ML20039A343
| ML20039A343 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 11/30/1981 |
| From: | Myers H NRC |
| To: | Dircks W, Haller N NRC, NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20039A341 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8112170391 | |
| Download: ML20039A343 (3) | |
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' November 30,- 1981
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To Bill,Dircks/ Norm Haller From Henry Myers Re: B' asis for I'&E Conclusion tha't. pressure pulse was dismi'ssed as an instrument anomoly.
My November 16' memorandum queIstioned the basis for the I&E-
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conclusion that on March 28,.1981 Gary Miller was unaware of the pressure pulse tha't occurred.ct 1:50 P.M.
A related question concerns the I&E basis for stating:
...., with the exception of two shif t supervisors it appe.ars that the recorded pressure transient and spray pump actuation was generally attributed to electrical faults or instrument malfunctions.
(NUREG-0760, p. 23.)
In order to reach this conclusion, it would have been necessary'to compile and compare statements and the chronological evolution of such statements for each of the interviewees who had something to say on the subject. The House Interior Committee Staff Report contains much of the raw material fo.r such a comparison. Such a compilation indicates that the pressure pulse was not dismissed,as the consequence oftinstrument malfunctions. From this compilation comes.the inference that the contention', that on March 28 the pressure pulse was considered an artifact of the instruments, was put forth by Met Ed personnel retrospectively in order to explain why the event had. not been reported'on the day it occurred.
Craig Faust, a Unit 2 operator on duty at 1: 50 PM on March 28 told GPU investigators at 4: 00- A.M.
on March 30 (prior to the Commissioners being aware of the pressure pulse):
Of course we got flashing and went right out the drain tank probably into the building and we saw a 27 psi spike building pressure and it came immediately.back down.
O.K. we picked up.everything, everything else seemed to steady back out where it was again it seemed -
everythng went where it was and we figured at this time we got our, we overroad 'the system again', in other words, bypassed'it, bypassed ES',
and stabilized-out'where we were again.
- Building spray pumps of mme course picked up and we took them off.-
My1 reasoning E['
behind that is we didn't have a'high' building pressure.
3$;
anymore and why start washing everything down in there c4-with sodium hydroxide, so-that's about it. Up to that 80' point that's about where I finally got relieved. (Page 11, 3/30/79 Faust interview with R.
Long and D.
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m Reppert, underline added.)
On
- oC, Faust 'does noE say th'e pressure spike was caused by an 20$f electrical-malfunction, and before we conclude - that he did "O
'think.it due to'a malfunction, there.should be an
-_emm h aut e snyn
On April 6, 1979 Faust engaged in the following dialogue a
with GPU interviewers:
a Q. What about the reactor building spike?
A.
We had probably had some sort of explosion because that's what it looked like; shock waves.
Q. Did'you hear anything,?
A.
No. I didn't.
Q. Did it affect the pumps?
A.
There didn't seem to be any change in anything.
When the pressure dropped right off, we stopped the building spray pumps, we didn't think we'needed them.
(Page 5-6, -4/6/79 Faust interview with-GPU inveitigation team.)
On May 11, 1979 Operators Faust and Frederick stated the following in discussion with Interior Committee staff in answer to the question of whether anything but excess reactor building presssure could have simultaneously led to (A) the. reactor building pressure indicator indicating 28 psi, and to (B) actuation.of the containment sprays:
Frederick., No; it had to be the high level pressure, t
Faust. There had to be a pressure surge in the building for it to happen.
(Page 147, E&E, TMI-I.)
On Septem,ber 11, 1979 (the above noted' statements were made in March, April and May, 1979) in an interview with the NRC Special Inquiry Group, Faust and Frederick stated that they did not believe that the pressure-spike could have been real because nothing in their training had prepared them for such I
an event'.
(Note. The record should be checked to determine whether there are~ statements made prior to' September 11, 1979 wherein Faust and/or Frederick said they did not believe the pressure pulse to have been real.)
At approximately 3:00 A.M.
on March 29, 1979 (Some 30- hours before the Commissioners were aware that there had been a
' pressure pulse, Hugh McGovern, a.TMI operator, made the following statement, according to the notes of Met-Ed's
~
Bubba Marshall:
an RX building pressure spike that went off scale on narrow range meter [at 2:00 P.M.
on March 28] -
definite spike straight up, straight back down - had meter - definite spike straight up, straight back down l
- had full RX building (Spray pumps & BS - VPS, j
DH-V8's)' isolation and cooling. Someone secured spray
' pumps, shut BS - Vi's and DH - V's (Hugh did) and -
unisolated equipment for building."
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Met Ed instrument engineer Ivan Porter was asked whether the' spike on the reactor building pressure char't'could be explained by any form of instrument malfunction.
.said:
Porter
.I would think not. It did look like a real spike to That was when I specifically asked if it'could
.me.
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be real.
(Porter', I&E Tape 237, May 21, 1979, p.35.)
NUREG-0760 agrees that TMI supervisors Chwastyk 4
(NUREG-0760, p.28) and Mehler (NUREG-0760, p. 28 -29)
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believed on March 28, 1979 that'the pressure s a real. increase in reactor building. pressure. pike indicated In addition TMI operators Illjes and Mell recall.the pressure pulse having been discussed on March 28 in the context of its having been perceived as indicative of a rsal increase in pressure.
(See NUREG-0760 references 90 and 91.)
NUREG-0760 does not refer to B&W TMI site supervisor Leland t
Rogers' statement that fellowing the pressure pulse, a check ~
i 1
was made of containment integrity to determine whether the reactor building pressure might have caused a crack in the reactor building. The implication of Rogers' statement was that the pressure pulse had been considered real.
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af ter making this statement in a report written in June,
- Rogers, 6
1979,- told I&E,in September, 1980 that while it was possible l'
to interpret'his re integrity had beeh. port as having said that contain. ment this is not what he had meant to imply. Chwastyk alsochecked f j
g"
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recalled there having been a check of containment integrity l
following the pressure pulse; NUREG-0760 concludes, without stating aJ of' containment integrity be made on.Marchreason, that Chwastyk did no l cil 28, 1979.
NUREG-0760 appears.to base its conclusion that the pressure pulse was dismissed.as an electrical anomaly on the denial-p by Miller that he was aware on March 28 that a pressure-l pulse had been recorded; on a statement by Supervisor Mike
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Ross which appears to be based-on reference 74-in NUREG-0760~
l (which is worth reading in the original in' order to get the full. flavor of what Ross is saying and which in fact contradicts Miller's' recollection of not being' aware of the pressure pulse on March 28); and'TMI Supervisor Zewe's-statements to I&E on April'23, 1979 and-September 4 1980 wherein Zewe states he.did not.believe a. pressure pu,lse of the observed magnitude could havy o'ccurred.
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