ML20039D040

Forwards Draft Safety Evaluation of SEP Topic IV-2, Reactivity Control Sys.Response Requested within 30 Days

ML20039D040
Person / Time
Site:	La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png
Issue date:	12/28/1981
From:	Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Linder F DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE
References
TASK-04-02, TASK-4-2, TASK-RR LSO5-81-12-087, LSO5-81-12-87, NUDOCS 8112310248
Download: ML20039D040 (8)

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December 28, 1981 s

A Docket No. 50-409 LS05-81-12-087 nacEtVED DEC301981d 7

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Mr. Frank Linder General Manager g

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Lacrosse, Wisconsin 54601

SUBJECT:

SEP TOPIC IV-2, REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS DRAFT SAFETY EVALUATION - LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR Enclosed is a copy of our draft safety evaluation of SEP Topic IV-2, Reactivity Control Systems for Lacrosse. This assessment compares your facility, as described in Docket No. 50-409, and your evaluation of Topic IV-2, with the criteria currently used by the regulatory staff for licensing new facilities. Please infonn us if your as-built facil-ity differs from the licensing basis assumed in our assessment.

Your-response within 30 days of the date you receivedthis letter is re-quested. If no response is received within that time, we will assume that you have no coments or corrections. This evaluation should be a' basic input to the evaluation of Topic XVV8 and the integrated safety asu assessment for your facility unless you identify changes needed to re-flect the as-built conditions at your facility. This assessment may be revised in the future if your fasility design is changed or, if NRC criteria relating to this subject are modified before the integrated assessment is completed.

Sincerely, Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing

Enclosure:

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 December 28, 1981 Docket No. 50-409 LS05 81-12-087 Mr. Frank Linder General Manager

~ Dairyland Power Cooperative 2615 East Avenue South Lacrosse, Wisconsin 54601

SUBJECT:

SEP TOPIC IV-2, REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS DRAFT SAFETY EVALUATION - LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR Enclosed is a copy of our draft safety evaluation of SEP Topic IV-2, Reactivity Control Systems for Lacrosse. This assessment compares your facility, as described in Docket No. 50-409, and your evaluation of Topic IV-2, with the criteria currently used by the regulatory staff for licensing new facilities.

Please infonn us if your as-built facil- -

ity differs from the licensing basis assumed in our assessment.

Your response within 30 days of the date you receive this letter is re-quested.

If no response is received within that time, we will assume that you have no comments or corrections. This evaluation should be a basic input to the evaluation of Topic XV-8 and the integrated safety assessment for your facility unless you identify changes needed to re-flect the as-built conditions at your facility. This assessment may be revised in the future if your facility design is changed or, if NRC criteria relating to this subject are modified before the integrated assessment is completed.

Sincerely,.

[dV Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/ enclosure:

See next page

LA CROSSE Docket No. 50-409 Mr. Frank Linder cc Fritz Schubert, Esquire U. S. Environmental Protection Staff Attorney Agency Dairy 1&nd Power Cooperative Federal Activities Branch 2615 East Avenue South Region V Office La Crosse, Wisconsin 54601 ATTN: Regional Radiation Representative 230 South Dearborn Street O. S. Heistand, Jr., Esquire Chicago, Illinois 60604 Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 1800 M Street, N. W.

Mr. John H. Buck Washington, D. C.

20036 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. R. E. Shimshak Washington, D. C.

20555 La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor Dairyland Power Cooperative Dr. Lawrence R. Quarles P. O. Box 135 Kendal at Longwood, Apt. 51 Genoa, Wisconsin 54632 Kenneth Square, Pennsylvania 19348 Ms. Anne K. Morse Charles Bechhoefer, Esq., Chairman

- Coulee Region Energy Coalition Atomic Safety and Licensing Board P. O. Box 1583 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission La Crosse, Wisconsin 54601 Washington, D. C.

20555 Dr. George C. Anderson La Crosse Public Library 800 Main Street Department of Oceanography La Crosse, Wisconsin 54601 University of Washington Seattle, Washington 98195 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspectors Office Mr. Ralph S. Decker Rural Route #1, Box 276 Route 4, Box 190D Genoa, Wisconsin 54632 Cambridge, Maryland 21613 Tcwn Chairman Thocas S. Moore Town of Genoa Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Route 1 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Consission

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Genoa, Wisconsin 54632 Washington, D. C.

20555 Chairman, Public Service Commission.

Mr. George R. Nygaard of Wisconsin Coulee Region Energy Coalition Hill Farms ~ State Office Building 2307 East Avenue Madison, Wisconsin 53702 Lacrosse, Wisconsin 54601 Alan S. Rosenthal, Esq., Chairman Atomic Safety '.nd Licensing Appeal Board U. S. Nuclear Aegulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555 Mr. Frederick Milton Olsen, III 609 North lith Street Lacrosse, Wisconsin 54601

SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT SEP TOPIC IV-2r REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS INCLUDING FUNCTIONAL DESIGN AND PROTECTION AGAINST SINGLE FAILURES LACROSSEBOILINGhATERREACTOR DOCKET NO. 50-409 I.

INTRODUCTION The purpose of this evaluation is to insure that.the design ba-sis for the Lacrosse reactivity control systems is consistent analyses performed to verify that the protection system with meets General Design Criterion 25.

General-Design Criterion 25 requires that the reactor protection system be designed to assure that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded for any single malfunction of the reactivity con-trol systems, such as accidental withdrawal.of control rods.

Reactivity control systems need not be single failure proof.

Howevers the protection system must be capable of assuring that acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded in the event of a single failure in the reactivity control systems.-

The review criterions covered in this evaluations i s address-ed in Sect-ion II.

Review areas that are n'ot coverede but are related and essential to the completion of this topice c

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are' covered by o.ther SEP topics addressed in Section III.

The scope of.the SEP-topics is defined in the " Report on the Systematic Evaluation of Operating Facilities" dated November 25, 1977.

This report is Limited to the identification of inadvertent control rod withdrawals and malpositioning of controls rods which may occur as a result of single failures.'in the control rod drive system.

II.

REVIEW CRITERION The review criterion for this topic is based upon Section 7.7s Part II of the NRC Standard Review Plan.

In the specific case

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of the reactivity control systems a single failure shall not cause plant conditions more severe than those for which the reactor protection system is designed.

III.

RELATED SAFETY TOPICS The fotLowing. Listed review areas are not covered in this re-porte but are related and essential to the completion of this t op.i c.

These review areas are covered by other SEP topics as indicated below.

1.

Analyses of.the consequences of control rod withdrawals and the malpositioning of control rods which may occur as a result of single failures in the electricat circuits of the reactivity control systems are covered by SEP Topi c-XV-8s " Control Rod Misoperation (System Malfunction or Operator Error)".

2.

Analyses of reactivity insertions occurring as a result of inad ve r t en t reactor coolant pressure increases or-temper-ature decreases are covered in SEP Topic XV-1, "D e c re a s e in Feedwater Temperatures Increase in Feedwater Flows In-crease in Steam Flow and Inadvertent Opening of Steam.

Generator Relief or Safety Valve;" SEP Topic XV-3r " Loss of External Loade Turbine Tripe Loss of Condenser Vacuumi Closure of Main Steam Isolation Valve (BWR), and Steam Pressure Regulator Failure (Closed);" and SEP Topic XV-9, "Startup of an Inactive Loop or Recirculation Loop l

at an Incorrect Temperatures and Flow Controller Malfunction i

Causing an Increase in BWR Core Flow Rate."

IV.

REVIEW GUIDELINES The purpose of this evaluation is to identify inadvertent control l

rod withdrawals and malpositioning of control rods which may occur

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as a result of single failure in the control rod drive system for the Lacrosse Boiling Water Reactor.

V.

EVALUATION Information was provided in Dairyland Power Cooperative Letter dated June 1r 1981, de s c ribin g single failur'es within the control rod drive system which can cause control rod with-drawals and malpositioning of control rods at the Lacrosse Boiling Water Reactor.

Also included was a description of design features which Limit reactivity insertion rates and rod malpositionings resulting from single failures.

Based upon an audit review of the information provided by the Licensee we conclude that the fotLowing may occur as a result of single failures:

1)

A control rod may not move when commanded to move (including s c r a m).

2)

A control rod.may continuously move even though no movement i s commanded.

3)-

Two control rods may continuously move at the same time.

4)

A partial or fut t-scram may occur when~not commanded.

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This conclusion is based upon the design of the control rod drive system.

It should be noted that Items 1, 2, and 4 are :,i not specifically addressed in the Licensee's Letter..

Additionally, we do not agree with the Licensee's statement contained in his letter, that a single failure may cause

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a control' rod to drop; instead, we believe a control rod drop accident would be caused by multiple failures.

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"VI.

CONCLUSION The review of SEP Topic XV-8 should include the four items listed above or show why these types of failures can not oc' cur at Lacrosse.

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