ML20040C377
| ML20040C377 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 11/13/1981 |
| From: | Mcduffie M CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| REF-SSINS-6820 IEB-81-02, IEB-81-2, NUDOCS 8201270583 | |
| Download: ML20040C377 (8) | |
Text
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Carolina Power & Light Company e2 0 Z November 13, 1981 g l @\\] is to c
4 Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director 8
t RECEP,g Region II Jg
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e g#% 198 4 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commissioa 101 Marietta St., Suite 3100 Atlanta, CA 30303 SHEARON IIARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 24
,(N UNIT NOS. 1, 2, 3, AND 4
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DOCKET NOS. 50-400, 50-401, 50-402, AND 50-403 SUPPLDIENT TO IE BULLETIN NO. 81-02
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) has completed its review of IE Bulletin No. 81-02 Supplement, " Failure of Gate Type Valves to Close Against Dif fereatial Pressure," for the Shearon IIarris Nuclear Power Plant (SHNPP). The attached Table 1 summarizes the results of that review and lists:
1.
The affected valves identified for use in safety-related
- systems, 2.
Their planned service, 3.
The maximum differential pressure at which they would be required to close, 4.
The safety consequences of the valves failing to close, 5.
The corrective action planned, and 6.
The planned schedule for completing the corrective action.
Each of the valves listed in Table 1 is planned for use on each unit at SilNPP (i.e., 45 Westinghouse EMD Valves per unit).
I CP6L has received additional information concerning the affected three-inch and four-inch valves previously reported in CP&L's July 9, 1981 response to IE Bulletin No. 81-02.
These valves are included in Table 1, along with the updated information which supersedes the previous report.
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The manpower expended in the review and preparation of this report was approximately 10 e.an-days.
CP&L estimates that 100 man-days will be necessary to complete f.he planned corrective actions.
If you have any further questions on this subject, please contact our staff.
Yours very truly, kaaw M. A. McDuffie Senior Vice President Engineering & Construction ONH/lr (7189)
At taclunent cc: Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement United States Nuclent Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 E. A. Licitra (NRC)
M. A. McDuffie, having been first duly sworn, did depose and say that the information contained herein is true and correct to his own personal knowledge or based upon infonnation and belief.
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TABLE 1 MAXIMUM aP (PSID)
AS FLOW APPROACllES AP (PSID) BELOW ZERO WilICll VALVE POTENTIAL EXPECTED
~
VALVE VALVE FUNCTION Equip.
Funct.
WILL CLOSE SAFETY PROPOSED DATE OF VALVE I.D.
LOCATION AND SYSTEM Spec.
Reqmt.
_j AS SilIPPED)
CONSEQUENCES MODIFICATION MODIFICATION 3CM78 FN 8106 Chg. Pump Miniflow 2750 2750 700 2, 4 A
9/82 del.
Iso. - CVCS 3CM78FN 8107 Chg. Line Iso.
2750 2750 700 2, 4 A
9/82 del.
CVCS 3CM78FN 8108 Chg. Line Iso.
2750 2750 700 2, 4 A
9/82 del.
CVCS 3GM78FN 8801A Boron Inj. Tank 2750 2750 2450 2, 3 B
2/22/82 Iso. - SIS (open (open) function) 3GM78FN 3801B Boron Inj. Tank 2750 2750 700
- 2. 3 B
2/22/82 Iso. - SIS (open function) 3GM78FN 8803A Boron Inj. Tank 2750 2750 2450 2, 3 B
2/22/82 Iso. - SIS (open (open) function) 3GM78FN 8803B Boron Inj. Tank 2750 2750 2450 2, 3 B
2/22/82 Iso. - SIS (open (open) function) 3CM78FN 8884 IIL Recire. Iso.
2750 0
700 13 D
p SIS e
3CM78FN 8885 CL Recire. Iso.
2750 2750 2450 2, 3 B
2/22/82 I
SIS (open (open) h function) 3GM78FN 8886 IIL Recirc. Iso.
2750 0
700 13 D
SIS l l
MAXIMUM AP (PSID)
AS FLOW APPROACllES AP (PSID) BELOW ZERO WilICl! VALVE POTENTIAL EXPECTED VALVE VALVE FUhCTION Equip.
Funct.
WILL CLOSE SArETY PROPOSED DATE OF VALVE I.D.
LOCATION AND SYSTEM Spec.
Reqmt.
(AS SilIPPED)
CONSEQUENCES MODIFICATION MODIFICATION 3GM88FNil 8000A PZR. PORV Block 2750 2500 700 1, 5 A
9/82 del.
RCS 3CM88 FNil 8000B PZR. PORV Block 2750 2500 700 1, 5 A
9/82 del.
RCS 3GM88FNil 8000C PZR. PORV Block 2750 2500 700 1, 5 A
9/82 del.
RCS l
4CM72FB LCV115C VCT Outlet 200 100 6
C 2/22/82 CVCS 4CM72FB LCV115E VCT Outlet 200 100 6
C 2/22/82 l
CVCS 4GM78FN 8132A Chg. Pump Disch.
2750 500 850 13 D
XO Iso. - CVCS 1
4CM78FN 8132B Chg. Pump Disch.
2750 500 850 13 D
XO Iso. - CVCS 4CM78FN 8133A Chg. Pump Disch.
2750 500 850 13 D
XO Iso. - CVCS 4CM78FN 8133B Chg. Pump Disch.
2750 500 850 13 D
l i
l XO Iso. - CVCS 8CM72FB LCV115B RWST to Suction 200 200
'20 7
B 2/22/82 of CCPs - CVCS 8CM72FB LCV115D RWST to Suction 200 200 120 7
B 2/22/82 of CCPs - CVCS 8CM72FB 8130A CCP Suction-CVCS 200 200 120 6
B 2/22/82 8CM72FB 8130B CGP Suction-CVCS 200 200 120 6
B 2/22/82 8CM72FB 8131A CCP Suction-CVCS 200 200 120 6
15 2/22/82
.. J
MAXIMl[M AP (PSID)
AS FLOW APPROACllES AP (PSID) BELOW ZERO WilICil VALVE POTENTIAL EXPECTED VALVE VALVE FUNCTION Equip.
Funct.
WILL CLOSE SAFETY PROPOSED DATE OF VALVE I.D.
LOCATION AND SYSTEM Spec.
Reqmt.
(AS SIIIPPED)
CONSEQUENCES MODIFICATION MODIFICATION 8CM72FB 8131B CCP Suction-CVCS 200 200 120 6
B 2/22/82 C
2/22/82 8CM74FE 8706A RilR IIX Disch to 700 300 250 8
CCP Suction - RIIR 8CM74FE 8706B RIIR llX Disch. to 700 300 250 8
C 2/22/82 CCP Suction - RilR 10CM74 FE 8887A Rilk Disch. Cross 700 300 250 9
C 2/22/82 Connect - SIS 10CM74FL 8887B RilR Disch. Cross 700 300 250 9
C 2/22/82 Connect - SIS 10CM78FN 8888A RIIR Pump CL Inj.
2750 200 1180 13 D
SIS 10CM78FN 8888B RilR Pump CL Inj.
2750 200 1180 13 D
SIS 10CM78FN 8889 RilR IlX Disch. to 2750 200 1180 13 D
IIL - SIS 12CM88FNil 8808A Accumulator Disch.
'2750 1750 2200 13 D
SIS (open (open) function) 12CM88FPI 8808B Ac'cumulator Disch.
2750 1750 2200 13 D
SIS (open (open) function) 12GM88FNil 8808C Accumulator Disch.
2750 1750 2200 13 D
SIS (open (open) function) 12CM88 Sell 8701A RilR Suction Iso.,
700 700 490 10 B
2/22/82 Outer - RllR
.3-a
MAXIMUM AP (PSID)
AS FLOW APPROACHES AP (PSID) BELOW ZERO WilICll VAL'.'E POTENTIAL EXPECTED VALVE VALVE FUNCTION
. Equip.
Funct.
WILL CLOSE SAFETY PROPOSED DATE OF VALVE I.D.
LOCATION AND SYSTEM Spec.
Reqmt.
(AS SilIPPED)
CONSEQUENCES MODIFICATION MODIFICATION 12CM88 SEli 8701B RIIR Suction Iso.,
700 700 490 10 B
2/22/82 Outer - RllR 12CM88SEli 8702A RilR Suction Iso.,
700 700 490 11 B
2/22/82 Inner - RIIR 12CM88SEli 8702B RHR Suction Iso.,
700 700 490 11 B
2/22/82 Inner - RHR 14CM74FE 8809A RWST to RHR Pump 700 100_
300 13 D
Suction - SIS 14GM74FE 8809B RWST to RHR Pump 700 100 300 13 D
Suction - SIS 14GM74FE 8811A Sump Suction - SIS 700 100 300 13 D
14GM74FE ES11B Sump Suction - SIS 700 100 300 13 D
14CM74 FE 8812A Sump Suction - SIS 700 700 300 12 B
2/22/82 14GM74FE 8812B Sump Suction - SIS 700 700 300 12 B
2/22/82 NOTES:
Each valve contracted for all four Shearon liarris units.
a)
Unit 2 valve sent to Marshall Test Loop for EPRI Test Program.
b)
Unit 2 valve sent to Pilgrim.
c)
Unit 2 valve sent to Farley via Westinghouse.
d)
See Enclosure 1 for key to potential safety consequences.
e)
See Enclosure 2 for key to proposed modifications.
- 4.
ENCLOSURE 1 KEY TO POTENTIAL SAFETY CONSEQUENCES I.D. NO.
CONSEQUENCE 1
(PORV Block Valves) Potential incomplete isolation of pressurizer PORV.
2 Potential cavitation of a centrifugal charging pump or safety injection pump due to operation beyond maximum
" runout flow.
^
3 Potential inability to perform post-accident containment isolation.
,4 Potential degradation of safety injection flow below values in SAR.
5 Potential inability to isolate RCS pressure boundary.
6 Two valves in series; failure of either ' valve to close reduces redundancy of providing isolation. Alternate valve will provide isolation.
7 One MOV in each of two parallel paths from the RWST to suction of the CCPs; failure reduces redundancy of providing isolation of RWST during the recirculation 4
phase following a LOCA.
Isolation will be provided by a check valve in series with the two paths.
8 Valve is opened for recirculation phase following a LOCA.
Failure of valve to close precludes realignment of RHRS for normal operation.
9 Failure of valve to close reduces redundancy of providing low lead train separation during CL recirculation phase following a LOCA. Train separation can be achieved by closing other valve.
10 Two valves in series; failure of outer isolation valve to close reduces redundancy of providing isolation.
Isolation is provided by closing the inner valve.
11 Same as No. 10 above except for closing the outer valve.
12 Valve is opened for recirculation following a LOCA.
Valve would be closed for containment isolation. Valve is encapsulated within a protective housing which acts as the redundant containment isolation.
Failure of either valve to close reduces redundancy. Alternate valve will provide isolation.
13 None yet identified - valv: meets functional requirement.
A
%i llui iu
_____________________._____._a
ENCLOSURE 2 KEY TO PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS 1
MODIFICATION I.D.
A Replacement valve - valve must be shipped back to manufacturer.
B Gear change - modification can be pericrued on site with valve installed.
C Adjust torque switch - modification can be performed on site with valve installed.
D No modification indicated - valve meets functional requirement.
.