ML20041E050
| ML20041E050 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 02/25/1982 |
| From: | Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Cavanaugh W ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| 820223-01, 820223-1, NUDOCS 8203100027 | |
| Download: ML20041E050 (4) | |
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q Senior Vice President AEOD FIECEtVED Energy Supply IE Arkansas Power & Light Coapany ACRS-10 3-FEB 2 619825-7'8 P. O. Box 551 GVissing umm m m Little Rock, Arkansas 72203 RIngram ma surain ADeAgazio b
Dear !!r. Cavanaugh:
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Uc have reviewed your submittals dated November 15, December Deccaber 9,1976, March 24,1977 and !!ay 11,1978, concerning overpressure protection for Arkansas fluclear One, Unit No. 1.
As a result of our review, we have identified in the attached Request for Additional Infomation, infomation which is needed to complete our review.
f.ccordingly, as agreed to with your staff, we request the infomation to be received by April 15, 1982.
Sincerely, jhLL agg 7 l
Joh5735t61fAf#f f Operating Reactors Branch #4 Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
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Arkansas Power & Light Company cc w/ enclosure (s):
Mr. ' John R. Marshall Manager, Licensing Arkansas Power & Light Company P. O. Box 551 Director, Bureau of Environmental Little Rock, Arkansas 72203 Health Services 4815 West Markham Street Mr. James P. O'Hanlon Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 General Manager Arkansas Nuclear One P. O. Box 608 Russellville, Arkansas 72801 Mr. William Johnson U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 2090 Russellville, Arkansas 72801 Mr. Robert B. Borsum Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear Power Generation Division Suite 220, 7910 Woodmont Avenue Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Mr. Nicholas S. Reynolds Debevoise & Liberman 1200 17th Street, Nil Washington, DC 20036 Arkansas Tech University Russellville, Arkansas 72801 Honorable Ermil Grant Acting County Judge of Pope County Pope County Courthouse Russellville, Arkansas 72801 Regional Radiation Representative EPA Region VI 1201 Elm Street Dallas, Texas 75270 Mr. John T. Collins, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011
Enclosura 1 to ltr. dtd. 2/23/82 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATIE CONCERNING OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION FOR ARKANSAS NUCLE F ONE, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-313 1.
The Branch Technical Position requires the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO-1) overpressare protection system (OPS) to prevent exceeding the applicable Technical Specifications and 10 CFR 50 Appendix G limits. In your analys.is and systen description, you use 550 psig as the low temperature PORY setpoint and as the value that RCS pressure is allowed to reach prior to any credited operator action, a.
Provide a copy of the current ANO-1 Appendix G curve.
b.
Does the 550 psig setpoint provide adequate assurance that the Appendix G curve limits will not be exceeded for all temperatures below the minimum pressurization temperature?
2.
The OPS is required to function assuming any single active component failure. ANO-1 overpressure protection systen does not meet this criterion for the case of inadvertent actuation of the high pressure injection (HPI) systen with the PORY failing closed. You discussed several procedural and administrative controls used to prevent this scenario from occurring and the Branch Technical Position allows for such cases, if reviewed and approved on an individual basis, and if adequate controls to prevent the event are included in the plant Technical Specifications.
a.
Provide a copy of all Technical Specifications that deal with this subject, or propose appropriate ones.
b.
List all procedural and administrative controls used during HPI system tests to prevent violating Appendix G limits, Could the HPI isolation valves (CV-1219, CV-1220, CV-1227, and CV-1228) c.
be manually opened locally? Would the control room operators have positive valve position indication in light of the proposal to renove power to the valve operators?
3.
Relative to the OPS testing, please respond to the following:
a.
How is the PORV and its control circuitry functionally tested?
b.
At what frequency are these tests perfortned?
c.
How do you ensure that these valves actually open during testing?
i
1
. 4.
In your J4ay 16,1978 submittal, you state that AP&L would install an alarm at ANO-1 that would alert the operators if RCS temperature dropped t,elow 2800F and the PORY isolation valve (CV-1000) had not been opened or the key-operated switch had not been positioned to enable the lower PORY set-point. You also indicated that an alann would be added that would sound to alert the operators if any of the HPI valves (CV-1219, CV-1220, CV-1227, and CV-1228) circuit breakers had not been de-energized when the RCS temperature falls below a predetermined setpoint.
a.
Have these two alarm circuits been installed as described? If not, explain any deviations from your proposal.
b.
Do these alarms share power suppites with each other or the PORY control circuitry, where a single failure could disable more than one function?
c.
How can the operators ensure that the HPI valves are in fact closed pr.ior to racking out the b'reakers? Does the indication show the actual valve position or merely a circuit indication? n d.
You indicate that the predetennined temperature is 280 F.
ffthe minimum pressurization temperature (MPT) is higher than 280 F, please disguss the protection afforded the reactor coolant system between 280 F and the MPT.
5.
You take credit for operator action to mitigate a pressure transient for all analyzed events when a failure-closed of the PORV is considered. No credit can be taken for operator action until 10 minutes after the operator is aware that a pressure transient is in progress. For the most severe event that you analyzed, what audible alar;n will alert the operators that a pressure transient is occurring (alarms associated with the PORV cannot be used be-cause it is assumed failed closed)? We require that acceptable technical specification changes or system modifications be proposed to increase your calculated operator time from 4.4 minutes to at least 10 minutes.
6.
What training has been conducted at ANO-1 to make.the operating. personnel aware of overpressure incidents at other facilities and possible over-pressure situations at ANO-l? How do you ensure that an emphasis is placed on this problen during your licensing and retraining programs?
7.
Provide current P& ids of the overpressure protection systen.
l 8.
You state that when the PORY is out of service, the makeup tank level iT to be lowered to limit the water that can be added to the RCS.
a.
Where i's this requirement stated in ANO-1 operating and control documentation?
b.
Are there alternate sources of makeup water, on which HPI pumps could be lined-up to take suction which contain a larger inventory of water than the lowered makeup tank? If so, what controls are in place to control those alternate sources?
9.
Provide the age of the primary system, in effective full power years (EFPY),
at which the current Appendix G limits are calculated.