ML20038A067
| ML20038A067 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 05/31/1981 |
| From: | Laudenbach D EG&G, INC. |
| To: | Bender P Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17258A659 | List: |
| References | |
| EEG-1183-4204, EGG-1183-4204, IEB-80-06, IEB-80-6, NUDOCS 8109140235 | |
| Download: ML20038A067 (7) | |
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INTERIM' REPOR'T
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NRC TAC No. 42744 Report No. EGG l'183 4204 Contract Program or Project
Title:
Electrical, Instrumentation, and Control System Support Subject of this Document:
Technical Evaluation of the Licensee's Response to I&E Bulletin 80-06 Concerning ESF Reset Controls for the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Type of Document:
Infonnal Report i
Author (sh D. H. Laudenbach Date of Document:
May 1981 Responsible NRC Individual and NRC Office or Division:
P. Bender /R. Wilson,'ICSB l
This document was prepared primarily for preliminary or internal use.
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has not received full review and approval. Since there may oe suostantive I
changes, this document should not be considered final.
EG&G Energy Measurements Group San Ramon Operations l
San Ramon, CA 94583 l
l Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission Washington. 0.C.
Under 00E Contract No.B&R 201904031 NRC FIN No.
A.0250 l
INTERIM REPORT l
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EGsG EGaus34g d3Y I Energy Measurements Group San Ramon Operations TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF THE LICENSEE'S RESPONSE TO I&E BULLETIN 80-06 CONCERNING ESF RESET CONTROLS FOR THE R. E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 1 (DOCKET NO. 50-244)
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by D. H. Laudenbacn I*
l Approved for Publication l: -
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l 9 J. R. Raaosevic Department Manager This document is UNCLASSIFIED M
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Nicnolayii.. BrocericK Department Manager Work Performed for Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under U.S. Department of Energy Contract No. DE.ACO8 76 NVO 1183.
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e INTRODUCTION On March 13, 1980, the USNRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement (I&E), issued I&E Bulletin 80-06, entitled " Engineered Safety Feature (ESF Controls," to all PWR and BWR facilities with operating licenses.
I&E Bulletin 80-06 requested that the following actions be taken by tne Reset licensees:
Review the drawings for all systems serving safety-(1) related functions at the schematic / elementary diagram level to determine wnetner or not upon tne reset of an ESF actuation signal all associated safety-related equipment remains in its emergency mode.
(2)
Verify that the actual installed instrumentation and controls at the facility are consistent with tne schematics reviewed in Item 1 above by conducting a i
test to demonstrate that all. equipment remains in its emergency mode upon removal of tne actuating signal and/or manual resetting of the various isolating or actuation signals.
Provide a schedule for the per-formance of the ' testing in your response to tnis bulletin.
If any safety-related equipmer.t does not remain in its (3) emergency mode upon reset of an ESF signal at your f acility, describe proposed system modification, design change, or other corrective acticn planned to resolve the problem.
in writing within 90 days the results of your (4)
Report review, include a list of all devices wnicn respond as discussed in Item 3 above, actions taken or planned to assure adequate equipment control, and a schedule for implementation of corrective action.
evaluation addresses tile licensee's response to This technical I&E Bulletin 80-06 and tne licensee's proposed system modification, design In cnange, and/or other corrective action planned to reso the bulletin, tne following NRC staff guidance is also used:
Upon the reset of ESF signals, all safety-related equipment snail remain in its emergency mode.
Multiple reset sequencing snali not cause tne affected equipment to deviate f rom its emergency mode.
Justification snould be provided for any exceptions..
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EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS In a letter dated June 3.1980 [Ref.1], Rochester Gas and Elec-
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tric Corporation, the licensee for R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power P replied to 1&E Bulletin 80-06.
March 3,1981 (Ref. 2], the licensee provided additional information an clarification to their written response.
i a drawing review nas been The licensee reported (Ref.1] that at Ginna station for all systems serving safety-related i
determine This review was conducted at tne senematic level ta completed whether all associated safety-related equipment would remain in its emer-functions.
i gency mode upon the reset of an engineered safety feature actu The licensee ident,1fied [Ref.1] the following equipment as not rema in the emergency mode upon ESF reset:
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Containment Spray additive tank discnarge valves.
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Main Feedwater isolation and bypass valves.
- 2. t We conclude that tne licensee has complied with tne requirements of A i
Items 1 and 4 of I&E Sulletin 80-06 by completing the systems servingthat do not remain in their emergency mode upon ESF reset.
The licensee reported (Ref, 1] that testing to verify that actual i
installed instrumentation and controls were consistent w We conclude reviewed was completed during the May 1980 refueling 2 of for the I&E Bulletin 80-06 by providing a schedule and completion date performance of testing.
The licensee indicated (Ref.1] that no modifications or design changes were planned for the Containment Spray additive tank disc valves nor for the Main Feeedwater isolation and bypass valves.
Tne licensee offered justification [Ref. 1] for not mo offered in reference 1.
The licensee offered [Ref. 1] the following justification for not modifying the Containment Spray additive tank discnarge valves:
The Containment Spray circuit has a reset switch wnicn gives Once the operator the means of resetting containment sp discharge valves will return automatically to the position called for by tneir. controllers.
The containment spray valves would require operator pumps and their discharge This capability is necessary so tne action to change state.
operator.nas tne flexibility in dealing witn post-accident conditions within containment (i.e.,
LOCA or steam line break). t
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l The licensee offered [Ref. 2] tne following additional justifi.
cation for not modifying the Containment Spray additive tank discharge valves:
The valves associated with the spray additive tank will be
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opened automatically two minutes after the containment spray signal is actuated.. The sodium hydroxide will flow due to the suction of tne spray pumps and mix with refueling water prior to being discharged tnrougn tne spray nozzle into the containment.
After :he containment spray signal is actuat-i ed, the operator has the capability to stop the timer if it has been detemined that actuation of the sodium nydroxide addition is not warranted.
The 6perator also has the cap-ability to reinstate the sodium hydroxide addition, if required.
Eniergency procedures set forth guidelines for this action based on one or more of the folicwing:
(1)- High containment pressure in comoination with a total loss of RCS pressure.
I (2) High radiation levels in combination with elevated containment pressure.
(3) Pressure signals indicative of accumulator dis-charge into the RCS.
j The licensee offered [Ref.1] the following justification for not '
modifying the Main Feedwater isolation and bypass valves:
The Feedwater Isolation circuit has a. reset switch wnich gives the operator the means of resetting tne isolation 9
signal to the feedwater bypass valves.
Once the reset switch is actuated, tne feedwater bypass valves will assume i
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the position called for by their controllers.
Tne main feedwater valves will remain closed until the isolation logic clears, and then they will automatically assume tne position called for by their controllers.
It should be noted.that a safety injection signal also causes the main feedwater pumps to be tripped and their discnarge valves to automatically close; therefore, closing the main feedwater valves on a safety injection signal is redundant.
The licensee offered [Ref. 2] tne following additional justifi-cation for not modifying the Main Feedwater isolation and bypass valves:
While reset will result in the feedwater isolation valves returning to tneir demand position, reset does not affect t
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pump discharge the status of the feedwater pumps or the valves.
Thus, re-opening of the feedwater isolation (and bypass) valves would not result in tne addition of feedwater to tne steam generator via tne feedwater lines.
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The above justifications were offered by the licensee in lieu of any system modification, design cnange, or otner corrective action.
We nave reviewed tne justifications submitted by tne. licensee to insure tnat sufficient information is provided as a basis for the NRC staff to prepare l
a Safety Evaluation Report.
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1 FIN 0iNGS I
Based on our review of tne information and documents provided by i
the licensee, we find tnat tne ESF reset controls for R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, satisfy the requirements of Action Items 1, 2, and 4 i
of I&E Bulletin 80-06.
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In response to Action Item 3 of I&E Bulletin 80-06, tne licensee identified several valves as not remaining in their emergency mode upon ESF reset and offered justification in lieu of any system modification, design J
change, or otner corrective action.
REFERENCES 1.
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation letter (L.D. Wnite, Jr.) to NRC I&E (B.H. Grier), " Response to I&E Bulletin 80-06," dated June 3, 1980.
2.
Telepnone conference call, NRC (P. Bender); Rocnester Gas and Electric Corporation (R. McCready, G. Daniels); EG&G San Ramon (D. Hackett, D.
Laudenbacn), March 3, 1981.
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