ML20041A212
| ML20041A212 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/31/1982 |
| From: | Vanderbeek R EG&G, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041A210 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-06-03, TASK-06-04, TASK-06-07.A3, TASK-06-07.C, TASK-06-10.A, TASK-6-10.A, TASK-6-3, TASK-6-4, TASK-6-7.A3, TASK-6-7.C, TASK-RR 0625J, 625J, NUDOCS 8202190279 | |
| Download: ML20041A212 (12) | |
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0625J SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRIN TOPIC VI-7. A.3 ECCS ACTUATION SYSTEM LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR Occket No. 50-409 January 1982 R. V ancerBeek EG&G Idano, Inc.
e 1-4-82 8202190279 820217 PDR ADOCK 05000409 P
CONTENTS I
1.0 I N TR ODU CT IO N....................................................
I 2.0 CR I T ER I A........................................................
2 3.0 HIGH ?RESSURE. CORE SPR AY (S AFETY INJECTION) SYSTEM..............
2 13. 1 D es cr i p t i on...............................................
3
- 3. 2 E v a l u a t io n................................................
3 4.0 LCW PRESSURE COO LANT IN JECTION SYSTEM...........................
3 4.1 De s cr i pt i o n...............................................
4 4.2 E v a l u a t i on................................................
5 5.0 EMERGENCY SERVICE W ATER SU??LY SYSTEM...........................
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Des cription c.
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E v al u a ti o n................................................
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6 6.0 S HUT DOWN CO ND ENS ER S Y S TEM.......................................
6 6.1 De s cr i pt i o n...............................................
6 6.2 Ev aluation
.6 7.0
SUMMARY
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8.0 R E FER EN C E S......................................................
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. SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM TOPIC V I-7. A. 3 ECCS ACTUATICN SYSTEM LA. CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTCR
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The objective of this review is to determine if all Emergency Core
- Cooling System (ECCS) components, including pumos and valves, are included in component and system tests, if thi scope and frecuency of periodic test-ing are identified, and if the test program meets current licensing cri-te r ia.
The s.' stems included in the review are the Hign Pressure Core Soray (Safety Injection) System, the Lcw Pressure Ccolant Injection System, the Emergency Service Water Supply System, and the Shutdown Condenser System.
2.0 CRITERIA t
General Cesign Criterion 37 (GDC 37), " Testing of Emergency Core Cool-ing Systems," reautres that:
The ECCS be designed to permit apprcpriate periodic pressure and func-tional testing to assure the operability of the system as a whole and to verify, under conditions as close 'a design as practical, the per-formance of the full operational secuence that brings-the system into operation, including coeration of apolicable portions of the protec-tien system, the transfer between ncrmal and emergency p er sources, and the operation of the, associated cooling water system Branch Technical Position IC-SB 25, " Guidance for the, Interpretation cf GCC 37 for Tes ting the Operability of the Emergency Core Ccoling System as a Whole," states that:
All ECCS pumos should be included in the system test.
Regulatory Guide 1.22, " Periodic Testing of the Protection System Actuation Functions," states, in Section 0.1.a, that:
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The periodic tests should duplicate, as closely as practicable, the cerformance that js reauired of the actuation devices in the event of an accident.
Standard Review ?lan, Section 7.1, Acpendix 3, Guidance for Evaluation of Cenicemance to IEEE STD 279 states, in Sectico 11, that:
Periodic testing snould duplicate, as closely as practical, the overall perfcrmance reauired of the protection system. The test should confirm coerability of both the automatic and manual c ircu i try. The cacaoility should oe ;reviced to permit testing curing pcwer operation. When this capability can only se achieved by overlapping tests, the test scneme must be such that th e te s ts oo, i n f a ct, ov er la p f r om on e tes t s e gme n t to anoth er.3 Regulatory Guide 1.22 states, in Section D.a, that:
Where actuated eauipment is not tested during reacter operation, it snould be shcwn that:
a.
There is no cractical system cesign that uould permit operation of the actuated equipment without acversely affecting the safety or operability of the plant.
b.
The probability that the protection system will fail to initiate the oceration of the actuated scutoment is, and can be main-tained, acceptably low without testing the actuated eauipment during reactor ope' ration.
c.
The actuated ecuipment 'can be routinely tested wnen the reactor is snut down.
3.0 HIGH PRESSURE CORE SFRAY (SNTETY *NCECTION) SYSTEM 3.1 Des criotion.
The High Pressure Core Spray (Safety Injection)
System is designed to autcmatically actuate the injecticn of water from the overhead storage tank into the core spray header wnich supplies the lines leading to a spray nozzle just above each fuel assembly.
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Ooeration of the High Pressure Core Soray (Safety Injection) System is initiated automatically oy an actuation signal generated upon icw reactor The hign pres-water level or 5ign centainment building internal pressure.
individu'al control sure core spray pumps can be started and tripped with swittnes in -he centrol room.
However, an interlock crevents manual starting of the pumps unless the reactor is scransned.
The La Crosse' Technical Specifications recuire the
- 3. 2 Ev alua tion.
hign pressure core spray system controls and remotely-operated valves be tested semi-annually to cemonstrate operability.
A systems integrated test The annual' test is to be performed annually to cetermine proper operation.
includes a determination of ne differential pressure between the coolant spray,line and the reactor vessel.
The High Pressure Core Soray (Safety Injection) System is not tested frem ' the automatic and manual actuation devices through to the estaolish-ment of flow through to the core scray. header during reactor operation, as Test-specified by Standard Review Plan Section 7.1, Acendix 3, Section 11.
ing of the High Pressure Core Soray System during reactor operation is not practical 'with the presenti system design; for this reason the Licens'ee has recuested relief from testing the core spray pumps and associated system The evaluation made in the Safety Evalua-
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valves during reacter operatien.
tion Report EC4-EA-5274 en the inservice testing program for La Crosse concludes that a proposed testing frecuency during cold shutdown should denenstrate ; roper pumo and valve operation. The proposed testing would then ccmply with Regulater'y Guide 1.22 Section D. A.c, whicn allows routine testing when.the reactor is shutcown; however, whether a semi-annual con.
tre.ls and valve test er an annual systems integrated test can be classified as routine and adeouate will not be handled in this tocic.
- a. 0 LCW PRESSURE COOLANT INICTION SYSTEM i
The Low Pressure Ccolant Injection System is' 4.1 Des criction.
designed to provide additional ecoling water to the ccre under the condi-tions of low reactor pressure, icw reactor water level, and high reactor building. pressure Ehich would exist following the maximum credible accident 3
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This system also provides the means of ficcding tne reacter build-(MCA).
Acoroximacely 900 gpm of ecoling water can de suo-ing f ollowing an MCA.
l a nozzle in the top heao of the reacter vessel ano impinged plied through The cooling en perforated deflecter plates located above the reacter core.
- ater is sucalled frem the river by either of two diesel-driven service Two parallel control valves are water pumos located in the crib house.
provided in the line to the reactor and both cpen en signal, providing redundant paths for coolant injection.
The La Crosse Tecnnical Soecifications reautre tne 4.2 Evaluation.
Low Pressure Coolant Injecticn System controls and remotely-operated valves A systems integrated ce tested semi-annually to ceronstrate ccerab ility.
l test is to be performed annually with the supply line to the reactor vesse isolated and tne cooiant ficw directec througn the system and back to the In addition, an annual test is performec to demonstrate that the r iv er.
in the closed position.
check valves in the system are not stu'ck The Low Pressure Ccolant Injection System is not tested from tne auto-actuation cevices thecugn to the estaolisnnent of flow matic and manual through to the supply nozzle in the top head of the reacter vessel during reactor coeration as specified by Standard Review Plan Section 7.1, Appen-The Licensee has requested rellef from testing the Low dix 3 Section 11.
Pressure Coolant Injection System valves during reactor cperation because it wculd introduce river water into the stainless-steel core soray system supply line, which would recuire flusning the system clean in ceder to precluce ccnditions susceptable to stress corrosien and would result in The Safety Evaluation, Report EGG-EA-5274 shutting cown reactor operation.
agrees that a temocrary relief should be granted, but recommends tnat the licensee ceveloo a method to exercise full strcke operation at least each The reautred testing fer tne Lew Pressure Coolant Injec-refueling cutage.
tion System coes not conform with the testing criteria of Regulatory Guice 1.22 and GDC 37, but does comply to the criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.22, Section 0.4.c.
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5.0 EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM 5.1 - Descriotion.
The Emergency Service Water Suoply System is designed to supoly an additional alternate cooling source to the reactor.
The system enchances the safety factor in a seismic event here free field liauefaction at the Safe Shutdown Earthauake may cause f ailure of the Crib Mcuse structure and the uncerground hign pressure service water piping connecting the Crib House to the Turbine.Suilding.
The system consists of isolation valves to truncate tne potentially damaged systems inside the Turbine Building (thus' closing the pathway to seismically damaged piping), portable pumps capaole of drawing a suction from th*. Mississippi River and the necessary hoses and hardware to connect e
the pumps to the Turbine Suilding piping, either inside the building or from the outs i ch.
The system. is' capable of supplying 900 gpm flow rate against a 50 psig reactor pressure. The system installed oiping can supply water to the High Pressure Core Soray System, the Alternate Core Spray System, the Fire Suppress ion Systems, the Shutdown, Condenser and the Low Pressure Service Water System (which is the ultimate heat-sink for decay heat).
5.2 Ev al ua tion. The la Crosse Technical Specifications reauire the Emergency Service Water Sucply System be snewn operable by performing an integrated system test which directs coolant flow thrcugn the Alternate
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Core Soray System (Low Pressure Coolant Injection System) test loop and back to the river every 18 months.
The valves, gasoline driven pumps and interconnecting hosing are periodically tested to demonstrate opersoility.
The Emergency Service Water Sucply System is not tested from tne automatic and manual actuation through to the estaolishcent of ficw to the reactor during reactor operation as specified by Standard Review plan Sec-tion 7.1, Appendix 3, Section 11.
Testing of the Emergency Service Water Sucply System during operation is not practical because it would introcuce river water into the reactor coolant system. Therefore, testing of the 5
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4 systen during reactor snutdown complies with Regulatory Guide 1.22, Section D.4.1.c.
6.0 - SHUTDOWN - CONDENSER SYSTEM 6.1 Descr iotion. The Shutdown Concenser System is designed to condense reactor steam when the reactor is isolated from the main condens upon closure of the reactor building steam isolation valve or the turbine builcing steam isolation valve. The system is automatically actuated when (1) the reactor building steam isolation valve is not fully open, (2) the turbine building steam isolation valve is not fully open,.or (3) the reactor pressure is above 1325 psig. When the sysem is initiated autom#tically, the steam inlet valve and the off-gas vent valve to the waste gas system open immediately.
The Shutdown Condenser System control valves are I
6.2 Evaluation.
. tested ouarterly to demonstrate their operability and an integrated system test is perforned annually. However, there are no established recuirements in the la Crosse Technical Specifications reauiring channel checks and The Shutdown Condenser System is not tested calibration for the system.
or the automatic and manual actuation during reactor operation as f
' specified by Standard Review Plan Section 7.1, Appendix 3, Section 11'.
1 Testing' of the Shutdown Concenser System during reactor operation is not practical, therefore an annual integrated system test during shutdown does comply to the criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.22, Section 0.4.c.
7.0 SU14ARY i
L The review of the reference Taterial has determined the following in regard to the testing. and testao flity of tne systems reviewed.
e The High Pressure Core Spray System does not meet'tne current 1.
criteria for testabilty during reactor operation as specified by
[
Hon-Standard Review Plant Section 7.1, Appendix B, Section 11.
ever, La Crosse has requested relief.from the reauirement and 6
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intends to, conform to tne requirement of Regulatory Guice 1.22, Section D.4.c.
2.
The Low Pressure Coolant Injection System does not. meet the cur-
- ent criteria for testaoility during reactor operation as
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. specified by Standard Review Plan Section 7.-1, Appendix 3, Sec-tion 11. However, La Crosse has recuested relief from the recuirement and intends to conform to the requirement of Regula-tory Guide 1.22, Section 0.4.c.
TheEmergencyServiceUaterSupolySystemdoesnotmeetthetur-3.
rent criteria f:r testability during reactor coeration as speci-fied by Standard Review Plan Section 7.1, *ppendix 3, Section 11, out does comply to the criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.22, Sec-tion D.A.c.
The shutdown condenser system coes not meet the current criteria 4
for testability during reactor operation as specified by Standard Review Plan Section 7.1, Apoendix 3, Section 11, but does comply to the criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.22, Section D.4.c.
It is left to the NRC Staff to determine whether.the existing testing of the systems is adequate to establisn that the probability of system f ailure is acceptably low.
3.0 REFERENCES
Aopendix A to Provisional Cperating Authorization No. OPRA-6, 1.
Technical Specifications for tne '.a Crosse Soiling Water Reactor (LACSWR).
General Design Criterion 37, " Testing of Emergency Core Cooling Sys-2.
tem," of Apoendix A, " General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," 10 CFR Part 50, " Domestic Licensing of Production and Utili-zation Facilties."
Branch Technical ?osition ICSS 25, "Guicance for the interpretation of 3.
GDC 37 for ~esting the Operatility of the Emergency Core Cooling Sys-tem as a Whole.
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Regulatory Guide 1.22, " Periodic Testing cf the Protection System-Actuation EUnCtions."
5.
Nuclear Regulatory Comission Standard Revfew-Plan, Section 7.1, Appendix 8, " Guidance for Evaluation of Conformance to IEEE STD 279."
' 5.
EGG-EA-5274, " Safety Evaluatien Report 'nservice Testing Program, t.a Crosse Boiling Water Reactor," by J. M. Fehringer and H. C. Rockhold, l
1 November 1980.
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c SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM TOPIC VI-7.A.3 LA CROSSE TOPIC:
VI-7.A.3, ECCS ACTUATION SYSTEM I.
INTRODUCTION The CCS actuationsystem was reviewed with respect to the testability of operability and performance of individual active components of the system and of the entire system as a whole under conditions as close to the design condition as practical. The purpose of the reviews was to assure that all ECCS components (e.g. valves and pumps) are included in the component and system test and to assure that the scope of the periodic testing is adequate and meets the requirements of GDC 37.
The technical specifications were also audited for large differences between the present test requirements and those in the Standard Technical Specifi-cations.
II.
REVIEW CRITERIA The current licensing criteria are identified in Section 2 of EG&G Report 0625J, "ECCS Actuation System."
III.
RELATED SAFETY TOPICS AND INTERFACES The scope of review for this topi.c was limited to avoid duplication of effort since some aspects of the review were performed under related topics.
The related topics and the subject matter are identified below.
Each of the related topic reports contain the acceptance criteria and review guid-ance for its subject matter.
Topic VI-3,
" Containment pressure and Heat Removal Capability."
Topic VI-4,
" Containment Isolation System."
Taoic VI-7..
" Emergency Core Cooling System.",
"ECCS Single Failure Criterion and Requirements for Topic VI-7.C.
Locking Out Power to Valves Including Independence uf Interlocks on ECCS Valves."
Topic VI-9,
" Main Steam Isolation."
Topic VI-10.A,
" Testing of Reactor Trip System and Engineered Safety Features, Including Response Time Testing."
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Only Topic VI-10.A is dependent on the present topic information for completion.
Response time testing is addressed in Topic VI-10.A.
IV.
REVIEW GUIDELINES The review guidelines are presented in Section 3 and 4 of Report 0625J.
V.
EVALUATION Report 0625J describes the extent to which the ECCS actuation system is tested, except for the question of response time testing.
In summary, the safety systems do not meet the review criteria because of inadequacies in the current test program.
VI.
CONCLUSION Based upon our review of our contractor's evaluation, the staff concludes that Lacrosse conforms to current licensing criteria except for the Tech-nical Specifications.
The staff recommends 'Je following changes in the Technical Specifications:
1.
The Low Pressure Coolant Injection System valves shall be subjected to a system level, no flow, test annually when shutdown.
This test shall demonstrate proper, automatic valve functioning while the diesel service water pumps are locked out.
Upon completion, the diesels shall be tested to assure that they have been returned to service.
2.
The senst rs that initiate isolation condenser operation shall be cal-ibrated on a schedule of 1 out of N sensors each 30 days such that all sensors are tested every N months.
Proposed change 1 above is consistent with past staff recommendttions in this regard.
Change 2 is consistent with present staff requirements for other boiling water reactors.
Because limit switches and blind pressu'e sensors are used, channel checks and system tests are not practical.
Problems with range and accuracy have created set point problems that require. frequent cal-ibration of blind sensors in other plants.
- The staff's judgement is that the system test frequencies are sufficient.
Our judgement is based on operating experience. The test frequencies can be changed if additional experience indicates that such action is necessary.
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