ML20041C095

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Forwards Final Evaluation of SEP Topic V-5,RCPB Leakage Defection.Rcpb Leakage Detection Sys Does Not Conform to Reg Guide 1.45 Recommendations.Mods Presented
ML20041C095
Person / Time
Site: Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date: 02/22/1982
From: Crutchfield D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Counsil W
CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO.
References
RTR-REGGD-01.045, RTR-REGGD-1.045, TASK-05-05, TASK-5-5, TASK-RR LSO5-82-02-101, LSO5-82-2-101, NUDOCS 8202260179
Download: ML20041C095 (8)


Text

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February 22, 1982

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Docket flo. 50-213 LS05-82 02-101 s'

$ %.d=9 FQ Mr. W. G. Counsil. Vice President de 00798 4 g Nuclear Engineering and Operations q,

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Post Office Box 270 g

Hartford, Connecticut 06101 p

Dear Mr. Counsil:

SUBJECT:

SEP TOPIC V-5, REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE DETECTION, HADDAM NECK NUCLEAR POWER STATION Enclosed is a copy of our final evaluation of SEP Topic V-5 for Haddam Neck. This assessment compares the facility, as described in Docket No. 50-213, with the criteria currently used by the staff for licensing new facilities. This revised evaluation factors in the information contained in the March 10 and June 3,1981 letters from the NRC to CYAPCo, the April 30 and August 19, 1981 comment letters from CYAPCo to NRC, pertinent infonnation contained in SEP Topic V-10.A and avail-able 10 CFR 50, Appendix I submittals for Haddam Neck.

This evaluation concludes that the Haddam Neck reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage detection systems do not pnisently conform to the recomendations of Regulatory Guide 1.45 and presents the modifications needed to establish compliance. The necessity for implementation of the modifications will be considered during the integrated safety assessment.

This assessment may be revised in the future if your facility design is changed or if HRC criteria relating to this subject are modified before the integrated assessment is completed.

Sincerely, Dennis H. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing

Enclosure:

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cc Day, Berry & Howa'rd Counselors at Law One Constitution Plaza Hartford, Connecticut 06103 Superintendent Had!.;n Neck Plant Pf a 61 Ptit Office Box 127E East Hampton, Connecticut 06424 Mr. Richard R. Laudenat Manager, Generation Facilities Licensing Northeast Utilities Service Company P. O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101 Russell Library 119 Broad Street-Middletown, Connecticut 06457 Board of Selectmen Town Hall Haddam, Connecticut 06103 State of Connecticut Office of Policy and Management ATTN: Under Secretary Energy Division 80 Washington Street Hartford, Connecticut 06115 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Region 1 Office ATTN: Regional Radiation Representative JFK Federal Building l

Boston, Massachusetts 02202 Resident Inspector Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Station c/o U. S. NRC East Haddam Post Office East Hac' dam, Connecticut 06423 Ronald C. Haynes, Regional Administrator Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I Office of Inspection and Enforcement 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

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SYSTEMATIC r' JA' ION PROGRAM TOPIC V-5 REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE BOUNUARY (RLPo) LLAKAbt UtitCTION

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1.

Introduction The safety objective of Topic V-5 is to determine the reliability and sensitivity of the leak detection systens which monitor the reactor coolant pressure boundary to identify prinary system leaks at an early stage before failures occur.

II.

Review Criteria.

The acceptance criteria for the detection of leakage from the reactor coolant pressure boundary is. stated.in the General Design Criteria of Appendix A,10 CFR Part 50. Criterion 30, " Quality of Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary,"

requires that means shall be provided for detecting and, to the extent practi-cal, identifying the location of the source of leakage in the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

III. Review Guidelines The acceptance criteria are described in the Nuclear Regul~atory Commission Standard Review Plan Section 5.2.5, " Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage '

Detection." The areas of the Safety Analysis Report and Technical Specifications are reviewed to establish that information submitted by the licensee ic in compli-ance with Regulatory Guide 1.45, " Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems."

IV.

Evaluation Safety Topic V-5 was evaluated in this review for compliance of the informa-tion submitted by the licensee with Regulatory Guide 1.45, " Reactor Coolant Pressure Bourdary Leakage Detection Systems." The information in the Safety Analysis Report and Technical Specifications, the April 12, 1979 letter from CY to the NRC regarding SEP Topic V-10. A, the April 30 and August 19, 1981 letters from NU. and CY to the NRC regarding SEP Topic V-5, and the available 10 CFR 50, Appendix I review information for Haddam Neck was reviewed.

I Regulatory Guide 1.45 recommends that at least three separate detection systems be installed in a nuclear power plant to detect an unidentified leakage from the reactor coolant pressure boundary to the primary containment of one gallon per minute within one hour.

Leakage from identified sources must be isolated so that the flow rates may be monitored separately from L

unidentified leakage.

The detection systems should be capable of performing their functions following certain seismic events and capable of being checked in the control room.

Of the three separate leak detection methods required,

two of the methods should be (1) sump le' el and flow monitoring and (2) v airborne particulate radioactivity monitoring.

The third method may be either monitoring of condensate flow rate from air coolers or monitoring of airborne gaseous radioactivity.

Other detection methods, such as humidity, temperature and pressure, should be considered to be alarms of indirect indication of leakage to the containment.

In addition, pro-visions should be made to monitor systems interfacing with the reactor coolant pressure boundary for signs of intersystem leakage through methods such as radioactivity and water level or flow monitors.

Plant incorporated systems and their corresponding features are tabulated in Enclosure 1.

Detailed guidance for the leakage detection system is contained in Regulatory Guide,1.45.

Based upon our review of the referenced documents and the summaries presented in Enclosure 1, we have determined:

1) The. systems employed for detection of leakage from the reactor coolant pressure boundary to the primary containment meet the Regulatory Guide 1.45 requirement for the types of leakage detection systems tc be employed.

However, the airborne particulatee radioactivity monitoring system does not have the required sensitivity for the detection of leaks.

of 1 gpm within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

Furthermore, this system is not seismically qualified to function following the occurrence of earthquakes up to and including the SSE, and the sump level and airborne gaseous radio-

. activity monitoring systems are not seismically qualified to function following the occurrence of earthquakes up to and including the OBE, as recommended by Regulatory Guide 1.45.

The additional Regulatory Guide 1.45 criteria are met.' (See Table 1.)

2) The Haddam Neck Technical Specifications do not impose requirements concerning the operability of the leakage detection systems to monitor leakage to the primary containment, as recommended by Regulatory Guide 1.45.

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3) Provisions are made to monitor reactor coolant in-leakage to those systems listed in Table 2 of Enclosure 1.

However; from the review l

of the referenced information it is not clear that this table includes l

all systems which interface with the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

l In addition, information concerning the leak detection methods, similar to that given for the detection systems in Table 1, is incomplete for those in Table 2.

4)

Information concerning the use of reactor coolant inve'ntory balances, as indicated in Table 3, for a determination of its usefulness for reactor coolant pressure boundary leak detection is incomplete.

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V.

Conclusions

1) The review of Table 1 indicates that the systems incorporated for measurement of leakage from the reactor coolant pressure boundary to the containment do not conform with Regulatory Guide 1.45 criteria regarding sensitivity and seismic qualification.

The necessi.ty for modifications will be considered during the integrated safety assess--

, ment.

2) Standard Technica1' Specification 3/4.4.6 and the correspondi.ng surveillance requirements concerning the operability of the reactor coolant pressure boundary to the containaent leakage detection systens (excluding ~the sump flow monitor) should be added to the Haddam Neck Technical Specifications. Also, the current Haddam Neck Technical Specification 3.14 should be revised to state that the sensitivities of the reactor coolant pressure boundary to containaent leakage detection system is 1 gpm within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> for Items 1, 4 and 7 in Table 1 of Enclosure 1.

3)

Information concerning the leakage detection systeas for the detection of intersystem reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage.and the reactor coolant inventory balance is incomplete.

Therefore, we cannot determine the extent to which Regulatory Guide 1.45 is met.

The necessity for any modifications in this area will be considered during

,the integrated safety assessment.

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COOLANT PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS Regulatory Guide 1,45 Requirements Plant: Haddam Neck

. Table 3:

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- Corresponding Time Required to

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(Normal' Inventory Check Instrumentation Required with Corresponding Location:

Earthquake For Which Instrumentation Hardware Functioning Is Assured:

Tastable During Norn.a1 Operation:

s, Documentation

Reference:

FSAR Section 1.212.3 1

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