ML20039F189

Application for Immobilization of Waste Matls Using Hydraulic Cement

ML20039F189
Person / Time
Site:	07109044
Issue date:	12/01/1981
From:	GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20039F186	List: ML20039F185 ML20039F189
References
20007, NUDOCS 8201120137
Download: ML20039F189 (22)

Text

.

GENEAL ELECIRIC 00MPANY FDDEL 1600 PACKAGE APPLICAT3DN FOR IM0BILIZATION OF WAS'IE MA'IERIALS USING HYIRAULIC CDENT l

Decenber 1,1981 GENER AL h ELECTRIC VALLECITOS NUCLEAR CENTER PLEASANTON, CALIFORNIA l

8201120137 811201 PDR ADOCK 07109044 PDR I

C

TABLE OF CONIDES RD9iL Stenary 1

Description of Waste Materials 1

Estimate of Maximtzn Package Contents 2

Proposed Packaging Methods 6

Cenent Grout 8

Grout Test Results 9

Grout Test Conclusions 10 Sinclated Packaging Test 11 Results of Simulated Packaging Test 12 Packaging Methods and Factors Affecting Contents Dispersability 15 Drop Test of Grout Cylinder 15 Postulated MaximLan Losses from the Drtzn and Cask 17 Driving Forces for Contanination Release 18 Application of Containment Factors 20 Conclusion 21 l

Attactsnent 1.

Procedural Outline of the Innobilization of Cell Waste I

Using Canent Grout t

-s

l

. SUMARY GE-VNC proposes to use cement grout to imobilize and contain solid radioactive waste in a metal inner container. %is inner cx>ntainer will be loaded in a GE Model 1600 transport package for shipnent to a comercial waste burial ground.

We grout converts the solid but loose waste material into a monolithic cylinder which, when loaded in tne Model 1600 package, will be resistant to damage frm normal and postulated accident conditions of transport. W is report describes the methods, materials and procedures developed and tested by G.E. to imobilize and contain radioactive waste by-products generated during routine operation of the high-level hot cell facilities at the Vallecitos Nuclear Center. We report further delineates the basis for concluding that the Model 1600 package with contents as described in tnis subnittal emplies with federal regulations pertaining to the shipnent of radioactive material.

In order to demonstrate acceptable containment of radioactive materials under hypothetical accident conditions it was necessary to: (1) determine a reasonable maximm cask loading; (2) determine any possible driving forces tnat would cause dispersal of material frm the several contaiments provided by the package assembly ; and (3) determine the fraction of material that could reasonably be dispersed from the package. As a result of our evaluation, it was determined that under accident conditions no more tnan 0.018 curies of mixed fission l

products (MFP) or 0.01 curies of Co-60 would be released fra the Model 1600.

nese nmbers empare very favorably with the A limits f the proposed NRC 2

regulations (0.4 Ci for MFP and 7.0 Ci for CcK0).

%ese results are both reasonable and conservative, and they demonstrate the effectiveness of the grout in providing contalment for the cask contents under the hypothetical accident conditions. A detailed discussion of the elements of this waste imobilization method is given in the following paragraphs.

1 DESb1IPfIONOFWASTEMATERIALS he hot cells are used for a wide variety of functions normally involving l

radioactive materials. Most of the cell work involves the remote exmination l

ancVor processing of these radioactive materials. % ese materials are frequently dissected into smaller pieces or chmically processed. As a result of these operations, the cell interiors become contaminated with loose

., particulates. Because of this, all items tnat are entered into tne cells became contaninated. S e greatest bulk of cell waste is made up of non-irradiated materials which have becme contaminated while inside the cells. Many years of operating experience indicate that it is econmically and physically impractical to attempt to remove tnis type of contamination. Asaresulp,essentiallyall materials entering the hot cells eventually must be renoved as radioactive waste.

We radioactive waste resulting frm operation of the GE-VNC hot cells is quite diverse in nature as are the operations conducted in the cells. S ee of the waste materials.are a product of the contamination control process such as absolute filters, manipulator boots, absorbent wipes, but most materials result fr a specific in-cell operations. %e waste volume is about equally divided between non-cabustible materials: metal, glass, abrasives, solidified aqueous media, etc., and combustible materials: wood, plastic, adhesive, rubber, dry paint, resins, solidified organic absorbent, paper and other fibrous materials.

Many of these materials are packaged in-cell into containers for ease of handling. One gallon tin cans are used to hold tubing, wire, floor sweepings, absorbent solidification, melted plastic, and other miscellaneous small items.

%ese and other bulky items are then loaded into a sheet metal bucket or slip l

liner which is sized to slip-fit into a 55-gallon drum or similar metal inner container, i

l ESTIMATE OF MAXIMUM PACKAGE CONTENTS l

Radiation measurements of the unshielded waste drm are routinely taken by GE l

operating personnel as a guide for assuring themselves that the cm pleted 1600 package will be below the regulatory limits for radiation after tne packaging I

operation is emplete. Dose rates are also measured at the side of the cask as it is removed from the hot cell after loading, and this value is used to estsnate a Curie content for the shipping papers.

In order to provide the curie content estimates it was necessary to develop conversion factors to translate the cask surface dose-rate readings into estimated curie values for contents. Using computerized shielding codes, factors of 14.7 Curies /mR/hr and 510 Curies /mR/hr were generated for Co-60 and MPP, respectively. W e application of these factors is highly conservative as

. the highest, rather than the average, surface dose rate is used. For the purposes of the calculations contained in this document the MPP and Co-60 were asstuned to be uniformly distributed in the grout and an energy level covering decay periods of six months to two years was asstaned for the MFP.

l S e calculated factors are themselves conservative. Actual measurenents were taken on a 1600 cask containing a 77 Curie source centrally located in tne cask cavity and producing a surface dose-rate of 140 mR/hr. % is yields a factor of 0.55 Ci/mR/hr. We computer calculations produced a factor of 1.107 Ci/mR/hr for a point source, a factor of 2 higher than the measured result.

Se contents of the waste containers will vary from hot cell to hot cell. One of the cells is used for both cobalt source fabrication and nuclear fuel and reactor component examination. Radiation levels due to the higher cobalt gama energy cause waste loads from this cell to indicate considerably higher radiation levels than waste from the other cells which have no added cobalt conta ination. Cobalt is, however, a major impurity or alloying constituent in the irradiated reactor hardware in the waste frm all cells. We historic maximum radiation levels of waste packages in the VNC hot cells are as follows:

Peak Unshielded Surface Dose Rate

~

Contents Dose Rate on 1600 ('n k MFP + Reactor Hardware + Cobalt 1,000 R/hr 200 mR/hr MFP + Reactor Hardware 400 R/hr 20 mR/hr Again, these radiation levels represent peak readings taken around the surface of the waste drum (unshielded) or the surface of the cask.

Considering the contents of the two categories of waste, a reasonable breakdown of the mount of the dose rate contributed by each type of waste is as follows:

I 4

. Contents Unshielded Waste Drum 1600 & nk Dose-Rate MFP + Reactor Hardware +

200 R/hr - MFP 10 mR/hr 00-60 Waste 200 R/hr-Co in Hardware 10 mR/hr 600 R/hr - Co Waste 180 mR/hr 1000 R/hr 200 mR/hr MFP + Har&are 200 R/hr-MFP 10 mR/hr 200 R/hr-Co in hardware 10 mR/hr 400 R/hr 20 mR/hr Using our calculated conversion factors based on dose rates at tne surface of the cask, the following quantities are estimated:

MPP-Curies Co-60-Curies For MFP + Hardware + Co Waste 10 mR/hr (MFP) x 510 C1/mR 5100 10 mR/hr (Hardware) x 14.7 Ci/mR 147 180 nR/hr (Co) x 14.7 Ci/mR 2Ein S100 2793 For MFP + Harchare 10 mR/hr (MPP) x 510 Ci/mR 5100 10 mR/hr (Hardware) x 14.7 C1/mR

_141 5100 147 On this basis, the maximum contents of the Model 1600 would be 5100 Ci of MFP and 2800 Ci of Co-60.

It i's reasonable to asstane that the conservative factor of two noted between the measured versus the calculated conversion factors for the CcHi0 source applies to these estimated quantities. However, as this factor has not been denonstrated for other than the point source case, no attenpt is made to apply it.

i

. As a check on GE-VNC methods, dose rate to curie conversion factors were also 1

calculated using a method described by Bowman and Swindle for unshielded waste containers.

Using the methods proposed by Bowman and Swindle for a cylindrical waste package (unshielded).

h= 330 m (53") height 28.7 m (11.3") radius d

57.4 m diameter r =

=

1 gWec (he density is probably less than water for ungrouted o =

waste but no actual measurements have been made; 1 g #cc is felt to be conservative in this case.)

he following formula is proposed by Bowman:

K R

whe m Q

=

dc Curies Q

=

Kd= Gemetry factor 61 cWec density Ec" N UU" 0" f*

Surface dose rate in R/hr R =

Frm Figure 8 (Bowman) with d = 57 m, h = 130 m, o= 1 gVcc; Kd = 20.

For cobalt, the average energy is cormonly taken as 1.25 MeV; MFP average energy for 1 yr decay is estimated as 0.6 MeV.

Bownan's calculations are based on an energy level of 0.5 MeV. Table 1 of his paper offers correction factors for other energy levels. By use of sinple interpolation of the values from Table 1, energy correction factors (E ) of 1.28 c

and 0.299 were obtained for MFP and Co-60, respectively.

Based on cylindrical hmogeneous unshielded packaging the Bowman and Swindle met &d results are as follows:

" Determination of the Curie Content of Packaged Radioactive Waste Using Measured Dose Rates", W. B. Bowman and D. L. Swindle, Health Physics. Vol. 31, i

Nov.,1976, pp. 445-450.

..s a-

., MER Cobalt For Waste with MFP

+ Hardware, 0 = 20 x 1.28 x 200 P/hr 0= 20 x 0.299 x 200 R/hr Q = 5120 Ci MFP Q = 1196 Ci Cobalt in Hard-ware For waste with MFP

+ Hardware + Co Q = 5120 Ci MFP Q= 20 x 0.299 x 600 R/hr Q = 3588 Ci Cobalt O = 1196 C1 Cobalt in Hard-ware Q = 4784 Ci cobalt We two methods show reasonable agreenent for the most part and the non-uniform dispersion of the cobalt and the use of peak radiation readings rather than average values are probably the primary causes of the higher value for the Bowman and Swindle method's cobalt estimate.

PROPOSED PACKAGRI; ME'IHODS Since all of the materials in a waste shipnent have high levels of smearable surface contanination, a method of assuring contairunent and Innobilization during transport adds to the overall package integrity. We method described in this application utilizes canent grout to accanplish this result.

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Slip Liners and Extended DCTf Metal Inner Container

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. he slip liners are fabricated from perforated sheet metal to allow a cement i

grout mix to be pumped in to thoroughly permeate and penetrate all open spaces around the waste. Figure 1 shows a pair of the perforated slip liners in front of an extended DOT 17H Drtru inner mntainer. %e six vertical tubes on the l

outside effectively center tne liners in the inner container, and the grout forms a solid, impervious layer between the slip liner and the inner container.

Figure 2 shows a sinulated typical load of hot cell waste spread out in front of the slip liners and inner container, and Figure 3, the two slip liners loaded and ready to be installed in tne inner container for grouting. W e inner antainer is outfitted with appropriate sealing and lifting devices to allow handling at VNC and the waste disposal facility with typical renote material handling equipnent.

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A Simulated Waste Load

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Loaded Slip Liners CEMENT GROT 7F

'1he formulation of cement grout for waste inmobilization was selected after a 2

thorough review of literature published on this subject. Cement grout is cmmonly used in the nuclear industry as a solidification media for aqueous waste but no meaningful details of other application for solid material imbechenc were found. Information extracted from this literature was used to l

prepare six proposed grout formulations which were then tested to determine optire.xn conformance with performance requirenents.

The following parameters were used as a guide in establishing optimtzn formulation for the crout mix.

1.

High penetrability - to result in a monolithic encapsulization of the waste.

2.

Resistance to a 400 F ambient temperature as soon as possible after initial setting.

('1his is the calculated maximum cavity tenperature of the Vodel 1600 package during accident conditions with a 100 watt internal heat load.)

J. G. Moore, H. W. Godbee, A. H. Kibbey, " Leach Behavior of Hydrofracture Grout Incorporating Radioactive Wastes", Nuclear 'mchnology, Vol. 32, American i

Nuclear Society, Jan.1977.

. 3.

Lack of bleeding or water standing on top of the grout after initial setting.

4.

High early strength.

5.

Readily papable with standard camercial equipnent.

%e six formulations included three based on portland cenent (Type II) and three based on calcim alminate cement. %is calcim aluninate cement is comonly used for applications requiring very hign early strengths and/or refractory applications up to 2550 F.

Strength tests were run on these batches as follows:

Cocoressive Strenaths AS'IM C109 procedures were used as applicable with 2'x2"x2" test cubes.

Solittino Tensile Strengths AS'IM C496 procedures were followed with 3" dia. x 6" long test cylinders.

Therral Resistance Se 2" cubes were cured 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and then subjected to a thermal exposure test by heating to 400 F (20 min) and holding this tenperature for 30 minutes. %e oven was then turned off and allowed to reach anbient temperature. We cubes were tnen removed and tested in cmpression.

GR0t7f TEST RESULTS he three portland and three calcitu aluninate formulations are compared generically as material vs. material, without reference to exact formulations.

As expected, the three calciun aluninate batches showed very high early strength capared to the portland cment formulations. Cmpressive testing indicated portland formulations only 40% as strong as calciun aluninate in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and 60% in 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. Splitting tests again indicated portland formulations lagging (60%) at 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> but about equal at 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. %e thermal exposure tect resulted in a considerable loss of cmpressive strength by the calcium aluninate senple (38%) and a small increase by the portland sample (6%). %e portland cement suple was, however, only 75% as strong as the calcitn alminate after this exposure. Despite the reduction and increase of these materials' strength values, the calcite aluninate smple was 25% stronger than the portland saple.

l l

' i GROlR TEST CONCWSIONS Both types of cment grout demonstrated adequate strength (greater than 3000 psi) at 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> even after exposure to a themal environment of 400 F.

(Calculations for the Model 1600 package indicate this tmperature is not exceeded in the cask cavity during postulated accident conditions.) Grout formulations using either type of cement will retain adequate strength to assure that the imobilization medium is not degraded by normal or accident thermal enviroments during transport. It was decided to use the calcium aluminate cment for the test, not only for its strength, but also to provide experience with this type of cement. %is test experience will facilitate the conversion of the test data to the actual operation.

SIMUIATm PACKAGING TEF he proposed internal waste package was assembled using non-radioactive materials to simulate typical waste contents. A stand was used to simulate the support available during in-cell loading.

A grout formulation using calcium alminate cment the same as that previously tested for strength was prepared and pumped into the drm. We grout was praped through a metal tube into the annular space between the slip liners and the drum with release near the botte of the drm. A vibrator shown in Figure 4 was used during the entire filling operation to insure maximum grout penetration.

Figure 4.

The Extended Drum with l

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C~

Strap-on Drum Support and Vibrator in the Test Fixture.

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through the tube entering the annulus at the top of the picture.

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Filled inner container

, 2e drum head was then installed and the assably was left in the stand to set up. One of the primary aspects of this test was to identify the practicality of the grout pumrJ.ng process. See problens were experienced at the beginning of the mixing and paping operation. To further expedite the flow capability of the grout mix, it is planned to substitute up to 15% of the cerent with pozzolan (fly ash). This is a comon cementitious additive used to increase the fluidity of the mix. It will also enhance the ability of the mix to permeate into cavities in the waste without reducing the final strength of the mix.

RESULTS OF SIMUIATED PACKAGIM] TPRP Following the grout filling operation, the simulated waste package was closed and allowed to stand overnight. h e next day it was delivered to a concrete sawing contractor. We package was cut in half fra two directions, yielding four sections.

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%e first cut of the drum Figure 8. A closeup view of the interior following the firct cut te grout demonstrated a high level of penetration to surround and enter most open containers in the package. Figure 9 shows the complete penetration of the grout throughout the waste and the layer between the slip liner (shiny dotted edge) and the drum. he cut surface indicated no evidence of cracking or separation. % e outside surface of the grout as seen in Figure 9, did show see minor hairline cracks as expected. Figure 11 shows a cmplete cross-section of the bottm half of the drum, with glass, plastic, cans, tubes, etc. solidly embedded in the grout matrix.

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, PACKAGIld MEIHCES AM) FAC'IGS AFFECTING CONI'ENI'S DISPERSABILITY As stated in the estimate of maximm package contents, a major constituent of the waste is irradiated metal hardware. W ese are primarily reactor structural caponents in stainless steel alloys. It is therefore not credible that the internal activation products (largely Co-60) are available for dispersion. Only the surface contm inants would be dispersible.

In line with good operating practice, GE places all sweepings, loose powder, absortent materials, solidified solutions, and other small loose debris in primary contaiment such as gallon cans with friction closures. Wese cans are normally cmpacted for voltanetric efficiency. While this practice does not provide 100% contaiment, a majority of the activity would be confined to the package under accident conditions. he application of ceent grout further enhances this method because the grout tends to penetrate into the smallest openings and plug potential leaks.

%e cobalt occurring in waste frm the source fabrication cell contains both free pellets and sealed sources. We sources are normally in special form contaiment. Because of their small size, the cobalt pellets are connonly mixed with the sweepings and other small particulate debris and placed in cans before loading into the waste drm.

General Electric estimates that 80% of the total package activity is in a form or contaiment which preclude loss under accident conditions. %e dispersible fraction, 20%, is defined as F. GE feels that this factor is conservative y

under any credible accident condition.

DRCP TEST OF GROUT CYLIM)ER A cylinder of cement grout (3 inches in diameter by 6 inches in length) was prepared for testing by encapsulating the cylinder in a close fitting stainless tube. We ends of the tube were closed and tack welded to confine the contents. %e cylinder was dropped 30 feet down a guide tube to keep it axially aligned. Impact occurred on a 250 lb. block of steel at the botte of the tube.

s

! S e cylinder was carefully opened and the contents weighed to determine the amount of grout which crumbled and broke due to ingset:

Wt. of total cement cylinder 1500 gm wt. of broken debris 26 gm t loose 1.754' he corner of the cylinder was slightly broken resulting in loose material. A fracture across the dianeter occurred near the damaged area but no material was lost in this area. his test demonstrates that only a minor fraction of the grout is likely to fail in such a way as to allow the material to be dispersed.

his fraction is defined as F '

I 2

)!

2 1s drop test was very conservative. No energy absorption was used to protect I

the grout from maxima dynanic loads. W e actual grouted package has several energy abscrbing systems which would reduce the loads on trie grouted waste:

1.

Metal overpack deformation 2.

Local cask deformation 3.

Drtan deformation l

Additionally, the rolling hoops in the barrel tend to lock the grouted cylinder in place in the drtsu minimizing secondary impact loads, and spreading the load over a larger area.

Based on these facts, GE feels that the 1.754 broken fraction (F ) is 2

conservative enough to be used without change.

Further examination of the broken material indicates that only 6.5 grans or 25%

of this potentially free mat.erial was less than 1/8" in arry dimension. Bis indicated that a very ar.all amount of the broken material is of a size which could realistically be transported by the air coolant as it leaves the package.

h is fraction is defined as F.

3

In order to account for possible mntanination on the surfaces' fractures or cracks in the grout matrix, it was assmed that the same amount of material was available for dispersion in other cracks or fractures as in the dispersible-size pieces of broken grout.

POS'IUIATED EXIMLE ILSSES FEM 'EE DME AIO CASK We damage to the Model 1600 package from the 30 foot free fall accident condition can be estimated based on the testing of the Model 100 package.

General Electric is pursuing analytical methods which will indicate the stresses and strains en the package under accident conditions, but at this time no analytical information is available which would clearly show damage to the cask seal area or resulting leck rates.

Preliminary studies based on a one dimensional Imped mass analysis (IMPAC2) and a structural analysis of the cask lid indicate that the cask lid bolts will not fail by either shear or tension if subjected to the 30 foot inpact condition.

%is analysis was accmplished on analytical models without the metal overpack and the results are therefore quite conservative.

General Electric concludes that the package may be deformed but the overpack assembly and the cask and lid assembly are expected to renain attached and in the same relative positions.

l We drm containing the grouted waste is expected to deform as a result of the forces of the postulated impact and no claim is made on the integrity of the drum seal. Like the cask and lid, however, the drm and lid can be expected to deform but renain attached.

GE does not feel that a leak rate analysis of the package with accidental damage 1s appropriate in this ciremstance. In lieu of the leak rate analysis, the l

drum and cask should be assigned maxinun credible release factors which are i

based on judicious application of source terms and logical assessment of the four liter air loss resulting from thermal expansion of the air in the drm as a result of the accident thermal conditions.

I

/

e e

, Accordingly, a loss of 2% of this fine material from the damaged drum is conservative considering the small driving force of the air coolant. %is fraction is defined as F. It is expected that the cask will also retain 4

a substantial portion of the radioactive material released from the drm. We postulate that 90% of this mat.erial will be retained in the cask. Se 10% not retained is defined as F '

5 DRIVING EDRCES

%e Model 1600 package heat transfer analysis indicates that the maximum 0

tenperature resulting fra accident conditions will be less than 389 F for the cask cavity and its contents for thermal loads up to 100 watts. Wis tenperature is not expected to produce significant change in the strength of the grout matrix. Concretes and grouts are coninonly used above this tenperature with no breakage, cracking or other degradation.

Bis temperature rise would, however, cause an increase in the drm and cask cavity pressure due to thermal expansion. Based on a 100 watt thermal load the pressure change, based on perfect gas laws, is as follows:

0 Ty = Ttsnperature at Loaded Conditions, 70 F (530 R)

Py = Pressure at Loaded Conditions,1 atztosphere 0

0 T, = Temperature at Accident Conditions, 389 F (849 R)

P, = Pressure at Accident Conditions At constant volme, a.F T

a 1

1 P,= 14.7 x

= 23.5 psia (8.8 psig)

, Assair.g the air coolant is released and expands to one atzcsphere at constant tenperature:

P,V,=

P, V, where V,= free volume inside drum (22.6 in, dia., 1 in. high)

V,= W vol m e P, = External Pressure,1 atmosphere 2

6 3

V, =

nx x 1 = 401 in 4

V, = V 3

401 x 641 in a

=

=

e

'Iherefore the chaage in volme is 3

V = 641 - 401 = 240 in or 3.93 f, A total of approximately 4 liters of air would be released from the drum under the thermal accident conditions. Following this release, no significant air movsnent of the package would occur, and therefore no release for the period after the fire transient is expected.

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, APPLICATION OF CONPAINMDFf FACTORS A.

Maximta package Cf = 5100 Cf of MFP and, 2800 d of M 0 contents, C and C C

=

f c

c B.

Dispersion Factors Available Ramminina Activity (niri a)

Fraction ME Q2-fd

1. Fraction of mari==

Fy = 0.2 (F ) (C ) = 1020 F ) (C ) = 560 y

f y

c cask contents in " loose" form (prior to grouting)

-F.y

2. Fraction of grcat ex-F2 = 0.0175 (F ) (1020)=17.9 F (560) = 9.8 2

2 pected to crtanble or break in the postulated 30 foot drop (loose material proi ced by impact forces) - F2

3. Fraction of grout real-F3 = 0.25 (F ) (1.9) 5 (F ) (9.8)=2.5 3

3 istically expected to be of dispersible size-F 3

4. Additional material in 4.5 Ci MFP fractures or cracks in 2.5 Ci Co-60 9.0 5.0 the grout which may be

- dispersible. (Equal to anount in loose grout.)

5. Fraction of available F4 = 0.02 (F ) (9.0)=0.18 (F ) (5.0)=0.10 4

4 material realistically released from the drta by the dispersal forces generated by the hypo-thetical accident - F 4

6. Fraction of the mater-F5 = 0.10 (F ) (0.18)4.018 (F ) (0.10)4.01 5

5 ial released from the drum which escapes the cask and cask /fireshield - F5 F'+ar-i't' c-*=wrs'e-w ww-ww--m e-

=-w-m

-,wwww - ew -

ie w w

,e,,

-e

-,w r+y-e-

--*g--yey

--y

-wr

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21-C(23CTllSICH It is apparent frem the sin 11ation test and the contaiment capability that cemmt grout is a good medium in which to innobilize and contain hot cell waste for disposal. We method is capatible with cell operations and the imnobilization procedure will result in adequate contairsnent of radioactive species such that the Model 1600 package with such contents will be in full empliance with all federal regulations pertaining to the shipnent of radioactive material.

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ATDGMENP 1 Procedural Outline of the Tenhilhation of Call Waste Usina romant Grout 1.

Waste products shall be p)'.ced in a perforated metal slip liner which fits into a metal inner container. We metal inner container shall be at least 18 gauge steel, closed and sealed with a gasket and cover retained with bolts or a bolted clamp ring. Typically, an extended 55 gallon drtan will be used but the method is not limited to this specific inner container.

2.

ne slip liners shall be mechanically centered in the inner container and waste shall be retained in the assenbly to prevent flotation of contents during grouting.

3.

We cement grout shall be primarily a mixture of sand, cement, po::zolan, and water in the following proportions by weight.

Includ-Without ing H O HO 2

2 (Wt. t)

(Wt. %)

Cement 33-42 40-50 Pozzolan 0-8,5 0-10 Sand 37-46%

44-55 Water 14-20%

4.

%e grout shall be directed into the annulus between the metal inner container and the slip liner so that the grout fills the package fr a the Lotte up. S e assembly shall be vibrated continuously during grouting to maximize penetration of the grout into the waste material.

5..ne grouted assenbly shall be allowed to set without moving until the grout is hard and firm on the surface. Any free standing water shall be removed fra the top of the grout prior to installation of the gasket and closure mechanism.

6.

We inner container shall be a single trip container sized to fit easily into the cask cavity but without excessive clearance. It shall be fitted with appropriate lifting devices to allow removal using installation and renoval with normal renote handling tools.

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..