ML20039C665
| ML20039C665 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1981 |
| From: | Vincent R CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| To: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TASK-03-03.C, TASK-3-3.C, TASK-RR NUDOCS 8112300018 | |
| Download: ML20039C665 (12) | |
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POW 8f tvt Company oeneret Offices: 212 west Michigan Avenue, Jocanon, MI 49201 *(517) 788-0550 Y
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N December 21, 1981 RECElVED
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m Dennis M Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No 5 Nuclear Reactor Regulation US Huclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 DOCKET 50-155 - LICENSE DPR BIG ROCK POINT PLANT - SEP TOPIC III-3.C, INSERVICE INSPECTION OF WATER CONTROL STRUCTURES Attached is the Consumers Power Company evaluation of SEP Topic III-3.C for the Big Rock Point Plant.
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' O ~~ I Robert A Vincent Staff Licensing Engineer CC Director, Region III, USNRC NRC Resident Inspector-Big Rock Point 1 pages
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SEp EAFEn* 'IOPIC EVAWATICH BIG ROCK POE;T PLU
TOPIC III
~4.C In::ervice Inspection of Water-Control Stractures HT'RCDUCTION The objective of this topic is to assure that water-control structures of a nuclear pcwer facility (i.e., da=s, reservoirs, conveyance facilities) are adequately inspected and =aintained so as to preclude their deterioration or failure which could result in flooding er in jeopardizirs the integrity of the ultimate heat sink for tne facility.
CURREIIT PS/IEW CRITERIA Regulatory Guide 1.127 CATED SAFETY TOPICS AND INTERFACE The slope stability aspect of water-control structures will be reviewed under Topic II-4.D.
Settle: ant of water-control structures will be reviewed u%er Topic II-4.F.
Other interface topics include:
II-4.E, " Dan Integrity";
II-3.A, " Hydrologic Description"; II-3.C, " Ultimate Heat Sink"; III-3.A, "Ef-fects of High Water on Structures"; III-4.A, " Tornado Missiles"; IX-3, "Sta-tion Service and Coolirg Water Syste=c"; III-6, "Seis=ic Design Considera-tions"; XVI, " Technical Specifications"; and III-3.B " Structure and Other Consequences of Failures of Underdrain Systems."
EVA WATICN 1.
Site Description Site physiography is described in SEP Topic II-4.F, Reference (1): For orientation purposes, use Big Rock Site Plan, Reference (2).
2.
Foundations and Engineering Characterictics of the Site Geographical studies are discussed in SEP Topic II-4.F, Reference (1).
Site test boring infor=ation is also contained in Reference (1) above, and in the Geographical Cross-Hole Survey, Reference (3). The specific test boring location for the screenhouse/ diesel generator roon/ discharge structure and other site borings may be quickly observed in Reference (6),
Fi ure H-1.
6 3
Description of Water-Control Structures and Associated Features The water-control structures and associated features at Big Red Point site are li=ited to tne offshore intake structure, offshore iv.ttGte line,
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screenhouJe/ diesel generator roo=/ discharge structure, discharge canal and buried fire =ain pipirg systes (SEPS). No da=s, slopes, canals or other water-control structures except those listed above are used to i= pound, restrain, or direct water sources for e=ergency coolire opera-tions.
(a) Offshore Intake Structu-e The offshore intake structure serves as tne pri=r.ry inlet of lake water supply for essentially all cooling syste=s of the plant. The structure is located about 1,450 feet offshore in Iake Michigan, and the supply of water to the plant flevs through a 60-inch-dis =eter reinforced concrete pipe runniq beneath tne lake botto= from the off-shcre intake structure to the screenhouse. The offshcre intake struc-ture, shown in Reference (4), Figures I-1 and I-2, consists of a baffled inlet of wood anu steel, a steel cone reducirg in diameter fro: 12 to 5 feet, a 5-foot-dia=eter steel elbow, and a steel fra=e-work which supports tne inlet and provides a very stable base for the entire structure. The excavation for the structure has been backfil-led with sand topped with a layer of coarse = tone.
(b ) Offshore Intake Line The offshore intake line supplies all water to tne plant, including e=ergency core coolirs water. The pipe connects the screenhouse with tne inlet crib as shown in F.eference (5), Figure J-3 The pipe is reinforced concrete with a 60-inen inside dia=eter and six-inch-thick walls. The pipe is reinforced with two steel cases.
It is laid in 16.5-foot sections which are connected witn gasketed joints, as indicated in Figure J-4, and has a total length of about 1,450 feet. The pipe is essentially straight with an approxi=ately 35-foot elevation differential between the ends.
(c) Screenhouse/ Diesel Generator Rec =/ Discharge Structure The screenhouse/ diesel generator roc =/ discharge structure, shcvn in Reference (6), Figures H-2 through H-5, is a two-story reinforced concrete structure approxi=ately 85 feet lorg and havira a caxi=us width of approxi=ately 47 feet. One 60-inch-diameter offstore intake pipe ('rects water into tne intake section (forebay) of tne co=bined structtu e. The intake water portion of tne structure is nearly rec-targular in plan, but tapers to a width of approximately 12 feet in the norta. At its southeast portion, the structure widens to the east to enco= pass the discharge struct'tre. Circulatire water is rereened through the suspended trash racks and pu= ped to the plant through two 36-inch-dia=eter intake lines which are located in the scath end of the co=bined structure. The e=ergency core coolirg and fire cain v tupply is located in the screenhouse, The e=ergency diesel gent is located at the intermediate leve' of the discharge structure. Thus, the cultipurpose function of the combined structure and its functional i=portance ditrirg an e=ergency qualifies it as beira very unique.
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Reference subparagraph c(1) below for a disenssion of the circula-tirg water and emergency cooling require =ents.
The foundation of the comained structure consists of a 175-foot-thick reinforced concrete mat beneath tne screenhouse and a 15-foot-thich reinforced concrete cat beneath tne discharge structure and diesel generator room. The screenhouse/ diesel generator room / dis-charge structure (screenhouse) is e= bedded in soil on three sides, with the intake portion (north erl.) of tne structure being exposed.
The average depth of e= bed =ent is approxi=ately 17 feet.
(1) From the screenhouse, approximately 50,000 gpm of water are su;, plied to the plant coolirg and service water (circulatirq water) systems by two condenser circulating water pumps and one of two service water pu=ps. Those pumps take their suction from the screenhouse and are not considered safety related. Approxi-mately 1,000 gpm of water are needed to supply the fire suppres-sion water system or the emergency shutdown and cooling systems (including core spray, redundant core spray and core spray beat exchanger). This water is furnished by tne standby electric or diesel fire pumps which take suction from the screenhouse and are considered safety related. Not= ally, pressure is =aintained in the fire suppression water system by a small jockey fire pu=p/ accu =ulator. The pu=p takes its suction from the screen-house at 25 gpm and is not considered safety related.
(d) Discharge Canal The discharge canal carries circulating water from the discharge structure to Iake Michigan.
It is an open waterway over 100 fcet long, depending on the water level of lake Michigan and gently fans out from the discharge structure which is approximately 12 feet wide.
A small rip rap breakwater was built on the west side of the discharge canal to reduce sand and silt buildup from wave action in the =outh of the discharge canal. A 24-inch warm water recirculation line is connected to the discharge structure and is layed via the discharge canal to the forebay in the screenhouse to allow warm circulating water to mix with the very cold water from lake Michigan durira the cold weather months.
(e) Buried Fire Main Pipirg System The buried fire =ain piping system (BFMPS) provides water for e=er-gency shutdown ana coolira systems, and fire suppression water sys-tems to bo4 Miags and external hydrants at the plant. The water is obtained iron lake !?ichigan and ficws to the screenhouse through the 60-inch offshore intake line. The BRIPS forms an eight-sided loop around =ajor plant structures and is connected to the screenhouse through an eight-inch pipe. The loop itself and the laterals which connect to buildirgs and hydrar M are six-inch-diameter pipes.
There are laterals connec'.iq to the core spray equipment room (base-ment of fuel cask loading dock), to the turbine generator building and to six hydrante located around the site, Reference (5), Figure J-1.
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The pipe is all of cast-iron construction and is buried at an approxi-mate average depth of six feet. The pipe lereths are a maximum of 16 feet ana joints are gasketed, as shown in Reference (5), Fi are J-2.
6 4.
Eagineering Data on ' dater-Control Structures Baiag an older plant site, only li=ited data is available for review re-garding this Topic. However, general site data, hydrolo6ic ana hydrologic features, geotechnical data, founaation and soils data /drawires, Seolo6io features information, geotechnical data, seismic analysis data, inspection Jata/ reports, and drawi':gs are available on site and in the General Office fer ready accessibility.
5 On Site 'Jater-Control Structure and Associated Features Inspection Program A for=al' inspection program, as outlined in Regulatory Gaide 1.127, has not been established for the water-control structures ana associated fea-tures at Big Rock Pc'.. Ifowever, our nor=al surveillances, periodic inspections and routine preventive maintenance performed on the water-control structures, systers ana components would uncover argt signs of detericration that could result in failure, in a timely =atter.
The plant operators make a surveillance (rounds) approximately every two hours to inspect the plant systems wnich includes the screenhouse und asscciated equipment. They observe the water flow (level) over the weir in the outlet to the discharge structure and inspect the water level in the forebay of tne screenhouse and lo;; the water level of the forebay once per shift (Technical Specifications require maintaining a 570 foot min 4-"
level.-) Both these inspections provide a good indication that the intake and dischar6e areas are clear and are functioning properly.
Furthermore, if tne water level is low in the forebay of the screenhouse, an alarm will sound allowire for operator inspection and subsequent action.
4 In the past ten years we have conducted a number of periodic inspections e
as follows:
(a) The offshore intake structure was visually inspected usir4 a aiver in Juky 1972 and September 1975, hy an outside contractor. The former inspection revealed some irregular piles of rip rap around the intake structure but no visible dama6e to the wood baffle (Vanes) or steel portions; and no dents or corrosion.. The latter inspection noted no significant enarges between the 1972 inspection and this one.
A s=all sa=ple of a wooden vane was removed from the baffle which revealed sound wood with no trace of rot.
(b) The forebay of the screenhouse was inspected by a CP Co diver (certi-t fled diver ana registered PE) on two occasions between 1977 ana 1981.
Inspections included:
(1) Checxing conditions of the concrete structure for cracks, spal-ling, errosion, etc.
5 (2) Exa-Mirs the openirg (exit) of the offshore intake line for holes,cerrosion,da=cge/ integrity,etc.,andthetrashrack grating fer holes, loose objects, da= age / integrity.
(3) cbservira nrroundir4 AI-Eas of the traveling screens for loose objects and general condition of concrete, travelir; screens and components.
(4) Examining the condition and damage / integrity of the 24" War =
water recirculation line.
The conclusions reached frc= these inspections showed the forebay of the screenhouse (to include components /pipirg) to be in excellent condition. There was no indication of wear, damage, degradation, sediment or foreign objects.
(c) Soandirgs have been periodically taken in the =outh of the discharge canal and Lake Michigan to determine if dredgir4 is required. Prior to 1977, the discharge canal experienced buildup of sand ans silt in the =outh of this canal which necessitated the iredgirg of this area approximatt./ once per year. In 1977, a rip rap breakwater was built on the west side of the discharge canal extendi':g into Iake Michigan. Since this breakwater was built, no further dredging has been required. Our records show that soundings were taken in the discharge canal and Lake Michigan in 1976 (prior to the last dreds-ing work) and in 1931. The soundir4 data were then co= pared to the 1976 data to determine if any further dredging was req 2 ired. This co=parison showed that dredgir4 was not necessar/ at that time.
Because. the discharge canal is nearby the plant, the routine opera-tor surveillance (roands) ar.d daily observation by the plant person-nel is aciequate to note any builtup of sand and/or silt in the discharge canal.
If abnormal conditions warrant further corrective action, then additional soundings and/or dredging will be done as required.
(d) Site plant foundations have been inspected for cracks and settle-
=ent.
In Nove=ber 1978, the 1730 staff and CP Co representatives
=et to discuss site geology ana geotechnical data. They toured the plant site observirg local geology, topography and settlement of foundations. So=e minor cracks were obserted in the foundations, i
but no foundation / ground settlement was observed around the screen-house or in areas where buried equipment was located, Reference (1).
The writer of this topic (while researching same in late 1981) in-spected the screenhouse and areas surroundirg the screenhouse for settle =ents, cracks in foundttion concrete, etc. Again, sc=e minor cracks were coserted in the concrete but no foundation / ground settle-
=ents were obserted.
(e) Our current preventative =aintenance progra= provides us with another source of surteillance which would uncover proble= areas of the screenhouse and associated features.
Preventive =aintenance is cen-ducted periodically on a nu=ber of components in the screenhouse to include trash racks and the traveling screens. The trash racks and traveling screens are periodically cleaned of debris by plant opera-tors ; the travelirg screens are inspected, greased and cleaned by the plant maintenance crew once per year in accordance with the plant prea ventative maintenance progra=.
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6 Based upon these periodic inspections of the water-control structrres and associated features perfor=ed to date, w have seen no significant changes in the condition of the structures which would have necessitated a technical evaluation of that change.
It should be noted that the plant circulating water requirements ari normally supplied at 50,000 gpm while only 1,000 gp: are needed for a postulated accident. Consequently, our system has built-in safety fro:
degradation which is also monitored by the plant-operator during his surveillance (rounds). The inspections above are desirable but not absolutely necessary. Our only concern is for failures.
m.J-a 6.
Technical Review of Inspection Results and Evaluation of Water-Control Structures Our review of the surveillances ana inspection program discussed in Sec-tion 5 under Evaluation, shows that CP Co should conduct an inspection of the offshore intake structure and an inspection of the submerged portion of the foundations that are exposed in the screenhouse specifically, bet-ween the traveling screens and the south wall. These inspections would fall within the general guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.127 and would up-date 2r current infor=ation relatin6 to this Topic. Our reco::r::endation would ce to conduct these inspections within the next 2-year period' fol-loved by subsequent inspections at approximately 5-year intervals.
Also, our review of tne surveillance and inspection progras discur, sed above, shows that a for alized procedure was not initiated prior to a given inspection; data was apparently gathered without the aid.of a check-Guide,1.127 Con-list which is discussed in the guidelines of Regulatory /or checkli.?t of sequently, CP Co should have formalized a procedure and significant structural and hydraulic features prior to future inspections.
A report of significant findir4s and observations should be documented..
The followin6 evaluation is made due to our continuing effort to a'n_Glyze '
older plant structures, system and components to newer decign criteria and because of the unique features of tne water-control structures at Big Rock Point; even though our surveillances anu inspection program discussed in Section 5 under Evaluation have shown that no significut, changes have occurred which may potentiall;y impact upon the capacity of the water-control structures to function as designed.
In July 1979, D'Appolonia Consultin6 Engineers were contacted to work with Big Rock Point Seismic Safety Margin Evaluation..This evaluation represents only a portion of an effort by CP Co to' determine tne capabi-lity of essential structures, systems and co=ponents to safely shutdown the reactor and =aintain it in a safe shutdown condition during and efter a postulated (sample problem) SSE. This work was performed as a part of tne SEP current 1;y being conducted by the US NRC.
Based upon the D' Appolonia Evaluation, References (4), (5), (6) a.d (7);-
the plant water-control structures and associated features will posass
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an adequate safety cargin when sabjected to a seismic inpat consistir4 of a sa=ple problem earthquake having a zero period horizontal ground t
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- acceleration equal to 0.12 6; which =atches the require =ents of tne US NRO Regulatory Guide 1.60 (1973).
Parthemore, the snfety =argin discussed above is very conservative because the essential loadir4 condition cc= bines dead load with seismic load, Reference (7), Page I-2.
Offshore Intake Structure The D'Appolonia evaluation of the offshore intake structure indicates that the stability of the structure from overturnir4 due to seismic accelera-tion or frca loss of foundation strength due to liquefaction is not a concern.
Our. review of' current data shows that there has been no known structural daca6e to the offshere intake structure from undercurrent, ice, etc.,
liquefaction or other effects in over 20 years service, consequently, the present stfactural design / stability is considered satisfactory. We could however, postulate' damage to or loss of the wooden vanes from the baffled inlet in the offshore intake structure due to rotting or breakage. If this should occur, the woodon vanes would prcbab3;y be drawn into the l trash racks which would readily show the plant personnel that there is p'
some damage to'the offshore intake stractare. But we wculd not anticipate any significant 'pluggir4 or restrictions of ficw through the offshore in-
' take structure, the offshore intake line or the trash racks from this
. occurrence. We could postulate the pluggir4 (fall or potential) of the cffshore intake structure from ice durir4 the cold weather months. How-ever, if plugging saould occur from ice, restricting flow to the screen-house, the lar6e 24" wars water recirculation line* is open and would pro-vide the necess.ry water for plant shutdown requirements and for maintainir4 plant in a safe shutdown condition. This line would also be available for other e::r:rgency situations if one snould arise.
Offshore Intake Line.
6e D'Appolor a eva'. cation of the offshore intake line and BE*.Ps, uew
'.the pipir4 lays in firs uniform soil, has excellent flexibility due c
cainly to the gasketed joint _ construction which does not permit strains to accumulate in the piping,athus preventing the buildup of large stresses.
Thay further s}.cd tnat stresses due to tner=al conditions are well witnin
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17 ur.rbikk 'ofjptin' piping'systens above, show that the concrete and cast-0
.,,71ron.pipirey.ey.well suit-2 for these applications and no significant 4
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- The var = vater *Yecirculation'line is opened during the cold wetther months an? takes itsMuction from the discharge structure and discharges warm water (b9 gravity flow) to the foreGy in the screenhoute. This line is primarily W3 sea for preventing ice buiLlup in the scr'eenhouse, on tne trash racks and travelir4 screens.
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fiilure =echanism is postulated. We could however, postulate that a
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-rubber gasket in the joint weald fai1++ fro some effect, causir; a e'L enl1 gap to exist between the pipire sections of the offshore in-take line. If this snoald occar, a small enount of silt =ay possibly
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j infiltrate the gap /openirs (leakge of water fro = the pipi 6 is not p,nticipated) but would not be sufficient to cause silt build p in the ferebay of the screenholse or cause arg/ proble= with flow through the offshore intake line. The structural integrity of the joint would not v
be' 'affected.
f Hevever, leakage would be expected from the s=all 6ap in tne pressurized buriei fire =ain pipi g (ED1?) if a rubber 6asket joint failed. This leaksse is readi2y detectable by a plant operator during routine srveil-4 lance (roands) on any given shift by observir4 the operation of the jock-ey fire pump which =aintains booster fire water header press =e.
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abnor=al operatien of this p2=p wocid indicate possible leakge from the systen which would have to be explained and/or resolved. If the leahage was larse enough frc= the EDIP's joint and the jockey fire pc=p could
,' noirahtain system require =ents, then the electric fire punp would oper-ate. Significant leaksge would surface above ground level for detection
/and for subsequent repair. The structral integrity of the joint wo21d i not be affected.
Screenhouse/ Diesel Rcom/ Discharge Structure (Screenhouse) p
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The D'Appolonia evaluation of the screenhouse shows a=ong other conclu-sions that the foundations of the screenhouse are stable relative to overturnire and slidirg fro = the seismic loadire conditions they imposed by analysis. Their analysis was based on the screenhouse being a partial-ly subnerged structure.
02r review of the screenhouse shows the structure is unique but well suited for its application with no additional failure mechanis antici-
. t pated. Hi6h water, tornados, etc., will be addressed in other SEP Topics.
Four recent inspections since 1977, would tend to confir= the above con-clusion. Reference HRC/CP Co 1978 inspection of foundations, Para 6raph (d) i under Section 5; writers,1981 inspection of fon,iations, Paragraph (d) under Section 5; two CP Co inspections of structures and co=ponents, Para-graph (b) under Section 5 of this Evaluation.
,. Discharge Cana'!.
/ 'Our review of the discharge canal shows that it is an open wate:way which flovs to If chigao. The only proble=s seen to date, are the buildup
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of sani'and sixt in the =outh of the discharge canal, discussed in Para-graph (c) un:!er Section 5, of this Evaluation and periodic =aintenance of a
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++ Failure is not considered probable because of the flexibility build into the pipirg syste=s and the low ther-al stresses in the joints, as only s=all te=perature differentials exist between the pipe syste=s and the surroundire soils. Ecth pipire syste=s are buried underground and not subject to si ni-6 ficant environ =enbal and ther=al' charges.
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9 the rip rap along the canal. The rip rap breakwater forced on the west side of tne canal has reduced the problem associated with the buildup of sand and slit. Periodic observation ana soundiras will provide sufficient infor=ation to insure any future dredging is donc in a ti=ely matter. No other significant prob 1 cms would be anticipated.
Connections (Joints)
The D'Appolonia evaluation shows that the BHiFS has connections ta three plant buildings at four locations, an eight-inch cast-iron line connects the -Mn loop to the screenhouse, a six-inch line connects to the core spray equip =ent room, and two six-inch lines connect to the turbine buildire. They analyzed pipe stresses for building morements by the core spray equipment room ana the screenhouse ana found the pipire stresses to be within acceptable limits. They performed no calculations for entr' of
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pipe into the turbine building because their visual inspection sb' ced that the pipe entry to this building alluvs unimpeded cove =ent of Jne pipe.
Our revi..t of data concernirg the BF25 connections above, snow no addi-tional postulated failure mechanisms.
The D'Appolonia evaluation considered stresses in the connection between the offshore intake structure and the offshore intake line. They conclu-ded that because the stability of this intake structure is not a problem, the structural integrity of the connection will also not be a problem.
Conversely, the same analogy would apply for the connection between the forebay (of screenhouse) and the offshore intake line, i.e., because the stability of tne screenhouse is not a problem, the structural integrity of the connection will not be a problem.
Our review of the data concerning these connections above show no addi-tional postulated failure mechanisms with the exception of the Amseal joints. Hcwever, because of the stability of structures shown in the D'Appolonia evaluation and no other postulated failure mechanism, signi-ficant movement in tne joint (s ) is not anticipated. Even if minor failure could somehow occur, causing tne joint to open, leakage from the joint can be tolerated without seriously affecting waterflow through the offshore intake line.
Our review also shows that r.a7 damage to a fire hydrant or valve con-nected to the BRIPS is isolatable and not a concern because of the redun-dancy built into the BWJS's loop header.
Based upon the D'Appolonia evaluation and our review, we have found no additional unknowns re6arding the water control structures and associated features, nor have we seen any significant problems in over 18 years of operation that would result in flooding or in jeopardizire tne function-ing of tne emergency shutdown and cooling systems. Consequently, we feel that our current surveillance program is satisfactory.
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Frecuency of Inspection We hace not established a formal schedule of inspections for Big Rock Point water-control structures and associated features but have relied on plant operator surveillances, periodic inspections and routine pre-ventive maintenance to insure the integrity of the water-control struc-tures and associated features. As shown in Section 5 of tnis Evaluation, the surveillances and inspectfan pro 6ra= bas proved to be quite success-ful for over 18 yens of operation and believe it meets its intent of ReSulatory Guide 1.127 which states that:
Inservice inspections should be perfor=ed at periodic intervals to check tne condition of the water-control structures and evaluate their structural safety and operational adequacy.
CONCIUSION Our records show there has been no evidence of any abnor=al degradation of the water-control structures and associated features taking place, since Big Rock Ibint Plant was constructed over 20 years ago. Even though our current in-service inspection progra= of tne water-control structures and associated fea-tures does not co= ply with all the reco=nendations of Regulatory Guide 1.127, we believe the intent of this guide hau been =et.
Based upon the infor ation provided in the D'Appolonia Reports (References) our review of this Topic, the surveillances and inspections performed to date, ana the 1cng-ter= operating experience which show no significant dagradation, it is concluded that the current surveillance ana inspection progra= has been satisfactory and t,te water-control structures c.nd associated features at Big Rock Ibint Plant is not a uroble= of concern.
Consideration vill be given, however, to for=ali::ing future inspections of the intake structure and pipe under the plant Preventive Maintenance Progrs=, as detemined during the Integrated Assessment.
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(1) CP Co letter, EA Vincent to DP. Crutchfield, SEP Topic II-4.F, Settle:nent of Fo.:ndatians and Baried Equip:nent, dated October 19, 1981 (2) Sig Rock Point Plant Site Pinn, Sechtel Drawing #3159 C-3 (3) Eeport, Geophysical Cross-Role Survey, D'Appolonia, January 1979 (4) Report, Seismic Safety Margin Evalcation Intake Structure, D'Appolonia, A:;sust 1950, Rev 1, August 1931 (5) Eeport, Safety Margin Dealuatica 3 cried Fire and Lake Bed piping, Undergroand Electrical Cable, and 3 ried Fuel Tanks, D'Appelenia June 1950, Rev 1, August 1981 (6) Report, Seismic Safety Margin Evalaation Screenhouse/ Diesel Generator Eco=/ Discharge Structure, D'Appolonia, Ju.e 1930, Rev 1, August 1931 (7) Eeport, Seismic Safety Fargin Pra12ation, Sig Ecek Point Nuclear Twer Plant Facilities, D'Appolonia, Dece=ber 1980, Rev 1, August 1931
References:
CP Co recreds show the ERC has tce above-referenced infornation.
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