ML20039C565
| ML20039C565 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1981 |
| From: | Johns S AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20039C560 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8112290470 | |
| Download: ML20039C565 (8) | |
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g ;;L} 9 I UNITED STATES CF AMERICA NUCLIAR REGULATCRT CCMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICFJISING 30ARD In the Matter of
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CCNSUMIRS PCWER CCMDANT
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Docket No. 50-155 i
(31g Rock Point Plant)
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(Spent Fuel Fool Modificsttion) 15 a witnesis..in the Consumers Power Company (C.P.Co.) 31g Rock Point
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Svent Fuel Pool Expansion Hearing, it is necessary for me to request for an ext 9nsion of time in which to answer the Summary Dispositions of C.P.Co.
and the NRC staff. This is of utmost necessity for the following reasons:
E.
Yital information has been withheld because of C.P.Co.'s tardiness in announci::g its plans to provide make-up water to the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) with the ICCS.
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Intervenors and witnesses received Summry DispositionsInformation as late as Dec. 11.
C.
C.P.Co. and the NRC staff insist on putting the cart before the horse and demand replys to Su=mry Disposition before all items of discovery are in.
Indeed before the NRC Board has even decided whether ce not to admit certain contentions.
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1.
The ECCS is the sou-ee for make in water to tha boiline S.F.P..
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Intervenors, the NRC, and witnesses were unable to pursue questions na
- sN of discovery relating to the adequacy of the ECCS to nake-up water in the 0
0wco 8C event of the pool boiling.
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@7 Yhether intentionally or unintentionally, C.P.Co. neglected to reveal their plan to use the ICCS for S.F.P. make-up water until as4ar the period
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R of discovery. C P.Co.'s plan we first revealed in it's motion for sunmary disposition of Crista Maria's contention 8 and John O'Neill l
contention 111 3.2, thereby conviently avoiding their responsibility to won reply to intterrogatories.
C.P.Co. may as^ announced that fuel pool makeup water would be supulled by a bucket brigade of simians clad in full face repirators and rain suits.
If C.P Co. wishes to substitu,te a new system for a faulty vipal system at this late date, they must be willing to have that system undergo the scruntiny of the dissenting parties.
2.
I would like to remind the NRC that C.P.Co. has received at least one life-time exe=ption to the single failure criteria 6f the ICCS. And, if an additional burden of the S.P.P. makeup water is added to an already burdened system,the entire system, exemptions and modifications must be reevaluated to assure that the health and safety of the workers and the public will be protected.
,It is of utmost importance that intervenors'be given the orportunity to addri'ss this vital safety factor. As Com=issioner Gilinsky pointed out in his dissenting opinion to the ECCS exemution at 31g Rock Point,"Where a "significant hazards consideration"...is involved, as there is in this case, the Commission can issue an amendment to an operation license, in the absense of a request for a hearing, only after a thirty days notice period following publication in the Peders1 Reeister of its intent to do "so." ' (See Attachment) 7, Dr. Nall, and exnert for the NRC, also expressed concern on the ade,ocacy of the fire system in certain seismic events.
4 A dangerous precident* could be set if C.P.Co. is allowed to follow L
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this evade and deflect method of dealing with admitted inadequate systene.
C.P.Co. states in its motion for Summary Dispositien: "none of the equipteent associated with fuel tool cooling has been tested er evaluated in the high te.~uurature and high humidity environment associated with a L.O.C. A..
(this)
... requires us to assume conservatively that the equintment fails. horeover because the comronent cooling water and fuel pit pumps are located below the maximun permissible water level in containment, they s:ay become submerged and thereby rendered inoperative."
C.P.Cc. goes en to propose a haphatard patch and pray modification of the ECCS.. Utilities must be made to fullfill their responsibilities to provide workable dedicated syetems.
5.
Af ter intervenors, licensee, and the NRC has investad thousands er' i
hours in this proceding, it would be a glaring oversigh't to omit inspection,
of a system so vital to plant safety as the ECCS.
3.
Intervaners and witnessas recei'ad Svent Fuel Peel in#erration as lef,a
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a s Dae 11.
1 Information on cask dron analysis is still being sent to intervenors and witnesses.
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It is not clear that contentions regarding Ivacuation, Seismic, and C.uality Assurance have been admitted. From the information that I have received, it is of my opinion that these issues be addressed.
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C.P.Co. and the NRC staff insist on rutti tha cart befora the herse and de nnd rarlies to Su-a r Discosition before all itars of discoverv eye in.
Indeed befora the NRC Board has avan decidad whethat or not to~ad it certain contantiens.
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Based on the new information of the ECCS as a primary factor in S.F.F.
cooling, it is an obvious nexus to Crista Maria It. al Svacuation contention.
2.
Futhermore, it took Licensee from June of 1980 till F.ay of 19P1 to answer Intervenors Interrogatories (Set II), instead of replying within lif L
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c days as required by 100.F.R. 2.704b. Intervenors were then deposited with thousands of pages of evasive answers.
Intervenors were given ten days to respond to thousands of pages of Interrogatories plus read S.E.R. and E.I.A. with a motion to compel futher answers as required by 100.F.R. 2.740.
3.
In January of 1981, at the Hearing before the Atonic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board regarding C.P.Co. denial to do an Environmental Imnact Assessment, the ASL3 stated that since Crista Maria and John O'Neill
- had ainilar opinions, the were to consolodate their opinion.
The NRC staff and C.P.Co. counsel also had like opinions and were allowed to, submit serarate and indenendant opinions. I understand that the NRC staff and C.P.Co.
are senarate institutions; however, this anpears to be a clear violation of Intervenors rights to submit independant and separate opinions.
For reasons stated above, this proceeding must remain open to a futher appropriate extention to respond to Summary Disposition of Licensee and NRC staff to January 15, 1982.
May you and yours have a joyful and pleasant Christa:as and/or hmilelemh yours in the struggle-Shirley J. Johns
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Material originatine fecm 1!. 5. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1.
Letter of August 4,1980(3 pages plus Attach:ents 1 and 2) 2.
Letter of April 24, 1981 (5 pages) -- SEP Topic III-6, Seismic De-sign Considerations Sig Rock Foint 3.
Letter of June S. 1931 (23 pages) -- Site Specific Grcund Res;cnse Spectra for SEP Plants Lccated in the Eastern United States Su=r.ary of Meeting Held with pages) -,ismic Cesign Consiceratiens 4.
Letter of June 22, 1981 (11 Censumers Power Cc:pany to Discuss Se (SEP Topic III-6) for the Big Rock Point Plant 5.
Plot (undated) -- 1 page, illustrating USNRC Site specific Spectrum and 'the 0.12 g anchored REG. Guide 1.60 Spectra (84.1 percentile) employed by applicant fer analysis Ccpy of Re;crt entitled "Cerivation of F1cor Rescenses -- Reacter 6.
Building," prepared by D'Appolenia Censulting Engineers, Inc., June 1973, 62 p.
On Jur.e 30, 1981, in conjunction with T. Cheng and W. Paulson a'nd W. T.
Russell, I made a site visit to the Big Rock Point site and participated in technical discussions and a plant inspection.
On the basis of =y review of the seis=ic portiens of the risk analysis studies made available to te, and reflecting en the brief discussions at the tice of the site visit wherein sece of the uncertainties and gaps in tne analysis were identified, I cannot recc==end e aloying such an accroach as a sole basis fer centinued ccerations. Suen stuctes, wnen they ence: pass rig-creus total system perior ance ans e.,e interactions therein, can be helpfui as a basis for fer=ing an opinion as to the adequacy of expected perfcrmance under various ccnditicns of system disturbance. My brief review of the seis=ic pcrtien of the risk analysis studies suggests that,[*geh an overall cc=crehensive treat =ent does not currently exist in the present case.
As ene might surmise frem my foregoing statements, and irrespective of whethe-or not the level of earthquake hazard is perceived to be Icw based en recent recorded seismic history, I bel' eve reasenabiv demenstrated adecuacy of system resistancr_ to ear **mukee _1e earmeenry s
In view of the recent seis=ic quiescence of the region in which the plant is located, and en the basis of the recent USNRC/ TERA site specific studies, spectra anchored at 0.11 to 0.12 g horizental ground acceleratien appear acceptable in this particular case. Although I a;;reciate the bases ucon which the USNRC site specific spectra were generated, I do wish to note ttat f
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'f Dr. 'few ark (prict to his death) and I expressed c:ncern verbally &a-ti r m ;:'- "yl ware that in sc=e cases the acclified rag 9s her=1to Stancard Reg. Guide 1.6G icw c:= pare In this c:se it is =y understanding tha h
would rec.....cn; far use. ave emeleyed Reg. Guide 1.50 s:ectra (54.1 the licensee and his c:nsul* r.:s percentile) ancncred at 0.12 g heri: r.tal ZPA f:r safety related structures and tne reacter c:elant Icep; such spectra do c:ntain reas:nable accelers-tien and velocity a=plifications and I c:ncur with their use.
Even so. when reviewing the physical resistance of critical safety systems in such ases as this, na=ely older plants. I. rec:=end : articular attenti:n be aid u the cargint tha =ay be present to rests: cverload seis=ic activity, as in this case, the leading c:ntributien effects.
locati:ns, especially when c:= pared to alle ables.
24, 1981 USNRC letter and shall I subscribe fully to the content of the Acril The site visit reveals that not re; eat the c:ntents of that letter herein.
=uch of the equip =ent has been reviewed for adequacy of anchorage and su{e wnich is cc=ferting, but =uch remains to be done (as fer exam le. -
walkIthr: ugh alene, which involves li=ited inspecticn at test, indicated a acr:
" * " ^ *iOG need f r anchoring the c:ntrcl reem cabinets.W, CWg-""*. ada a 3
fi ra extinguishing e en'the-t0ur suggested that s:=e portiens of the equip =ent have not been exaD-In any event, it is =y rec:==endation that this progra= cf up-ined as yet.
grading be pursued rig:rcusly, systa=atically and pr =ptly.
Obvicusly I believe the total, system integrity at the react:r c:clant pressure ble en a d:cu e,nted Acundary should be examined carefully as scen as possiIn this connection I am "a w"***_
syste: by syste= basis. system witn its standard threaded pi;e which is relie
-a-cy wa:er injecticn t rc= :ne intake well JJJ "^* ""255 i [nc ints syste: =ay not possess the resist-ca i i.e,.. e nce.
ance t5 seismic' excitation that is; believed to exist, and I str:ngly sugges: -
s that an upgraded system be developed and installed in the very neg futu with 50=e degree of redundancy as to water scurcas, water
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-. w It ap; ears to ee inat such upgrading can be done at min 1=al ex-but care cus; be exercised that the system is anchered to scund capacity.
structural sup;cr systems, i.e. not valls wnich can f ail or near walls pense Alternatively it =ay be necessary which could affect the systec perfor=ance.
to strengthen sc=e walls.
In cenclusion, the system as it currently exists =sy not be as inherently l
If the licensee resistanf. to seismic excitation as believed by the licensee.
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,V DISSENTING OPINION OF C0!NISSIOiER GILI 1"' Tk)*
'N 8 2 I am satisfied that granting the pending exemption request for the Big Rock Point nuclear reactor, subject to the conditions recommended by the staff, is consistent with our responsibility to protect the public health and safety.
The requirements of the law do not stop there, how-ever.here a "significant hazards consideration" within the meaning of section 189 of the Atomic Energy Act is involved, as there is in this case, the Corr:nission can issue an amendmen't to an operating license, in the absence of a request for a hecring, only after a thirty days notice i
period following publication in the Federal Reaister of its intent to do d
- The relevant notice here is the one published in the Federal Recister so.
on March 15, 1976 which proposed exemptions from the failure criterion of 10 CFR 50.46 as it reletes to "the specific case of a break in either core spray line." 41 Fed. Reg.1096'L One of the exc=ptions we now propose to grant relates not to a break in a core spray line -- a small pipe whose rupture would lead to a slow loss of coolant -- but to a possible break in a large pQe whose rupture could lead to rapid loss of coolant.
In this case, given an assumed nozzle spray deficiency, emergency
, cooling is vulnerable to any single failure which disables the core ring spray, for example failure of a core ring spray valve to open.
The e
nozzle spray problem was not referred to until the applicant's March 26, j
supplement and was not recognized a a serious problem until the staff's April 19, 1976 coments.
To provide reliable emergency core cooling in n
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2 the evert of 'arge breaks.M he staff has insisted upon a new remedy:
t augmented surveillance of the core ring spray valves I am satisfied thatthisremedywilladequitelyprotectthepublicduringtheperiod of the proposed temporary exemption.
It is also plain to me, however, that these new matters are not covered by the Federal _ Register Notice
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described above, and that the requirements of the law concerning public notice have not yet been met.
I therefore cannot join my colleagues in the grant of this exemption until the public notice requirement has been satisfied.
The staff refers to these as " breaks at locations for which 1/
i reflooding of the core is not possible" Staff Co=ents p,13.
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