ML20038A424
| ML20038A424 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/03/1980 |
| From: | Fitzgerald NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20038A409 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-92-436, TASK-CA, TASK-SE SECY-A-80-150, NUDOCS 8110300050 | |
| Download: ML20038A424 (1) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
?
SECY-A-80-150_
October 3. 1 En__
ADJUDICATORY ITEM
_COMMISSlQonersNER ACTION The Commiss For:
James A. Fitzgerald From:
Assistant General Counsel 1
1 FIVIEW OF ALAB-611 (NORTHERN STATES POWER AND ALAB-612 (JERSEY CENTRAI,, PO*w'ER
Subject:
COMPANY)
AND LIGHT COMPANY) i--
r To inform the Cenmission of two Appeal Board deci-aionsonwhichnopartyhaspetitionedforreview)!
Purecse:
j
{andwhich,inouropinion, _
(as previously exter'.ed Review Tine Oc cter 17,1980 ( ALA3-611)
Exrires October 20, 1980 (ALAS-612) (as previously exten.ed i
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This re=crandum ecncerns two Appeal Ecard deci-siens retardinc the conversicn of the c. revisicna'.
r Discussi:r_:
(POL) fc: two plants tc full-cperating licenses (FTOL).
The decisiens 4
term operating licenses are discussed together because throug." them the Ap. eal Scard established additional prc0edures believes are required for a finding :f ccn-r tinued safe operation ever the life cf a fu.-
it These precedures term cperating license.
d in will rec.uire the staff to update the reccrge.eri:
i these preceedings by determining if ar;.
issues which arcse since :he re::ci.<as clesed wculd preclude the issuance cf a full-safe:S term cperating license.
ALAE-611 concerns the propcsed conversion cf f
Monticelle has c,
Menticello 's POL to an FTOL.
"fr<
teen operating under a POL for nine years.
Durinz the course of the license conversi:n
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proceeding all intervencrs either withdrew cr Although the withdrew their cententiens.
Licensing 5 card was then free to dismiss the retained jurisdi:-
- roceeding as un
- entested, ittien to censider the
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cf Mentice".;c pending resolu i n cf the ;r:tler-e-
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in accMme with the ficvon t!!d ] tion Act, exemntions I. _._
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2 The Licensing Board posed several questiens to the staff and applicant regarding ATWS, and after considering the responses found that operation could continue safely pending final resolution of ATWS and dismissed the proceeding.
The Appeal Board re' viewed sua sponte the Licens-ing Board's decision and found that the record supported the Licensing Board's decision that Monticello can continue to operate safely This pending resolution of the ATWS issue.
decision was based primarily on the licensee's incorporation of a recirculation pump trip systen and agreement to implement staff's reconnendaticns regarding emergency procedures-and operator training.
however, because the Appeal Board found the record in this proceeding to be "e2tremely stale," the Board was unable to determine whether any other unresolved generic safety issues would prevent the centinued safe operation of Monticello.
Accordingly, it directed the staff to identify which unresc1ved generic safety issues ennumerated in NUREG-0510 1/ could affect Menticello,.and why the faciifty can centinue to operate safely pending their resolution. 2/
The Board also stated that in future proEeedings of this type it would recand consideration of unresc1ved safety issues :c the Licensing Ecard.
ALAS-612 concerns the conversion of Oyster Creek's FOL tc an FTOL.
The Licensing Ecard terminated the proceeding after it: (1) apprcved envircnnental technical specifications prepcsed (23 by the staff and accepted by the applicant; determined that a11' issues in controversy had been resolved by the parties themselves; and' (3) implicitly found that Oyster Creek could operate safely under added technical specificatiens designed to prevent recurrence of a coolant flow reduction incident.
f
- sisc 1/
E: ff was instructed :: fccus en Category A Tasks but in Category B Tasks which could present in;1ude any issues
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p::entia_17 sericus safety er environmental concerns.
the staff should file the materia". as Tr:- Ecard suggested that the Ecari w:uld sr sneniner-cr supplererr c the SEE sc that
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F Recenmendation:
J L
Dow u
J es A. Fitzgerald ssistant General Counsel Attachments:
ALAB-611 ALAB-612 Comissioners' comments should be provided directly to the Office of the Se by c.o.b. Friday, October 17, 1980.
Comission Staff Office coments, if any, should be submited to the Comissio If with an infont.ation copy to the Office of the Secretary.
the paper is of such a nature that it requires additio NLT October 10, 1980, when coments may be expected.
DISTRIBUTION Comissioners Comission Staff Offices Secretariat we l
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NRWp SEP 4 5E0 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA e
NUCLEAR _ REGULATORY COMMISSION g
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9 co W ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD 9\\
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Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman g'~ efP ~ 4 Nt$[
Dr. John H. Buck d # g g"r' pts- $,
D Thomas S. Moore Off
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M ro
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In the Matter of
)
)
Docket No. 50-263 NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY
)
(Monticello Nuclear Generating
)
Plant, Unit 1)
)
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER September 3, 1980 (ALAB-611) subsequent to the withdrawal of all On October 25, 1979, j
interveners, the Licensing Board dismissed this proceedinc involving Northern States Power Company's application to its provisional operating license for the Monticello -
1/
convert
~
Nuclear Generating Plant to a full-term operating license.
Thus, af ter almost nine years of authorized full-power operation of the Monticello facility under a provisional t
1/ The Montice llo ' f acility, located in. Wright County,is a boi
~
Minnesota, power outptt of 545 MWe.
9
license, the Licensing Board's final order paves the way for 2/
the issuance of a full-term operating license.
The procedural history of the Monticello operating license proceeding was set forth in detail in Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2),
ALAB-571, 10 NRC 687, 689-690 (1979) (although in a somewhat Accordingly, we need not repeat it here.
different setting).
Suffice it to note that all of the intervenors either with-drew from the Monticello proceeding or withdrew their conten-tions.
Once that occurred, the proceeding was in the posture of an uncontested case and, under Commission regulations, the After reviewing the Licensing Board was free to dismiss it.
the Board declined to do so.
It was concerned record, however, the continued saf e operation of the Monticello f acility about 2 / In 1971 the Monticello f acility received authorizatien for a provisional license f or full power operation (see 4 AEC which, under then-applicable Commission regulations, Thereaf ter, in 1972, the 496) was effective for 18 months.
present proceeding was begun to convert the provisional See 4 AEC 830 license to a full-term operating license. proceeding dragged on until That (1972) r 5 AEC 25 (1972).1979 when the Licensing Board issued its order dismissing the proceeding, thus authorizing the issuance of October 25,
' The normally short-lived a full-term operating license.
provisional license remained in effect throughout this entire period, however, because the Commission's regulations provide that a timely license application for a previously authorized activity "will not be deemed to have expired until the application has been finally determined. "
i pending resolution of the problem of anticipated transients
)
The ATWS problem -- one of a number of without scram (ATWS).
so-called unresolved generic safety issues involving nuclear power f acilities -- prompted the Licensing Board to pose After several questions to the NRC staf f and applicant.
considering the evidentiary responses to its questions, the Board made several substantive determinations on the ATWS He then issued an issue and terminated the proceeding.
order anncuncing that we would review the case on our own initiative.
I.
the Licensing Board made substantive findings The fact that Even though on the ATWS saf ety issue undergirds our own review.
the ti=e it was dismissed, the proceeding was uncontested at those ATWS detemminations require that we review the Licensing As we stated in WPPSS, ALAB-571, supra, 10 tmC Board's decision.
in annunciating the rationale for sua sponte review at 692, in the lionticello proceeding:
" Appeal board review will be routinely undertaken of any final disposition of a licensing either was or had to be founded upon substantive proceeding that determinations of significant safety or environmental issues."
4-in such a case, the standard for review of a licensing
- And, board's substantive determinations is sLsilar to that re-We may " reject or modify quired in a contested proceeding.
findings of the Licensing Board if, af ter giving its decision intrinsically commands, we are convinced the probative force it Niagara Mohawk that the record compels a dif f erent result. "
(Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2), ALAB-264, Power Corp.
See also Northern Indiana Public 1 NRC 347, 357 (1975).
(Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear 1),
Service Co.
ALAB-303, 2 NRC 858, 867 (1975).
In applying that standard to the case before us, however, we are mindful that we do not have the benefit of brief s f rom interested parties, as would be the situation in a contested proceeding.
We have reviewed the Licensing Board's findings on the ATWS issue and have found no error requiring corrective action.
As we explain in Part II, we are satisfied that the record supports the Licensing Board's ultimath conclu-the Monticello f acility can continue to operate sion that saf ely even though the ATWS question remains an unresolved however,
As will be seen in Part III, generic safety issue.
d we shall retain jurisdiction over this case to receive a -
ditar nal evidence regarding certain other unresolved generic issues which may significantly aff ect saf e operation safe./
of.he Monticello facility.
i II.
The ATWS issue is complex, its history long and the In order to put into controversy surrounding it intense.
context the Licensing Board's concern about whether the Monticello facility could continue to operate safely while the ATWS issue remained an unresolved generic safety question, a brief description of the problem is helpful.
As previously mentioned, ATWS is an acronym f or 1.
scram."
Anticipated
" anticipated transients without transients are expected deviations from normal operating conditions which can be foreseen as probable occurrences during the service lif e of a nuclear plant.
i Such transients, however, are to be distinguished from ac-cidents, which (although always possible) are unexpected and
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The second two have a much lower likelihood of occurrence.
letters of the ATWS acronym involve the reactor protection The planned response to certain occurrences shutdown system.
is an automatic shutdown or " scram" of the reactor by rapid 1
insertion of the control rods into the reactor core, which i
Should one of those expected stops the nuclear reaction.
events requiring reactor shutdown occur but no shutdown take I
the result would be an " anticipated transient without place.,
\\
l
. issue The history of ATWS as an unresolved generic saf ety At that time, an Advisory Committee on dates back to 196S, consultant expressed concern that Reactor Saf eguards (ACRS) i common mode f ailures in scram systems Q.e,., deficienc es installation or maintenance of in the design, manuf acture, lly) could a component that af f ect all such components equa h t they so reduce the reliability of protection systems t a For certain might not function properly when called upon.
scram f ailure could result in serious types of transients, the ATWS issue generally involves two
- Thus, safety problems.
whether the probability of common mode
- first, questions:
failures in reactor scram systems is sufficiently great to of pro-warrant consideration; and second, if so, what typeized water tection is required for boiling water and pressur reacters to mitigate the consequences of scram f ailure.
The dif ficulty of assessing the probability of common The techniques mode f ailures lies at the root of the ATNS issue.
f or analyzing a system f or common mode f ailures have no lly accepted --
as well developed -- or at least not as universa 3/
the NRC staff As a result, as those for random f ailures.
oarkedly dif f er ent, and the nuclear industry have taken d by worn 3/ 5 cram f ailures occurring on a random basis cause i
systems cut equipment or malfunctions in shutdown protect on deter iora-nave not been perceived as causing any appreciableThis is.b ion of scram system reliability.
In recent years,
- edundancy of shutdown protection systems.f ailures have received d
techniques for..alyzing common mo e' onsiderable a
-y-i and indeed almost opposite, positions on the reliability of ex st-Similarly, the staff and the industry disagree ing scram systems.
on both the need for additional protection against the conse-quences of scram f ailures and the type of protection required.
over the years, the perceived potential for serious harm resulting from ATWS events has led to a number of studies and documents by the various vendors, utility groups, and the AEC and NRC regulatory staf fs to assess the probabilities and con-4/
These same materials set
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seguences of such occurrences.
forth in detail the positions of the staff and the nuclear industry on the ATWS issue.
" Technical Report S. Atomic Energy Commission, 4/ See, e.g., U.on Anticipated Transients Without Scram for Water-Cooled (September 197 3) ; Electric Power Power Reactors," WASH-1270 A Reappraisal, Part I:
An Exami-
"ATWS:
1976);
Research Institute, nation and Analysis of WASH-1270," EPRI NP-251 "ATHS:
Electric Power Research Institute, Evaluation of Societal Risk Part II:
tection System Failure, Vols. I and II: Electric Power Research Institute, EPRI NP-265 (August 1976);
Evaluation of Societal Risks A Reappraisal, Part II:
PWR Risk Due to Reactor Protection System Failure, Vol. III: Electric Power Researc "ATWS:
(August 1976) ;
The Analysis," EPRI NP-265A Reappraisal, Part II, Vol. IV:
Probability of Exceeding 10 CFR 100 Guidelin Institute, "ATWS:
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Without scram for Light Water Reactors," Vols. I and II, Ele U.
NUREG-04 60 (April 1978) ;
Frequency of Anticipated A Reappraisal, Part III:
Transients," EPRI NP-801 (July 1978); U. S. Nuclear Regulatory "ATWS:
" Anticipated Transients Without Scram for Light (December 1978) ; U. S. Nuclear Commission, III Water Reactors," Vol.
" Anticipated Transients Without Scram Resolution of Unresolved Legulatory Commission, f or Light Water Reactors, Vol. IV: (tiarch 1980).
Safety Issue TAP A-9," NUREG-0460 i
It would serve no purpose to attempt to detail the evolu-d d
tion of the staff's position set out in the documents pro uce Indeed, the staff has yet,to announce its final to date.
position and recommendations to the Commission on the ATWS At the risk of overstmplification, the staff's S/
issue.
i position appears to be that present reactor operating exper ence is not adequate to determine conclusively on a statistical basis k
the whether reactor scram systems are reliable enough to ma e f
probability of unacceptable consequences from ATWS events su -
(using Based on its best engineering judgment ficiently small.
the staff has concluded that cor-risk assessment as a tool),
di-rective measures involving both procedural and hardware mo fications for all boiling water and certain pressurized water reactors are necessary to reduce the risk of severe consequences Stated otherwise, the from possible ATWS events in the future.
staff sees an inadequate statistical base for assessing the scram systems and, in light of the reliability of present potential severity of ATWS events and the f act that more 15, 1980, the the Commission's open meeting on July staff announced its intent to submit to the Commissio S/ At in the near future a staf f paper containing its final recommendations.
. 4 i
reactors are scheduled for operation in the future, bel eves it prudent to improve safety cargins even further to protect The staff has not determined that there is a the public.
- rather, present risk to public safety from an ATWS event; 6/
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it its position is that no unacceptable risk currently ex s s.
l The nuclear industry, on the other hand, has consistent y ff's and unanimously disagreed over the years with the sta Simply stated, the industry 's position evaluation of ATWS.
is that the probability of ATWS events in present reactor designs is sufficiently small that there is no need forh plant modifications to mitigate the consequences of suc if plant modifica-The industry also insists that, events.
many of the staff's 7/
tions are made in spite of this f act, ffective.
recommendations for hardware changes will not be cost-e supra fn.
4, Vol. 3 at pp. 1-8, 42-44, 6/ See NUREG-04 60, and Vol. 4 at pp.
3-6, 63-65.
5-6 and fn.
4, Vol. 1 at pp.
7 / See NUREG-04 60, supra Vol. 4 at pp.
5-6.
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At this writing, the ATWS issue remains an unresolved although its resolution may be soon generic saf ety issue --
8/
The snail's pace at which work on the ATWs achiev ed.--
issue has proceeded over the past eleven years, however, must remain a matter of serious concern pending final Com-In any event, it is readily mission action on this question.
in the circumstances presented, the Licensing apparent why, Board raised the ATWs issue on its own motion as a " serious safety matter" pursuant to 10 CFR 2.760a and required the applicant and the staff to respond to its questions on In light of the controversy surrounding ATWS that issue.
and the divergent views of the staf f and the nuclear industry the Licensing Board was "not merely authorized, on this subject, 9/
to pursue the course which it did" -
in but obligated, considering whether the Monticello f acility could continue to operate saf ely while the staff was studying the problem.
8/ See fn.
5, supra.
10 NRC at 691 (footnote omitted).
9/ WPPss, ALAB-571, supra,
. In response to the Licensing Board's questions 2.
concerning the status of the generic ATWS issue and whether d
the Monticello f acility could continue to operate safely pen ing its resolution, the staf f and the applicant each submitted af-18, 1979) was exe-The staf f 's af fidavit (dated January _
fidavits.
He cuted by the Task Manager of the NRC ATWS Task Action Plan.
first described the various published staff reports on the He next summarized (as more fully developed ATWS issue.
its then the staff's position on ATWS, in those reports) current recommendations for mitigating the consequences of and its projected schedule for ultimately ATWS events, Addressing the staf f's views on con-resolving the issue.
tinued operation of the Monticello f acility, he then stated (at pp. 12-13):
the Monticello design incor-We recognize that porates an acceptable recirculation pump trip f eature which reduces the risk f rom ATWS events.
in order to further reduce As a prudent course, the risk from ATWS events during the interim period while this matter is under review by the staff believes that the the Commission, following steps should be taken.
Emergency procedur'es [should) be 1.
developed to train operators to including recognize an ATWS event, consideration of scram indicators, rod position indicators, flux monitors,
i 1
- 1.2 -
vessel level and pressure indicators, relief valve and isolation valve indicators, and containment tempera-ture, pressure, and radiation indicators.
Operators [should) be trained to take 2.
actions in the event of an ATWS includ-1Laited to consideration of ing but not manually scramming the reactor by using the manual scram buttons, changing rod scram switches to the scram position, stripping the f eeder breakers on the reacter protection system power distri-bution buses, opening the scram. discharge volume drain valve, prompt actuation of the standby liquid control system, and prompt placement of the RHR in the pool cooling mode to reduce the severity of the containment conditions.
Early operator action as described above, in con-junction with a recirculation pwmp trip, signifi-cantly improves the capability of the f acility to withstand a range of ATWS events, namely those as a result of common mode f ailure which occur (1) in the electrical portion of the scram system and at low some portions of the drive system, and (2) power levels where the existing standby liquidcon the pool temperature rise to acceptable levels.
Since the Monticello Nuclear Ge.erating Plant has an automatic ATWS-related recirculation pump trip and since the above actions would further reduce the likelihood of severe ATWS events, we believe that continued operation of this facility presents no undue risk to the health and safety of the public while this matter is under review by the Commission.
13 -
The applicant submitted the affidavit of its General 25, 1979).
He Manager of Power Production (dated January stated that the Monticello f acility,had used a recircu-lation pump trip system cf a design approved by the staff the emergency procedures recommended since late 1978 and that by the staff had already been instituted (with one exception With respect to the staf f 's to be accomplished by April 1979).
d recommendations concerning operator training, he explaine l
d that such training had been undertaken and would be comp ete by April 1979.
Based upon these af fidavits, the Licensing Board found, that the Monticello design had incorporated a inter alia, recirculation pump trip system and that the applicant had the staf f's recommendations regarding agreed to knplement h
emergency procedures and operator training -- all with t e consequence that the risks from ATWS events would be further The Board noted that it would rely on the staff to r educ ed.
insure that the staf f's recommendations had been Loplemented that "the Monticello plant can It then concluded (at p.
5) continue to operate with acceptably low risks from an ATWS
14 -
pending implementation of whatever modifications even-tually are required by Commission rule,"
Our review of the record, including many of the under-lying staff and industry reports on the ATWS issue referenc from that therein, does not compel us to a different result
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The record demonstrates reached by the Licensing Board.
by allowing ample time for insertion of borated water
- that, i
l ting through the standby liquid control system, the rec rcu a i
pump trip system already installed at the Monticello boil ng t
water reactor eliminates the concern that an ATWS even might lead to f ailure of the reactor vessel caused by This being so, we find no basis on overpressurization.
i that this record to disagree with the Board's conclus onfl the Monticello facility may continue to operate sa e y We thus con-pending resolution of the generic ATWS issue.
cur in the disposition below of the ATWS matter.
III.
i Our scrutiny of this proceeding'does not end with rev ew the of the Licensing Board's substantive determinations on To be sure, ATWS is the vehicle by which the ATWS issue.
- ~ - -. ~. -. _. _ _ -
15 -
procaeding was brought to this Board for sua sponte review.
But once a case is properly before us, our review need not be confined to those issues on which a licensing board may Rather, the Co= mission's have made substantive findings.
regulations empower us, on our own motion, to consider matters not raised by the parties or the licensing board.
In an operating license proceeding, we may do so, however, only when "a serious saf ety, environmental, or common de-10 C.F.R.
82.78 5 (b) (2).
f ense and security matter exists. "
This limitation restricts our See also 10 C.F.R. 82.760a.
review to a much narrower path than we would follow.in a proceeding where matters are contested by the parties; necessari,1y places upon nevertheless, Section 2.785 (b) (2) us the burden of suf ficiently scrutinizing the record to no serious safety or envirertmental satisfy ourselves that 10/
matters have been overlooked.
Sections 2.760a and 10/ Prior to their recent amendment,in an operating license provided that, adjudicatory boards could examine and d 2.7 8 5 (b) (2) serious saf ety, environmental, or common def e proceeding,
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"only in extraordinary circumstances," and that such 10 C.F.R. 55 2.760a authority was to be used " sparingly. "The Commission deleted this and 2.7 8 5(b) (2) (1979 rev.).
restrictive language to ensure that adjudicatory boards al-would not be deterred from " examining issues that, though not presented by ' extraordinary circum 44 Fed. Reg. 67088 (November 23, 1979).
To enable us to fulfill that responsibility, the record must contain adequate information on which an informed judgment may be made, because the question of whether an environmental or "saf ety matter is ' serious' within the meaning of that Section manif estly is not controlled by whatever ultimate decision may WPPSS, ALAB-571, be reached af ter it receives full exploration."
the record -- primarily supra, 10 NRC at 691, fn. 13.
But here, 11/ -- is insuf ficient to permit us to de-
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because of its age termine whether the Monticello f acility can continue to operate saf ely pending resolution of other unresolved generic issues Accordingly, we shall identified by the staf f over the years.
retain jurisdiction over the case to enable the staf f to supple-With an, adequate record before us, we shall ment the record.
then determine whether the Monticello nuclear plant can con-tinue to operate saf ely pending resolution of any unresolved generic saf ety issues previously identified by the staf f which affect this particular facility, 2,
supra), the Monticello f acility 11/ As earlier noted (fn. received authorization for a provisional license that license to a full-term the proceeding to convertoperating license began the next ' ye Because all intervenors little activity over the years.
either withdrew from the proceeding or withdrew their con-tentions, no hearing before the Licensing Board was ev facility could continue to operate safely pending resolution held.
af ter making findings on that (f the generic ATNS issue; Because of this pro-
- 2estion it then dismissed the case.
edural history, there is very little of record in this
- roceeding dealing with substantive matters and what record For example, the Safety Evaluation
- xists is quite old.for the facility prepared by the AEC staff is dated
.eport rebruary 5, 1973.
i
. i Our decisions teach that the record must contain suf-information concerning each generic unresolved ficient safety issue affecting operation of the facility under con-sideration to enable adjudicatory boards to fulfill their respective responsibilities under the Commission's regula-(River Bend Station, Units 1 tions.
In. Gulf States Utilities Co.
and 2), ALAB-4 4 4, 6 NRC 760 (1977), we pointed out, albeit that a in the context of a construction permit proceeding, licensing board must make a finding that there is a reasonable the f acility can be operated safely irrespective assurance that of what matters may or may not have been placed in controversy.
He held that,in order to make such a finding in the absence on a particular safety matter, the licensing board of a contest
- rather, authorized to duplicate the staff's review, is not the board must determine whether the staff's review of that Id. at 774.
We then stated:
issue was adecuate.
Of necessity, this determination will entail inquiry into whether the staff review ansatisfactorily has come to grips with any unresolved generic safety problems which might have an impact upon operation of the nuclear f acility under consideration.
The SER is, of course, the principal document before the licensing board which reflects the con-The board of the staff's review, tent and outcome should therefore be able to look to that document to ascertain the extent to which generic unresolved safety problems which have been previously identified
in a TSAR item, a Task Action Plan, an ACRS report or elsewhere have been, factored into the staf f 's analysis for the particular reactor -- and.with what result.
each SER sF.ould contain a To this end, in our view, summary description of those generic problems under continuing study which have both relevance to facilities of'the type under review and potentially significant public safety implications.
the board (and the public as well)
In short, should be in a position to ascertain from the SER itself -- without the need to resort to extrinsic documents -- the staff's perception of the nature and extent of the relationship between each signif-icant unresolved generic safety question and the eventual operation of the reactor under scrutiny.
_I_d. at 774-75.
i in a case closely parallel to the one new A year later, before us, this Board again dealt with unresolved generic safety issues, this time in the context of a sua sponte, review of a licensing' board's grant of authority for an operating Vircinia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna
)
license.
ALAB-491, 8 NRC 245 Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2),
After canvassing the entire record to satisfy our-(1978).
selves that the North Anna f acility could operate safely pending resolution of all outstanding unresolved generic safety issues, we required that the record be supplemented on the issue of In reaching that result, however, we commented turbine missiles.
satisfactory answers con-on the difficulty of ferreting out cern ag many such generic issues and strongly suggested that
the staf f's Safety Evaluation Report be supple-in the future, mented to include an :dequate explanation of each generic safety issue affecting the facility under review and why that partic-facility could nevertheless safely operate pending reso-ular Id. at 249 and fn. 9.
lution of those issues.
In North Anna, we also articulated the minimum level in light of the Commission's regu-of record evidence which, a board to determine that no serious lations, would permit safety or environmental matters e'xist:
In view of the limitations imposed by regulation, and the fact that our review was necessarily unaided by any of the parties, we have not probed deeply into the substance of the reasons put forth by the staff Rather, we for allowing operation to go forward.
have only looked to see whether the generic safety in a manner that issues have been taken into accountif proven to be of is at least plausible and that, substance, would be adequate to justify operation.
Scrutiny of the substance of particular explanations will have to await a contested proceeding.
Id. at 248, fn.
7.
guide our review of the present That same principle must in North Anna, however, the record proceeding.
Unlike that before us is extremely stale because of the extended time in-of the provisional license and the terval between the grant Licensing Board's final action, which had the effect of authoriz-Indeed, the ing the grant of a full-term operating license.
1973 and, staf f's Saf ety Evaluation Report is dated February 5,
..=.;..
with respect to previding useful information concerning many unresolved generic safety issues, it is manifestly insuf-This being so, we are unable to determine whdther ficient.
any other unresolved safety issues previously identified by the staff stand as impediments to the continued safe operation of the Monticello facility.
To remedy this deficiency, the staf f should supplement the record with an appropriate identification of those un-12/ it has brought to light over
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resolved generic saf ety issues the years which might af f ect saf e operation of the Monticello the staf f is to focus its atten-facility.
For this purpose, tion on those Category A Tasks identified in RUREG-0510 as unresolved saf ety issues which could aff ect the Monticello 12/ We are fully cognizant of the history of the unresolved-saf ety-issue question and the dif ficulties experienced over the years in defining what matters should or should Likewise, we are conversant with not be so considered.
the various staf f ef forts to categorize unresolved safety See issues and to establish programs to resolve them."NRC Program f or the S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.
Resolution of Generic Issues Related to Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0410 (January 1978); U. S. Nuclear i
" Generic T,ask Problem Descrip-Regulatory Commission, (June 1978);
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory tions," NUREG-0471" Identification of Unresolved Safety Issues Commission, Relating to Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0510 (January" Task Action U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Plans for Unresolved Safety Issues Related to Nuclear 1979);
Power Plants," RUREG-0649 (February 1980).
i I
In addition, however, the staff should include facility.
in its submission any issues from Category B Tasks listed in NCREG-0510 which may have an impact on the Monticello f acility and which, if lef t unresolved, could present po-tentially serious saf ety'or environmental concerns.
Such identification should be accompanied by a brief As description of the dimensions of each generic issue.
part of its submission, the staff should provide a succinct explanation of why the Monticello plant can continue to operate safely pending resolution of each generic safety as we did in River Bend We once again suggest, issue.
that the staff consider filing this addi-and North Anna, tional material as an amendment or supplement to its SER.
i "the Placing such information in the SER will permit to ascertain from board (and the public as well) j without the need to resort to extrinsic the SER itself information we seek should not place an unreasonab 13/ The burden on the staff.
unresolved safety issue affecting the Monticello facility
~~
I Rather, _ a short one or two paragraph Similarly, the staf f 's are not necessary.
description should be adequate.
explanation of why the f acility can continue to operate safely pending resolution of each generic issue also need not be excessively detailed.
l l
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1 22 -
i the staf f's perception of the nature and documenta extent of the relationship between each significant unre-
- *
- operation of solved generic safety question and River Bend _, ALAB-444, supra _,
the reactor under scrutiny."
It also will facilitate in any other parallel 6 NRC at 775.
proceedings an evaluation of those questions at the licensing is more appropriately undertaken in the board level, where it 14/
first instance.
The staff shall file the requested supplemental material by October 15, 1980.
It is so ORDERED.
i l
FOR THE APPEAL BOARD
~b.
1 C. gean Bishop J
Secretary to the Appeal Board l
l licensing boards. should make sure t
14/ In such proceedings, that the record before them reflects the staf f's curren hi i
views on any unresolved generic safety issues that mig t
~
i be of significance for the particular facility involved, rsy whether or not those issues have been placed in con b itted I
unless the Board determines that the inform by the parties.
and security matters.
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i UNITED STATES,OF AMERICA
'2,IiO.
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 7
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1 ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD l,O L':,'. y
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(C C//l:,[;f'" - 3 k k
Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman
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Dr. John H. Buck
- c Thomas S. Moore
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CAP a.
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In the Matter of
. S',
)
e JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY -)
Docket N). 50-219
)
)
(Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating
)
i Station)
_)
MEMORANDUM Aht ORDER September 5, 1980
( ALAB-612)
This proceeding involves the conversion to a full-term 1.
operating license of the provisional license which was issued for the Oyster Creek nuclear f acility in 1969.1!
On May 31, 4
(1) ap-1979, the Licensing Board entered an order in which it proved certain environmental technical specifications which the ~
to attach (with the applicant's' acquiescence)
NRC staff proposed (2) determined to both the provisional and full-term licenses; that all issues in controversy had been resolved by the parties called upon the staff to supply its evalua-themselves; but (3) tion cf the significance of a then-recent coolant flow reduction incident at the Oyster Creek facility.
The Oyster Creek facility, located.in Ocean County, New Jersey, is a boiling water reactor with a rated power
_1,/
output of 650 MWe,
.-w.,
,a,,,n-
- - -. - + - - -
On June 8,1979, the staff complied with the Licensing Board's request by furnishing it with copies of (1) the May 30, 1979 letter from the Director of the Division of Operating Reactors, Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Re'gulation (NRR),
to the applicant; and (2) the NRR Safety Evaluation Report dealing (which document had accompanied the letter).
with the incident the staf f filed a motion seeking, "[i}n On September 25, 1979, the event that the [ Licensing) Board has no further questions to be addressed in this matter", an order terminating the pro-ceeding.
By order of February 22, 1960, the Licensing Board granted the motion and dismissed the proceeding.
In so doing, it en-dorsed (at least implicitly) the staf f's analysis of the coolant That analysis had produced the conclu-flow reduction incident.
the Oyster Creek core had not been damaged and that,
'sions that with certain added technical specifications designed to obviate the facility could safely resume a repetition of the incident, operation.
In an unpublished March 20, 1980 memorandum, the Appeal Panel Chairman announced that the dismi'ssal order would be re-viewed sua sponte by an appeal board under the standard laid down in Washincton Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2), ALAB-571, 10 NRC 687 (1979).
This Board was thereaf ter established for that purpose.
We have examined both the environmental technic 2.
approved in the Licensing Board's specifications (NUREG-0488) l i i g to May 1979 order and the Safety Evaluation Report perta n n That examination has the coolant flow reduction incident.
i The given rise to no concern requiring our further inqu ry.
to grips environ = ental technical specifications appear to come blems attend-satisf actorily with' the special environmental pro i
m ant upon Oyster Creek operation -- including the sh pwor al infestation matter of which we took note sever (marine borer)
(Forked River See Jersey Central Power & Light Co.
years ago.
ALA3-139, 6 AIC 535, 537 Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1),
the analysis contained in the fn. 7 (1973).
For its part, seems to be suf ficiently complete and Saf ety Evaluation Report ff's conclusions to provide an adequate foundation for the sta derived therefrom.
now af firm the dismissal of the Nonetheless, we cannot 3.
for the reasons set forth in Part To the contrary, proceeding.
i llo pro-III of our very recent decision in the parallel Mont ce
- ceeding,
! before the final curtain can be brought down the furnish certain additional information respecting staff must i ht be applicable those unresolved generic safety issues as m g to Oyster Creek operation.
i (Monticello Nuclear Generatine 4
, ~~~ (September 3,'
Northern States Power Co. 12 NRC 2/
Un:t 1), ALA3-611,
~~~
Plant, (slip opinion, pp.14-22).
1910)
o
-4_
that information is being supplied directly In Monticello, We there indicated, however, that in proceedings such to us.
as this the licensing boards henceforth would be called upon to undertake ab initio_ the task of appraising "the nature and ex-d tent of the relationship between each significant unresolve
- operation of the reactor un-generic safety question and
- der scrutiny". E!
Accordingly, in this instance the staff is d by to submit the required information to the Licensing Boar Following its evalua-whatever date that Board may prescribe.
the Board may reinstate the dismissal tion of the submittal, of the proceeding or take such other action (af tdr giving the as should appear appre-parties an opportunity to be heard) priate to it in the circumstances.
Remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this III cf Monticello, ALAB-611, supra.
opinion and Part As explained (id. at (slip opinion, p. 22).that appraisal is Fan-3/
Id. at(slip opinion, pp. 17-19)),
caTed by Gulf States Utilities Co.. (River Bend Station,
~~
~~
6 NRC 760 (1977) and Virginia Units 1 and 2), ALA3-444,(North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Electric and Power Co.
Units 1 anc 2), ALAB-491, 8 NRC 245 (1978).
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+
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It is so: ORDERED.
4 FOR T11E APPEAL BOARD i
Qd _y tt _)
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C. J(gn Bishop:
SecreYary to the Appe'al-Board l
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