ML20040E600
| ML20040E600 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 11/23/1981 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Chase J, Paulk G, Sullivan R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20040E585 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-2.E.4.2, TASK-TM 50-259-81-32, 50-260-81-32, 50-296-81-32, NUDOCS 8202050157 | |
| Download: ML20040E600 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000259/1981032
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
8
101 MARIETTA ST
N.W.. SUITE 3100
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303
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Report Nos. 50-259/81-32, 50-260/81-32 and 50-296/81-32
Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority
500A Chestnut Street
Chattanooga, TN 37401
Facility Name:
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260, and 50-296
License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68
Inspection at Browns Ferry site near Athens, Alabama
Inspectors:
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R. F. Sullivan
Date Signed
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J. W. Chase
Date Signed
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nG. L. Paulk
Date Signed
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Approved by:
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/ Chief, Division of
Date ' Signed
F. S. Cantrell, Sectiot) Project Inspection
Resident and Reactor
SUMMARY
Inspection on September 26 - October 25, 1981
Areas Inspected
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This routine inspection involved 326 resident inspector-hours in the areas of-
operational safety, plant physical protection, reactor trips, surveillance
testing, maintenance, training, reportable occurrences, TMI action items,
independent inspection effort, organization changes and respirator protection.
Resul ts
Of the eleven areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in
eight areas.
Violations were found in three areas; (Violation of 10 CFR ~50
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Appendix B, Criterion V, two examples (Units 1, 2 and 3), paragraphs 8 and 12;
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violation of a Limiting Condition for Operation (Unit 2) paraaraph 5;
Failure to report as required by 10 CFR 50.72 (Unit 1) paragraph 5,
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8202050157 820121
PDR ADOCK 05000259
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
G. T. Jones, Power Plant Superintendent
J. R. Bynum, Assistant Power Plant Superintendent
J. R. Pittman, Assistant Power Plant Superintendent
R. T. Smith, Quality Assurance Supervisor
R. G.11etke, Engineering Section Supervisor
A. L. Clement, Chemical Unit Supervisor
D. C.111ms, Engineering and Test Unit Supervisor
A. L. Burnette, Operations Supervisor
R. Hunkapillar, Operations Section Supervisor
T. L. Chinn, Plant Compliance Supervisor
11. W. Haney, Mechanical Maintenance Section Supervisor
J. A. Teague, Electrical Maintenance Section Supervisor
R. E. Burns, Instrument Maintenance Section Supervisor
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J. E. Swindell, Field Services Supervisor
A. W. Sorrell, Supervisor, Radiation Control Unit BFN
R. E. Jackson, Chief Public Safety
R. Cole, QA Site Representative Office of Power
Other licensee employees contacted included licensed senior reactor
operators and reactor operators, auxiliary operators, craftsmen,
technicians, public safety officers, QA, QC and engineering personnel.
2.
Management Interviews
Management interviews were conducted on October 2, 9,16 and 23,1981, with
the Power Plant Superintendent and/or his Assistant Power Plant Super-
intendents and other members of his staff. The inspectors summarized the
scope and findings of their inspection activities. The licensee was
informed of four apparent violations identified during the report period.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee concerning these
violations.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to
determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or
deviations. New unresolved items identified during this inspection are
discussed in paragraphs 8, 12 and 13.
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5.
Operational Safety
The inspectors kept informed on a daily basis of the overall plant status
and any significant safety matters related to plant operations.
Daily
discussions were held each morning with plant management and various members
of the plant operating staff.
The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room such that each was
visited at least daily when an inspector was on site.
Observations included
instrument readings, setpoints and recordings; status of operating systems;
status and alignments of emergency standby systems; purpose of temporary
tags on equipment controls and switches; annunciator alarms; adherence to
procedures; adherence to limiting conditions for operations; temporary
alterations in effect; daily journals and data sheet entries; and control
room manning.
This inspection activity also included numerous informal
discussions with operators and their supervisors.
General plant tours were conducted on at least a weekly basis.
Portions of
the turbine building, each reactor building and outside areas were visited.
Observations included valve positions and system alignment; snubber and
hanger conditions; instrument readings; housekeeping; radiation area
controls; tag controls on equipment; work activities in progress; vital area
controls; personnel badging, personnel search and escort; and vehicle search
and escort.
Infomal discussions were held with selected plant personnel in
their functional areas during these tours.
In addition a complete walkdown,
which included valve alignment, instrument alignment, and switch positions,
was performed on the Nuclear Instrument System and the Containment
Atmosphere Dilution System (CAD). These walkdowns were performed on Unit 1
just prior to startup from an extended refueling and modification outage.
No discrepancies were observed.
During the inspector's review of TRs, it was noted that TR-236278, performed
on September 1,1981, required the removal of Flow Indicator Controller
(FIC)71-36A [ Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)] from service for
cali bra tion.
An inspection of this TR by the resident inspectors revealed
that removal of the FIC-36A for calibration rendered the RCIC system
inoperable for automatic operation.
Even though the flow controller was
only out of the system for approximately ten minutes, no provisions were
made by operations personnel on shift to manually start the system if needed
or to test HPCIS as required by the technical specifications.
This
oversight resulted because operations personnel did not recognize the system
was inoperable when the flow controller was removed.
In addition, an
evaluation made by the Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor as to whether this
event was reportable to the NRC did not reveal that the RCIC was inoperable
so no thirty-day report was made as required by Technical Specification 6.7.2.b.(2).
On October 9,1981, the resident inspectors informed the Plant Superin-
tendent that failure to recognize that the RCIC system was inoperable and
take appropriate corrective action to satisfy a limiting condition for
operation was an apparent violation of Technical Specifution 3.5.F.2 which
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requires HPCIS to be demonstrated operable if the RCICS is inoperable.
(260/81-32-01).
During a routine tour of the reactor building, which is classified as a
regula'ted area, the inspectors noted three out of three craftsmen obtaining
drinking water from a water cooler without frisking as required by the
posted instructions.
1e inspectors contacted a Health Physics (HP)
supervisor and requested that he observe with the inspector the water
cooler.
During the time interval that the HP sapervisor and inspectors
observed the water cooler, two out of four personnel 'obtained drinking water
without frisking.
On October 23, 1981, the Plant Superintendent was infonned that ebtaining
drinking water from water coolers in regulated areas without frisking was an
open item (259/81-32-08) and drew attention to che past NRC HP reports which
reconniended that drinking from water coolers and smoking in regulated areas
not be allowed.
The Plant Superintendent stated that this recommendation was
currently being studied by TVA.
There was a trip of Unit 1 on October 1,1981, in which the staff failed to
notify the NRC by telephone within one hour as required by 10 CFR 50.72. The
cause was an oversight by the operating crew. The licensee was notified on
October 2,1981, that failure to make the telephone report was an apparent
violation (259/81-32-01).
6.
Reportable Occurrences
The below listed licensee event reports (LERs) were reviewed to determine if
the information provided met NRC reporting requirements.
Th3 determination
included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or
planned, existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety
significance of each event.
Additional in plant reviews and discussion with
plant personnel as appropriate were conducted far tcose indicated by an
asterisk.
LER No.
Date
Event
259/81-39
7/3/81
Inverter for alann panel XA-55-8E
259/81-51
9/8/81
Turbine builuing ventilation exhaust
radition monitor inoperable
259/81-53
9/8/81
RHR valve FCV-74-66 inoperable
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- 259/81-50
9/3/81
Secondary containment emergency bypass
switch misused causing secondary
containment breaching
- 259/81-47
8/22/81
A2 RHRSW pump air relief valve failed to
seal flooding RHRSW pump room "A"
260/81-44
9/13/81
H202 analyzer B sample pump inoperable
- 296/81-47
9/7/81
RHR system II valve FCV-74-75 inoperable
296/81-39
8/17/81
Turbine 1st stage permissive switch
PS-1-81-A out of specification
- 296/81-46
9/5/81
3EA reactor motor operated valve board
296/81-48
9/8/81
Torus temperature indicator TI-64-55A
In the areas inspected no deviations or violations were identified.
7.
Surveillance Testing Observation
The inspectors observed the performance of the below listed surveillance
procedures. The inspection consisted of a review of the procedure for
technical adequacy, conformance to technical specifications, verification of
test instrument calibration, observation on the conduct of the test, removal
from service and return to service of the system and a review of test data.
Surveillance Instruction (SI) 4.4.A.1
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In the above area, no violations or deviations were observed.
8.
Maintenance Observation
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During this report period, the inspectors observed the below listed
maint.' nance activities for procedure adequacy, adherence to procedure,
Technical Specification, radiological controls, Quality Co.ntrol hold points
.and posting of-tagouts.
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a.
flechanical flaintenance Instruction - 15.2.2B Leak Test and Repair of
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b.
~llechanical flaintenance Instruction - 23 Change Out of Oil HPCI.
c.
Instrument flaintenance Instruction - 92.1 Power Range Neutron
lionitoring System
d.
Trouble Report (TR) - 241667, 241486 H2-02 Sample Pump Troubleshoot and
Repair.
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The inspectors also reviewed the use of emergency TRs. The N-0QAM Part II
Section 2.1 states that the plant QA Staff shall review itR's and TR's prior
to performance of the work to assure format, content and QC inspection hold
points comply with plant quality assurance requirements.
It further states
that during off-shifts, holidays, or other times when QA is not available,
the QA Staff review for i1R's/TR's may be performed by the SE or STA.
The
licensee could not produce any instructions, procedures or training docu-
mentation which instructed the SE's and STA's in how to perform this review
for the QA Staff. The only training they receive is that given in General
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Employee Training.
On October 16, 1981, the inspectors identified to the Plant Superintendent
that failure to provide training and instructions to the SE's and STA's in
how to ;arform a QA Staff review of emergency TR's and i1R's was an apparent
violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criter Mn V which requires that activities
affecting quality shall be prescribed by uocumented' instructions or
procedures of a type appro riate to the circumstances.
(259/81-32-02,
260/81-32-03, 296/81-32-01 .
During-this inspection the inspector held numerous discussions with the
Plant Superintendent and members of his staff discussing the use of
emergency Trs. The N-0QAM defines emergency condition as "... normally
those that require action to place the plant in a safe configuration, to
prevent loss of power generation, to remove the plant from a limiting
condition for operation, or to correct serious personnel safety hazards."
If the SE declared a item of work an emergency condition, then the SE was
authorized to perfonn the QA review of the TR or MR if QA was not available.
The inspector questioned whether to prevent loss of power generation or to
remove the plant from a limiting condition for operation were emergencies
which justified bypassing the normal QA review of TRs or MRs prior to work.
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On 10-16-81, the inspector identified the definition of emergency as defined
in the N0QAM as an unresolved item to the Plant Superintendent. The
inspector stated that he has requested Region II to evaluate this item.
The
licensee stated that power generation is the primary objective of the plant
and hence anything which would disrupt its goal was an emergeacy.
(259/81-32-03).
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9.
Plant Physical Protection
During the course of routine inspection activities, the inspectors made
observations of certain plant physical protection activities. These
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included personnel badging, personnel search and escort, vehicle search and
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escort, communications and vital area access control.
No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.
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10. Tlil Action Items
The following Tfil action item was reviewed by the inspectors during this
report period:
II.E.4.2.(1)-(4)ContainmentIsolation
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The status of this item was reviewed on February 19-20, 1980 by staff
personnel from flRR who visited the site and were accompanied by the resident
inspectors.
The results of this review were reported by letter, 2/29/80, to
TVA from T. A. Ippolito, flRR, which confirmed that the system had been
evaluated as required by the action item and that certain modifications had
been made to prevent inadvertent re-opening of isolation valves. On certain
valves which normally remained closed, TVA had modified the controls for
ganged reset which was questioned by the NRC staff as providing sufficient
assurance to prevent inadvertent opening. TVA subsequently agreed to
further modify the controls for individual valve resetting.
The inspectors verified that the additional design changes were completed on
all three Units according to approved work plans (WP) as follows:
Unit 1
9/14/81
WP-6434
Unit 2
11/12/80
WP-9857
Unit 3
1/4/81
WP-7804
The inspectors consider this item closed.
11.
The inspectors reviewed activities associated with the below listed reactor
trips during this report period.
The review included determination of
cause, safety significance, performance of personnel and systems, and
corrective action. The inspectors examined instrument recordings, computer
printouts, operations journal entries, scram reports and had discussions
with operations, maintenance and engineering support personnel as
appropriate,
a.
On October 1,1981, Unit 1 scrammed from 616 MWt caused by the ilSIVs
isolating on a main steam line low header pressure.
The cause of the
low pressure was attributed to having too many bypass valves open in
preparation for turbine overspeed testing.
No relief valves operated.
HPCIS and RCIC were initiated manually to control water level.
Plant
safety systems performed satisfactorily.
b.
On October 3,1981, Unit 1 scrammed from 325 f1We on receiving a low
vacuum signal from the main condensor.
The cause of the low vacuum was
the result of inleakage of air to the 1B1 high pressure heater while
attempting to drain the heater.
No relief valves operated, nor did any
emergency core cooling systems initiate.
Safety systems performed
satisfactorily.
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c.
On October 5,1981, Unit 1 scrammed fror; 316 ftWe on receiving a low
reactor water level signal. The cause of the low reactor water level
was due to the short cycle valve inadvertantly opening, while instru-
ment mechanics were removing test equipment, causing a partial loss of
feedwa ter. fio relief valves actuated and no emergency core cooling
systems actuated.
Safety systems performed satisfactorily.
d.
On October 12, 1981, Unit I was removed from service by performing a
manual scram.
The shutdown was to perfom required maintenance on a
loose backing plate on #1 generator. fio emergency core cooling systems
actuated and no relief valves operated.
Safety systems perfomed
sa tisfactorily.
Within the areas inspected no deviations or violations were identified.
12.
Independent Inspection Effort
During this report period, the inspectors performed a review of surveys
being performed by the QC organization.
It was determined that approxi-
mately 50% of the surveys scheduled for April - September 1981 had not been
performed.
Typical examples of surveys scheduled but not performed were:
Title
fiumber
Frequency
last performed
Use of Radiation
HP-15
Weekly
July 24, 1981
flonitor
(f4RC commitment)
Radioactive
HP-1
Bimonthly
May 13, 1981
Waste Management
Plant Security
S-3
fionthly
July 4, 1981
Fire Hose Reel,
SA-3
lionthly
July 16, 1981
Cart and Hose
Inspection
Radiochemical
CR-1
Monthly
July 16, 1981
Lab flanual
Material Handling
P-1
Bimonthly
June 18, 1981
and Storage
QA Records
DC-lb
Semi-Annually
April 3, 1980
Management
Health Physics
On October 16,1981, the Plant Superintendent was informed that failure to
perform QC surveys as scheduled by Section Instruction Letter - S.1, was an
apparent violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V which requires that
activities affecting quality be prescribed by instructions or procedures and
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shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions or procedures.
(81-32/259-04,81-32/260-04,81-32/296-02).
Other independent inspection efforts was an inspection of drywell electrical
penetrations as outlined in Electrical Maintenance Instruction EMI-51. The
ir.spectors noted that the nitrogen charge on 20% (4 out of 20) of the
penetrations checked were below the minimum acceptable value stated in
EMI-51. The quarterly inspection required by EMI-51 had not been performed
in September 1981 as scheduled because of a lack of an operating Bechman
Trace Moisture Analyzer needed for checking nitrogen moisture content prior
to penetration purging and charging.
Action has been taken by the licensee
to obtain an operable analyzer to complete the quarterly maintenance. This
item will remain open and followed up on future inspections (259/81-32-05).
During the review of records for EMI-51, the inspectors found the latest
record held of EMI-51 by plant document control was for maintenance done in
June, 1980.
The inspector located maintenance records for dates after June,
1980 in the QA office waiting for QA supervison review.
Additionally,
approximately 200 other maintenance records were stacked in the QA office
awaiting the review cycle. The majority of unreviewed records indicated
work had been completed 6-15 months previously. This item will remain
unresolved (259/81-32-06).
13.
Respiratory Protection Program
The inspectors conducted an inspection during the weeks of October 12 and
October 19, 1981 of the radiation protection operation to determine
compliance with regulatory protection. Areas reviewed included medical
status of respirator users, individual fitting of respirator training,
maintenance of respiratory protective equipment, operational and admini-
strative control of the respiratory protection program and the selection and
use of respirators.
The inspectors conducted the inspection in accordance with requirements of
10 CFR 20.103(c), Regulatory Guide 8.15 and Browns Ferry Radiological
Control Instruction 3.
The inspectors attended the mask fit training for
new employees and the biannual health physics requalification training
during this inspection.
Regulatory Guide 8.15 requires that respiratory particulate recycled filters
be used within the limitations for type and mode of use.
Additionally, a
quality assurance program should be established to ensure reused filters
meet the requirements for efficiency and resistance to breathing specified
for unused filters. Guidance for a quality assurance program is outlined in
The inspector found that no quality assurance program existed and
that particulate filters are routinely reused without efficiency or
resistance checks.
Similar concerns were identified during the licensee
radiological hygiene quality assurance inspection of October 2,1981.
The
licensee is taking action to correct this program deficiency, therefore,
this item will remain an unresolved item (259/81-32-07).
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No violations were identified in the areas inspected.
14. Training
During this report period the inspectors attended the Health Physics and
Security retraining program which is required of each employee every two
years. The inspectors held discussions with the instructors and various
personnel on site to determine their level of knowledge in the two areas
already mentioned. The inspectors determined that the training was adequate
and met or exceeded the minimum requirements.
Discussions with the Health
Physics instructor revealed that the initial training program is being
re-organized to develop a more hands on approach to training, such as
actually dressing out in contamination clothing.
In the above area no violations or deviations were identified.
15.
Organization Changes
Recent changes in the Browns Ferry organization have been made as follows:
On October 5,1981, H. L. Abercrombie, Plant Superintendent, was promoted
within the Nuclear Power Division and was transferred to the Chattanooga
Office.
On October 5,1981, G. T. Jones, was assigned the Plant Superintendent
position. . Mr. Jones had previously been the Assistant Branch Chief of .the
Outage Management Branch.
On October 2,1981, J. L. Harness, Assistant Plant Superintendent -
Maintenance, terminated employment with TVA.
On September 28, 1981, J. R. Pittman, Instrument Maintenance Supervisor, was
promoted to Assistant Plant Superintendent - Maintenance.
On September 28, 1981, R. E. Burns, Lead Instrument Engineer, was promoted
to Instrument Maintenance Supervisor.
On January 11, 1981, J. R. Bynum, who was an Assistant Plant Superintendent
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at Sequoyah was transferred to Browns Ferry as the Assistant Plant
Superintendent-Operations and Engineering
A third Assistant Plant Superintendent position has been authorized but not
yet filled.
The inspectors reviewed the qualifications of the above personnel for
conformance to the minimum acceptable levels as described in ANSI-18.1,
Selection and Training of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel, dated March 8,
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1971, which is a technical specification requirement.
The inspectors
confirmed that qualification requirements were met with one possible
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exception; that being whether one of the personnel in the position of Plant
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Superintendent or Assistant Plant Superintendent, had the necessary training
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to be eligible for the NRC examination for Senior Reactor Operator (SRO).
TVA made the determination that Mr. Bynum satisfied the SR0 equivalency
requirements.
Further review of this matter was requested of the
IE Regional office where it was determined that Mr. Bynum satisfied the
quaification requirements of ANSI 18.1.
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