ML20040C971
| ML20040C971 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 01/25/1982 |
| From: | Silberg J CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8201290421 | |
| Download: ML20040C971 (14) | |
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CLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )
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THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ) Docket Nos. 50-440 ILLUMINATING COMPANY, et al. ) 50-441
)
(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, )
Units 1 and 2) )
APPLICANTS' ANSWER TO SUNFLOWER ALLIANCE MOTION TO RESUBMIT CONTENTION 7 In its March 15, 1981 Petition for Leave to Intervene, Sunflower Alliance et al. (" Sunflower") included the following contention as its " Seventh Ground of Intervention":
Petitioners allege that there is insufficient documentation of the ability of the containment structuren of said facilities to safely inhibit a hydrogen explosion of the magnitude and type which occurred at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania andlof which the Commission is aware.1 1 The Seventh Ground of Intervention also included an allegation concerning the emission of "certain minimal amounts of radiation." That portion of the Seventh Ground hr.s not been i included in Sunflower's present mot.ica.
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2 Both Applicants and Staff urged that the contention not be admitted.
During the Special Prehearing Conference, the Licensing Board stated its tentative view of the contention's legal status, indicating its belief that the Commission's decision in 4
the Three Mile Island Unit 1 Restart proceeding was con-trolling. Under that decision, an intervenor could raise a contention calling for hydrogen control measures exceeding those specified by 10 CFR 550.44. However, in order to avoid being dismissed as a challenge to the provisions of 10 CFR S50.44, the contention must show that "there is a credible loss-of-coolant accident scenario entailing hydrogen genera-tion, hydrogen combustion, containment breach or leaking, and offsite radiation doses in excess of Part 100 guideline values." CLI-80-16, 11 NRC.at 675. The Licensing Board stated that if Sunflower were not able te comply with this standard in the course of the Special Prehearing Conference, it could file a late contention subject to meeting the requirements of 10 CFR S2.714. Tr. 320-323. This analysis was memorialized in the Special Prehearing Conference Memorandum and Order, LBP-81-24, 14 NRC 175, 207-08 (July 28, 1981).
2 " Applicants' Brief on Contentions of Sunflower Alliance, Inc., Et A1. " dated May 22, 1981, pp. 10-13; " Applicants' Brief on Contentions," dated July 6, 1981, p. 18.
3 "NRC Staff Position on Part.es and Contentions," dated May 27, 1981, p. 5.
4 Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), CLI-80-16, 11 NRC 674 (1980).
On January 8, 1982, Sunflower filed its Motion to Resubmit Contention 7. According to Sunflower, the motion has two aspects. First, it was intended to correct the deficiency of its original contention (i.e., the absence of a credible loss-of-coolant accident scenario entailing hydrogen genera-tion, hydrogen combustion, containment breach'or leaking, and offsite radiation doses in excess of Part 100 values). Second, it was aimed at satisfying the tests of 10 CFR S2.714 for late-filed contentions. Sunflower's filing fulfills neither of these requirements. The motion to resubmit Contention 7 should therefore be rejected.
I. Sunflower Has Failed to Show Good Cause for its Untimely Filing The criteria for justifying admission of late-filed 5
contentions have been-discussed previously and need not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that as to the most important factor, good'cause for the delay, Sunflower has made no showing whatever.
Sunflower has known since the Special Prehearing Con-ference, June 2, 1981, that an acceptable contention on 5 " Applicants' Answer to Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy Motion for Leave to File its Contention 15", dated December 7, 1981; " Applicants' Answer to Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy Motion for Leave to File its Contention 16",
dated December 7, 1981; " Response of NRC Staff to Motions of Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy for Leave to File Contentions 15 and 16", dated December 11, 1981; " Response of NRC Staff to Motion of Sunflower Alliance for Leave to File an Additional Contention," dated January 13, 1982.
7 hydrogen generation and control would have to meet the criteria set forth in the Commission's Three Mile Island decision. Yet not until January 3, 1982 did Sunflower present its purported compliance with that decision. Sunflower's discussion of " good cause" presents no explanation for this seven month delay.
Instead, Sunflower states that the Commission on December 2, 1981 issued a final rule on interim hydrogen control require-ments.6 Motion, p. 5. Sunflower then states (erroneously) that this final rule does not deal with boiling water reactors (such as Perry) which have Mark III containments. Next, Sunflower asserts that the issuance of the rule " clearly indicates that the rulemaking process is not adeguately addressing this issue." Id. From this, Sunflower derives its conclusion that "the recent notice of final rulemaking and its lack of applicability to the Perry case constitute ' good cause' for this late filing." Id.
Applicants are totally at a loss to understand how Sunflower's assertions constitute good cause. Sunflower's argument seems to be a complete non sequitur. Sunflower has not alleged, nor could it, that hydrogen generation is a new phenomenon. It has pointed to no new information on hydrogen generation or control as support for its untimely filing. The December 2, 1981 final rule itself provided no new information on the generation of hydrogen during an accident. Nor is there 6 46 Fed. Reg. 58485 (December 2, 1981).
any good cause to be found in Sunflower 's observation, Motion,
- p. 5, that some of the items in the proposed interim hydrogen generation rule 7 were subsequently incorporated in the Commission's proposed licensing requirements for pending operating licenre applications.8 Nor can good cause be found in the fact', noted by Sunflower (Motion, p. 5), that the one item explicitly addressing Mark III containments in the October 2, 1980 proposed rule 9 was not incorporated in the December 2, 1980 final rile. There is simply nothing in any of these observations which can justify Sunflower's untimeliness.
Sunflower's good cause rationale might be that it was relying upon NRC's rulemaking to resolve the hydrogen genera-tion issue. Because, according to Sunflower, the NRC failed to address the issue, "[p]lant-specific litigation is therefore appropriate." Motion, p. 5. However, even if the factual underpinning for this logic were correct (which it is not10),
7 45 Fed. Reg. 65466 (October 2, 1980).
8 46 Fed. Reg. 26491 (May 13, 1981).
9 "The Commission is therefore considering amending S50.44 to require that . . . (3) licensees now operating PWR plants or Mark III BWR plants, or license applicants that plan to operate these plants, study the various methods of controlling the behavior of large amounts of hydrogen . . . ." 45 Fed. Reg. at 65467. Most other items in the October 2, 1980 proposed rule applied to BWR Mark III plants as well as other designs.
10 Suaflower seems to imply that the December 2, 1980 rule is not applicable to Mark III containments. That implication is incorrect. The December 2 rule does include provisions applicable to Mark III containments, such as the high point vents. 10 CFR 550.44(c)(3)(iii). In addition, Sunflower seems unaware of a parallel rulemaking proposing additional hydrogen (footnote continued on next page)
_ _ . .. . ---____________________________________u
Sunflower'is in no better position that an intervenor who seeks to justify a late contention on the " good cause" that it had been relying upon a second intervenor to litigate the issue.
Both the Courts and the Commission have rejected this as an appropriate justification for an untimely filing. See, e.g.,
Easton Utilities Commission v. Atomic Energy Commission, 424 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Gulf States Utilities Company (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760, 795-797 (1977).
Sunflower 's showing on the other f actors specified in 10 CFR S2.714(a) is no better than its good cause argument. As to other means to protect its interest, Sunflower boldly states that "rulemaking is not effectively resolving the hydrogen control issue, especially as it concerns PNPP." Motion, p. 5.
Yet Sunflower evidences no knowledge of the December 23, 1981 hydrogen control rulemaking directed specifically at Mark III containments such as Perry's, or those portions of the December 2, 1981 hydrogen control rulemaking applicable to Perry, or indeed those aspects of the May 13, 1981 rulemaking relevant to hydrogen control in Mark III containments. To this must be
! added Sunflower's apparent failure to participate in any of I
l l
(continued) control requirements for Mark III containments, including the design analysis specifically cited by Sunflower from the l October 2, 1980 proposed rule. See " Interim Requirements l Related to Hydrogen Control," 46 Fed. Reg. 62281 (December 23, l 1981).
l t
l
m these'rulemaking proceedings. Sunflower is thus in no position to claim that other means of protecting its interest are lacking.
Sunflower makes no showing at all on its ability to assist in developing a sound record. Sunflower acknowledges that the admission of the contention will broaden the issues. Finally, Sunflower observes that no other party in this proceeding is pursuing the issue. While this latter fact might weigh in Sunflower's favor, it can hardly overcome the weakness of Sunflower's showing on the other S2.714(a) factors.
Thus, Applicants submit that Sunflower has failed to meet its burden of justifying admission of a late contention.
II. Sunflower Has Failed to Meet the Requirements of CLI-80-16 Sunflower recognizes that resubmission of its untimely contention can only succeed if it complies with the requirements set forth by the Commission in Three Mile Island, CLI-80-16.11 Sunflower has not met these requirements.
11 In addition to its purported showing of compliance with CLI-80-16, Sunflower's Motion (p. 2) also " objects" to one aspect of 550.44 and CLI-80-16, the reference in both to loss-of-coolant accidents. See S50.44(a); 11 NRC at 675. Such an " objection" would appear to be in the nature either of a challenge to a rule or a collateral attack on a Commission decision. If it is the former, Sunflower has failed to comply with 10 CFR S2.758. If the latter, it is simply inappropriate in this forum. See Special Prehearing Conference Memorandum and Order, supra, 14 NRC at 208.
The Three Mile Island decision requires as a prerequisite to litigation of hydrogen generation beyond that specified in 10 CFR 550.44, that an intervenor come forward with a credible loss-of-coolant accident scenario entailing hydrogen generation, hydrogen combustion, containment breach or leaking, and offsite radiation doses in excess of Part 100 guidelines.
CLI-80-16, 11 NRC at 675. See Special Prehearing Conference Memorandum and Order, LBP-81-24, 14 NRC at 207-208.
Sunflower purports to meet this requirement by providing "an example of a specific accident scenario":
"1. a pipe break in the reactor coolant pressure boundary causes a LOCA, as defined by 10 CFR 50.46(c)(1).
- 2. failure of the ECCS to maintain coolant inventory.
The cause of this failure may be: electrical.or mechanical component failure; common mode failures resulting from the LOCA; design deficiencies which undermine ECCS effectiveness; and/or operator error.
- 3. the Zircaloy fuel cladding melts; the zirconium reacts with water, liberating hydrogen gas.
- 4. the hydrogen concentration within the containment increases to the flammability limit before the combustible gas control system becomes effective, or said system never operates effectively.
- 5. uncontrolled hydrogen-oxygen reaction (explosion) occurs.
- 6. containment is breached; a substantial fraction of the core inventory of fission products is released to the atmosphere, resulting in offsite doses at the LPZ boundary which exceed the 10 CFR 100.11 guidelines of 25 rems whole body and 300 rems thyroid."
Motion, p. 3. Sunflower states that the " scenario is admittedly lacking in minute details." As is obvious from
~
i reading:this " scenario," it is lacking in any details. More
-importantly, it is lacking any showing of relevance to Perry and any basis'for' concluding that it is credible. ~It is also so vague and unspecific _thct Applicants woul'd have no possible way to understand and litigate the issue.
A clear example of these deficiencies is presented in step 2 of Sunflower's scenario. Aside from the fact-that failure of the ECCS to maintain coolant inventory involves the failures of redundant trains or _ redundant systems (and therefore postulates a violation of the single failure criterion), Sunflower presents nothing more_than.the most general amalgam of_ failure possibilities. None of1those possibilities are related to the Perry ECCS design -- which is spelled out in great detail in the Final Safety Analysis Report 56.3. Where is any indication of " credibility"? There.is no_ explanation of why or how an electricalLor mechanical failure could prevent the ECCS from maintaining coolant inventory. What kind of common mode failures are postulated? What are the design deficiencies or operator errors? Sunflower's " credible" scenario could just as I easily state that the failure of'the ECCS to maintain coolant inventory is caused.by a meteorite destroying the diesel generators. Such a postulate would have as much basis, i- specificity and credibility as Sunflower's " specific," "credi-l ble" accident' scenario. Something more is needed. To accept Sunflower's submission would wipe out the test established by l
the Commission..
i I
f _
' Wholly apart from the accident scenario postulated by Sunflower, Sunflower's motion purports to set forth defi-ciencies in the Perry hydrogen gas control system. Motion., p.
- 4. Although it is not at all clear the relationship between these allegations, the contention, and the postulated accident scenario, it must be pointed out that Sunflower's comments show a lack of understanding of hydrogen generation and control and are generally inaccurate.
First, Sunflower claims that manual operation of the current hydrogen control system is unreliable, implying that automatic operation is required. This conclusion stems from Sunflower's reading of the following sentence in 10 CFR S50.44(d)(1):
A time period of 2 minutes shall be used as the interval after the postulated LOCA over which the metal-water reaction occurs.
Sunflower compares this to the statement in the FSAR (56.2.5.2.1, p. 6.2-90) that start-up of hydrogen analyzers would be delayed until 15 minutes to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after the LOCA.
Sunflower's concern seems to be based on the assumption that for the purposes of S50.44, the hydrogen generated by metal-water reaction is of such magnitude that operation of the hydrogen control system is immediately required. Sunflower appears to ignore the fact that the 2 minute assumption in S50.44(d)(1) is only in the context of the quantities of hydrogen calculated pursuant to S50.44(d)(1).12 As shown in 12 The sentence in 550.44(d)(1) immediately preceding the one quoted by Sunflower makes this clear.
(footnote continued on next page)
the FSAR, the hydrogen generated by metal-water reaction in the first two minutes is far below flammability limits.13 In the context of 550.44, Regulatory Guide 1.7 states, In most reactor plants,- the hydrogen control system would not be required to be operated for 7 days or more following a postulated design basis LOCA.
- p. 1.7-4. Thus, Sunflower's comments on manual actuation are unfounded.
Sunflower's second set of comments casts aspersions on the effectiveness of hydrogen recombiners. Sunflower refers to a statement in Regulatory Guide 1.7 that "an inordinately large number of recombiners would be required... . However, Sunflower fails to acknowledge that this statement is made in a paragraph devoted to "small containments."14 A Mark III is not (continued)
"For facilities that are in compliance with S50.46(b), the amount of hydrogen contributed by core metal-water reaction (percentage of fuel cladding that reacts with water), as a result of degradation, but not total failure, of emergency core cooling functioning shall be assumed either to be five times the total amount of hydrogen calculated in demonstrating compliance with S50.46(b)(3),
or to-be the amount that would result from reaction of all the metal in the outside surfaces of the cladding cylinders surrounding the fuel (excluding the cladding surrounding the plenum volume) to a depth of 0.00023 inch
, (0.0058mm), whichever amount is greater."
l 13 FSAR Figure 6.2-61 shows concentration of just over 1 volume percent 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> after the LOCA. The lower limit of flammability is 4 volume percent. Regulatory Guide 1.7, l " Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment
- Following a Loss-of-Coolant Accident," p. 1.7-3 (Rev. 2, Nov.
l 1978).
14 This paragraph begins by stating: "In small containments, the amount of metal-water reaction postulated in Table 1 may (footnote continued on next page)
a "small containment." Thus, Sunflower's comment is simply inapplicable.
III. Conclusion For the reasons set forth above, it is clear that Sunflower has neither justified the untimely resubmission of its hydrogen generation contention, nor met the tests fo: a hydrogen generation contention exceeding the limits of S50.44.
The contention should therefore be rejected.
Applicants submit that the proper forum for this conten-tion is the on-going rulemaking proceeding. We would thus agree with the Appeal Board's recent observation when it affirmed a licensing board's exclusion of a contention which
" concerned Rancho Seco's ability to cope with the generation of hydrogen within the containment following an accident like that at TMI-2."
l Pretermitting the question of whether hydrogen control is even~within the scope of this special proceeding, we would ordinarily expect a more substantial treatment of this matter than that set forth in the initial decision. But, as the Licensing Board observes, the Commission now has under consideration the consequences of the generation of large amounts of hydrogen within the containment following a TMI-2 event. In this circumstance, we rely on our 1
(continued) result in hydrogen concentrations above acceptable limits." The FSAR shows that hydrogen generated by metal-water reaction in the first two minutes is well below acceptable limits. See FSAR Figure 6.2-61 (total hydrogen v. time) and Figure 6.2-61 (hydrogen from radiolysis vs. time).
prior holding that " licensing boards should not accept in individual license proceedings contentions which are (or are about to become) the subject of general-rulemaking by the Commission." Potomac Electric Power Co.
(Douglas Point Station, Units 1 and 2),
ALAB-218, 8 AEC 79, 85 (1974). We thus leave the matter of hydrogen control at Rancho Seco to the Commission's consideration in the ongoing rulemaking and refrain from any explicit comment or judgment on this portion of the Board's decision.
Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), ALAB-655, 14 NRC , slip op. at 31-32 (October 7, 1981).
Respectfully submitted, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE Dy: 4h /b b" Jay y. Silberg j Bruce W. Churchill Counsel for Applicants 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 822-1000 Dated: January 25, 1982
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )
)
TIIE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ) Docket Nos. 50-440 ILLUMINATING COMPANY, et al. ) 50-441
)
(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, )
Units 1 and 2) ).
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that copies of the foregoing
" Applicants' . Answer to Sunflower Alliance Motion to Resubmit Contention 7" were served, by deposit in the U. S. Mail, first class, postage prepaid, to all those on the attached Service List this 25th day of January, 1982.
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Jay,E. Silberg !
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Dated: January 25, 1982 L t f
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E UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t
- Before the Atomic Safety-and Licensing Board In the Matter of )
. ) .
!' THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC , ) Docket Nos. 50-440 ILLUMINATING COMPANY Et Al.) 50-441
)
(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, )
Units 1 and 2) ), -
i -
SERVICE LIST i
Pater B. Bloch, Chairman Robert.Alexaider'
~
- Atomic Safety. and Licensing Board OCRE Interim Representative
!U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2030 Portsmouth Street #2 Washington, D.C. 20555 Houston, Texas 77098
- l -
- Dr. Jerry-R. Kline Daniel D. Wilt, Esquire -
iAtomic' Safety and Licensing Board Wegman, Hessler & Vanderburg iU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 102 .
! Washington, D.C. 20555 7301 Chippewa Road .
Brecksville,' Ohio 44141 .
'Mr.. Frederick J. Shon -
f i Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Terry Lodge, Esquire .
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 915 Spitzer B.uilding-
- Washington, D.C. 20555 Toledo, Ohio 43604
! Atomic Safety and Licensing Mr. Tod'J. Kenney
! Board Panel 228 South College, Apt. A 1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission- Bowling Green, Ohio 43402 IWashington, D.C. 20555 '
4 Donald T. Ezzone, Esquire .
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Appaal Board Panel Lake County Administration Center
!U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 105 Center Street jWashington, D.C.l20555 Painesville, Ohio 44077 c
lDo'keting and Service Section iOffica of the Secretary John G. Cardinal, Esquire
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Prosecuting Attorney .
Washington, D.C. 20555 Ashtabula County Courthouse Jefferson, Ohio 44047
' James H. Thessin, Esquire -
j Office of the Executi ve L Legal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
!Washingten, D. C. 20555 .
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