ML20039A342
| ML20039A342 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 11/16/1981 |
| From: | Myers H NRC |
| To: | Dircks W, Haller N NRC, NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20039A341 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8112170389 | |
| Download: ML20039A342 (3) | |
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November 16, 1981 To Bill Dircks/ Norman Haller From Henry Myers Re: Basis for I&E conclusion that Gary Miller was unaware of the pressure pulse recorded at approximately 1:50 P.M.
on March 28, 1979.
The various TMI inquiries received the following testimony with regard to this matter.
Shift Supervisor Bill Zewe:
i "I found it hard' to believe.that anyone who was in the i
control room observing anything would have missed.that
[the spike] or turning off the pumps or any of the discussions at all."
(Zewe; SIG, 9/11/79, p. 257.)
Reactor Operator Ed Frederick:
"I think Mr. Marshall tried to figure it (the spike]
out, and Gary Miller was particularly interested in it."
(E&E, TMI, Part I, p.
145.)
TMI-l Operations Supervisor Mike Ross:
"...and we looked back at the charts at that time.
We-2 saw a fairly large spike on the-chart and the exact pressure at this time I. don't know,...it was around 30 pounds.
My '.hought.at the time and Miller was out there with us and he questioned he said, 'jeese, you know I thought I' heard something, too.'
(Ross, I&E, May 19, 1979, p.
3-4.),
-Mehler recalled discussion of the spike with Miller in the context of.an instruction to not start oil pumps, presumably 5
out of concern that this might cause a spark, thus triggering another hydrogen detonation. The answers are Mehler's, whose recollection if correct implies that Miller knew of the 1:50 P.M.
pressure pulse and its significance:
Q.
Your best recollection new is that an instruction was given.
A.
That's correct.
Q.
By whom was it given?
A.
Mr. Miller.
(Mehler, I&E, 9/3/80, p.
30 - 31.)
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Shift Supervisor Joe Chwastykt "It-was shortly af ter the actual explosion and the pressure pulse in the building that I surmised that it was, in fact, an explosion and probably a hydrogen explor.io n, and I related that to Gary.
That was prior to Gary leaving for the Governor's office, as far as I can remember.
(Chwastyk, I&E, 9/4/80, p.
62.)
NRC Inspector Higgins in a dialogue with I&E investigators, where the answers are Higgins':
Q.
Was Gary Miller aware on Wednesday of the thud?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Was he aware that containment spray pumps came on?
A.
I believe so.
O.
Was he also aware of the pressure spike as indicated by the recorder?
A.
I believe so, but again the only reason I say that is from reviewing what I said when I made i
depositions, and~right now I cannot say for certain.
Gary Miller stated in letter to Chairman Udall:
"I was first aware of the recorded pressure-pulse and associated actuation of the safguards system on l
Friday morning, March 30, 1979."
(E&E, TMI, Part 2, p.
298.)-
The point here is not that the statements are unaminous and' unambigous to the effect that Gary Miller was aware of the l
pressure pulse confemporaneously:with its occurance.
'There l
is ambiguity in the sense thst there was a tendency, especially in the later interviews, for witnesses to express less certainty as to Miller's having been informed. than they' i
expressed in their initial interviews.
Backing.and filling aside, no one has ever explained how it could'have been that Miller was in the control room and have been unaware of the pressure pulse.a.nd actuation of safeguards systems, leaving 2
aside for the monent whether he understood the significance-of these events. (House Interior Committee Staff Report, p.54 - 59, 88 - 92, 96 - 97.)
Also, it is worth considering l
Chwastyk's statement in his last interview on the subject on September 4, 1980 when he was asked by I&E to give his best recollection as to whether there had been discussion on Marchf28 of the potential for'further_ hydrogen detonations in the reactor. building, _ such discussion implying knowledge of the-1:50 P.M.
pressure spike and its significance.
After I *
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t-t having consulted with his attorney, Chwastyk engcged in the following discussion with the investigators:
Q.
The question was, do you recall at the time that the order [not to start equipment] was given whether or not there was a statement as to why the equipment was not to be operated?
A.
Again, I don't remember specifically that_the '
the reason was given or that I just assumed it that this was to prevent sparking in the building.
I do remember the circumstances and who was present.
Essentially Gary Miller had mentioned, and Brian Mehler was there.
Mehler said something to the effect that it was too late, and that he had just started some piece of equipment in the building. I remember some comment of mine to the effect, and this was sometime later, " Don't worry about it because we have burned up what is in there anyway."
Q.
That was your comment?
A.
That was my comment.
Q.
To Mr. Mehler?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And Mr. Miller?
A.
To whoever was there.
Q.
Mr. Miller, to your recollection was there?
A.
Yes, to my recollection he was there.
(Chwastyk, I&E, 9/4/80, p. 18 - 19, also see p.
15 - 17 where Chwastyk discusses his recollections of the pressure pulse and discussion with G,ary Miller regarding same.)
On page 66 of his March 4, 1980 memorandum, Frampton states:
" Station Manager Gary Miller has said he was not aware of the spike at the time, but others have testified that he was, and it appears more likely than not that he was made aware of it."
I&E states on page 25 of NUREG-0760:
"The investigators conclude that Miller was not aware of the 28 psig pressure spike on March 28, 1979..."
In sum, notwithstanding that the preponderance of eviden'ce indicates that Miller was aware of the pressure pulse, I&E, without providing a rationale, concludes the opposite.