ML20039G880
| ML20039G880 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 12/28/1981 |
| From: | Miller L, Zwetzig G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20039G873 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-206-81-40, NUDOCS 8201190256 | |
| Download: ML20039G880 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000206/1981040
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U. S. ::UCLEAR REcUINIOnY CC10'.ISSION
Orr!c:: or I:::;rtc; Ion A::3 c::roncE:tE:::
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REGION V
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Report ::o. 50-206/81-40
Docket No. 50-?C6
License No.
OPR-13
Safeguards Group
Licensee: Southern California Edison Comoany
P. O. Box 800
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Rosemead, California 91770
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raciltey name: San Onofre Unit 1
Inspection at: San Onofre, California
Inspection cc
cted:
November 2 - November 24. 1981
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Inspectors:
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L.
iller, ' Senior Resident inspector, Unit 1
Date' S igned
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, Date Signed
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ace igned
Approved by': M
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G. Zwetzig, Chief, Reactord.codects Section 1
/ Dac6 Signed
Reactor Operations Project Branch
Date Signed
Summary:
Inspection on November 2-24, 1981 (Report No. 50-206/81-40)
Areas Insoected; Routine, resident, operational safety verifica-
tion; followup on unusual event (loss of onsite power), licensee
event reports, and unresolved item; independent inspection; and
monthly surveillance and maintenance cbservations. The inspection
involved 65 inspector hours by one NRC inspector.
Results: Two items of apparent noncompliance were identified
(Severity Level V - failure to calibrate safety related instru-
mentation-para. 6) and (Severity level V - failure. to provide
oracess monitors for a safety related system - para. 2).
RV rorm 219 (2)
820119D254 811231
PDR ADOCK 05000
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
- H. B. Ray, Station Manager
- H. E. Morgan, Assistant nation Manager, Operations
- P. A. Croy, Manager, Configuration Control and Compliance
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- G. W. Mcdonald, Quality Assurance / Quality Control Superv!:or
- B. Katz, Assistant Station Manager, Technical
- S. W. McMahan, Acting Assistant Station Manager, Maintenance
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- J. Anaya, Instrumentation and Control Foreman
- F. Briggs, Compliance Engineer
The inspector also interviewed other licensee and contractor
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employees during this inspection.
- Denotes those attending the Exit Interview on November 23, 1981.
2.
Operational Safety Verification
The inspector observed Control Room operaticns frequently for
proper shift manning, for adherence to procedures and limiting
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conditions for operation, and appropr4te recorder and instrument
indications. The inspector discussed the status of annunciators
with Control Room operators to determine the reasons for abnormal
indications, and to detemine the operators' awareness of plant
status. Shift turnovers were observed.
The Control Operator's log was reviewed to obtain information on
plant conditions, and to determine whether regulatory requirements
had been met. Other logs, including the Watch Engineer's Log and
Steam Generator Chemistry Logs, were also reviewed several times.
The west train of the auxiliary feedwater system was verified to be
properly aligned, however, two discrepancies were observed: The
first discrecancy was that the system drawing was in error. The
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drawing failed to show several block valves and drain valves in the
pneumatic lines serving the systems' control valves. The inspector
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expressed concern that the drawings for this system were in error,
but concluded that this particular drawing error had no imediate
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safety significance. This item is closed,
The second discrepancy was that six of twelve backup nitrogen
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bottles were isolated. These bottles provide pneumatic power for
auxiliary feedwater system control valves and for the pressurizer
power operated relief valves and block valves. They are located at
three stations: one station of eight bottles for the pressurizer
valves (of which four were found isolated), and two stations of two
bottles each for the auxiliary feedwater system valves (of which
one bottle at each station was found isolated). The inspector
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concluded that a design criterion for the system had not been met.
This criterion was that at each station, all of the bottles were
assumed to be in service, with a total allowable pressure decrement
from the bank of 2,000 psi from the nominal total pressure in all
the bottles of the bank. That is, if the nominal full pressure in
a bottle was 2,400 psig, and there were two bottles in one bank,
the bottle pressure in one bottle could drop no lower than 400 psig,
provided the other bottle in the bank remained fully charged at
2,400 psig. After discussions with licensee personnel the inspector
determined that the station procedures did not incorporate this
criterion, or any other, for monitoring bottle pressures and bottle
isolation valve alignment. This situation does not appear to
satisfy the requirements of Technical Specification 6.8.1, " Procedures,"
and ANSI N18.7-1976, Para. 5.3.4. , " Process Monitoring Procedures,"
to the extent that these significant process pa ameters were not
identified nor was system alignment controlled by procedure. (01
50-206/81-40-05)
This is an apparent Severity Level V Violation.
Radiation Controlled Area access points were generally safe and
clean. Portions of an area survey were witnessed. Several radia-
tion work permits were checked and were found to be correctly
completed. Several "Frisker" monitors were checked and appeared to
be operating properly.
The P'hysical Security Plan appeared to be properly implementhd.
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The inspector verified that selected security posts were properly
manned, isolation zones were clear, personnel searches were cerformed
when required, vehicles were controlled within the protected area,
and personnel were badged and escorted as necessary. No degrada-
tion of protected area barriers was observed. Plant housekeeping
was adequate. Fire barriers appeared intact. The equipment control
log was audited and no significant discrepancies were identified.
Several tagouts in effect were verified to have been hung as indicated
on the equipment control form.
3.
Followup on Unusual Event (Loss of Onsite Power)
On November 19, 1981, at approximately 1:20 P.M., while operating
at nominal full power, the Unit lost both diesel generators for
approximately thirty minutes. At the time of the event, the No. 2
Diesel Generator was out of service for routine maintenance, and
the No.1 Diesel Generator was being tested for operability.
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repeatedly tripped on overspeed. The operability test is required
by Tcchnical Specification 3.7.2.B.
The licensee declared an
unusual event as required by the Emergency Plan, and the NRC was
nctified as required. The inspector determined that the licensee's
im.ediate response to the event was in accordance with regulatory
r;quirements. The inspector noted, after the event, that the No. 1
Diesel Generator had unexpected overspeed trips twice previously in
November: on November 3 and on November 18. In both cases, licensee
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personnel attributed these trips to air entrainment in the fuel
following fuel filter replacement. Subsequent to the event of
November 19, 1981, licensee representatives stated that the cause
for the November 19 event was insufficient oil in the diesel governor.
According to a licensee representative, the mounting of the governor
lube oil cooler was such that the oil level in the governor would
not be read accurately unless the diesel was operating. The licensee
representative stated that they had been unaware of this prior to
the event and thus, had not known that the No.1 Diesel governor
needed oil.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedures for diesel opera-
tion, and the Technical Manual and Service Bulletins for the diesel
which were available onsite. These did not indicate that governor
oil level should be periodically checked, nor the necessity to
check the level with the diesel running. As an interim measure,
the licensee has added procedural requirement to check diesel
governor oil level when the diesel is operated. This item remains
unresolved pending review of vendor correspondence and information
provided to the licensee. (0I50-206/81-40-02)
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Followup on Licensee Event Reports
a.
LER 81-026 (Diversion of Borated Water to Condenser Hotwells).
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The inspector reviewed this report, witinessed several tests of
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the valve following its repair, and discussed the event with
the cognizant station personnel. In this event, the east
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feedwater recirculation valve failed to shut during a func-
tional test of the safety injection system. This left open a
flowpath f:;r borated water from the refueling water storage
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tank through the feedwater pump to the condenser hotwell.
Approximately 15,000 gallons of barated water were transferred
via this path. Subsequent to the event, the licensee discovered
that the air supply for the valve was improperly connected to
the vent port of the solenoid control valve rather than the
supply port. The solenoid valve is supposed to vent upon
receipt of a safety injection signal, allowing the recircula-
tion valve to shut. The misconnected air line caused the
valve to " vent" to supply air pressure rather than to atmospheric
pressure. The supply air pressure was a variable signal
developed by the recirculation valve positioner and feedwater
flow. The inspector concluded that the improper air connection
may have caused the valve failure.
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At the conclusion of this event, the licenree had not completed
an evMuation of the effect of inoperability of this valve on
the safety analysis for the facility. This item remains unre-
solved pending review of that evaluation. At the Exit Interview
the inspector expressed concern that this event provided
another example of an unapproved plant configuration resulting
in a significant event. Further discussion with the licensee
of possible methods to detet other such anomalies is planned.
(01 50-206/81-40-03)
b.
LER 81-024 (Multiole Failures of EFCCMATIC Valve Actuators)
The inspector reviewed this report and the valve actuator
technical manuals, discussed the evt.nt with licensee personnel,
and inspected ~several of the actuators in the field and on
test stands. The inspector determined that the licensee was
aware of several deficiencies in an actuator which would
prevent proper operation. These deficiencies in the actuaters
were developed during an exhaustive testing program conducted
in 1979. Design change 80-37 was approved in 1980 to correct
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these problems. However, at the time of the event, the design
change had not been implemented.
Licensee representatives agreed that valve actuator reliability
would have been enhanced by implementing the design change,
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but stated tha- in the interim, periodic testing of the valves
had provided sufficient assurance of valve operability. The
inspector questioned this position on the basis that the 1979
test program had identified intermittent valve actuator
failure modes that might not be revealed during relatively
infrequent surveillance testing, and on the basis that ample
time had been available during the 1980-81 outage to implement
the design changes.
After discussions with the licensee, a licensee representative
stated that during the shutdown of November 24-25, 1981 the
valve actuators would be inspected for deficiencies and retested
to the extent possible while operating in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown),
with the balance of the inspection to be completed during the
next period of cold shutdown. In addition the licensee agreed
to modify operating procedures for these actuators to enhance
their reliability until they are replaced or upgraded.
Finally, subsequent to this inspection, the licensee has
proposed to completely refurbish these actuators, and, in the
long term, to replace them. The inspector stated that these
actions appeared adequate. (0I 50-206/81-40-04)
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5.
Monthly Surveillance and Maintenance Observations
a.
Surveillance
The inspector witnessed the initial hot functional surveillance
testing of the safety injection system following its modifica-
tion on November 23, 1981.
In addition, on November 4, a
portion of the routine calibretion check of the loop A average
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temperature instrumentation was observed. The inspector
determined that these activities did not violate Limiting
Conditions for Operation, that required administrative ap-
provals and ,:learances were obtained prior to initiating the
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work, and that the work was reviewed as required. These
surveillances appeared acceptable.
b.
Maintenance
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The inspector observed that packing' leakage from the safety
injection valves was significant, and expressed concern to the
licensee that the packing might be overtightened to reduce the
leakage. Licensee personnel agreed to establish a packing
gland nut torque specification for these valves and to document
all packing adjustments, because of the potential effect of
packing tightness on valve timing. The inspector verified
that these measures had been implemented. This item is closed.
6.
Followuo on Unresolved Item
Inspection Report 31-37 identified the apparent lack of calibration
of the 16 transducers which convert hydraulic accumulator and
manifold pressures for the safety injection system valve actuators
to electrical signals. Further discussions were held with licensee
personnel which confirmed that no calibration procedures for these
transducers existed. The transducers supply local pressure indica-
tors and remote high and low pressure alarms in the control room,
and provide the only continuous monitoring of actuator pressures.
Licensee personnel were able to demonstrate that a two point calibration
check cf the transducers had been performed at the vendor's shop in
May, 1983.
This check, since it was performed at only two points,
did not reveal the nonlinear transducer response identi.fied by the
licensee when the multipoint calibration of the transducers was
performed in October, 1981. Further, the licensee did not require
this calibration check as part of its quality assurance program.
The cosence of calibration procedures for these transducers appears
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to not satisfy the requirements of Technical Specification 6.8.1,
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" Procedures," and ANSI N18.7-1976, Para. 5.3.7, " Calibration," to
the extent that procedures adequate to keep safety-related parameters
within operational limits did not exist. (OI 50-206/81-40-05)
This is an apparent Severity Level V Violation.
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7.
Independent Inspection
The inspector observed the reactor startup on November 2.
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conducted in accordance with the appropriate procedures. An inverse
count rate plot was med as an additional control on the approach
to criticality. The inspector noted that the Watch Engineer was
frequently distracted from the startup by administrative duties.
This was discussed with a licensee representative, who stated that
an administrative assistant would be provided Watch Engineers to
reduce their administrative duties to the minimum. The inspector
stated that this commitment acceptably resolved this concern.
8.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is
required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items,
items of noncompliance, or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed
during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 3 and 4.a.
9.
Exit Interview
A meeting was held on November 23, 1981, to summarize the scope and
findings of this inspection. Significant findings are discussed in
the test of this rescrt. Two items apparent of noncompliance were
identified.
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