube marking operations were being conducted.
While moni-toring the scaffold workers' pocket dosimeters, the health physics technician could not observe the activities of the steam generator tube markers.
While improper placement of personnel dosimetry was a principal cause of this event, the technician's lack of vigilance was a contributing cause. If the technician's vigilance had extended to the control of steam generator entries, the worker's exposure might have been decreased.
Item A remains a violation.
While additional input was presented by the licensee, it is clear that procedures were not followed as required.
There-fore, the civil penalty is not being mitigated or remitted.
Item B STATEMENT OF NONCOMPLIANCE 10 CFR 20.201(b) requires licensees to make or cause to be made such surveys as may be necessary to comply with the regulations in 10 CFR 20.
A survey as defined in 20.201(a) is an evaluation of the radiation hazards under a specific set of conditions.
10 CFR 20.101(a) requires licensees to restrict the total occupational dose to the head of each individual in a restricted area to 1.25 l
rems during any calendar quarter except as provided in paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 20.101.
Centrary to the above, between August 11 and 16, 1981, surveys of the radiation hazards associatea with marking steam generator tubes were not conducted adequately to assure compliance with the head dose limit specified in 10 CFR 20.101(a) in that radiation expose *e to individuals marking steam generator tubes was controlled based on readings from self-reading pocket dosimeters worn on the chest instead of the head where the exposure to radiation levels was I
higher.
One individual received a radiation dose to the head of 1.3 rems during the third calendar quarter of 1981, specifically, on August 15, 1981, which was in excess of the applicable limit.
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This is a Severity Level III Violation (Supplement IV).
l (Civil Penalty - $15,000).
NRC EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION The licensee admitted that one individual had received a radiation dose to the head of 1.3 rems during the third calendar quarter of 1981, but denied the l
inadequacy of the survey of the associated radiation hazards.
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continued as follows:
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Appendix (Continued) "The surveillance data for S/G tube marking was in sufficient quantity to accurately evaluate the hazard.
HP-12, which required the pocket chambers be placed on the head or shoulders, was in complete concert with the survey which indicated that the highest dose was to be in the region of the head.
Had this procedure been followed, the overexposure would not have occurred.
CP&L has previously in this response admitted to the failure to follow procedure."
The NRC agrees with this partial denial.
Accordingly, the survey portion of the violation will be deleted from Item B in our records, the severity level for Item B has been reduced to a severity level IV, and the civil penalty for Item B is mitigated to $5,000.
Item C STATEMENT OF NONCOMPLIANCE Technical Specification 6.3.1 requires that each member of the facility staff shall meet or exceed ANSI N18.1-1971 with regard to the minimum qualifications for comparable positions.
Paragraph 4.5.2 of ANSI N18.1-1971 states, in part, that technicians in responsible positions shall have a minimum of two years working experience in their specialty.
Contrary to the above, between approximately 4:30 a.m. and 6:35 a.m. on August 15, 1981, a radiation control technician was serving in a responsible position who had approximately 11 months experience, most of which consisted of observing personnel monitoring themselves for contamination a; they left the controlled area.
This tect'nician was solely responsible for monitoring and controlling doses to four individuals on the "B" steam generator platform.
Two of these individuals were marking steam generator tubes, a task that was identified by the licensee as a nigh exposure task requiring vigilance on the part of the health physics technician to carefully monitor and control radiation dose rates and total worker doses.
This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement IV).
(Civil Penalty - $10,000).
NRC EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION The licensee admitted the violation and stated as follows:
"A contract RC Technician who had 11 months of experience and had received on-the-job training conn tning S/G Health Physics (HP) coverage on more than six occasions was assigned to the S/G platform to cover a tube marking operation that was not to include a S/G entry.
Existing plant procedures provide adequate instructions for a more experienced RC Technician to provide the proper HP coverage of the S/G tube marking operation.
However, an RC Technician with less than the ANSI N18.1-1971 level of experience should have been given detailed written instructions so that no discretion in the establishment of specific work requirements could be required or implied in the performance of his duties.
This was not done in this case."
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Appendix (Continued) -
The item as stated is a Severity Level IV Violation.
The information presented by the licensee does not provide a basis for remission or migitation of 'the proposed penalty.
Cause of Failure of Radiation Control Program NRC REQUEST The NRC letter, dated December 1,1981, contained the following request:
"...please inform us.of the underlying causes of the failure of your radiation control program to prevent this type of occurrence and how you plan to correct this failure."
NRC EVALUATION AND C"NCLUSION The licensee responded as follows:
"In your letter of December 1,1981 you requested that CP&L address the underlying causes of the failure of our radiation control program and how we plan to correct this failure.
CP&L disagrees with your charge that it has a programmatic problem in the area of radiation control.
As discussed in our response to the specific violations, we have demonstrated that this occurrence was an isolated failure to follow procedures.
In the following paragraphs, we have provided additional information relating to your inspection activities and the measures we have and/or will take to refine our radiation Control Program."
The licensee's~ response continued with a cot.prehensive review of NRC and licensee actions relating to external radiation exposur.'s at the H. B. Robinson Plant since January 1981.
In his description of the May 30, 1981 overexposure incident the licensee stated as follows:
l "The root cause of this occurrence was clearly the contractor's failure to I
follow written (i.e., RWP) and posted instructions provided to him by Radiation Control personnel,..."
In a summary paragraph the licensee stated as follows:
i "The occurrence on August 15, 1981, was due to a failure to follow pro-cedures in that the Tube Marker, although wearing multiple whole body l
TLDs, did not wear his pocket chamber on his head or shoulder as required in HP-12, Revision 8.
The previous violation and civil penalty regarding calculated doses to the head was a result of S/G entries being made prior I
to 1981 without TLDs on the head.
Therefore, CP&L does not believe this occurrence was a repeat event.
Furthermore, the overexposure and its causes were identified by CP&L, the causes were corrected by CP&L, and the violation (overexposure) was promptly reported to the Resident Inspector.
Unlike the earlier incidents, this incident was the direct result of an isolated failure to follow a procedure which was adequate in itself."
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Appendix (Continued) Although the licensee denied that this event should be attributed to a program-matic problem in the area of radiation control, the circumstances surrounding the event indicate program involvement rather than an isolated failure to follow a procedure.
The following observations support this position:
Neither the worker nor the assigned health physics technician were instructed in the provisions of HP-12 (Rev. 8).
The health physics technician who prepared the radiation work permit, failing to specify proper location of personnel dosimetry and failing to prohibit steam generator entry, had not been adequately instructed.
The individual who assigned one health physics technician (rather than two) to monitor the tube marking activity was apparently not cognizant of the provisions of SP-319.
The individual who assigned the inadequately trained health physics technician to this job was apparently not aware of the requirements of Technical Specification 6.8.1.
The licensee's denial that the August 15 event is repetitive is contradicted by his statements of the respective causes of the May 30 and August 15 events.
The root cause of each was identified as a failure to adequately follow procedures.
In fact, failure to follow a procedure in both events should be more accurately catergorized as proximate and contributing causes.
A more basic common cause can be found in program management that allowed an uninstructed worker to be supervised by an unqualified and uninstructed health physics technician.
The statements presented by the licensee in this portion of the letter do not provide a basis for remission or mitigation of the proposed penalty.
Information Provided in Licensee Letter Dated January 5, 1982 (Serial No.82-018)
LICENSEE STATEMENT "CP&L denies that the identified infractions reflect a failure to institute appropriate corrective measures in response to prior incidents or that the infractions are indicative of a programmatic defect, as implied in the transmittal letter accompanying the Notice, for the reasons set forth in the Company's Response to the Notice."
NRC EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION In the last sentence on page 8 of the licensee's response (Serial No.82-017),
the root cause of the May 30, 1981 incident is attributed to "the contractor's failure to follow written (i.e., RWP) and posted instructions...".
Had appropriate corrective measures been instituted in response to this prior incident, the August 15, 1981 incident, which is also attributed by the licensee to a failure to follow a procedure, may not have occurred.
The licensee's denial of programmatic involvement has been evaluated above.
Appendix (Continued) LICENSEE STATEMENT "CP&L acknowledges that Infraction B as set forth in the Notice constitutes a Severity Level III infraction pursuant to the guidelines contained in the proposed General Statement of Policy and Procedure for Enforcement Actions published at 45 Federal Register 66754 (" Proposed Enforcement Policy"), but submits that Infraction A was improperly classified as a Severity Level III event since it involved only an isolated failure to follow a recently promul-gated (June 22,1981) procedure (Infractions A-1 and A-4) and an isolated failure to follow special Plant proc'.are SP-319 (Infraction A-2).
CP&L has denied the alleged failure to follow Special Radiation Work Permit SRWP 816-6 and Section 7.2 of MRS 2.2.2 Gen-12 (Infraction A-3).
Although this failure to follow procedures was the direct cause of Infraction B, which was categor-ized as a Severity Level III occurrence, it is improper to also categorize Infraction A as a Severity Level III event.
Supplement IV of the Proposed Enforcement Policy clearly classifies a " failure to follow procedures that has other than minor safety or environmental significance" as a Category V violation.
The maximum penalty for a Severity Level V infraction is $5,000.
Accordingly, the $15,000 penalty proposed for Infraction A violates the Pro-posed Enforcement Policy which was followed in assessing penalties in this case."
NRC EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION In assigning a Severity Level to a violation of a procedure, the NRC considers the consequences of the violation.
If, as in this incident, a failure to fol-low a procedure is a principal or contributing cause of a Severity Level III violation, the NRC emphasizes its concern for correction of the cause by assign-ing the severity level of the cause on a parity with its effect.
LICENSEE STATEMENT "As demonstrated in the Response, the event which gave rise to Infractions A, B, and C was not a repetition of a previous violation nor did it stem from the failure to adopt proper procedures.
It arose out of an isolated failure to follow a new procedure which in itself is adequate to prevent overexposures of the type experienced in this and prior incidents. Accordingly, CP&L submits that it is improper to increase the total penalty 25% in this case."
NRC EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION The cause of the overexposures disclosed in the NRC inspection on March 2-4, 1981 was a failure to evaluate nonuniform radiation fields and failure to pro-vide procedures that would preclude excessive exposure in these fields.
The licensee took adequate action to correct this situation by issuance of proce-l dures.
Had these procedures been followed it is unlikely that the August 15, 1981 event would have occurred.
The NRC based the 25% increase of the proposed penalty on the similarity between ths May 30 and August 15 overexposures and the fact that adequate steps were not taken to assure the procedures were implemented.
Both were related to steam generator tube marking and both I
resulted from failure to follow a procedure.
The NRC also considered that
Appendix (Continued) the EA 81-46 civil penalty should have focused management attention on this potentially hazardous operation and snould have prevented the several program failures which contributed to this incident.
LICENSEE STATEMEliT "CP&L respectfully requests that the penalty in this case be reduced to a maximum of $5,000 ($6,250 less 20%) for Infraction A, $20,000 ($25,000 less 20%) for Infraction B, and $8,000 ($10,000 less 20%) for Infraction C. In requesting this reduction, CP&L further asks that recognition be given to the fact that the Company promptly reported the over-exposure; promptly retrained -
all HP and other necessary personnel in the proper application of HP-12 (Rev. 8);
and has implemented extensive measures to assure that all steam generator work is performed in strict compliance with all applicable procedures."
NRC EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION For the reasons presented previously, the NRC has mitigated the proposed penalty of $15,000 for Item B to $5,000, but finds no substantial basis for remission or mitigation of those penalties proposed for Items A or C.
The NRC acknowledges the licensee's promot reporting of the overexposure, but finds no basis for mitigation in a licensee's reporting of a self-disclosing
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incident.
The NRC also expects licensees to take prompt and effective action to correct each violation identified by the NRC or the licensee.
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Appendix (Continued) '
the EA 81-46 civil penalty should have focused management attention on this potentially hazardous operation and should have prevented the several orogram failures which contributed to this incident.
LICENSE $ STATEMENT "CP&L respectfully requests that the penalty in this case be reduced to a maximum of $5,000 ($6,250 less 20%) for Infraction A, $20,000 ($25,000 less 20%) for Infraction B, and $8,000 ($10,000 less 20%) for Infraction C. In requesting this reduction, CP&L further asks that recognition be given to the fact that the Company promptly reported the over-exposure; promptly retrained -
all HP and other necessary personnel in the proper application of HP-12 (Rev. 8);
and has implemented extensive measures to assure that all steam generator work is performed in strict compliance with all applicable procedures."
NRC EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION For the reasons presented previously, the NRC has mitigated the proposed penalty l
of $15,000 for Item B to $5,000, but finds no substantial basis for remission or mitigation of those penalties proposed for Items A or C.
The NRC acknowledges the licensee's prompt reporting of the overexposure, but finds no basis for mitigation in a licensee's reporting of a self-disclosing incident.
The NRC also expects licensees to take prompt and effective action to correct each violation identified by the NRC or the licensee.
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