ML20040C983
| ML20040C983 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron, Braidwood, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 01/14/1982 |
| From: | Tramm T COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8201290438 | |
| Download: ML20040C983 (31) | |
Text
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N Commonwoelth Edison
/ one First National Plata. CJ:icago. liknois l
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Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690 e-O f
9 January 14, 1982 DECEivsa 71 g,
2:
JAN281982e ~
is rmnwen ms Ml
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V E:x.r rm a Mr. Harold R.
Denton, Director MC
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Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation q,
U.S. Nuclea r Regulatory Commission y
l Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Byron Station Units 1 and 2 Braidwood Station tJnits 1 and 2 Advance FSAR Information NRC-Docke t No s. 50-454/455/456/457
Dear Mr. Denton:
This is to provide advance copies of information which will be included in the Byron /Braidwood FSAR in the_next amendment.
Attachment A to this letter lists the information enclosed.
One (1) signed original and fif ty-nine (59) copies of this letter are provided.
Fif teen (15) copies of the enclosures are included for your review and approval.
Please address further questions to this office.
Very truly yours, fh b$x jkt T. R. Tramm Nuclear Licensing Administrator Pressurized Water Reactors Attachment l
1 3129N l1 8201290438 820114 PDR ADOCK C5000454 A
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Attachment A 4
List of Enclosed Information i
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FSAR Question Responses 4
1 New:
040.162 Revised:
022.6 040.163 022.25 040;164 a.
022.50 040.165 022.62 040.166 022.73
- 040.108 212.154 040.12
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II.
FSAR Text Changes New Subsection 3.8.5.5.2.5
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Revised Table 6.2-54 l
Regulatory Guide 1.124, 1.130 1
III.
Miscellaneous Items RSB Item MEB Item 14 (revised)
New CSB Item (1/14/82)-
Transient Combustible Administrative Controls Valve Tests i
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B/B
' Reactor Systems Branch Open Item Charging Pump Miniflow Isolation Valves e
1.
Address the concern of post-accident recirculation fluid being transferred to the RWST via the charging pump mini-flow lines following a small break LOCA with repressuriza-tion to above the RCS pressure setpoint that requires the operator to reopen the miniflow isolation valves.
RESPONSE (Revisedl The miniflow is directed to the charging pump suction header not the RWST.
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B/B s
Administrative Control Regarding Transient Combustibles Byron /Braidwood will incorporabsinto administrative procedures provisions to control transient combustibles.
As stated in 10 CFR'50, App.
R, the procedures will 4
state that transient combustibles in safety-related areas, which are not in approved containers, shall not be left unattended.
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Testing of Turbine Stop Valves,' Governor Valves, Intercept Valves and Reheat Stop Valves Byron /Braidwood will test the turbine stop valves,.
governdr valves, intercept valves and reheat stop valves on a monthly basis.
Testing frequency will be increased if generic valve closure problems occur which neccessi-tates an increased test interval.
The turbine-generator preventative maintenance program for Byron /Braidwood will follow the format of the CECO plants.
This includes scheduling of maintenance during every refueling outage to one component of the turbine-generator assembly such that the high pressure turbine, three low pressure tur-bines and the generator-exciter assembly receive main-tenance one time in a five year interval.
Maintenance on valves associated with each assembly will be completed at the same time.
Additional components will be reviewed for repair if preventative and corrective maintenance routines uncover a problem that could cause a generic failure.
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B/C-FSAR Overturning Sliding OBE + 25 year flood 11.5 4.0 OBE + Combined event flood 7.0 2.5
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SSE + 25 year flood 6.0 1.75 3.8.5.5.2.4 Lake Screen House (Braidwood)
The stability of the lake screen house is investigated under seismic conditions with highest water level in the lake The e
factors of safety are given below.
Overturning Sliding Floatation Highest Water Level
- 1. 5 Highest Water Level and SSE 3.0 1.1 Highest Water Level and OBE 5.5 1.8 3.8.5.5.2.5 Containment Building The factors of safety against overturning, sliding and buoyancy for the containment structure are greater than the required values contained in SRP Section 3.8.5.
Factors of safety for the containment against overturning and sliding are given below:
Overturning Sliding
()N OBE + Dead Weight
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+ Lateral Earth Pressure 3.28 9.30 l
SSE + Dead Weight
+ Lateral Earth Pressure 1.81 3.57 Overturning resistance is provided by the dead weight of the containment structures and components.
Sliding resistance is provided both by friction between the basemat poured against rock (coefficient of friction = 1.0) and in direct bearing against rock of the reactor cavity wall and the tendon tunnel walls.
Resistance to uplift forces due to buoyancy from design basis flooding is considered to be provided by the dead weight of the containment structure.
The factor of safety is 3.40.
3.8.5.6 Material, Quality Control, and Special Construction Techniques The materials, quality control, and special construction tech-niques for foundations conform to those set forth in seismic Category I structures and are discussed in Subsection 3.8.4.6.
2.0-40
New CSB Item (1/14/82)
Provide the power source for each of the containment s
isolation valves in the Process Radiation Monitoring system and the Hydrogen Monitoring system.
This infor-mation,is normally read from the P&ID, but P&ID's for these systems are not yet available.
i RFSPONSE System Isolation Valve No.
Power Source Process Radiation Monitoring 1PR001A Ell IPR 001B E12 1PR031 Ell /E12 1PR032 N/A Hydrogen Monitoring 1PS228A Ell 1PS229A E12 1PS230A Ell IPS231A N/A 1PS228B Ell 1PS229B E12 1PS230B E12 1PS231B N/A Train A of the Hydrogen Monitoring system is powered from Ell and train B is powered from E12.
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B/B MEB Item 14 (Revised Response
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Inter-system LOCA/ Periodic Leakage Testing Periodic leakage testing of RCS pressure isolation valves identified as inter-system LOCA isolation check valves will be done simultar.cously (not individually) for a gross leakage with a global limit of 5 gpm.
The measurement will be determined either by using installed flow meter indication ~on the test lines to the Holdup Tank, portable flowrate instrumentation, or other acceptable test measurement means.
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3.'8.5.7 Testing and Inservice Inspection Requiyement's Regular and rigorous inspection during constructi'on in conjunc-O tion with testing of the structural materials is carried out as outlined in Appendix B.
Structural integrity and/or perf ormance tests are as specified in Subsection 3.8.1.7 for the containment base slab.~
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2.5-4aa J
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TABLE 6.2-54 ACTIVE HEAT SIllK DATA FOR MINIMUM POST-LOCA CONTAINMENT PRESSURE I
Containment Spray System Parameters A.
Maximum spray system flow, total 8118 gpm B.
Fastest post-LOCA initiation of spray system Assuming off-site power loss at start of LOCA 25 see II Containment Atmosphere Recirculation Fan Coolers A.
Maximum number of fan coolers operating 4
B.
Fastest post-LOCA initiation Assuming off-site power loss at start of LOCA 17 see C.
Performance data See Figure 6.2-25~
for fan cooler temperature versus heat load curve 9
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B/B-FSAR
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REGULATORY GUIDE 1.124 V
Revision 0, November 1976 SERVICE LIMITS AND LOADING COMBINATIONS FOR CLASS 1 LINEAR TYPE SUPPORTS The design of the Byron /Braidwood NSSS components supports is in compliance with all of the applicable regulatory pocitions contined in Regulatory Guide 1.124.
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B/B-FSAR REGULATORY GUIDE 1.130 O
Revision 1, October 1978 DESIGN LIMITS AND LOADING COMBINATIONS FOR CLASS 1 PLATE-AND-SHELL-TYPE COMPONENT SUPPORTS The design of Byron /Braidwood NSSS component supports is in compliance with all of the applicable regulatory positions contained in Regulatory Guide 1.130..
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D/D-FSAR AMENDMENT 36 JANUARY 1982 supplier has qualified the valves for mechanical O
and seismic loading by analysis, and has proven the operability of the valves.through normal and e,mergency environmental conditions by actual test.
B.1.d:
The containment isolation provision for the purge system lines are designed to Section III, Class 2, and Category IE electrical requirements.
Inboard and outboard isolation valven (redundant valves) are supplied by Division 11 and 12 power respectively.
Operators are of att air / spring design, fail the valve to the closed position upon loss of air or power, and are testable from the Control Room.
The containment isolation provisions of the purge system therefore, meet all standards appropriate to Engineered Safety Features.
B.l.e:
The purge system isolation valves close automatically on receipt of an ESF actuation signal.
No external energy source is required to close the containment isolation valves.
They are of a spring return design and will fail to the closed position upon loss of air pressure or electric power.
B.l.f:
The specified maximum closure time for the containms'r1 purge isolation valves is 5 seconds.
B.l.g:
The containment mini-flow purge exhaust intake is 8 inches in diameter, located 73 feet above the operating floor and approximately 2' feet 6 inches from the face of the containment wall.
Due to this distance, it is unlikely that following an accident, any debris would blow as high as the mini-flow exhaust intake.
To ensure that debris or damaged ductwork does not impair the isolation of the miniflow system following a LOCA, a debris screen will be added to the miniflow supply duct.
The debris screen and the duct between the screen and the isolation valve will be Seismic Category I and will be designed to survive transient differential pressure due to LOCA.
The debris screen will be located at least 1 foot away from the isolation valve.
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Q22.6-2
B/B-FSAR AMENDMENT 36 l
JANUARY 1982 B.2 The system is designed to purge the coatainment and in order to keep maintenance personnel exposures B.3:
to ALARA levels and not used for containment tem-perature and humidity control..The concentration of fission products in the containment are also reduced by charcoal filter units provided within the containment, thus minimizing the need for purging the containment.
B.2.b The minipurge system has one purge line and one and c:
vent line of 8 inch size.
B.4:
Provisions are made to meet the Type C leak test requirement of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, for isolation
-valve leak testing.
B.5.a The minipurge system is provided with an 8 inch line and b:
and isolation valves which close in 5 seconds.
Thus the system complies with BTP 6-4 and the dose to the public determined under the terms of Appendix K to 10 CFR 50 are well below the limits in 10 CFR 100.
B.5.c:
Based upon both ECCS, trains operating concurrent with minimum spray water and service water temperature, an analysis was performed which maximizes mass and energy release.
Minimum containment pressure of
-0.1 psig was used in the analysis.
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B The containment purge isolation valves are supplied to bubble-tight seat leakage requirements with pres-sure dif ferential of 110% of design shut-of f pressure across the seat.
This would apply to all the contain-ment purge isolation valves.
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B/B-FSAR AMENDMENT 36 JANUARY 1982 QUESTION 022.25 "FSAR Section 6.5.2.2 states ' Containment spray injection and caustic edue tion...will continue until...the low-low level alarm of the RWST is annunciated.
Containment spray injection and caustic addition may then be terminated, and the operating personnel may transfer the containment spray pumps from the injection to the recirculation mode by first closing the motor-operated valves in the suction line from the RWST, the water and caustic lines to the eductor, and then opening the motor-operated valves in the suction lines from the containment sumps.'
State clearly whether transferring the containment spray pumps from the injection to the recirculation mode involves stopping and restarting the containment spray pumps as iniplied in the above statement because the valves ir the suction line from the RWST are closed before the valves in the suction lines from the containment sumps are opened."
RESPONSE
The containment spray pumps will be run for at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> following a LOCA.
During_this time, switchover of pump suction from the injection to the recirculation mode of
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operation will be manually initiated and completed.
The containment spray pumps do not have to be stopped when transferring from the injection mode to the recirculation mode of operation.
The response to Question 450.2 from the-Accident Analysis Branch provides a more detailed discussion on this subject.
A summary of the sequence of events leading up to and during switchover follows.
The RWST level is initially one volume inaccuracy below the low alarm setpoint.
RWST outflow during injection is 18,200 gpm.
ECCS switchover begins at one volume inaccuracy below the low-low alarm setpoint.
The volume consumed prior to switchover is 257,454 gallons and requires 14.15 minutes.
ECCS switchover is given in Table Q212.65-2 in response to Question 212.65.
It' requires 235 seconds (3.92 min.)
j and consumes 73,618 gallens assuming two trains and worst single ECCS failure.
Following completion of ECCS switchover, the outflow from the RWST is 14,400 gpm and continues until 20.9 minutes have elapsed, consuming an additional 40,752 gallons.
06 Q22.25-1
D/B-FSAR AMENDMENT 36 JANUARY 1982 Spray switchover begins at 20.9 minutes, and is completed 3
when 21.6 minutes have elapsed, consuming an additional 10,080 gallons.
Total cumulative volume used is 381,904 gallons.. At this time 24,948 gallons are still available one volume inaccuracy above the nominal empty alarm setpoint.
See Table Q22.25-1.
When containment spray is initiated 25 seconds after the str et of injection, the operator verifies that flow is present from the spray additive tank for both trains.
Assuming the single failure is failure of the spray additive eductor valve to open.
The operator turns off the pump in the train with the failed valve.
In this' mode of operation, the cumu-lative volume used at the time ECCS switchover is complete is 262,496 gallons.
While the ECCS pumps are operating from the recirculation sump, the one operating spray pump continues to take suction from the RWST until the RWST level is one volume inaccuracy above the nominal empty alarm setpoint.
This occurs at 31.7 minutes.
At this time the spray pump is switched to the recirculation mode.
Spray switchover is complete at 32.4 minutes.
In order to obtain the long term required sump pH, a minimum of 2100 gallons of 30% NaOH is required from the spray additEve tank.
After 32.4 minutes, another 357 gallons is required to be added.
This can be accomplished by continuing caustic s
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addition for another 6.5 minutes while the spray pump is taking suction from the sump.
See Table Q22.25-2.
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022.2s-2
B/B-FSAR AMENDMENT 36 JANUARY 1982 Deliberate operator action is 0guired to open the containment isolation valves after resetting the actuating signal.
Each containment
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isolation valve must be opened individually.
Position 5)
The containment setpoint pressure that initiates containment isolation for nonessential penetrations must be reduced.to the minimum compatible with normal operating conditions.
The containment isolation setpoint pressure is 5 psig.
This value is used in all analyses of the capability of the containment to withstand and contain the results of postulated line breaks.
Operating plant experience indicates that use of this setpoint pressure will not result in i
unnecessary isolation signals.
Analytical results show that the containment pressure and offsite releases will stay well below limits and that safety systems will work properly with this setpoint.
Position 6)
Containment purge valves that do not satisfy the operability criteria set forth in Branch Technical Position 6-4 or the Staff Interim Position of October 23, 1979 must be sealed closed as defined in SRP 6.2.4, Item II.3.f during operational conditions 1,
2, 3, and 4.
Furthermore, these valves must be I~N verified to be closed at least every 31 days.
(A V
copy of the Staff Interim Position is enclosed as.)
The containment purge valves are closed whenever the reactor is not in the cold shutdown or refuel-ing mode.
These valves will be put under adminis-trative control per ANSI N271-1976.
These valves will be verified to be closed at least once every 31 days by checking position indication' in the control room.
See response to Question 22.54.
Position 7)
Containment purge and vent isolation valves must close on a high radiation signal.
A high radiation signal, separate from the con-tainment isolation signal, will close the contain-ment purge and vent isolation valves.
See response to Question 22.55.
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Q22.50-2
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D/B-FSAR AMENDMENT 36 JANUARY 1982 HYDROGEN MEASUREMENT
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The measurement of hydrogen in the presence of nitrogen, oxygen and water vapor is possible because the thermal conddctivity of hydrogen is approximately seven times higher than nitrogen, oxygen or water vapor, which have nearly the same thermal conductivities (at the filament operational temperature of approximately 500 F).
The measurement is accomplished by using a thermal conductivity measurement cell and a catalytic reactor.
The sample first flows through the reference section of the cell, then passes through the sample section of the measuring cell that includes the catalyst.
The change is sample composition, due to the catalytic reaction, is therefore,
, indicated by the difference measured in the sample and reference sides of the cell.
If an excess amount of oxyg sample for recombining all,en does not exist in the the hydrogen, oxygen can be provided ahead of the hydrogen analyzer.
The amount of oxygen added is determined by the highest range of the analyzer.
Span calibration is accomplished by introducing a known amount of oxygen and gas mixture of hydrogen in nitrogen to the cell; this will give a specific output for a
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readout calibration.
Zero calibration may be accomplished by shutting off the oxygen supply of the span gas mixture.
This will result in the gas flowing' unchanged through both sides of the cell and the thermal conductivity will also remain unchanged, the cell will be balanced, and the electrical output will be zero.
CONTROLS Calibration, zero and span controls and lights are located on the analyzer cabinet.
A master off, standby power on, and analysis mode selector switch is located in the control room.
OUTPUTS A 4-20ma current output from each analyzer provides the signal which feeds the seismically qualified control room recorders.
Local alarms for the hydrogen monitor
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Q22.62-3
D/D-FSAR AMENDMENT 36 JANUARY 1982 are provided on the local hydrogen monitor control panel.
The following alarms are provided:
a.
high hydrogen b.
low analyzer flow
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low reagent and/or calibration gas pressure "d.
low analyzer temperature e.
analyzer cell failure f.
common alarm (any of alarm b through e above)
A trouble alarm is provided in the control room which is the same as the common alarm on the local panel (item f above).
A high hydrogen alarm is also provided in the control room.
The reference and span gas bottles are installed on a seismically qualified bottle rack, and are sized for 100 days of continuous unattended operation during post-LOCA events, with calibration checks possible from the control room.
l The units are to have an accuracy of approximately 15%
i of full scale.
The operation of these monitors is such that several hours of warmup time for stabilization of the hot-box which houses the sample chamber is required.
Because of this, Byron /Braidwood plans to maintain these monitors in a " standby" mode continuously, which maintains the monitors in a warmed-up condition, so that accurate sampling may begin when a LOCA occurs and the sample pump is started.
Actuation and control of the hydrogen monitors will be from the main control room.
The items requested in Question 022.62 are also addressed as follows in the order of the question:
a.
Address positions and clarifications of NUREG-0737, II.F.1-6.
1.
The monitors will be maintained in a standby mode and manually actuated from the main control room when required to operate.
2.
The range of the monitors is 0% to 10% hydrogen concentration by volume over the pressure range from -5 psig to 60 psig.
l 022.62-4 l
B/B-FSAR AMENDMENT 36 JANUARY 1982 3.
The hydrogen monitors are qualified to IEEE 323-1974.
4.
Indication and recording of hydrogen concentration will be available in the main control room when the monitors are operating.
5.
The hydrogen monitors are located at Auxiliary Building elevation 401 feet.
Samples are piped from containment penetrations to the monitors.
The accuracy of the monitors is to be +5% of full scale.
b.
Operation of the hydrogen monitors is indeper. dent of the hydrogen recombiner since both systems used separate piping and containment penetrations and are not dependent upon the other to operate in any way.
The hydrogen monitoring system consists of two independent, physically separated and redundant subsystems and thus meets the single failure criteria.
Separate piping pen-etrations of the containment are utilized by each train of this system.
Each train is powered from a separate IE power source The portions of the hydrogen monitoring piping c.
system which form the containment atmosphere isolation barrier are designated Seismic Category I, Quality Group B.
The remainder of the system outside the containment is Seismic Category I and classified as ANSI B31.1 piping supplied with material manufacturer's and supplier's certifications.
For this application (low pressure, normally isolated, redundant system external to the containment) Seismic Category I design to B31.1 allowables is an adequately conservative design basis.
d.
Refer to c above.
l Samples of the containment atmosphere will be taken at or near the containment penetration through which the sample piping passes.
The samples taken are representative of l
the containment atmosphere due to the mixing system effects l
which is discussed in Subsection 6.2.5.2.3.
l The mechanical piping penetrations used for the hydrogen monitoring system are IPC-12 and 1PC-31 for Unit 1 and 2PC-12 and 2PC-31 for Unit 2.
Penetrations 1PC-12 and 2PC-12 l
will be for the Train A monitors and 1PC-31 and 2PC-31 are l
for the Train B monitors.
Additional information concerning the mechanical penetration's elevations and azimuths are
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listed in Table 3.8-1.
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D/B"FSAR
- AMENDMENT 36 JANUARY 1982
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QUESTION 022.73 "FSAR Table 3.2-1 indicates that quality measures equivalent O-in intent to those in Quality Group C will be applied to the reactor containment fan coolers.
It is our position that the reactor containment fan coolers must be designed, fabricated, erected and tested to Quality Group B standards, as recommended by Regulatory Guide 1.26 (SRP Section 6.2.2.11.6).
Provide information on how you will comply with this position."
RESPONSE
The reactor containment fan cooler (RCFC's) coils are ASME Eection III, Class 3 components.
The difference between Quality Group B and C (ASME Section III, class 2 and Class 3) is in the type of nondestructive testing required.
ASME Section III, Class 2 requires radiographic testing, ASME Section III, Class 3 nondestructive teuting requiring magnetic particle, dye penetrant or radiographic testing.
Allowable stresses, design and fabrication require-ments for ASME Section III, Class 2 and Class 3 are the same.
The fan coolers have been designed to meet seismic and other safety-related Quality Group C requirements.
In addition,
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the coils are functional during normal operating conditions and are redundant, such that only two of four coolers are required for post-accident heat removal.
The RCFC service water coils are designed to ASME Section III Class 3 requirements.
Following is our justification to demonstrate that by performing magnetic particle examination on the fillet welds and radiographic examination on the butt welds these coils will meet Class 2 NDE requirements:
1.
The RCFC coils are made of seamless copper tubes, formed and machined in one piece with end tube sheets.
2.
The retarn bends are brazed to the tubes on one end.
The NDE requirements are same for brazing process for Class 2 and Class 3.
3.
The water boxes are made in one piece with ru) points and bolted to the tube sheet on the other end of the coil.
Baffles in the box are internal to the box and hence are not in containment pressure boundary.
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Q22.73-1
B/B-FSAR AMENDMENT 36 JA!TUARY 1982 4.
Supply and return nozzles are fillet welded to the box.
To meet Class 2 NDE requirements, magnetic particle examination of these welds will be performed at the site.
5.
Pipe flanges are welded to the other end of the nozzles.
To meet Class 2 NDE requirements, radiographic examination will be performed on these welds at the site.
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QUESTION 040.12
" Provide a listing of all motor operated valves within your scope of design that require power lockout in order O
to meet the single failure criterion and provide the details of your design that accomplish this requirement.
RESPONSE
All motor-operated valves within the (total) scope of design that.equire power lockout to meet the Branch Technical Position ElCSB-18 are listed as'follows:
S78840 SI880LB SI8835 SI8808C 8806 SI8808D SI8809A SI8809B SI8802A SI8813 SI8808A SI8802B RC8001A VQ001A RC8001B VQ001B RC8001C VQ002A RC8001D VQOO2B RC8002A RC8002B RC8002C s
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RC8002D The details of the design that accomplish the single failure criteria requirement are described in Subsection 8.1.10.
In response to an NRC request to provide schematics and indicating circuits for each of the valves listed above, the following drawings were transmitted to the NRC under separate cover on September 24, 1980.
6/20 E-4008A 6/20 E-4030 Sill 6/20 E-4008B 6/20 E-4030 SI12 6/20 E-4008E 6/20 E-4030 SIl3 6/20 E-4008L 6/20 E-4030 SIl6 6/20 E-4008AA 6/20 E-4030 SIl8 6/20 E-4030 SIO7 6/20 E-4030 SI33 6/20 E-4030 SIO9 6/20 E-4030 SI34 6/2C E-1-4030 RC07 6/20 E-1-4030 VQ07 6/20 E-1-4030 RC08 6/20 E-1-4030 VQ08 6/20 E-1-4030 RC09 6/20 E-1-4030 VQ17 6/20 E-1-4030 RC10 G/20 E-1-4030 VQ18 6/20 E-1-4030 RC18 6/20 E-1-4030 RC19 6/20 E-1-4030 RC20 6/20 E-1-4030 RC21 Q40.12-1
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D/B-FSAR
' AMENDMENT 36 JANUARY 1982 QUESTION 040.108 g-
" Assume an unlikely event has occurred requiring operation
(_]j of a diesel generator for a prolonged period that would require replenishment of fuel oil without interrupting operation of the diesel generator.
What prevision has been made in the design of the fuel oil storage fill system to minimize the creation of turbulence of the sediment in the bottom of the storage tank.
Stirring of this. sediment during addition of new fuel has the potential of causing the overall quality of the fuel to become unacceptable and could potentially lead to the degradation or failure of the diesel generator."
RESPONSE
A filter has been provided on the. fill lines to the diesel oil storage tanks.
The filters are rated 5 micron, 98%
removal.
In addition, filters have been provided on the discharge of each diesel oil storage tank transfer pump.
The rating of those filters is also 5 micron, 98% removal.
The twin diesel oil tanks supplying the Unit 1 emergency d iesels, during periods of prolonged operation, will be replenished by refilling one tank with the other tank in service and allowing the refilled tank to settle for 12 3
hours.
During a prolonged operation of the Unit 2 diesel generators, the 50,000 gallon fuel oil tank for each diesel generator will be refilled when one-third of the volume of the tank has been consumed.
For both Unit 1 and 2, the 125,000 gallon fuel oil storage tanks and fuel oil transfer system is capable of replenishing the emergency diesel oil tanks.
This fuel oil storage tank contains safety-grade, commercial grade fuel oil (identical in purchase specification to the emergency diesel oil) and is the normal source of replenishing the emergency diesel oil tanks.
Byron Station policy is to maintain a full fuel oil storage tank.
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040.108-1
D/D-FSAR QUESTION 040.162
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" Provide a table that lists all equipment including instre;nentation and vital support system equipment required to achieve and maintain hot and/or cold shutdown.
For each equipment listed:
a.
Differentiate between equipment required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown and equipment required to achieve and maintain cold shutdown.
b.
Define each equipment's location by fire area.
c.
Define each equipment's redundant counterpart.
d.
Identify each equipment's essential cabling (instru-mentation, control, and power).
For each cable identified:
(1) Describe the cable routing (by fire area) from source to termination, and (2) Identify each fire area location where the cables are separated by less than a wall having a three-hour fire rating from cables for any redundant shutdown system, and e.
Lists any problem areas identified by item 1.d. (2) above that will be corrected in accordance with Section III.G.3 of Appendix R (i.e., alternate or dedicated shutdown capability)."
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RESPONSE
The requested information was provided in the Safe Shutdown Report, November 1981.
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B/B-FSAR QUESTION 040.163
" Provide a table that lists Class lE and Non-Class lE cables that are associated with the essential safe shutdown systems identified in Question 040.162.
For each cable listed:
a.
Define the cables' association to the safe shutdown system (common power source, common raceway, separation less than IEEE Standard 384 guidalines, cables for equipment whose spurious operation will adversely affect shutdown system, etc.).
b.
Describe each associated cable routing (by fire area) from source to termination, and c.
Identify each location where the associated cables are separated by less than a wall having a three-hour fire rating from cables required for or associated with any redundant shutdown system."
RESPONSE
There are no associated cables at the Byron /Braidwood Stations.
l This is explained in Subsection 2.4.1.5 of the Safe Shutdown
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Analysis.
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740.163-1 l
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B/B-F5AR
,..a QUESTION 040.164
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" Provide one of the following for each of the circuits identified in Question 040.163 part (c).
(a)
The results of an analysis that demonstrates that failure caused by open, ground, or hot short of cables will not affect its associated shutdown
- system, l
(b)
Identify each circuit requiring a solution in accor-dance with Section III.G.3 of Appendix R, or (c)
Identify each circuit meeting or that will be modified to meet the requirements of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R (i.e., three-hour wall, 20 feet of clear space with automatic fire suppression,.or one-hour barrier with automatic fire suppression)."
RESPONSE
As mentioned in the response to Question 040.163, there are no associated circuits at Byron /Braidwood.
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040.164-1 l
D/B-FSAR QUESTION 040.165 "To assure compliance with GDC 19, we require the following O
information be provided for the control room.
If credit is to be taken.for an alternate or dedicated shutdown method for other fire areas (as identified by item 1.e or 3.b above) in accordance with Section III.G.3 of new Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, the following will also be required for each of these plant areas.
a.
A table that lists all equipment including instru-l mentation and vital support system equipment that are required by the primary method of achieving and maintaining hot and/or cold shutdown.
b.
A table that lists all equipment including instru-mentation and vital support system equipment that are required by the alternate, dedicated, or remote method of achieving and maintaining hot and/or cold shutdown.
Identify each alternate shutdown equipment listed c.
in item 4.b above with essential cables (instrumen-tation, control, and power) that are located in the fire area containing the primary shutdown equipment.
For each equipment listed, provide one of the following:
(1)
Detailed electrical schematic drawings that O
show the essential cables that are duplicated elsewhere and are electrically isolated from the subject fire areas, or (2)
The results of an analysis that demonstrates that failure (open, ground, or hot short) of each cable identified will not affect the capa-bility to achieve and maintain hot or cold shutdown.
I d.
Provide a table that lists Class 10 and Non-Class lE cables that are associated with the alternate, dedicated, or remote method of shutdown.
For each item listed, identify each associated cable located in the fire area containing the primary shutdown equipment.
For each cable se identified, provide the results of an analysis that demonstrates that failure (open, ground, or hot short) of the associated cable will not adversely affect the alternate, dedicated, or remote method of shutdown."
RESPONSE
O This information was provided in the Safe Shutdown Analysis, Nov. ember 1981.
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B/B-FSAR QUESTION 040.166 "The residual heat removal system is generally a low pressure system that interfaces with the high pressure primary coolant system.
To preclude a LOCA through this interface, we require compliance with the recommen-dations of Branch Technical Position RSB 5-1.
- Thus, this interface most likely consists of two redundant and independent motor operated valves with diverse inter-locks in accordance with Branch Technical Position ICSB 3 These two motor operated valves and their associated cable may be subject to a single fire hazard.
It is our concern that this single fire could cause the two valves to open resulting in a fire-initiated LOCA through the subject high-low pressure system interface.
To assure that this interface and other high-low pressure interfaces are adequately protected from the effects of a single fire, we require the following information:
'a.
Identify each high-low pressure interface that uses redundant electrically controlled devices (such as two series motor operated valves) to isolate or preclude rupture of any primary coolant boundary.
b.
Identify each device's essential cabling (power and control) and describe the cable routing (by
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fire area) from source to termination.
c.
Identify each location where the identified cables are separated by less than a wall having a three-hour fire rating from cables for the redundant device.
d.
For the areas identified in item 5.c above (if any),
provide the bases and justification as to the accep-tability of the existing design or any proposed modifications.
RESPONSE
l (Not yet available.)
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wuw awww A.
Residual Heat Removal f~')i The function of residual heat removal is performed in x_
two stages in accomplishing the cooldown from hot stand-by to cold shutdown.
The first stage is from hot standby to 350' F.
During this stage, circulation of the reactor coolant is pro-vided by natural circulation with the reactor core as r.he heat source and the steam generators as the heat sink.
Steam is initially released via the steam generator safety valves to maintain a hot standby.
This occurs automatically as a result of turbine and reactor trip.
Steam release for cooldown occurs via the steam generator power-operated atmospheric relief valves.
As the cooldown proceeds, the operator adjusts these valves to increase the amount of steam dump, to permit a reasonable cooldown rate.
Feedwater makeup is provided by the Auxiliary Feedwater System.
The steam generator safety valves are Seismic Category I spring-loaded valves that can automatically maintain the plant in a safe hot standby for an extended period of time.
The steam generator power-operated atmospheric relief valves are also seismically qualified.
Should a single failure render one of the atmospheric dump valves inoperable, the plant could be cooled down to
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the RHRS initiation temperature via the three active loops.
Additionally, the eight inch manual valve x-upstream of the failed relief valve could be closed while the f ailed valve was repaired or replaced.
Communications for 4.ny local operations would be made by the use of hand held two-way radios.
The auxiliary feedwater system has sufficient align-ment capability and flow capacity to ensure that feedwater can always be provided to all steam genera-tors.
A motor drum pump is provided which feeds all 4 steam generators.
A separate system incorporates a diesel driven pump which can also supply feedwater to all 4 steam generators.
The Auxiliary Feedwater System is capable of providing feedwater for an extended period of time.
The primary source of feedwater is the condensate storage tank which has a minimum available volume of 276,000 gallons.
The backup is from the Seismic Category I Service Water System.
In the unlikely event that suf ficient auxiliary feedwater was not available in the condensate storage tank, the pump suction is automatically switched to the backup source of water.
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The status of each steam generator can be monitored using safety related instrumentation located in the Control Room.
Separate indication channels for both steam
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generator pressure and water level are available.
Oper-ation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System can be monitored using. instrumentation located in the control room.
This includes indication of the flows into each steam generator, the operating status light for a motor-driven pump, and condensate storage tank level indication.
There is also local indication of the diesel driven l
pump suction and discharge pressure.
The second stage is from 350' F to cold shutdown.
During this stage, the RHRS is brought into operation.
Circulation of the reactor coolant is provided by the RHR pumps and the heat exchangers in the RHRS act as the means of heat removal from the RCS.
In the RHR heat exchangers, the residual heat is transferred to the Component Cooling Water System which ultimately transfers the heat to the Service Water System.
The RHRS is a fully redundant system.
The RHRS includes two RHR pumps and two RHR heat exchangers.
Each RHR pump is powered from different emergency power trains and each RHR heat exchanger is cooled by a different Component Cooling Water System loop.
The component Cooling Water and the Service Water Systems are both designed to Seismic Category I.
If any component in one of the RHR subsystems were rendered inoperable as the result of a single failure, cooldown of the plant would not be comprised; however, the time for cooldown-would be extended.
The operation of the RHRS can be l
monitored using instrumentation in the Control Room.
There is indication of the pump discharge flow, the pump operating status and the component cooling flow from the discharge of the RHR heat exchangers.
B.
Boration and Inventory Control Boration is accomplished using portions of the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS).
The boric acid trans-fer pumps supply four weight percent boric acid from the boric acid tanks'to the suction of the centrifugal charging pumps which inject the borated water into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) via the normal charging l
and/or reactor coolant pump seal injection flow paths.
Makeup in excess of that required for boration can be provided from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) using the centrifugal charging pumps and the same injection flow paths as described for boration.
Two motor-operated valves, each powered from different emergency diesels and connected in parallel, transfer the suction of the charging pumps to the RWST.
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