ML20039C195
| ML20039C195 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 12/15/1981 |
| From: | Lang G WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20039C190 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8112290029 | |
| Download: ML20039C195 (3) | |
Text
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AFFIDAVIT OF GLENN E. LANG Commonwealth of Pennsylvania County of Allegheny Glenn E. Lang being duly sworn accordingly to Law deposes and says; (1)' I am a Principal Engineer in Plant Protection, Nuclear Safety Department, for the Nuclear Technology Division, Westinghouse Power Systems Company, Westinghouse Electric Corporation (" Westinghouse'), and as such I am authorized to execute this Affidavit.
A statement of my Professional Qualifications is attached.
(2) With regard to the operation and design of the pressurizer heaters and associated controls, Westinghouse has reviewed several conditions under which the pressurizer heaters may be relied upon at Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP). These conditions include the following:
regulation and control of reactor coolant system pressure; maintenanct of natural ci culation; and restoration and stabilization of reactor coolant system in,1ost accident conditions. Westinghouse determined that the pressurizer heaters and associated controls are not required to be classifed as
" components important to safety" and therefore are not required to meet all safety grade design criteria.
The DCPP design provides other inethods of maintaining pressure control which use systems and components designed to safety grade requirements.
(3) For each of the conditions specified in item (2) above under which the pressurizer heaters may be operable, the equipment that is available to the operator to utilize in lieu of using the pressurizer heaters was investigeted.
The responses indicate that the pressurizer heaters provide one of a number of mears for controlling reactor coolant system pressure. Other methods utilize safety grade components, hence, the heaters need not be classified as important to safety.
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2 Further the affiant sayeth not.
AfA Glenn E. Lang h
Sworn to and subscribed before me this 15th day of December, 1981.
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PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS GLENN E. LANG WESTINGHOUSE WATER REACTOR DIVISIONS WESTINGHOUSE POWER SYSTEMS COMPANY WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION My name is Glenn E. Lang.
My business address is Westinghouse Electric Corporation, P. O. Box 355, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 15230.
I am employed by Westinghouse Electric Corporation as a Principal Engineer in Plant Protection within the Nuclear Safety Department of the Nuclear Technology Division.
I am responsible for the development, analysis, and evaluation of regulatory positions and actions relating to the licensing and operation of nuclear power plants with respect to protection systems designed to protect the health and safety of the public.
I attended Grove City College, Pennsylvania, from 1961 through 1965, and received a Bachelor of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering.
I attended graduate school at Michigan State University in 1965-66, and received a Masters Degree in Electrical Engineering.
In 1967 and 1968 I pursued graduate school studies in mathematics at the University of Minnesota.
Prior to joining Westinghouse, I held professional positions at Honeywell and Bendix Corporations mainly concentrating on the design and development of guidance and control systems for manned space vehicles.
In 1974, I joined Westinghouse Electric Corporation with responsibilities in the area of design, analysis and evaluation of protection systems on light water reactors.
Specific topics on which I have concentrated since joining the group include auxiliary feedwater system design requirements, post accident monitoring instrumention, plant emergency operating guidelines and instrument environ-mental qualification.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAk REGULATORY COMMISSION i
BEFORE THE ATOM"C SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
)
In the Matter of
)
)
Docket Nos. 50-275 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
)
50-323
)
(Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power
)
Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2)
)
(Full Power Proceeding)
)
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHh B. H0CH STATE OF CALIFORNIA
)
) 55.
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
)
JOHN B. HOCH, being duly sworn, deposes anc says:
My name is John B. Hoch.
I am Manager of Nuclear Projects for Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PGandE).
I hold a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering.
I am a registered Mechanical Engineer and Nuclear Engineer in the State of California.
I have over twenty-one years of power plant related experience of which ten years were nuclear related and eight years of which have been directly related to the Diablo Canyon Power Plant.
This affidavit relates to Joint Intervenors Contention 12 as set forth in the ASLB Prehearing Conference Order of February 13, 1981, and l
also to Clarified Combined Cententions 8 and 9 of the Joint Intervenors' 1
Statement of Clarified Contentions of June 30, 1981.
I attest that:
1)
The pressurizer of each unit of the Diablo Canyon Plant is equipped with three pressurizer power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and three associated block valves. Each PORV is equipped with one associated block valve.
2)
The PORVs are designed to relieve steam to limit the maximum pressure in the reactor coolant system, the function of the PORVs is to prevent unnecessary opening of the pressurizer safety valves and to provide a backup means of depressurization and over-pressure protection.
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One PORV is needed to accomplish the intenced function of the PORVs. A second PORV is installed to provide redundancy. The third PORV performs no safety-related function and was installed ta provide the capability for full load rejection without tripping the reactor.
4)
One separate block valve (BV) is installed upstream of each of the PORVs. The function of the BV is to permit isolation of a PORV for testing or maintenance, or permit isolation of a leaking or failed-open PORV.
5)
All three of the BVs have been classified as components impnetant to safety and meet applicable safety-grade design criteria.
The valve bodies for all three PORVs have been classified as compnnents important to safety rad meet applicable safety-grade design criteria. The PORVs and BVs have been classified '
acccrdance with the requirements of Design Class I, Code C! ass I as described in the FSAP, Tables 3.2-1, 3.2-E, 3.2-3, and 3.2-4 Similarly, these valves were seismically qualified for the Hosgri event.
The applicable safety-grade desige criteria to which these valves have been designed are listed in statement 7 of this affidavit.
6)
The instruments and controls of two safety-grade PORVs anc of all three block valves have been classified as components important to safety anc meet applicable safety-grade design criteria, indicated in statement 7 of this afficavit as follows:
(A) The devices through which motive and control power components for the PORVs and their associated block valves are connected to Emergency buses have been qualified in accordance with applicable safety-grace requirements.
(B) Normal plant instrument air supply (motive power) %
each valve is provided with a dedicated high pressure nitrogen backup system capable of operating the valves 140 times. This backup system is classified as safety-related and is not dependent on eny external power.
(C)
Power for control components of the three PORVs is provided from three Class IE,125 volt DC distribution panels which are redundant to each other. Power for motive and control for the three associated block valves is provided frcm three Class lE, 480 volt AC motor control centers which are redundant to each other.
7)
The safety-grade design criteria that are met by the three PORVs, three associated block valves, and the instruments and controls for two of the three PORVs include the following General Design Criteria (GDC): GDCs 1, 2, 4, 12, 13, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 29. The applicability of and compliance with these criteria has been determined in accordance with the requirements identified in the Standard Review Plan, Section 7, Table 7-1 (Rev.'2, July 1981).
8)
Proper operation of PORVs and BVs is net required to mitigate the consequences of any design basis dccident considered ire the FSAR. Analyses of design basis accidents are contained in Chapter 15 of the FSAR.
9)
Under normal conditions, the PORVs remain closed.
In the FSAR accident analyses, credit has not been taken for the automatic opening of the PORVs.
10)
If the third PORV, which meets safety-grade design criteria except for its instruments and controls, fails closed in its normal position, its pressure-relief function may still be performed by either of the other tw P0dVs, whose instruments and controls do meet applicad.e safety-grade i
design criteria.
If this third PORV fails open af ter actuation, it may be isolated by its associated block valve, which does meet applicable safety-grade design criteria.
No credible failure mode associated with the non-safety grade components of the third PORV's control system would adversely affect the function of any safety grade components.
- 11) An unisolated stuck-open PORV during a design basis i
accioent considered in the FSAR would not result in core damage, as demonstrated by analyses contained in Chapter 15 of the FSAR and in WCAP-9601. Therefore, the consequences of failure of the third PORV in either the closed or the open position during design basis accidents considered in 4
the FSAR have been demonstrated by analyses to be insignificant.
I
- 12) The Electric Power Reseerch Institute (EPRI) has established a performance testing program to obtain full scale data on the operational performance of valves, including relief valves, to operate under normal and accident conditions.
- 13) A Masoneilan series 20,000 model relief valve representative of Diablo Canyon was tested by EPRI.
Relevant detailed information on EPRI steam tests of this L
relief valve was provided as testimony during the Diablo Canyon Low Power Proceedings. Other EPRI tests on this Masoneilan valve have been completed following the Diablo 4
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Canyon Low Power Hearings. This valve passed applicable testing criteria and fully operated on demand under the EPRI test conditions which included full pressure steam, water, transition and loop seal simulation conditions. The conditions of these tests are representative of potential plant conditions described in the FSAR, which may be encountered by Dlablo Canyon valves.
- 14) A Velan model 810-30548-13MS block valve representative of Diablo Canyon was tested by EPRI. Relevant detailed information on block valve testing performed by EPRI has been provided as testimony during the Diablo Canyon Low Power Proceedings. This Velan block valve fully opened and 4
closed on demand in the EPRI tests, which included specific test conditions representative of potential Diablo Canyon plant conditions.
- 15) The NRC requires that utilities submit plant-specific reports by July 1982 to document the applicability of the EPRI valve performance testing program to each specific plant. The NRC also requires that a report for block valve qualification be submitted by July 1982.
(September 29, 1981 NRC letter to Licensees from Mr. D. G. Eisenhut and i
- 16) Results of testing performed by EPRI on relief and block valves is scheduled to be documented ftrmally by EPRI by July 1982.
PGancE will prepare plant-specific reports, to be submitted to the NRC as required, including qualification data on block valves and analyses of results of the EPRI valve performance testing program, for applicability to Diablo Canyon.
- 17) Based on the information presented above and that presented in separate affidavits by Edward M. Burns and Raymond J.
Skwarek of Westinghouse, the PORVs and associated block valves, which are part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, as well as their instruments and controls, comply with applicable regulatory requirements, including General Design Criteria 1, 14, 15, and 30.
JOHN 6.
CH Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21st day of December, 1981 Theodora Cooke, hotary Public in and for the City and County of San Francisco, State of California My Commission expires January 28, 1985. - -