ML20040F234
| ML20040F234 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 01/20/1982 |
| From: | Kintner L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8202080550 | |
| Download: ML20040F234 (27) | |
Text
Y,s JAN 2 01982 Docket lb.:
!D-341 APPLIC A:lT: Detroit Edison Company FACILITY:
Ferai 2 SU3 JECT:
Strt!ARY OF DECEMPER 4, 1931 MEETIllG REGARDIflG OPERATIllG LICEf!SE REYlEW: FIRE PROTECTIO!!
The sthject meetinq was called to hear and discuss applicant's bases for orotection aq11nst fires in the control roo'a.
Enclosuro 1 is a list of attendees. Enclosure 2 is a copy of applicant's slidos used in the neeting.
Uqr Safety Evaluation Renort, Jul y 1981, identified several areas where additional information was needed to demonstrate that fire protection for the control rnon is adequate. One of the principal neans for denonstrating adequacy was a test in which nocked-up control panels, includinq operable switches, were subjectad to an external fire of a prescribed nagnitude. Rv letters dated July 31, 1931 and ?!cvember 24, 1931, the annlicant has 9rovided results and conclusions of the fire test in response to the concerns exoressed in our SER and in subsequent tel eohone cere1onications. The staff revieted these doctr1ents prior to thf Decenher 1 n1eetinq.
The aop11 cant sumarized the development of its fire orotection neasures, as outlined in the slides (Enclosure 2).
Staff comented on the presentation as follows.
Pano 7 -
he staff's Pranch Technical Position APCSq 9.5-1 requires consideration of an exnosure fire if certain senaration roquirements are not net. Therefore, an exposure fire in the control room should have been considered in 1977.
-~Page 11 - Co ibustibles nay be introduced into the control roon, without failure of achinistrative controls: e.g. te7porary cables to connect instrumentation used durinq startup; viste baskets; drawinas on racks; conSustible cleanina fluid.
Page 13 - The maqnitude of the exposure fire used in the test (1 qallon
~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~
of heptan? In a 2 foot square pan) is aoplicable solely to the Fer112 control roon and control nanel desiqn - it should not be considered a " standard exposure fire" for other plants.
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. Pace 15,- The 600 F oven test of the control panel surface is not ff,'~1T occeptable because the switches only approached 600 F 'for a feu minutes of the eight-minute test, hutever, results of this test are not necessary for staff's conclusions.
Pyle 20 - If the exposure fire is a larger magnitude or larger duration than that used in the test, the plastic switches (which do not have a netallic backing) nay fall throuqh the panel, exmsin'] circuits inside the panel to fire or heat da7 ace hrwever, staf f aqreed to the riagnitude of the fire for Ferni 2.
Pace 20 - A fire inside a panel is exnected to be of s1all magnitude because of the electrical cable material used and the fire detection and extinquishinq neans available.
Integrity of circuits in an adjacent control panel is further assured because of the thernal insulation provided by the air space Setween the uncerforated metal sides of adjacent psnels.
~ ~ -Pace 22 '.;taf f aorces with apolicant's overall conclusions thit the fire protection features and renote shutdown canability of Ferli 2 are acceptable. For the Fer71 ? 91 ant, with its particular fire protcction features for the control roo1,the incre'eatal safety afforded by automatic control of safe shutdoul equioment by circuits in the control roon outweighs the incremental safety af forded by lanual control of safe shutdoun couinnent that is completely isolated from the control roon.
At the conclusion of the neetinn, staff advised aDplicant that its proposed dosinq of fire nrotection features and re>ote shutdown equip 7ent was accontele. A safety evaluation vill be issued in January 1982.
L. L. Vintner, Project "anager Licensing Branch !!a.1 Sivision of Licensinq L ocl o sure:
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Mr. Harry Tauber Vice President Engineering & Construction Detroit Edison Company 2000 Second Avenue Detroit, Michigan 48226 cc:
Mr. Harry H. Voigt, Esq.
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
20036 Peter A. Marquardt, Esq.
Co-Counsel The Detroit Edison Company 2000 Second Avenue Detroit, Michigan 48226 Mr. William J. Farner Project Manager - Fermi 2 The Detroit Edison Company 2000 Second Avenue Detroit, Michigan 48226 Mr. Larry E. Schuerman Detroit Edison Company 3331 West Big Beaver Road Troy, Michigan 48084 David E. Howell, Esq.
3229 Woodward Avenue Berkley, Michigan 48072 Mr. Bruce Little U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspector's Office 6450 W. Dixie Highway Newport, Michigan 48166 Dr. Wayne Jens Detroit Edison-Company 2000 Second Avenue Detroi't, Michigan 48226 Mr.. James G. Keppler Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 e
NRC - Detroit Edison Company Meeting December 4, 1981 Fire Protection - Fermi 2 NRC L. L. Kintner V. Benaroya W. Johnston R. Fergison R. Anand N. Fioravante W. LeFave J. Mauck G. Harrison J. Stang P. Byron Detroit Edison Company L. Schuerman E. Lusis W. Colbert L. Wooden R. Shaw J. Honkala R. Anderson R. Sawdye S. Maloney Sandia National Labs for NRC D. Dube NUS for Detroit Edison _
J. Slider Gage Babcock & Assoc. for NRC B. Cohn 4
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ORIGINAL DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION AT FERMI 2 1969 o
DETROIT EDISON CORPORATE POLICIES ON FIRE PROTECTION o
RECOMMENDATIONS OF INSURANCE UNDERWRITER o
GENERAL DESIGN CRITERION 3
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NEPIA RECOMMENDATIONS 1969 o
MINIMlZE USE OF COMBUSTIBLES IN PLANT DESIGN o
AD0PT NFPA STANDARDS THROUGHOUT PLANT o
INSTALL RATED FIRE BARRIERS BETWEEN BUILDINGS o
INSTALL A YARD RING HEADER WITH ISOLATION VALVES o
PROVIDE AN ELECTRIC AND A DIESEL FIRE PUMP o
INSTALL AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION IN HAZARDOUS AREAS o
PROVIDE A FLOW ALARM ON AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION ACTUATION o
PROVIDE CABLE TRAY SUPPRESSION ALL WERE AD0PTED BY DETROIT EDISON AND INCORPORATED INT 3 THE ORIGINAL DESIGN OF THE FERMI 2 PLANT - EXCEPT THE LAST RECOMMENDATION, -.
i CABLE TRAY FIRE TESTING 1969 - 1973 o
DEVELOPED AS AN ALTERNATE TO THE INSURANCE UliDERWRITERS RECOMMENDATION FOR CABLE TRAY SUPPRESSION o
(10 INDUSTRY STAi1DARDS EXISTED f
o ACTUAL FIRE TESTS PERFORMED BY EDISOf1 ON ACTUAL CABLE CONFIGURATIONS l
o THE RESULTS AND EXPERIENCE OF THE FIRE TESTS USED TO ESTABLISH THE TESTING CRITERIA IN THE PURCHASE SPEC o
CABLE VENDORS WERE REQUIRED TO PERFORM FIRE TESTS ON THEIR CABLES o
INSURANCE UllDERWRITERS o
RULED CABLE li4SULATIUll PURCHASED TO THESE CRITERIA AS NON-SELF PROPAGATING o
ACCEPTED THIS PROGRAM IN LIEU OF CABLE TRAY SUPPRESSION PSAR COMMITMENTS 1970 o
TO MEET DIVISIONAL SEPARATION CRITERIA 0F 3 FT, HORIZONTAL, 5 FT VERTICAL o
TO SEPARATE HIGH AND LOW VOLTAGE CABLES o
TO KEEP BOP CABLE RUN IN ONE DIVISIONAL TRAY UUT OF THE REDUNDANT DIVISION o
TO RUN INSTRUMENT CABLES IN SEPARATE TRAYS WITH COVERS o
TO PROVIDE FIRE STOPS AT FLOORS AND CEILINGS IN VERTICAL CABLE RUNS o
TO MARK blVISIONAL CABLE, TRAYS, CONDUIT o
TO PROVIDE FIRE DETECTION FOR CERTAIN AREAS CF PLANT DETROIT EDIS0N FORMED A BROWN'S FERRY PRELIMINARY REVIEW GROUP ON APRIL 15, 1975 FINDINGS o
FERMI 2 DESIGN FEATURES DIFFER FROM BROWN'S FERRY o
NO PVC CABLE III FERMI 2 o
MORE STRINGENT SEPARATION CRITERIA RECOMMENDATIONS o
TO ADD BREATHING AIR SYSTEM o
TO ADD AIR PACK CHARGING STATION o
TO ADD MANUAL BYPASS PNEUMATIC SUPPLY VALVE TO SAFETY RELIEF VALVES
?
FERMI 2 FIRE PROTECTION TASK GROUP FORMED DEC. 4, 1975 PURPOSE o
TO REVIEW THE FERMI 2 DESIGN FOR DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH o
TO REVIEW THE FERMI 2 DESIGN AGAINST NUREG-0050 RECOMMENDATIONS o
TO ESTABLISH MORE FIRE BARRIERS (ZONES) o TO ESTABLISH 3-HOUR RATINGS OF FIRE SEALS AND DAMPERS o
TO UPGRADE AND EXPAND FIRE DETECTION THROUGHOUT PLANT o
TO ADD SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS (GASE0US OR WATER) IN o
CONGESTED CABLE AREAS, AND 0
AREAS DIFFICULT TO ACCESS 1
FERMI 2 FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS - FILED OCTOBER 1977 o
CONDUCTED BY AN INDEPENDENT FIRE PROTECTION CONSULTANT o
PERFORMED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF A FIRE PROTECTION ENGINEER o
FERMI 2 DESIGN REVIEWED AGAINST AND UPGRADED TO BTP APCSB 9.5-1, APPENDIX A l
k FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS RECOMMENDATIONS TO PROVIDE o
ADDITIONAL 3-HOUR BARRIERS o
FIRE DETECTORS IN CONTROL ROOM PANELS o
ADDITIONAL SUPPRESSION WHERE DIVISIONS ARE 'N SAME ZONE o
SEVERAL ADDITIONAL HOSE STATIONS DETROIT EDIS0N COMMITMENTS IN RESP 0fiSE TO NRC QUESTIONS 1979 o
COMtilTTED TO 5-Mall FIRE BRIGADE o
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS ON VALVES o
FIRE D00R ALARM SYSTEM o
UPGRAIJED QUALITY ASSURANCE ON FIRE PROTECTION l
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DETROIT EDISON RESPONSE TO QUESTION 021.32 1981 o
IDENTIFIED o
CIRCUITS NEEDED FOR SHUTDOWN DURING FIRE o
DETERMINED ROUTING, TRAYS AND CONDUITS o
DETERMINED WHERE SEPARATION IS LESS THAN 20 FT, o
COMMITTED TO PROVIDE o
1 HOUR BARRIERS WHERE SEPARATION IS LESS THAN 20 FT.
o A DIVISION 2 REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL IN ADDITION TO EXISTING DIVISION 1 PANEL l
CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS NECESSARY TO POSTULATE AN EXPOSURE FIRE IN THE CONTROL ROOM 1.
FAILURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS AND PLANT SECURITY PROGRAM TO PREVENT THE INTRODUCTION OF A SIGNIFICANT QUANTITY OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS INTO A MANNED CONTROL ROOM 2.
LOSS OF CONTROL OF THE COMBUSTIBLE AT THE WORST LOCATION IN THE CONTROL ROOM 3.
PRESENCE OF AN IGNITION SOURCE COINCIDENT WITH THE PRESENCE OF THE COMBUSTIBLE 4.
OPTIMUM CONFINEMENT OF THE COMBUSTIBLE TO YIELD MAXIMUM ENERGY RELEASE UPON COMBUSTION 5.
FAILURE OF PLANT PERSONNEL WITHIN THE CONTROL ROOM TO DElECT THE ABNORMAL PRESENCE OF THE COMBUSTIBLE, OR l
TO CONTROL OR EXTINGUISH THE FIRE a
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DETROIT EDISON ACTIONS DURING CONTROL ROOM FIRE PROTECTION REVIEW 1981 e
COMMITTED TO 1-HOUR BARRIER OF PERIPHERAL ROOMS e
PERFORMED FULL SCALE FIRE TEST ON MOCK-UP PANELS FULL SCALE FIRd. TEST ON M0CK UP CON 1ROL PANEL CRITERION FOR TEST WAS THAT CIRCUITS WOULD NOT BE DAMAGED-e REPRESENTATIVE SWITCH LOCATION WAS SAME DISTANCE FROM e
PANEL EDGE AS EXISTS ON CONTROL ROOM PANEL REPRESENTATIVE'SWITCHLOCATIONWASCONSERVATIVELYMdVED e
TOWARD INTERSECTION OF CONTROL ROOM PANELS 601/602 TEST ARRANGEMENT AND INSTRUCTION REVIEWED BY NRC IN ADVANCE e
- TEST FIRE (PAN) PLACED AT INTERSECTION OF PANELS 601/602
- 1 GALLON OF HEPTANE
- 2 FOOT SQUARE PAN e
NRC AND CONSULTANT WITNESSED TEST i
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FIRE TEST RESULTS e
CIRCUITS NOT DAMAGED e
MINOR DAMAGE TO KNOB 0F CMC SWITCH e
NO DAMAGE TO PUSHBUTTON e
PAINT WAS DAMAGED 1" - 2" FROM PANEL EDGE CONCLUSION TEST PROVED THAT CIRCUITRY REQUIRED FOR REMOTE SHUTDOWN REMAINED INTACT l
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FUTHER DETROIT EDIS0N ACTIONS DURING CONTROL ROOM FIRE PROTECTION 1981 e
EXPOSED CMC AND PB SWITCHES TO 600 F TEST e
ANALYZED DESIGN BASIS CONTROL ROOM FIRE FOR WORST CASE EFFECT ON SWITCHES OVEN TEST OF PLASTIC SWITCHES APPROACH e
CMC AflD PUSHBUTTON SWITCHES MOUNTED ON SIMULATED CONTROL PAllEL SURFACE e
MOUNTED SWITCHES INSERTED lil OVEN HELD AT 600 F e
MOUNTED SWITCHES KEPT If1 OVEN FOR 8 MINUTES OVEN TEST OF PLASTIC SWITCHES RESULTS CMC SWITCH e
PORTIONS AB0VE PANEL SURFACE DEFORMED e
PARTS BELOW PAllEL SURFACE UNHARMED AND INTACT e
SWITCH REMAINED INTACT AI4D lil PLACE ON PANEL e
SWITCH CONTACTS OPERABLE DURiflG AilD AFTER TEST PUSHBUTTON SWITCH e
SWITCH UllHARMED e
SWITCH REMAINED INTACT AilD lii PLACE ON PAi!EL e
SWITCH OPERABLE DURliiG AliD AFTER TEST i
FIRE PLUME CALCULATIONS KEY ASSUMPTIONS e
FIRE ASSUMED TO.BE UNDISTURBED, FREE-BURNING, VERTICAL CYLINDER e
FIRE ASSUMED TO BURN WITH MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY (INTENSITY) UNTIL l
THE 1 GALLON OF HEPTANE IS CONSUMED (2 1/3 MINUTES) e FIRE ASSUMED TO CONTINUE TO BURN (AT LOWER EFFICIENCY) FOR 2 2/3 MINUTES-LONGER, FOR A TOTAL DURATION OF 5 MINUTES e
SWITCH FACE ASSUMED TO BE PERPINDICULAR TO THE FLAME AND TO SEE THE ENTIRE FIRE e
CONTROL PANEL AND SWITCHES ASSUMED TO ABSORB THERMAL RADI ATION WITH 95% ABSORBTIVITY AND TO REEMIT THERMAL RADIATION WITH 10% EMISSIVITY e
CONTROL PANEL ASSUMED TO CONDUCT HEAT IN ONE DIMENSION, AWAY FROM THE EDGE IN THE FIRE.
NO CREDIT TAKEN FOR CONDUCTION LATERALLY AWAY FROM THE CENTERPLANE OF THE FIRE e
CONTROL PANEL ASSUMED TO BE COOLED ONLY BY NATURAL CONVECTION TO 0
AIR INSIDE THE PANEL MAINTAINED AT 200 F, BOTH FORCED VENTILATION INSIDE THE PANEL AND CONVECTION TO AIR OUTSILE THE PANEL WERE IGNORED.
l
FIRE PLUME CALCULATIONS RESULTS
= THE CALCULATED TEMPERATURES DO [10T EXCEED THE 6000F CRITERI0f; o THE CALCULATED TEMPERATURES APPR0XIMATE THE TEMPERATURES MEASURED IN THE C0flTROL PAiiEL FIRE TEST, JUNE 1981 f
l TESTS AND CALCULATIONS BY DETROIT EDISON a
CONTROL PANEL FIRE TEST e
OVEN TEST OF PLASTIC SWITCHES e
FIRE PLUME CALCULATIONS CONFIRM THAT THE CONTROL PANELS WOULD SURVIVE THE POSTULATED EXPOSURE FIRE i
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CONCLUSIONS THE FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES AND THE REMOTE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY OF FERMI 2 ARE ADEQUATE TO PROTECT THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC.
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MEETING
SUMMARY
DISTRIBUTION d ocket FTf D M 2 01982 G. Lear NRC PDR W. Johnston e
Local PDR S. Pawlicki p
i f TIC /NSIC/ Tera V. Benaroya
't Sg EIV Z. Rosztoczy a
LB#1 Reading W. Haass ED 4
H. Denton/E. Case D. Muller 2
R. Ballard E;,
O D. Eisenhut/M. Jambor W. Regan 0
- R. Mattson
g B. J. Youngblood P. Check
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A. Schwencer F. Congel iG F. Miraglia
- 0. Parr J. Miller F. Rosa G. Lainas W. Butler R. Vollmer W. Kreger J. P. Knight R. Houston i
R. Bosnak F. Schauer L. Rubenstein R. E. Jackson T. Speis Project Manager LKintner M. Srinivasan Attorney, OELD J. Stolz M. Rushbrook S. Hanauer 0IE (3)
W. Gammill ACRS (16)
T. Murley F. Schroeder E. Adensam D. Skovholt M. Ernst NRC
Participants:
R. Baer C. Berlinger LKintner, JStan9 K. Kniel VBenaraya, PByron G. Knighton WJohnston A. Thadani RFerguson D. Tondi RAnand J, Kramer NFioravante D, Vassallo WLeFave P. Collins JMauck D. Ziemann.
GHarrison bcc:
Applicant & Service List I
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