ML20040F556
| ML20040F556 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 01/28/1982 |
| From: | Walker R HOUSE OF REP., SCIENCE, SPACE & TECHNOLOGY (FORMERLY |
| To: | Palladino N NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8202090340 | |
| Download: ML20040F556 (1) | |
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COVEMNMENT OPEM ATIONS D.N C.7%,.S SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY X1cust of Representatibt$
ELutingtm,D.C. 20515 January 28, 1982 Honorable Annunzio Palladino Chairman Nuclear Regtilatory Commission 1717 H Street, NW Washington D.C.
20555
Dear Mr. Palladino:
I have enclosed a copy of a recent letter of the Union of Concerned Scientists to Governor Richard Thornburgh.
Because of the seriousness of the charges made, I feel it would be appropriate to have your response to the issues addressed in the letter.
Accordingly, I would respectfully appreciate hearing from you concerning this matter at your earliest convenience.
I look forward to hearing from you.
- dially,
/
obert S. Walker de 2/3..To ED0 to Prepare Response for Signature of EDO..Date due:
Feb 18..Cpys to: RF, OCA to Ack, docket.. 82-88 (tbte: exparte per OGC) 1 GO9u3Y
lIN!ON 'OF uds Connecticui Avenue. N.W.
Dupont Circle Building. Suite 1101
,]Q(dClihld[l).
Washington, D.C. 20036 QCIENTISTS K
(202) 29s.ssoo C
.2 January 26, 1982
{
Honorable Richard Thornburgh Governor j
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 h
Dear Governor ThornburS :
'We are writing in response to the NRC staff's letter to you of January 5, 1982, regarding the restart of Three Hile Island Unit 1.
The most charitable interpretation of that letter is that it is. grossly misleading.
A more frank appraisal is that it is deliberately deceptive.
As you recall, your letter of November 20, 1981 to the -Chairman of -the Nuclear Regulatory Commission forwarded for review letters you h.'d received from U.S.
Rep. Morris K. Udall, dated July 23, 1981, and from UCS, dated' October 19, 1981.
You urged Chairman Palladino "to conduct a careful and objective review" of the questions surrounding the safety of restarting THI-1 that were raised by Rep. Ucall and UCS.
You suggested that if ther.e were 4
"any Unit 1 safety questions that have yet to be satisfactorily addressed,-
now is the time for the NRC to address them."
Finally, you requested "a written re'sponse. from (Chairman Palladino] or this) staff reflecting NRC's view of the various points raised by UCS and Rep. Udall."
The NRC staff characterized its reply to your expression of a " paramount concern for the health and safety of the people who live within the shadow of Three Mile Island" as an " interim response."
However, it is clear that the NRC staff did not address the' questions you posed.
There is no evidence that the staff carefully and objectively reviewed the substantive issues raised by i
UCS and Rep. Udall.
Tne. staff avoids saying whether any Unit 1 safety l
questions have yet to be satisfactorily addressed or, if so, whether the NRC has any plans to address them now.
Instead, the staff's' letter purports to
" summarize Staff positions on the several technical and procedural issues i
raised."
'If the NRC hnql simply failed to respond to your questions,* we would not need to bring that self-evident fact to.your dttention.
Our reason for writing now is that the NRC staff has not only declined to address the safety c
concerns that you articulated, but in addition has. presented you with information that does not re flect the whole truth.
In our view, the staff l
has attempted to create an impression more favorable to restart of TMI-1 than it knows is warranted.
l l
l l
4 (617)547-5552 -
Camoridge, M A 02238
+
Massachusetts Ottice:
1384 Massachusetts Avenue
~2-Rep. Udall's Letter Consider, for example, the staff's response to the issues raised by Rep. Udall.
Mr. Udall pointed to the continu ing resistance by GPU to requirements instituted for purposes of correcting deficiencies revealed by inquiries into the accident." ' He cited as an example GPU's resistance t-the
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requirement to install water level instrumentation for the reactor vessel.
Rep. Udall concluded with the following observation:
The reluctance of GPU to meet the flRC requirement, to say nothing of its failure to go the extra mile, suggests that, the current TMI management, as did its predecessor, holds that the plant-systems as they exist are adequate to cope with anticipated events; they appear to believe that unanticipated events simply will not occur.
This is of course the same line of thinking that led to GPU's present predicament.
Thus, Rep. Udall's letter can fairly be characterized as expressing concern primarily abaut GPU's attitude and only secondarily about water level instrumentation.
The staff's response is to acknowledge only the example and not to address the fundamental issue of GPU's attitude.
In addition, even this limited response does not accurately represent the staff's views.
In its letter to you, the staff said:
GPU has revised its position on this matter and has now cot:nitted to installation of a system in the Reactor
[ Coolant] System (RCS) hot leg piping which will provide an indication of RCS inventory loss.
This system is currently being reviewed by the Staff and ss.ne design modifications are expected to be required b' fore the system is installed at the e
next TMI-1 refueling outage.
This statement does not convey the same message as the report the staff gave the !!RC Commissioners on the TMI-1 water level instrumentation only a week before its letter to you.
In a memorandum r the Commissioners dated December 29, 1981, the staff said:
A single dp [ differential pressure) measurement over the top 10 feet of the hoc leg (as propos ed for TMI-1) would detect voiding at the top of the candy cane.
It will probably track hot leg level for a sufficient distance to distinguish between over cooling transients and a loss of coolant inventory indicative of an approach to core uncovery.
It would also provide valuabl'e informstion to support reactor' coolant system venting operations and to confirm that natural circulation operation. is not interrupted by voiding in the candy cane.
However, it would not trend. voiding with the pumps running and would not indicate void formation in the reactor vessel head until vessel water level reaches the hot leg nozzle.
It would also fail to provide a continuous
._=
~.
indication of coolant inventory loss proceeding to core uncovery, and would not track the replenishing of coolant
- As presently proposed, the single dp inventory.
measurement over the top 10 feet of the hot leg is unacceptable to the staff. (emphasis added)
' The inability of the proposed instrumentation to detect the formation of a steam bubble void in the reactor vessel and the inability to measure the e x t e n t.
of core uncovery are major deficiencies.
In view of these deficiencies and the staff's conclusion that the proposed TMI-1 instrumentation design is unacceptable, w? believe that the staff's statement to you that "some design modifications are expected to be required" was misleading.
The staff's phrasing is akin to saying that a proposed automobile design that does not include wheels and an engine is acceptable although some design modifications,may be required.
'In sum, the NRC staff's. response to the matters raised by Rep. Udall consists of ignoring the principal issue of GPU's attitude and failing to accurately inform you that the. staff found GPU's belatedly proposed design changes to be unacceptable.
UCS's Letter Regarding the staff's handling of the safety issues. raisec oy UCS, it is clear that the staff did not address the substance of those issues:
- 1) The NRC's focus on quick, cheap fixes that ignore the more serious problems revealed by the TMI-2 accident; 2)
The restrictions in the scope of the herrings which prevented consideration of important questions about the safety of restarting i
D1I-1; 3)- Reducing NRC's standard of safety to the lowest common denominator by ignoring safety problems th t are not unique to THI-1; I
4)
NRC's repeated extension of deadlines for implementing the THI-2
" lessons learned" requirements.af ter pressure from the nuclear industry; and
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- 5) The retraction or substantial weakening of comnitments made by the NRC staff and GPU Nuclear to make improvements directly related to the causes of the THI-2 accident.
l Like the response to tne matters raised by Rep. Udall, the staff's answer to the safety questions raised by UCS consists of ignoring the l
principal issues and providing misleading information on -the examples.
A brief discussion of just one subject, environmental qualification of safety l
equipment, will illustrate the deceptive nature of the staff's response.to you.
L-
e j
-4~
1 Environmental qualification of safety equipment involves demonstrating that.the equipment which is needed to safely shut down the plant in an accident can survive the environment that it will be ex posed to during the
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accident.
In our earlier letter to you, we pointed out that the staff's testimony had not addressed accidents such as steam line breaks and, even' for small break loss-of-coolant ' accidents, had been limitsd to an. accident of much smaller dimension than. the THI-2 accident.
We also noted that limitations on the scope of the hearings had prevented UCS from presenting evidence that many safety-related components in THI-1 have not been qualified i
1 to survive serious accidents.
Finally, we expressed our doubts that the NRC staff and GPU Nuclear would honor their promises to correct the environmental I
qualification deficiencies at THI-1 by July 1982.
t In its response the staff acknowledges the accuracy of one. of our I
statements, but misleads you on the remainder of the issues we raised.
The staff states that its testimony was " directed (rather than UCS's term
" limited"] to the ability of equipment to function following a small break Since the loss of coolant accident (SBLOCA) not involving core damage.
]
THI-2 accident was a small break loss-of-coolant accident-that involved l
substantial core damage, this - confirms that the staff analyzed only.an j
accident of the same type as, but less serious than, the THI-2 accident.
L Next the steff states its position favoring " interim operation" of.THI-1 until GPU can " complete the actions required, for all operating plants under the Commission's Memorandum and Order CLI-80-21 dated May 27, 1980 to demonstrate thz t all safety-related electrical equipment will be qualified to j.
withstand accident environments."
CLI-80-21 specifies that all safety-related electrical equipment in all opeating clants.nust be environmentally qualified by June 30, 1982. (11 NRC 707, 714, 715)
- However, the staff neglected to tell you that since July 1981, it has su;iported a
request to extend that deaf.ine.
In October and November 1981, the staff prepared proposals for Comissio'n consideration to accomplish that objective.
l Just two days after the staff's letter to you,
.a. majority. of the i
Cor=issisners voted for a proposed rule which, if adopted, will extend the June 30, 1982 " deadline" to the end of the second refueling after March 31, 1982. (See Inside N.R.C., January 11, 1982, p.
- 1) Thus, the situation is now even worse than when we last wrote you.
GPU apparently will not be required to cor rect the environmental qualification deficiencies at TMI-1 until 1984 at the earliest.
Furthermore, the proposed rule does not apply to all safety
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equipment.
" Additional electrical equipment important to safety will be covered in a later rule, NRC said." (Id.)
It would be pure speculation to attempt to estimate when or even if all the safety equipment in TMI-1 will be
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required to be environmentally. qualified.
The next. point in the staff's response which we believe is misleading is, the statement that "(a]lthough qualification of all of the equipment has not
.been fully demonstrated, many of the inabilitics to fully demonstrate compliance involve a lack of documentation of confirmatory test results to support a finding that the equipment is qualified."
This statement creates false impression that most of the remaining problems involve only a few the missing pieces of paper or the performance of some perfunctory tests that will not provide any new information.
In reality, the situation is far worse and the staff knows it.
In urging the Commissioners to extend the June 30,
- - - -. - = - - - -.. - -,
I 1982 de'adline, the staff informed the Commissioners that " licensee submittals to date do not satisfactorily identify all deficiencies or provide complete justification for interim operation
" (Staff Recommendations Concerning Extension of June 30, 1982 Deadline for Environmental Qnalification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment, July 31, 1981, p.
2)
The staff also informed the Commissioners that its " review to date has determined that full qualification has not yet been demonstrated for approximately 80% of the equipme.nt in a harsh environment" and that it estimated "that 15-40% of the equipment in a harsh environment will need to be replaced." (Id.)
The start's own " Safety Evaluation Report for the Environmental
' Qualification o f. Safety-Related Electrical Equipment at Three Mile Island Unit 1, ". dated March 24, 1981, discloses that environmental qualification deficiencies exist in the following safety systems: Emer gency - Core Cooling; Core Flood; Containment Spray; Auxiliary Feedwater; Nuclear Service Water; Containment Isolation; Decay Heat Removal; and Containment Cooling.
The equipment involved includes pump motors, valve motor operators, pressure switches, electrical distribution centers, solenoid valves, limit switches, instruments to measure various temperatures, pressures and levels, cables for instrumentation, control and power circuits, electrical connectors, terminal blocks, containment electrical penetrations, and heat shrink tubing used as an insulator.
The deficiencies range from some ~ equipment that -may be inadequate "only" because of aging - effects to other equipment that may be inadequate due to the effects of temperature, pressure, humidity, chemical spray, radiation, and aging.
Thus, relying solely on the staff's own documents, it is clear that the staf f's letter to you is decidedly incomplete.
Numerous important safety systems at TMI-1 have not been shown to be capable of functioning during an accident and, under the extension proposed by NRC, the deadline for demonstrating adequate assurance of safety will be postponed for years.
The staff.successfully prevented UCS from introducing this same safety evaluation report into evidence during the restart hearings, a ruling that the Licensing Board now regrets. (Partial Initial Decision, December 14, 1981, paragraph 1162)
The staff's, objection to the introduction into evidence of its*own safety evaluation rcport on environmental qualification of TMI-1 safety equipment should be contrasted with its statement to you that
"[t]his issue was litigated in the TMI-1 restart proceeding." The fact is that this issue was not fully litigated.
Despite the barriers which, the staff and GPU erected to preclude a complete review of the environmental qualification issue, the Licensing Board nonetheless concluded that UCS " prevailed to the extent that UCS has demonstrated that all of the safety equipment at TMI-1 will not meet all of the (environmental qualification] criteria in Regulatory Guide 1.89 at the time of restart." (Partial Initial Decision, paragraph 1181)
Unfortunately,
the Board declined to face the issue of whether " interim operation" of THI-1 should be denied, in part because it also was misled into believing that the issues would be addressed by June 30, 1982. (Id.)
In sum, the staff's response regarding the safety significance of the environmental qualification issue is grossly misleading.
It creates a false impression that the issues were fully litigated, that the remaining 9
6-environmental qualification ceficiencies are ninor, and that they all will be corrected by June 30, 1982.
On all these points, nothing could be further from the truth.
Conclusion We have discussed only two of the safety issues in the staff's letter and concluded that on both' the staff attempted to mislead you.
The bases for this conclusion are, we believe, amply explained in the discussion cbove.
If you would like copies of any of the referenced documents, we would be pleased to provide them.
We repeat our offer to brief you or your sttff on these and other safety issues relevant to restart of TMI-1 if you so desire.
We believe,it is important to address one other point you made in your letter to Chairman Palladino.
You commented that it would be foolish for you, as a layman, to substitute your judgment for the NRC's on whether there is adequate assurance that Unit 1 can be operated safely.
We c o not agree entirely with that view.
It certair.ly would be unreasonable to expect you to become involved in analyzing the details of water level instrumentation design or the adequacy of an environmental qualification test for a particular piece of safety equipment. On the other hand, we believe-that the judgments involved in aisessing whether the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has conducted a careful and objective review of the relevant safety issues are well within your capability and, more importantly, your responsibilities to the residents of central Pennsylvania.
In these latter areas, you need not be concerned about substituting your judgment for the Commission's.
We believe that your independent review of the record will cicarly show that the NRC failed in its responsibilities and that TMI-1 should not be restarted in these circunstances.
Sincerely.
A3
.o.o 7\\
Henry W. rendall Chairman Board of Directors W/8lv Robert D. Pollard Nuclear Safety Engineer ec:
Rep. Morris K. Udall Sen. John Hein:
Sen. Arlen Specter Rep. Allen Ertel Rep. Robert S. Walker William J. Dircks 4
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