ML20039C259
| ML20039C259 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Bellefonte |
| Issue date: | 12/17/1981 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8112290138 | |
| Download: ML20039C259 (2) | |
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400 Chestnut Street Tower II December 17, 1981 BLRD-50-438/81-38 BLRD-50-439/81-41 dl.: -
Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director 2
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Office of Inspection and Enforcement 2
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cocmission
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Dear Mr. O'Reilly-BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 i STEAM PRESSURE REGULATOR MALFUNCTION - BLRD-50-438/81-38, BLRD-50-439/81 41 - THIRD INTERIM REPORT The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-0IE Insiaector R. V. Celenjak on May 19, 1981, in accordance with 10 CFR'50.55(e) as NCR BLN NEB 8105. This was followed by our interim.hports dated June 18 and September 30, 1981. Enclosed is our third inte.ri:n report.
We expect to submit our next report by_ April 7, A982.
We consider 10 CFR Part 21 to be applicable to this deficiency. -
If you have any questions concerning this ma ter, hI'[nse get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.
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Very,truly-yours,
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY N f' L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Regulation and Safety Enclosure cc:
Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission g7 Washington, DC 20555 i
Mr. James McFarland (Enclosure) f l
Senior Project Manager l
Babcock & Wilcox Company
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P.O. Box 1260 Lynchburg, Virginia 24505 8112290138 811217 PDR ADOCK 05000438 S
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.a ENCLOSURE BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 STEAM PRESSURE REGULATOR MALFUNCTION BLRD-50-438/81-38, BLRD-50-439/81-41 10 CFR 50.55(e)
THIRD INTERIM REPORT Description of Deficiency During a May 6, 1981, telecon between TVA and B&W, B&W was not able to specify the minimum departure from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR) which would result should a steam pressure regulator malfunction occur.
Therefore, TVA is unable to verify the extent of damage which would result from a steam pressure regulater malfunction. This is unacceptable since the Chapter 15 FSAR analysis states that the steam pressure regulator malfunction is bounded by the steam line break event. Also, the steam pressure regulator malfunction is a condition II event and, as such, must have a minimum DNBR greater than 1.24, per section 4.2 3 3 5 of the FSAR. As stated above, B&W is unable to verify this.
This condition may be applicable to other B&W-supplied NSSS; however it affects no other TVA plants since Bellefonte represents TVA's only B&W-supplied NSSS.
Interim Progress As indicated in our previous report on this deficiency, TVA has determined the initial B&W response to be inadequate.
TVA has received a second B&W response which indicates that B&W is analyzing specific pressure regulator malfunction events. B&W expects to complete this analysis by February 15, 1982.
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