ML20040D009

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Affidavit of Wl Jensen Supplementing 811124 Affidavit. Discusses Min Time Available for Operator Action After Break in Reactor Coolant Pump Suction Pipe or Reactor Coolant Pump Discharge Piping.W/Prof Qualifications & Certificate of Svc
ML20040D009
Person / Time
Site: Crane 
Issue date: 01/22/1982
From: Jensen W
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20040D005 List:
References
NUDOCS 8201290473
Download: ML20040D009 (8)


Text

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

_BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of 3

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, ET AL j

(Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Dock

-289 Unit 1)

AFFIDAVIT OF WALTON L. JENSEN, JR.

I Walton L. Jensen, Jr., being duly sworn, depose and state that:

1.

I am an employee of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). My present position is Senior Nuclear Engineer, Reactor Systems Branch, Division of Systems Integration within the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. A copy of my professional qualifications is attached.

2.

The purpose of my affidavit is to supplement the information provided in my affivavit dated November 24, 1981. That affidavit was filed in a proceeding in the matter of Sacramento Municipal Utility District, Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station, Docket No. 50-312 SP. The information in this supplemen-tary affidavit is provided to explain in more detail the baiis for the staff's conclusion that the minimum time available for operator action after a break in the reactor coolant pump suction piping would not be significantly different from that available for operator action after a break in the reactor coolant-pump discharge piping.

G

Page Two 3.

The NRC staff has reviewed the information contained in the letter from Babcock and Wilcox to GPU Service Corporation on " Reactor Coolant Pump Suction break LOCA" dated March 25, 1981, which indicated that more reactor coolant system water might be lost for small breaks at the reactor coolant pump suction then fcr breaks at the reactor coolant pump discharge in the event that all feedwater were temporarily lost. We conclude that this infor-mation is not significant with regard to the safe operation of TMI-1 and that additional small break LOCA analyses at the Reactor Coolant Pump suction need not be performed. This conclusion was derived from the following consicerations:

a.

Regardless of the postulated break location in the cold leg piping, the reactor vessel water level would initially decrease to the same approximate elevation.

b.

The additional loss of primary system inventory during a break in the pump suction piping would be from water in the cold leg piping, c.

In the absence of Emergency Feedwater the operator has a ninimum of 20 minutes to actuate High Pressure Injection (HPI) regardless of break location in the cold leg piping.

d.

Emergency procedures instruct the operator to actuate HPI immediately regardless of break location if a loss of all feedwater has occured.

The discussion below addresses these areas:

In the event of a small break LOCA at TMI-1 the liquid level in the broken pipe would decrease to the elevation of the break by liquid discharge from the break. The break flow would then be steam which would be generated in the core by decay heat. The High Pressure Injection system at TMI-1 has

Page Thr:0 sufficicnt capability to replenish the water boiled in'the core by the decay heat.

For breaks in the cold leg piping at the reactor coolant pump suction water would be lost from the reactor vessel to the break until the liquid level dropped to the reactor vessel inlet nozzle elevation. At this point only steam would be lost from tne reacter vessel. Liquid discharge would continue from the break until the break was uncovered.

More water would be lost for a break in the reactor coolant pump suction piping than for a break in the discharge piping since the cold leg suction piping is located at a lower elevation than the cold leg discharge piping.

The additional coolant loss however would be limited to the cold leg piping inventory below the reactor vessel inlet nozzle.

The water loss from the reactor vessel which provides core cooling is limited by the elevation of the reactor vessel inlet nozzle so that loss of vessel water would be approximately the same regard-less of the break location in the cold leg.

Following the event at TMI-2, B&W performed small break LOCA analyses beyond those which had been presented to the staff as a licensing basis to show compliance with 10 CFR 50.46. These additional analyses were performed for the purpose of providing guidance to the operator and are documented in the B&W report titled " Evaluation of Transient Behavior and Small Reactor Coolant System Breaks in the 177-FA Plant" dated May 7, 1979.

These analyses demonstrated that Emergency feedvater would be required for 2

breaks of 0.01 ft and smaller in the reactor coolant pump discharge piping to depressurize the reactor system sufficiently to actuate High Pressure Injection.

It was further demonstrated that operator action within 20 minutes to manually actuate HPI woulri prevent core uncovery. Operators at TMI-1 are instructed to initiate HPI immediately in the event that all feedwater is lost in both the small break LOCA and loss of feedwater proce-dures.

l

Page Fcur Pump suction breaks coincident with a loss of all feedwater were not analyzed in the May 7th report.

For the reasons discussed above, the amount of reactor vessel water that would be available to cool the core would be approximately the same after 20 minutes for a break at the pump suction as for a break at the pump discharge.

It should be noted that more HPI water would be available to makeup the water boiled by decay heat in the core for the pump suction break than was assumed for the pump discharge break. The pump discharge break analyses in the May 7th report assumed that the break was between the HPI nozzle and the reactor vessel and that 30% of the total HPI flow was lost through the break.

For a pump suction break, all of the HPI water would be available to flow to the core. We therefore conclude that a minimum of 20 minutes would be available to the operator to actuate HPI and prevent core uncovery for breaks in the pump suction as well as at the pump discharge, even if all feedwater is temporary lost, and that the operating procedures at TMI are adequate for either event.

The above statements and opinions are true and correct to the best of my personal knowledge and belief.

j{Vd.

MM WaltonL.'Je[en,Jr.

/

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 128 day of/2wav/ 19 h 9

Onda N

, Notary Public ttrcommi%sion Expires: flo/a /, /90A r

a

WALTON L. JENSEN, JR.

PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS I am a Senior Nuclear Engineer in the Reactor Systems Branch of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

In this position I am responsible for the technical analysis and evaluation of the public health and safety aspects of reactor.

systems.

From June 1979 to December 1979, I was assigned to the Bulletins and Orders Task Force of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

I participated in the preparation of NUREG-0565, " Generic Evaluation of Small Break Loss-of-Coolant Accident Behavior in Babcock & Wilcox Designed 177-FA Operating Plants."

From 1972 to 1976, I was assigned to the Containment Systems Branch of the NRC/AEC, and from 1976 to 1979, I was assigned to the Analysis Branch of the NRC.

In these positions I was responsible for the development,and evaluation of computer programs and techniques to calculate the reactor system and containment system response to postulated loss-of-coolant accidents.

From 1967 to 1972, I was employed by the Babcock and Wilcox Company at Lynchburg, Virginia.

There I was lead engineer for the development of loss-of-coolant computer programs and the qualification of these programs by comparison with experimental data.

M

From 1963 to 1967, I was employed by the Atomic Energy Commission in the Division of Reactor Licensing.

I assisted in the safety reviews of large power reactors, and I led the reviews of several small research reactors.

I received an M.S. degree in Nuclear Engineering at the Catholic University o America in 1968 and a B.S. degree in Nuclear Engineering at liississippi State University in 1963.

I am a graduate of the Oak Ridge School for Reactor Technology, 1963-1964.

I am a member of the American Nuclear Society.

I am the author of three scientific papers dealing with the response of B&W reactors to Loss-of-Coolant Accidents and have authored one scientific paper dealing with containment analysis.

m 2

UtilTED STATES OF AMERICA 11UCLEAR REGULATORY COMilISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of METROPOLITAN EDIS0N COMPANY, ET AL.)

Docket No. 50-289

)

(Restart)

(Three Mile Island, Unit 1)

)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of " SUPPLEMENT TO NRC STAFF'S ANSWER IN SUPPORT OF LICENSEE'S MOTI0tl FOR RECONSIDERATION", dated January 22,1982 in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class, or as indicated by an asterisk, through deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's internal mail system, or as indicated by an double asterisk, hand-served, this 22nd day of January, 1982:

  • Dr. John H. Buck Dr. Linda W. Little Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Administrative Judge Board Panel 5000 Hermitage Drive U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Raleigh, North Carolina 27612 Washington, DC 20555 George F. Trowbridge, Esq.
  • Christine N. Kohl Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal 1800 M Street, N.W.

Board Panel Washington, DC 20006 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, DC 20555 Robert Adler, Esq.

505 Executive House

    • Ivan W. Smith P. O. Box 2357 Administrative Judge Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Honorable Mark Cohen Washington, DC 20555 512 D-3 Main Capital Building Harrisburg, PA 17120 Dr. Walter H. Jordan Administrative Judge Ms. Marjorie Aamodt 881 W. Outer Drive R.D. #5 Dak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Coatesville, PA 19320 Gary L. Milhollin, Esq.

Mr. Thomas Gerusky 1815 Jefferson Street Bureau of Radiation Protection Madison, WI 53711 Dept. of Environmental Resources P. 0. Box 2063 i

Dr. Walter H. Jordan Harrisburg, PA 17120 l

Administrative Judge Carib Terrace Motel 552 N. Oreon Blvd.

Pompono Beach, Florida 33062

  • Jadge Reginald L. Gotchy Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Mr. Harvin I. Lewis 6504 Bradford Terrace
  • Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Philadelphia, PA 19149 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Metropolitan Edison Company t

ATTN:

J. G. Herbein, Vice President

  • Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel P. O. Box 542 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Reading, PA 19603 Washington, DC 20555 Ms. Jane Lee
  • Secretary R.D. 3; Box 3521 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Etters, PA 17319 ATTN:

Chief. Docketing & Service Br.

Washington, DC 20555 Walter W. Cohen, Consumer Advocate 4

Department of Justice William S. Jordan, III, Esq.

Strawberry Square,14th Floor Harmon & Weiss Harrisburg, PA 17127 1725 I Street, N.W.

Suite 506 Thomas J. Germine Washington, DC 20006 Deputy Attorney General Division of Law - Room 316 John Levin. Esq.

1100 Raymond Boulevard Pennsylvania Public Utilities Comm.

Newark, New Jersey 07102 Box 3265 Harrisburg, PA 17120 Allen R. Carter, Chairman Joint Legislative Committee on Energy Jordan D. Cunningham, Esq.

Post Office Box 142 Fox, Farr and Cunningham Suite 513 2320 North 2nd Street Senate Gressette Building Harrisburg, PA 17110 Columbia, South Carolina 29202 Louise Bradford Robert Q. Pollard Three Mile Island Alert 609 Montpelier Street 1011 Green Street Baltimore, Maryland 21218 Harrisburg, PA 17102 Chauncey Kepford Ms. Ellyn R. Weiss Judith Johnsrud Harmon & Weiss Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power 1725 I Street, N.W.

433 Orlando Avenue Suite 506 State College, PA -16801 Washington, DC 20006 Ms. Frieda Berryhill, Chairman Mr. Steven C. Sholly Coalition for Nuclear Power Plant Union of Concerned Scientists Postponement 1725 I Street, N.W.

2610 Grendon Drive Suite 601 Wilmington, Delaware 19808 Washington, DC 20006 Gail Phelps ANGRY 245 W. Philadelphia Street York, Pennsylvania 17401

-* Judge Gary J. Edles, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing N' h ty Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission James M. Cutchin, IV Counsel for NRC Staff Washington, DC 20555

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