ML20040H463
| ML20040H463 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/22/1982 |
| From: | Vanderbeek R EG&G, INC. |
| To: | NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20040H461 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-06-07.A3, TASK-6-7.A3, TASK-RR 0579J, 579J, NUDOCS 8202180280 | |
| Download: ML20040H463 (13) | |
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SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION ?ROGRAM.
TOPIC VI-7. A. 3.
ECCS ACRIAT!0N SYSTEM i
I HADDAM NECK i
e Occket No. 50-213 i
January 1982 1
R. VanderSeek j
EG&G Idaho, Inc.
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1 1-22-82 8202180200 820211 PDR ADOCK 05000213 PDR P
CONTENTS' I
1.O IND 00UC+s.ON....................................................
T 2.0 CRITERIA........................................................
.1 2
3.0 HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM...........................
4 2
3.1 Description...............................................
3 3.2 Evaluation................................................
4 a.C CHARGING SYSTEM.................................................
4 4.1 Description...............................................
5 a.2 E v a l u a t i on................................................
6 5.0 1.0W ?RESSURE SAFETY INJECTION SYS EM (Core Deluge )..............
6 5.1 Descriptien...............................................
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5.2 Evaluation................................................
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r 6.0 SDMMARY.........................................................
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7.0 R EF E R EN CE S......................................................
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SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION ?ROGRAM TOPIC VI-7.A.3 ECCS ACTUATION SYSTEM HACDAM NECX 1.0 INTRODUCT!ON The objective of this review is to determine if all Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) components, including' pumos and valves, are included in component and system tests, if the scope and frecuency of periodic test-ing are identified, and if the test program meets current licensing cri-teria. The systems included in the ECCS are the High Pressure Safety injection System, the Char ing System, and' :ne '.ow Pressure Safety :njec-tion (Cort Oeluge) System.
2.0 CRITERIA General Design Criterion 37 (GDC 37), "Tes:ing of Emergency Core Cool-ing Systems," require that:
The ECCS be designed to permit appropriate periodic pressure and functional testing to assure the operability of the system as a whole and to verify, uncer conditions as close to design as prac-tical, the perf ormance of the full operational sequence that brings the system into operation, including coeration of appli-cable portions of the protection system, the transfer between normal and emergency power souregs, and the operation of the associated cooling water system.
Branch Tecnnical Position ICSB ZE, "Guicance for the Interpretation of GDC 37 for Testing the Oderability of the Emergency Core Cooling System as a Whole," states that:
All ECCS pumps should be included in the system test.
Regulatory Guide 1.22, " Periodic Testing of the Protection System Actuation Functions," states, in Section 0.1.a, that:
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The oeriodic tests should duolicate, as closely as oracticable, the performance jhat is reouired of the actuation devices in the event of an accit 'nt.
Standard Review Plan, Section 7.1,' Appendix 3, Guidance.for Evaluation of Ccnformance to IEEE STD 279 states, in Section 11, that:
Periodic testing should duplicate, as closely as practical, the overall performance required of the protection system. The test should confirm operability of both tne automatic and T.anual circuitry. The cacaoility should be provided to permit testing during power operation. When this capability can only be achieved by overlapping tests, the test scheme must be such that tne tests do, in f act, overlap from one test segment to another.'
Regulatory Guice 1.22 states, in Section D.4, that:
Where actuated equipment is not tested during reacter operation, it should be shown that:
1.
There is no practical system design that would permit operation of the actuated equipment without adversely affecting the safety or operability of the plant.
2.
The ' probability that the protection system will f ail te initiate the operation of. the actuated equipment.is, and can be maintained, acceptably low without testing the actuated ecuipment during reactor operation.
3.
The actuated equipment can be routinely tested unen the reactor-4 is shut down.
3.0 HIGH PRESSURE S'FETY INJECTION SYSTEM 3.1 Descriotion.
The High Pressure Safety Injection System is designed to automatically actuate the injection of borated water from the refueling nater storage tank into the four reactor coolant loops.
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Operation of the High ?ressure Safety Injection System is initiated automatically by an actuation signal generated as a result of two out of three low pressurizer pressure signals. The system may also te actuated manually frcm the main control room.
To prevent autcoatic operation while the reactor is cold and depressurized, the actuation signal is blocked manually when reactor coolant system cressure is belcw 1,700 psig. The signal is unblocked automatically when reactor ccolant system pressure rises above 1,700 psig.
s The safety injection signal starts all pumos and actuates all valves in the process ficw. Within 10 seconds after tne initiation signal is genera'ed, the two safety injection pumos can deliver borated refueling water at full rated ficw to a header supolying fcur independent injection lines, one to the cold leg of each loop.
3.2 Evaluation. The Hacdam Neck Technical Specifications require testing and surveillance as follows for the High ?ressure Injection System.
a.
Testing and Surveillance During Refueling Shutdown i
1.
During each refueling shutdown, a test signal is applied-to initiate a loss of normal AC power to each of the emergency power systems while a coincident signal initiates the opera-tion of the High ?ressure Safety Injection System.
2.
Verification is made that the diesei cenerator and its associated pumps have started in the proper sequence and that the high pressure safety injection pumps attain a required discharge' head of 1300 psig. The test is con-sidered satisf,3ctory oy the licensee if control board indicat'on anc visual observations incicate all components have operated and sequenced procerly.
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'g-Testing and Surveillance Curing Reactor Ooeration b.
1.
Each of the high pressure safety injection pumps.are individually test run on recirculation on a monthly basis.
2.
All safety injection valves are cycled under "no flow" con-ditions.on a monthly ' oasis.
3.
If one of the high pressure safety injection pumps is out of service, the remaining pump shall be tested within two hours and at subsequent intervals of not greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
During normal operating periods, a manual test is concucted 4
to demonstrate operaoility. The test is performed on a monthly basis in accordance with written orocedures.
The Hign Pressure Safety Injection System is not tested from the auto-matic and manual actuation devices thrcugh to the establishment of flow througn tne safety injection header during reactor operation,'as specified Because actua-by Standarc Review Plan Section 7.1, Appendix 3, Section 11.
tion of the High Pressure Safety Injection System would result in the.,
injection of borated water into the reactor, hampering operation, compliance The fo'r testing the system during reactor operation is deemed impractical.
present testing of the Hign Pressure Safety Injection System does conform to the testing criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.22 and GDC 37.
J.0 CHARGING SYSTEM The Charging System is cesigncd to automatically a.1 Descriotion.
actuate the injection of borated water from the refueling water storage tank into the reactor coolant system.
Operation of the Charging System is initiated automatically when the Upon receiving the High Pressure Safety Injection System is actuated.
initiating signal the suction of the two centrifugal cnarging pumps is automatically transferred from the volume control tank to the refueling 4~
water storage tank and borated water is delivered througn the charging lines to the cold leg of loop 2 and tne hot leg of loop 4 Injection of torated water aill continue until the indication of the pressurizer water level 'is adequate for estaolishing recirculation flow through the safety injectico pumps and/or charging pumps.
If acequate, the coerator will terminate the injection of borated water and begin recirculation ficw.
4.2 Evaluation. The Haddam Neck Technical Specifications require testing and surveillance as follows for the Charging System.
a.
Testing anc Surveillance During Refueling Shutdown 1.
During each refueling snutdown, a test signal is applied to initiate a loss of normal AC cower to each of the emergency power systems anile a :oincident signal initiates the coera-tion of the Charging System.
2.
Verification is made that the diesel generator and its associated pumos have started in the proper sequence anc that the charging pumps attain a required discnarge head of 2150 psig. The test is considered satisfactory by the licensee if control board incication and visual observations indicate all ccmpcnents have operated and sequenced properly.
b.
Testing and Surveillance Curing Reactor Operation 1.
Each of the charging pumps are individually tested.
2.
All valves associated with the Charging System are cycled l
under "no ficw" conditions on a monthly basis.
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During normal coerating periods, a manual test is conducted to demonstrate operability. The test is performed en a monthly basis in accordance with written procecures.
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The Charging System is not tested from the automatic actuation devices througn to the establishment of flow to loop 2 and 4 injection lines during reactor operation, as specified by Standaro Review ?lan Section 7.1, Appen-dix 3, Section 11.
Because actuation of tne Charging System would result in the injection of borated dater into the reactor, hampering operation, c:mpliance for testing the system curing reactor operation is ceemed impractical. The present testing of the charging system coes conform to the testing criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.22 and GDC 37.
S.0 LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM (Core Deluge) 5.1 Descriction. The Core Deluge System is designed to inject large auantities of borated water directly into the reactor vessel if reactor I
coolant pressure drops substantially as a result of a loss of coolant inci-cent.
The water, pumped into tne reactor vessel through four spare control rod mechanism housings and internal piping, is discharged directly over the reactor core.
The Core Deluge System is a completely incependent backup system for core cooling, used in the event of large reactor coolant system ruptures.
i The system's path of access, mode of cooling water celivery, and design ~-
characteristics are such as to assure core cladding immersion in steam and cascading water so that core camage and metal-water reictions are minimized.
Performance of the Core Deluge System is based on operation of one of two resioual heat removal pumps with or without normal auxiliary power sources.
The residual heat removal pumos can also be used to provice a containment l
spray for post-incident containment pressure control if desired.
Coeration of the Core Deluge System is initiated au'tcmatically by an l
actuation signal gencrated as a result of two out of three low pressurizer cressure signals.
The system may also be actuated manually from the main i
control rocm.
To prevent automatic coeration while the reactor is cold and i
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cepressurized, the actuation signal is blocked manually nnen reactor cool-ant system pressure is below 1,700 psig. The signal is unblocked auto-matically when reactor coolant system pressure rises aoove 1,7CO.psig.
5.2 Evaluation. The Haddam Neck Technical Specifications. require -
. testing and surveillance as follows for the Low Pressure Safety Injection System (Core Deluge).
Testing and Surveillance During Refueling Shutdown a.
During each refueling -shutdown, a test signal is applied to 1.
initiate a loss of normal AC power to each of the emergency power systems anile a coincident signal initiates the opera-tion of the Low Pressure Safety Injection System.
2.
Verification is made that the diesel generator and its associated pumps have started in tne proper sequence and that the icw pressure safety injection pumps attain a required discharge head of 295 psig. The test is considered satisf actory by the licensee if control board indication and visual observations indicate all ccmponer.ts have operated and sequenced properly.
Testing and Surveillance During Reactor Operation -
b.
1.
Each of the icw pressure safety injection pumps are individually test run en recirculation en a monthly basis.
All low pressure safety injection valves are cycled under 2.
"no flow" condition,s on a monthly basis.
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If one of the icw pr essure safety injection pumps is out of 3.
service, the remaining pump shall be testeo within two hours l
and at subsequent intervals of not greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
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4 Curing normal Operating cericos, a manual test is conducted to demor. strate operability. The test is performed on a monthly basis in accoraance with written procacures.
1 The Lew Pressure Safety Injection System is not tested frcm the manual and automatic actuation devices through to the establishment of flow to the discharge' lines during reactor operation as specified by Standard Review Plan Section 7.1, Appendix 3, Section 11. Other than the exception above the present testing of the Low' Pressure Safety Injection System does con-form to tne testing criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.22 and GDC 37.
6.0 S'UMMARY ine rollowing has been determined pertaining to the testing and test-ability of the Hacdam Neck ECCS.
I 1.
Because system testing during reactor operat. 'n would cause injection of borated water into the reactor, testing of the High Pressure Safety Injection and Charging Systems during reactor operation is deemed impractical.
2.
The present testing of the ECCS conforms to the current testing criteria of Regulatory Guide ?.22 and GDC 37.
It is left to the NRC Staff to cetermine anether enougn Derating experience at Hadcam Neck can establish that nonc:mpliance to Standard Review Plan Section 7.2, Appendix 3, Section 11, assures a low prtbability
.cf system f ailure.
6.0 REFERENCES
1.
"Haddam Neck Plant Facility Description and Safety Analysis (FSAR)"
Revised through Acril 1,1977, Volume 1, Secticn 5.2.7, Emergency Core Cooling System.
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2.
General Design Criterion 37, " Testing of Emergency Core Cooling Sys-tem," of Appendix A, " General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," 10 CFR P ar- ~50, " Domestic Licensing of Production and Utili-zation Facilities."
3.
? ranch Technical ?0sition ICSB 25, " Guidance for the Interpretation of GDC 37 for Testing the Operability of the Emergency Core Ccoling Sys-tem as a 'Whole."
4 Regulatory Guide 1.22, " Periodic Testing of the Protection System-Actuation Functions."
5.
Nuclear Regul atory Commission Standard Review Plan, Section 7.1, Appendix B, " Guidance for Evaluation of Conformance to IEEE STD 279."
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SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM TOPIC VI-7.A.3 HADDAM NECK TOPIC:
VI-7.A.3, ECCS ACTUATION SYSTEM I.
INTRODUCTION The ECCS actuation ystem was reviewed with respect to the testability s
of operability and performance of individual active components of the system and of the entire hystem as a whole under conditions as close to the design condition as practical.
The purpose of the reviews was to assure that all ECCS components (e.g. valves and pumps) are included in the component and system test and to assure that the scope of the periodic testing is adequate and meets the requirements of GDC 37. The technical specifications were also audited for large differences between the present test requirements and those in the Standard Technical Specifi-cations.
II.
REVIEW CRITERIA The current licensing criteria are identified in Section 2 of EG&G Report 0579J, "ECCS Actuation System."
III.
RELATED SAFETY TOPICS AND INTERFACES The scope of review for this topic was limited to avoid duplication of '
effort since some aspects of the review were performed under related topics.
The related topics and the subject matter are identified below.
Each of the related topic reports contain the acceptance criteria and review guid-ance for its subject matter.
Topic VI-3,
" Containment Pressure and Heat Removal Capability."
Topic VI-4,
" Containment Isolation System."
Topic VI-7.-
" Emergency Core Cooling System.",
"ECCS Single Failure Criterion and Requirements for Topic VI-7.C.
Locking Out Power to Valves Including Independence of Interlocks on ECCS Valves."
Topic VI-9,
" Main Steam Isolation."
Topic VI-10.A.
" Testing of Reactor Trip System and Engineered Safety Features Including Response Tine Testing."
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Only Topic VI-10.A is dependent on the present topic information for completion.
Response time testing is addressed in Topic VI-10.A.
IV.
REVIEW GUIDELINES The review guidelines are presented in Sections 3 and 4 of Report 0579J.
V.
EVALUATION Report 0579J describes the exterit to which the ECCS actuation system is tested, except for the question of response time testing.
In summary, the safety systems meet the review criteria.
VI.
CONCLUSION Based upon our review of our contractor's evaluation, the staff concludes that Haddam Neck conforms to current licensing criteria.
Operating experience sustains the technical evaluation prepared by our contractor.
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