ML20039B694
| ML20039B694 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 12/16/1981 |
| From: | Zimmerman S CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NO-81-2056, NUDOCS 8112230429 | |
| Download: ML20039B694 (2) | |
Text
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CD&L Carolina Power & Light Company December 16, 1981 File: NG-3514(B)
Serial No.: NO-81-2056 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ATTN:
Mr. T. A. Ippolito, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 2 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 k<r g
DOCKET NOS. 50-325 AND 50-324 LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 AND DPR-62 O
OVERRIDE OF CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION AND g! *g;;;.C OTHER ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SIGNALS
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Dear Mr. Ippolito:
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.-; A Carolina Power & Light Company (CP6L) has received your
$rlTM of August 26, 1981, which transmitted the Safety Evaluation Report (SER for the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant regarding the override of contain-ment purge isolation signals. We have reviewed the SER and have evaluated your conments on the need for automatic annunciation of the overridden status of the containment isolation logic. We reevaluated our design in light of your comments and have determined that the existing design and operating procedures provide equivalent protection.
Discussion The existing shift turnover procedures require a joint review of the status of the primary containment isolation system and a discussion of any abnormal conditions. To ensure that adequate guidance is pr.ovided in this area, the shift turnover procedure will be revised by January 30, 1982 to require'that any system or component which is either bypassed or in an~ override condition be specifically identified. This will ensure that adequate knowledge is provided to the operator for this type of abnormal condition so that he can safely operate the. plant.
[Q The current status lights are powered from the same source as the isolation override logic itself.
If a loss of power were to occur, 3
the override logic would reset itself and would have to be activated again by the operator in order to override any isolation signal. The
/O power source is an emergency bus which can be powered by an emergency diese.1 generator, and so represents a highly reliable source of power.
8112230429 811216
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DR ADOCK 411 Fayetteville Street
- P. O. Box 1551
- Raleigh, N. C. 27602.
05000,32,4, ~
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i Mr. T. A. Ippolito December 16, 1981 In addition, as discussed in the FSAR, the system is designed in accordance with the requirements of IEEE 279-1971 which requires that "If the protective action of some part of the system has been bypassed....
this fact shall be continuously indicated in the Control Room."
The status lights meet this criteria.
The logic is also designed such that only the original isolation signal is overridden.
Any subsequent isolation signal will isolate the valves again.
The override logic would have to be manually activated to allow opening the containment isolation valves.
In effect, the logic is designed so that the containment isolation is never completely overridden until all of the isolation signals are present, and so always remains functional.
Conclusion CP&L considers that the comments expressed by the SER are satisfied by the present indicating lights, and we believe that an additional annunciator is not necessary and would dilute the meaning of the present annunciators. We therefore believe our current design is acceptable.
Yours very truly, S. R. Zimmerman Manager Licensing & Permits RMP/WRM/lr (6783)