ML20038A879
| ML20038A879 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 11/18/1981 |
| From: | J. J. Barton METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | Snyder B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR GL-81-07, GL-81-7, LL2-81-0259, LL2-81-259, NUDOCS 8111240378 | |
| Download: ML20038A879 (9) | |
Text
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GL.s t- 01 Metropolitan Edison Company II
'g Post Office Box 480 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 Write.'s Direct Dial Number November 18, 1981 LL2-81-0259 A
S n!I Program Office f
y-i p 6
j Attn:
Dr. B. J. Snyder, Program Director k
h[ULi LJ 3 gy "Og U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
'g-NO
Dear Sir:
4 Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (Dil-2)
Operating License No. DPR-73 Docket No. 50-320 Control.of Heavy Loads
References:
(1) Letter B. J. Snyder (NRC) to G. K. Hovey (GPU) dated February 27, 1981 (2) Letter G. K. Hovey (GPU) to B. J. Snyder (NRC) dated August 27, 1981 (3) Letter G. K. Hovey (GPU) to B. J. Snyder (NRC) dated September 30, 1981 Attached is GPU's response to the NRC's Generic Letter (Reference 1) requesting information on the Control of Heavy Loads. As described in Reference 2, this response covers Section 2.2 and 2.4 of the NRC's request and applies only during the phase of operation prior to defueling.
Information concerning the Control of Heavy Loads for the deft eling phase and possibly the operation phase will be submitted according to the schedule given in Reference 2.
SitIher/ Ly,
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a ton A mt. ng
' rector, TMI-2 JJB:SWS:djb Attachment cc:
L. H. Barrett, Deputy Program Director Y
O 8111240378 811158
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SIQ PDR ADOCK 05000320 l
P PDR Metropohtan Ed: son Company is a Member of tne General Pubhc UtAties System
Heavy Loads: Section 2.2 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS OPERATING IN THE VICINITY OF FUEL STORAGE POOLS NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.2, provides guidelines concerning the design and operation of load-handling systems in the vicinity of stored, spent fuel.
Information provided in response to this section should demonstrate that adequate measures have been taken to ensure that in this area, either the likelihood of a load drop which might damage spent fuel is extremely small, or that the estimated consequences of such a drop will not exceed the limits set by the evaluation criteria of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1, Criteria I through III.
1.
Identify by name, type, capacity, and equJpment designator, any cranes physically cepable (i.e., ignoring interlocks, moveable mechanical stops, or operating procedures) or carrying loads which could, if dropped, land or fall into the spent fuel pool.
RESPONSE
The following is a list of lifting devices cap tble of carrying loads which could, if dropped, land or fall into the spent fuel pool:
Name Type Capacity Equipment Designator Fuel Handling Single Trolley 110 Ton Main Building Crane Overhead Holst Whiting Serial #9850 Traveling Crane 15 Ton Auxiliary Holst 3 and 5 Ton Monorail Holsts SDS Filter Monorail Holst 1/4 Ton Columbus-McKinnon Corp.
Station Holst Lodestar No. 27228 SDS Ion Exchange Monorail Holst 1/4 Ton Columbus-McKinnon Corp.
Station Holst Lodestar No. 27228 SDS Leakage Monorail Holst 1/4 Ton Columbus-McKinnon Corp.
Containment Lodestar No. 27228 Station Holst SDS Dewatering Monorail Holst 1/4 Ton Columbus-McKinnon Corp.
Station Holst Lodestar No. 27228 2.
Justify the exclusion of any cranes in this area from the above category by verifying that they are incapable of carrying heavy loads or are permanently prevented from movement of the hook centerline closer than 15 feet to the pool boundary, or by providing a suitable analysis demoi:strating that for any failure mode, no heavy load can fall into the 'uel-storage pool.
RESPONSE
The four (4) SDS quarter-ton hoists listed in the above category will be excluded due to their incapability of transporting heavy loads. These hoists are used only to manipulate lightweight tools (less than 100 pounds) for remote operation of the SDS. They are neither utilized for, nor capable of, handling heavy loads.
3.
Identify any cranes listed in 2.2-1, above, which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6 or partial com-pliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features).
For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling-system (i.e.,
crane-load-combination) infomation specified in Attachment 1.
RESPONSE
None 4.
For cranes identified in 2.2-1, above, not categorized according to 2.2-3, demonstrate that the critaria of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1, are satisfied.
Compliance with Criterion IV will be demonstrated in response to Section 2.4 of this request. With respect to Criteria I through III, provide a dis-cussion of your evaluation of crane operation in the spent fuel area and your determination of compliance. This response should include the following information for each crane:
a.
Which alternatives (e.g., 2, 3, or 4) from those identified in NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.2, have been selected.
RESPONSE
Alternative 4 has been selected. The effects of drops of heavy loads have been analyzeo and shown to satisfy the evaluation criteria of Secton 5.1 of NUREG 0612.
Table 1 identifies the load-handling system information for heavy loads in the fuel pool area.
Load drop impact on the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) systems has been considered which could possibly result in adversely affecting the ability to operate TMI-2 safely and maintain the plant in a safe cold shutdown condition. A load drop in f
the Unit 2 portion of the FHB could adversely affect the Standby Pressure Control (SPC) System, Tank Farm, Submerged Demineralizer System (SDS) or Nitrogen Supply systems.
Major components and piping comprising the SPC system are contained in the SPC
" pit" on the 347'6" level. A drop or bounce of a cask into this " pit" could rupture the discharge piping of SPC-T-1 and allow leakage out of the SPC system to a fluid level of 13 inches (clean borated water) within the pit, as well as releasing nitrogen. Continuous Reactor Coolant System pressure control would be reinitiated by enacting TMI Nuclear Station EP-2202-4.19: " Loss of Standby Pressure Control System". Neither criticality nor core boiling would occur upon loss of the SPC system under present cold shutdown conditions.
A load drop over the Tank Farm in the "A" Spent Fuel Pool or the SDS could result in a radiological release. However, neither the Tank Farm nor the SDS systems are necessary for maintaining safe shutdown of the plant. The Fuel Handling Building is equipped with ventilation systems capable of mitigating the consequences of such a drop should radiological circumstances arise. An accident analysis of worst case cask drop in this area is provided in the second round questions regarding the SDS from the NRC and Section 7.5 of the SDS Technical Evaluation Report (TER). This analysis illustrated that any radiological release due to a cask drop would be only a small fraction ('1%) of 10CFR100 limits. Although a specific analysis was not done for Unit II, a drop of an SDS cask in the Unit II Fuel Pool is bounded by the analysis of a drop of a fuel cask in the Unit I Fuel Pool. The Unit I analysis (submitted February 17, 1981) shows the drop of a 15 ton fuel cask will not pierce the Unit I Fuel Pool floor and allow immediate water leakage. The SDS cask weighs 11.5 tons (vs 15 tons) and the Fuel Pool floors are of similar designs, therefore, the Unit I analysis bounds the Unit II situation.
In addition, the review of the plant arrangement areas considered the Nitrogen Supply System for the SPC. A postulated load drop on the high pressure ('*2400 psig) nitrogen bottles of this system was analyzed. This antlysis determined that the most significant effect which could result from a heavy load drop on these, bottles is a potential missile hazard in the event the nitrogen escapes and con-sequently moves the bottles. For this reason, the nitrogen bottles have been anchored with 48 additional safety bolts along with eight angle clips and four hold down plates. A procedure to lower the nitrogen bottle pressure (to further mitigate the consequences of a load drop) has been written and will be enacted prior to SDS cask load movement over the bottles. If this load path is not used, the pressure reduction will not be made. Loss of the SPC system could occur as a result of a load drop on the N2 Supply System depending upon the severity of the drop and which bank (high pressure or lower pressure) of nitrogen bottles is impacted. Regardless, the plant would be operated utilizing Procedure EP 2202-4.19 and plant cooling and core neutron count rate would not be affected.
D.
If Alternative 2 or 3 is selected, discuss the crane motion limitation imposed by electrical interlocks or mechanical stops and indicate the circumstances, if any, under which these protective devices may be bypassed or removed. Discuss any administrative procedures invoked to ensure proper authorization of bypass or removal, and provide any related or proposed technical specification (operational and surveil-lance) provided to ensure the operability of such electrical interlocks or mechanical stops.
RESPONSE
Alternative 2 or 3 was not selected.
c.
Where reliance is placed on crane operational limitations with respect to the time of the storage of certain quantities of spent fuel at specific post-irradiation decay times, provide present and/or proposed technical specifications and discuss administrative or physical controls provided to ensure that these assumptions remain valid.
d.
Where reliance is placed on the physical location of specific fuel modules at certain post-irradiation decay times, provide present and/or proposed technical specifications and discuss administrative or physical controls provided to ensure that these assumptions remain valid.
RESPONSE
The TMI-2 Spent Fuel Pool does not contain any spent fuel at this time. Prior to
.defueling the appropriate review of present and proposed technical specifications will be made, e.
Analyses performed to demonstrate compliance with criteria I through III should conform to the guidelinas of NUREG 0612, Appendix A.
Justify any exception taken to these guidelines, and provide the specific infor-mation requested in Attachment 2, 3, or 4, as appropriate, for each analysis performed.
RESPONSE
Criteria II of Section 5.1 is not applicable due to the lack of fuel in the Spent Fuel Pool. Criteria III is met by the aforementioned analysis which determined that SDS cask load drop would not create immediate pool water leakage. This analysis was done in accordance with NUREG 0612, Appendix A.
Radiological release analyses for evaluation of Criterion I compliance were done in accordance with NUREG 0612, Appendix A, and, therefore, no exceptions are taken.
The results of this analysis are presented in Section 7.5 of the SDS TER and show compliance with Criterion I..
THE EPICOR II SYSTEM The EPICOR II System, contained in the Chemical Cleaning Building, has been analyzed to determine: 1) the consequences of a heavy load drop, and 2) its degree of compliance with N'JREG 0612. Table 2 identifies heavy loads associated with system operation.
Specific consequences of load drop were analyzed in NUREG 0591, in which it was determined that potential radiological releases resulting from load drop would be less than 10CFR20 limits. Criteria I of Section 5.1, NUREG 0612 is therby met.
The single load path within the system (via monorail hoist) runs over no safety equipment within the building. The earlier response (Reference 3 on the trans-mittal letter) to Section 2.1 gives details of heavy load transport in the Chemical Cleaning Building.
o Heavy Loads: Section 2.4 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS OPERATING IN PLANT AREAS CONTAINING EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR REACTOR SHUTDOWN, CORE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL, OR SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.5, provides guidelines concerning the design and operation of load-handling systems in the vicinity of equipment or components required for safe reactor shutdown and decay heat removal.
Information provided in response to this st.; tion should be sufficient to demonstrate that adequate measures have been taken t) ensure that in these areas, either the likelihood of a load drop which might prevent safe reactor shutdown or prohibit continued decay heat removal is extremely small, or that damage to such equipment from load drops will be limited in order not to result in the loss of these safety-related functions. Cranes which rust be evaluated in this section have been previously identified in your response to 2.1-1, and their loads in your response to 2.1-3-c.
RESPONSE
There are a number of monorail hoists in the Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Buildings (and therefore, in the vicinity of Reactor Jhutdown, Decay Heat Removal, and Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Systems) which are utilized for pump or filter changeouts, bulk boric acid or ion exchange resin handling, or equipment transport between floors.
Some of these hoists run over normal Plant Shutdown Systems, however, they generally handle loads which are not considered heavy loads but are on the order of a few hundred pounds. Where these hoiste dc travel over plant shutdown systems (i.e. RCS Makeup Filters), these systems cre. H undent and can be bypassed completely, if necessary.
There are no hoists which travel directly over equipment used for decay heat removal. The Fuel Handling Building Crane, as previously mentioned, cannot drop the SDS cask through the Spent Fuel Pool Floor onto the Decay Heat Systems located beneath the pool.
The Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System has been disassembled to allow construction of the SDS within the pool. With no spent fuel in the pool at this time, the system is not functionally necessary at present.
Hoists used to transport heavy equipment between floors of the Auxiliary Building do not travel over any equipment Important to Safety.
TABLE 1
, HEAVY LOAD / POTENTIAL IMPACT AREA MATRIX Page 1 of 2 CRANE:
Fuel Handling Building (110 Ton Hook)
I
'UCAII'"*
Fuel Handling Building
. POTENTIAL Unit 2 Fuel Pool Area Truck Bay Between Unit 1 and Unit 2 Fuel IMPACT (Column line AC-AT, Column line A68-A66).
Pools.'
AREA (Unit I Column line AT-11 A, Column line H3-J).
SAFETV SAFETV HEAVV RELATED HAZARD RELATED HAZARD LOADS-ELEVATION,
OR ELIMINATION ELEVATION OR ELIMINATION IMPORTANT CATEGORY IWORTANT CATEGORY
.EqUIPMEMT (Note 2)
EQUIPMENT
^
Chem-Nuclear 1-13C 347'6" SPC e, Note 1 305'0" examired in Fe >ruary 17th Cask containing Spent SDS submittal from Unit I.
SDS liner (23,000 lbs)
Fuel Pool Area Tank Farm e, Note 1 308'0" SDS a, e Fuel Pool Bottom 331'0" SPC a, e New Fuel Storage Pool Bottom 305'6" SDS e, Note 1 Fuel Cask Storage Pool Bottom l
List of Safety Related or Important Equipment:
SPC - Standby Pressure Control System
~
SDS - Submerged Demineralizer System l
Tank Farm in "A" Fuel Pool NOTE 1: Crane hook / cask travel in these areas also limited within a " safety zone" procedurally.
l NOTE 2:
Letter Designations are from NUREG 0612, Notes to Figure 1.
. HEAVY LOAD /P0TENTIAL IMPACT AREA MATRIX TABLE 1 Page 2 of-2 CRANE:
Fuel Handling Buil ding (15 Ton Auxiliary 11ook)
LOCATim:
Fuel Handling Building
- POTENTIAL Spent Fuel Pool and Fuel Cask Storage Pool IMPACT AREA SAFETY SAFETY HEAVY RELATED HAZARD RELATED HAZARD LpADS' ELEVATION,
OR ELIMINAil0N ELEVATION OR ELIFINATION llFORTANT CATEGORY IMPORTANT (CATEGORYNote 2)
EQUIPMENT
~
.ESIIPMENT Spent SDS Sand Filter 308'0" SDS e
Vessel (1470 lbs)
Fuel Pcci Bottom and Spent SDS lon Exchange 306'0" SDS e
Vessel (10001bs)
Fuel Cask Storage Pool Bottom 0
4 e
9
TABLE 2
. HEAVY LOAD / POTENTIAL IMPACT AREA MATRIX Page 1 of 1
. CRANE: Chemical Cleaning Building Monorail Hoist (15 Ton)
LOCATI M :
Chemical. Cleaning Building (Column Line CC6-CC2, Column Line CCD-CCC)
. POTENTIAL IMPACT AREA SAFETY SAFETY HEAVT RELATED HAZARD RELATED HAZARD L9W ELEVATION,
OR ELIMINATION ELEVATION OR ELININATION IMPORTANT CATEGORY Ifr0RTANT CATEis0RV
. EQUIPMENT EqulPMENT
~
Transfer f, sll 304'0" inside EPICOR System Load Drop (32,500 lbs).
305'1" outside Processing Consequcnes Location Analyzed and Found to be Arrontshio 4x4 Liner Reported in 1
ALC-F-1 NUREG-0591.
(1500 lbs) o 4x4 Liner ALC-K-1 (1500 lbs) 6x6 Liner ALC-K-2 (80001bs)
Lead Shield (1600 lbs) e