ML20037D384
| ML20037D384 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 07/06/1981 |
| From: | Churchill B CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO., DUQUESNE LIGHT CO., OHIO EDISON CO., PENNSYLVANIA POWER CO., TOLEDO EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8107100160 | |
| Download: ML20037D384 (53) | |
Text
4
-U UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
,s.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION B/
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" '., _.,a Bjg8, i Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Boarcl6-1
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q, In the Matter of
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THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC
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Docket Nos. 50-440 ILLUMINATING CCMPANY,
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50-441 DUQUESNE LIGHT CCMPANY,
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(Operating License)
OHIO EDISON COMPANY,
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PENNSYLVANIA POWER COMPANY,
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'3 and THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY )
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(Perry Nuclear Power Plant,
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5 APPLICANTS' BRIEF CN CONTENTIONS VA'NIIzi\\ '
At the Special Prehearing Conference held on June 2-3, 1981, the Licensing Board asked Applicants and the Staff to submit briefs commenting on changes to the contentions made by Sunflower Alliance, et al.
(" Sunflower") and Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy ("CCRE") and on the new contention introduced by Tod Kenney ("Kenney").
Tr. 293-99, 526, 610-12, 626, 628-30.1 For the most part, the changes were in the l
nature of additional information not earlier provided in either l
petitions or briefs; nenney introduced his only contention 1
l orally at the Special Prehearing Conference.
Tr. 594-95.
1 At Applicants' request, the date for filing this brief was l
set for July 3, 1981.
Tr. 628-29.
Since that date was a l
Federal holiday (a fact unbeknownst to Applicants at the time),
j the brief is filec July 6, 1981.
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The purpose of this brief is to comment on the new information presented, both from the point of view its timeli-ness and also as to its adequacy as a basis for the conten-tions.
The question of timeliness is important.
The Commission's Rules of Practice require that a petition for leave to inter-vene set forth the contentions and the bases therefore with reasonable specificity.
The rules provide a specific opportu-nity to file a later amendment to the petition to meet these requirements.
In this proceeding, the Licensing Board, by Memorandum and Order dated April 9, 1981, required each petitioner to file an amended petition no later than 25 days before the Special Prehearing Conference.
The Memorandum and Order also required each party and petitioner to file a brief in support of or in opposition to the contentions that were being advanced.
That brief was due seven days prior to the Conference.
None of the petitioners filed a brief in support of its contentions.2 Thus, the information presented for the first time, orally, at the Special Prehearing Conference was, in effect, the petitioners' third opportunity to take a bite at the apple.
Petitions for leave to intervene, which contain the contentions and the bases therefor, may be amended at any time.
2 Sunflower did file a "Special Prehearing Conference Brief" (dated May 22, 1981).
However this brief did not discuss Sunflower's submitted contentions.,
However, amendments which are filed later than 15 days before the Special Prehearing Conference are acceptable only if the presiding officer is able to find, among other things, a showing of good cause for being late.
Id.
Sunflower did not even attempt to show good cause for the late l
presentation of new information at the Special Prehearing Conference.
Thus, Applicants contend that none of the informa-tion put forth for the first time at the Special Prehearing Conference by Sunflower, which failed to meet its previous obligations under section 2.714(b) and the Licensing Board's April 9, 1981, order, c'an be used as bases for the various contentions advanced.
Kenney did not show good cause for his failure to provide any contentions in his petition, for his failure to file a amended petition, for his failure to file a special prehearing conference brief, or for the untimeliness of the submittal of his only contention, which was presented at the second day of the Special Prehearing Conference.3 Applicants therefore object to the admissibility of Kenney's new contention.
3 Kenney referred to a recent magazine article in support of several parts of his contention dealing with Applicants' emergency plans.
Tr. 597, 605-609.
h'hile that article might arguably be considered cause for an untimely attempt to amend or support parts of the contention, it is clearly not the reason or the cause for Kenney's untimely submission of a contention in the first instance.
Moreover, as will be more particularly discussed below, the magazine article does not provide an adequate basis for any parts of the contention and is in fact unrelated to much of the contention. __
r OCRE submitted a " Post-Special Prehearing Conference Brief", dated June 12, 1981, ten days after the Special Prehearing Conference.
The CCRE representative, Jeff Alexander, stated in that brief that he was unable to submit his special prehearing conference brief on time because he was preparing for his final examinations which were held April 21-29, and that he was involved in an " ongoing experiment" as part of his Master's thesis requirements.
OCRE did not request leave to file the special prehearing conference brief late, or give any indication that it even intended to file such a brief.
In fact, at the Special Prehearing Conference, the Licensing Board noted that the petitioners /intervenors would not have a further opportunity to argue their contentions after the Conference.
Tr. 295.
Kaiting until after the other parties have filed their briefs in accordance with the Licensing Board's order, failing to appear at the Special Prehearing Colference (or to have a representative prepared tc discuss the issues), and then submitting an untimely and unauthorized pleading, should not be tolerated by the Licensing Board.
None of OCRE's good cause arguments provides an excuse for filing an untimely brief or for not informing the Licensing Board of its intent to file a late brief.
The special prehearing conference brief was due on May 26 (7 days before the Special Prehearing Conference).
Mr. Alexander's final.
s examinations were completed on April 29.
While his "on-going experiment" may have taken a substantial amount of Mr.
Alexander's time, he was on notice from the date he received the Licensing Board's April 9, 1981 Memorandum and Order that the special prehearing conference brief had to be filed by May 26.
CCRE's failure to inform the Licensing Board of any schedule problems until June 10 shculd alone be sufficient grounds to reject OCRE's June 10 brief.
The Commission's recent Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, 46 Fed. Reg. 28533 (May 27, 1981), is particularly apt here.
The Commission stated:
Fairness to all involved in NRC's adjudica-tory proceaures requires that every participant fulfill the obligations imposed by and in accord-ance with applicable law and Commission regula-tions.
While a board should endeavor to conduct the proceeding in a manner that takes account of the special circumstances faced by any partici-pant, the fact that a party may have personal or other obligations or possess fewer resources than others to devote to the proceeding does not relieve that party of its hearing obligations.
Id. at 28534.
The Commission went on to state that a board should consider the imposition of sanctions against the offending party.
One of a number of sanctions specifically mentioned by the Commission was for the Licensing Board to " refuse to consider a filing by the offending party."
Id.
OCRE's Post-Special Prehearing Conference Brief should not be accepted by the Licensing Board. _
s Following is a discussion of the admissibility of the contentions which have been presented, taking into considera-tion the new information presented at the Special Prehearing Conference and in CCRE's untimely brief.
Applicants will not repeat in the discussion of each contention its objections to the consideration of this new information on the grounds of untimeliness and failure to show good cause.
Applicants also reaffirm the positions advanced in their May 22, 1981 briefs on the contentions of Sunflower and CCRE, and will not repeat those arguments here.
I.
CCNTENTIONS OF SUNFLOWER ALLIANCE, ET. AL.
Contention 1 (Emergency and Evacuation Plans). Tr.
174-225.
Sunflower's Contention 1 is a series of conclusions without supporting bases, i.e.,
that the emergency and evac-uation plans suffer from " inadequacy of notification plans; deficiencies in radiation exposure measurement techniques, insufficient practical workability; no agreement with local response organizations as to cost and implementation of plans l
and inadequate notification and information to media and residents within the ten (10) and fifty (50) mile radii."
Applicants' argument was (and is) that no bases have been l
stated for the series of broad conclusary allegations, and the contention should therefore be rejected.
l At the Special Prehearing Conference, Applicants suggested that this contention might have been intended to relate to the state and local (county) emergency plans, which had not yet been completed, rather than Applicants' on-site emergency plan described in Section 13.3 and Appendix 13A of the Perry Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Vol. 16.
The attorney for Sunflower, however, said he had in mind the plan contained in the FSAR.4 Also, as discussed below, facts cited at the prehearing conference by Sunflower's attorney came from that section of the FSAR.
The only factual basis asserted by Sunflower at the Special Prehearing Conference was that there are only 150 school buses available for evacuation in the emergency planning zone.
While there are a sufficient number of buses in the neighboring area,5 Sunflower alleges there is no agreement for the use of the buses.
Tr. 176-7.
Applicants agreed to admit that specific issue as a contention, Tr. 188-203, but Sunflower rejected the suggestion, preferring to stay with their contention as written:
4 "MR. WILT:
. They have an Exhibit 13A in the Appendix of the FSAR.
I thought that was the plan.
If that's not the plan, this is new to me."
Tr. 210.
5 At page 21 of Appendix D to Applicant's emergency plan (FSAR, Appendix 13A, Vol. 16), Applicants state that 150 buses serve schools within the emergency planning zone, and that there are approximately 400 school buses in Lake County, northern Geauga County, and western Ashtabula County plant.
The FSAR states that it would be necessary to draw on many of these 400 buses.
l MR. h'ILT:
I think the contention as I have written it, artfully or not, is perfectly clear.
It puts them on notice as to what we're trying to say and what we're talking about, namely, that their plan is no good.
Tr. 210 (emphasis added).
.they don't have a plan that works, and that's as specific as we have to get.
Tr. 210 (emphasis added).
So I would state to the board that the contention as set forth in the first filing of Sunflower should be admitted.
Tr. 210-11.
Sunflower, in effect, wants to say nothing more than "their plan is no good" at this stage of the proceedings, and then conduct a general inquiry, Tr. 189, to see if they can come up with something on discovery to justify the contention, Tr. 210.
This, of course, is dianetrically opposed to the Commission's Rules of Practice, which regoire a contention to be accompanied by a basis, prior to discovery, rather than allowing intervenors into a proceeding to conduct a fishing expedition in hopes of coming up with support for an unfounded allegation.
Sunflower, having failed to identify the aspects of Appli-cants' emergency plan in Appendix 13A of the FSAR which are defective, and the bases for the conclusions that they are defective, and having rejected the Licensing Board's attempts to frame more specific contentions, Tr. 181-83, insists on pressing its original contention as framed in its petition.
That contention does not comply with the specificity and basis. _...
4 e
g requiremente of section 2.714(b), and must ther-fore be disallowed.6 Contention 2 (Financial Capability; See also OCRE Conten-tion 7).
Tr. 233-300; 249-50; 453-7.
Sunflower's Contention 2 involves allegations as to the Applicants' financial capability to construct, operate, and decommission the Perry plant.
As stated at pages 4 and 5 of Applicants' May 22 brief, the Applicants' financial capability to construct the plant is outside the scope of an operating license proceeding.7 As to the question of plant operation, Sunficwer presented no basis in its petition for the contention that Applicants
" lack the financial capability of operating Units 1 and 2."
During the course of the Special Prehearing Conference, 6
Kenney joined the discussion of this contention, primarily on the subject cf radiological monitoring, Tr. 178-9, 211-13, 215-24, but later included that concern in a contention of his own.
Tr. 595-609.
Sunflower did not adopt Kenney's comments, preferring to stay with its contention as originally worded.
The NRC Staff, in its brief filed on July 6, 1981, supported the admissien of a Sunflower contention involving financing of the local (off-site) emergency plan.
However, since Sunflower neither raised that subject, nor showed any interest in l
adopting it, see, e.g., Tr. 189,210, it would be inappropriate l
to admit the issue as a Sunflower contention.
7 It should also be noted that Sunflo.er's concerns about the l
costs of construction are " principally financial in nature,"
rather than related to health and safety or the environment.
Tr. 248-9.
l l l
Sunflower argued that, because the costs of constructing the plant had oxceeded original estimates, the companies would somehow be financially.ncapable of operating the plant.
But their arguments were all conjecture and guesswork.
For example, Sunflower stated that The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company ("CEI") had ' considerable difficulties in cash flow."
Tr. 238.
But no explanation was given as to what those cash flow difficulties were.
Sunflower then suggested that "there is an extremely strong possibility that the capital structure of Cleveland Electric Illuminating is beginning to suffer."
Tr. 240.
But Sunflower did not say the company was, in fact, suffering, nor did it provide any basis in fact to support the allegation that the company's capital structure was not sound,8 or that the unsoundness would somehow adversely affect CEI's ability to operate the plant.
In sum, Sunflower is arguing that, because of increased construction costs, there are " changes in circumstances" that have " doubtless occurred in Cleveland Electric Illuminating's cash flow ability."
Tr. 243.
Sunflower did not know this to be the case; it was only guessing,9 and it therefore wanted to 8
Sunflower's only attempt to support the allegation was a reference to a report by the General Accounting Office which (a) had nothing to do with a utility's ability to operate a completed plant, and (b) had nothing to do with CEI.
Tr.
239-40, n
9 In fact, Sunflower guessed wrong about the financi '
condition of CEI.
The company has one of the highest N:t ratings among the nation's utilities, with an AA rating b,.
" reexamine" the issue.
Tr. 243.
But equally significantly, Sunflower did not relate the alleged cash flow problem to the ability to operate the plant.
The contention must therefore fail for lack of basis.
A utility's financial structure will improve, and improve conciderably, when a nuclear plant is completed and begins generating power.
It is placed into the utility's rate basis, and it generates revenues from operations.
It is thus rather extraordinary to suggest that a utility would not have the financial capability to operate a completed nuclear plant, and one would expect the suggestion to be accompanied by an explanation of how such a state of affairs would be likely to come about.
No such explanation was given.
As to the third aspect of this contention, Sunflower provided no basis for its blanket assertion that " Applicants lack the financial capability to decommission the facilities-and protecting them after decommissioning." Sunflower acknowl-edged that the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio ("PUCC") has established a pe!!av for setting up decommissioning funds that "apparently is becoming the standard accounting and rate making (continued)
Moody's, an AA-rating by Standard and Poor, and in AA rating from Fitch.
CEI's sound financial condition was reflected by the current effective yields of CEI bonds traded on the open market, and the interest paid on recently issued preferred stock.
CEI's commercial paper ratings are amctg the highest in the country.
Tr. 453-7., - - - _ -,,.. - - - - - - _, _,,
procedure of the P'JCO." Tr. 245.
Sunflower then seems.to argue that delays in the completion of the Perry facility coupled with inflation mean that the decommissioning costs are not and cannot be adequately addressed."
Tr. 246.
Justification or support for this argument is not provided.
Where the financial qualifications issue in general has been labelled by the Commission as of " limited usefulness",10 the admission of financial qualification contentions based on sheer speculation serves little useful purpose.
OCRF's Contention 7 deals with the related issue of prema'.;ure decommissioning.
OCRE'- representative had no new information to shed on this issue.
Tr. 249-251.
This conten-tion should also be denied.
Contentions 3, 4 and 5 (Need for Power; See also CCRE Contention 10).
Tr. 300-3; 462-534.
Sunflower's Contentions 3, 4 and 5 and OCRE's Contention 10 all argue that Applicants have overestimated the need for the Perry facilities and have not adequately considered alternatives such as conservation, cogeneration, load manage-ment, rate structure changes, and interconnections.
10 Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 ano 2), CLI-78-1, 7 NRC 1, 19 (1978).
In addition, the Commission is considering the complete elimination of financial qualifications as a hearing issue.
See SECY-81-168, Proposed Rulemaking to Reduce or Eliminate Requirements with respect to Financial Qualifications for Power Reactors.
(May 13, 1981) !
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o Applicants' response to these contentions as set forth in the 1
May 22 briefs was that the proposed alternativer were clearly unreasonable in the context of an operating license proceeding and therefore were inappropriate issues under the National Environmental Policy Act.
Applicants continue to believe tha~
NEPA does not require consideration of alternatives to a completed facility, especially where there has been a full NEPA review at the construction permit stage.
Sunflower presented additional (although not new) informa-tion at the Special Prehearing Conference to support considera-tion of these issues.
Sunflower's basic argument was that Applicants' load forecasts had been significantly lowered since the issuance of the construction permits.
- See, e.g.,
Tr.
462-463.
Sunflower cited Applicants' annual load forecasts submitted to Ohio state agencies, indicating that these forecasts had been reduced in succeeding years.
- See, e.g.,
Tr.
519-521.
There is no doubt that Applicants have revised their load forecasts.
For example, Applicants' 1973 forecast for 1983 peak load was 18,529 MW, while the 1980 forecast for 1983 was 12,768 MW.
Environmental Report - Operating License Stage
("ER-OL"), vol. 1, p. 1.1-11.
What Sunflower did not recognize is that Applicants have similarly revised the capacity which would be available to meet the forecasted load.
These revi-sions included the termination of 4332 MW of capacity. _ _
11 originally scheduled for operation in the 1981-1983 period as well as delays in in-service dates for the Perry units and other new generating capacity.12 Gunflower has presented no basis for a contention that the Perry units ure not needed or could be replaced by some alternative.
At the Special Prehearing Conference, Sunflower did refer to the testimony of Richard Rosen in a Pennsylvania state proceeding.
According to Sunflower Mr. Rosen indicated at thac time, which wac March, 1980, that the Beaver Valley plant, which of course is not in contention here, and the two Perry plants, all three of which were under construction at the time, were not necessary in part because of the fact that CEI and the other partners in those construc-tion ventures woulo become over base loaded, for all intents and purposes, by the inclu-sion of those plants on their capacities.
Tr. 470.
It is worth noting that in this same Pennsylvania proceeding, Mr. Rosen subsequently changed his conclusions, stating 11 The Davis-Besse Units 2 and 3 (906 MW each) were originally scheduled for operation in June 1981 and January 1983.
Erie Units 1 and 2 (1260 MW each) were originally scheduled for operation in January 1982 and December 1983.
These units have been terminated.
ER-OL, vol. 1, p. 1.1-9 and Table 1.1-8.
12 At the time that the Environmental Report-Construction Permit Stage was prepared in 1973, the Perry units were scheduled for operation in April 1979 and April 1980 respectively.
Current schedule calls for operation in 1984 and 1988.
Other units scheduled to begin operation in this time period were also delayed.
ER-OL, vol. 1, p. 1.1-9 and Table 1.1-8.
O If one weighs all factors at this time from the point of view of potential cost to consumers, cautiously weighing in the unlikely possibility that demand growth rates will be significantly above 2%, the most prudent program from the standpoint of cost to consumers involves completion of Perry I
."13 It is also important to observe that the PUCO has explicitly rejected Mr. Rosen's recommended construction program.
(T]he alternative construction program (Mr.
Rosen] now recommends for CAPCO, which involves an unbelievable reliance on oil-firc2 peaking units, casts doubt on the credibility of his entire study, even if it were fouqd to have application in this case.14 Thus the very agency charged with regulating Ohio utilities has rejected the same arguments put forth by Sunflower here.
While Sunflower asserted that "the economic benefit of having the plant operable and on line (in 1984 for Unit 1 and 1988 for Unit 2] has, for all intents and purposes, van shed as of this date, or is becoming more and more foreseeable as to 13 Sur-Rebuttal Testimony of Richard A. Rosen on behalf of the Pennsylvania Office of the Consumer Advocate (August 5, 1980),
Before the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, Docket 1-79070315, Investigation Upon the Commission's Gwn Motion into the Delay in the CAPCO Construction Schedule.
14 In The Matter of The Application of The Cleveland Electric Illur. inating Company for Authority to Amend and Increase Certain of its Filing Schedules Fixing Rates and Charges for Electric Service, Case No. 79-537-EL-AIR, and In The Matter of the Complaint and Appeal of The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company from Ordinance No. 1673-79 of the Council of the City of Cleveland, Case No. 79-774-EL-CMR, Opinion and Order, dated July 14, 1980, p. 29.
r the economic unviability of the facilities," Tr. 466-7, Sunflower provided neither specificity nor basis for this assertion.
The strongest support for its allegation was that some of the " dissenting literature in the area" stated that the cost of, for instance, coal versus the costs of nuclear are extremely competitive, that depending on the region of the country, coal generally has an advantage.
Tr. 468.
This allegation, in addition to ignoring marginal costs, see Tr. 469, does not even address the specifics of the situation at hand, i.e.
the Applicants and their service territories.
The contentions must therefore be rejected.
Even if Applicants' NEPA argument is not adopted, the.intervenors have provided neither specificity nor basis for allegations con-cerning any aspects of the balance to be struck at the operating license stage, i.e.,
the operating and maintenance costs, plus the environmental costs, including safety costs, that are associated with operating and (fuel]
loading, as opposed to whatever financial benefits there are Tr. 472.
Contention 6 (Spent Fuel Storage Pond Release).
Tr.
304-16.
Contention 6 is a good illustration of a contention that lacks both specificity and basis, and demonstrates the need for -
complying with those requirements in the Commission's regulations.
The contention in Sunflower's petition was that there has been inadequate consideration of "a possible major radiation release accident in the spent fuel storage pond."15 Applicants' May 22 brief objected to the contention on grounds of lack of specificity and basis, noting that Sunflower had failed to identify or quantify the " major radiation release accident", had failed to explain how the undefined accident would impact emergency plans, and had failed to explain how the health and safety of residents would be endangeted.
At the Special Prehearing Conference, Sunflower alleged that the loss of circulation of the cooling water in the pond, for "several hours" could cause a "very severe radiation release," Tr. 305-7, and that the pond would boil over, like a pot boiling on a stove, and release contaminated water to the environment, Tr. 307, 312, 314.
Sunflower gave no basis for its far-fetched statements.
Sunflower completely ignored the information in the FSAR which describes the spent fuel pool cooling system, including the redundant circulating pump / heat exchanger trains and the multiple sources of make-up water.
FSAR, S9.1.3, Vol. 13.
Without a basis for its allegations, the contention fails to meet the requirements of section 2.714(b).
15 Sunflower's " Petition for Leave to Intervene", dated March 15, 1981, p.
- 6. _
l Contention 7 (Hydrogen Control; See also CCRE Contention 5).
Tr. 320-323, 561-62.
The Licensing Board ruled that these two contentions, related to hydrogen control, will not be considered in the absence of a further showing by Sunflower and OCRE in accord-ance with the Commission's Memorandum and Order in Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Isicnd Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1),
CLI-80-16, 11 NRC 674 ( 3 '; 8 0 ).
Tr. 320-3.
No such showing has been made.
OCRE's June 10 brief addresses this contention, but makes no attempt to meet the showing required by CLI-80-16.
Contention 8 (Licensing of Two Units).
Tr. 323-34.
This contention has disappeared as a potential ist e.
Sunflower, after listening to an explanation of how NRC licenses are issued, agreed that it was not a factual conten-tion, Tr. 331, but rather an attempt to seek assurances that Unit 2 would not be licensed to operate before completion of construction.
Tr. 331-2.
Since NRC regulations prohibit licensing under those circumstances, the issue raised has been resolved.
Contention 9(1) (Construction Quality Assurance).
Tr.
337-49.
Contention 9(1) is the first two and one half sentences of Sunflower's Contention 9.
Tr. 342.
That contention begins as follows: l
Petitioners allege that Applicants have demonstrated throughout the construction process their inability to comply with the Quality Assurance Program established by both the Commission and the Applicants.
Applicants' construction practices, as demonstrated in the Commission's own inspec-tion reports, are totally inexecusable.
Petitioners allege that Applicants have not constructed Perry in accordance with appli-cable standards and that there are the following but by no means the only defi-ciencies:
A)
B)
C)
D)
The plain reading of Contention 9 is that the first two sentences are part of a general background allegation leading up to four more specific allegations (A-D) which were encom-passed within the general scope of the first two sentences.
Sunflower surprised everyone at the special prehearing confer-ence by alleging that the first two sentences were totally independent of the remainder of Contention 9, and that they had to do with a " voluntary stop work order" which " stopped construction at the Perry plant for a good six months before that deficiency was corrected."
Tr. 339-40.
There was no hint in the wording of the contention to suggest this issue.
As a result, Applicants and the Staff were caught unawares, and neither had briefed the issue.
This particular incident graphically demonstrates the need to require petitioners to state their contentions with specificity, and to provide bases, so as to give adequate notice to the Licensing Board and the other participants. _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
Although Applicants, as stated above, have generally pointed to petitioners' failure to show good cause for submit-ting untimely information, this contention presents peculiar circumstances that bear mentioning.
Daniel Wilt, Sunflower's counsel in this proceeding, wrote to U.S. Senator John Glenn on November 1, 1979, about the work stoppage.
Mr. Wilt included with that letter summaries of all of the NRC inspection reports issued during the period of time relevant to the work stoppage.
Mr. Wilt's unique and intimate knowledge of the events surroun-ding this allegation, coupled with the curiously misleading phrasing of Contention 9, rakes it highly unlikely that a finding of good cause for the late presentation of this contention could be made.
In any event, Sunflower has not even attempted a showing of good cause.
For that reason alone, Contention 9(1) should be reject.ed.
Other reasons also mandate its rejection.
The contention falls far short of providing the necessary specificity.
Nowhere does Sunflower identify the parts of the Perry facility that are deficient for not having been constructed "in accord-ance with applicable standards", nor do they specify the
" applicable standards" which have not been met.
The contention is also deficient in that it lacks adequate basis.
Sunflower has provided Applicants with 24 inspection reports, with a total of 309 pages, covering a three-year period between early 1978 and early 1981.
Most of the informa-tion bears no relationship to the work stoppage.
Sunflower has --.-.
not provided any citations to the portions of the documents which arguably form a basis for contention 9(1).
By no rational logic can this be construed as providing the bases, with reasonable specificity, required by section 2.714(b) for the allegations that Applicants have not constructed the plant in accordance with applicable standards.
Sunflower's Contention 9(1) tefers to a period early in the construction of the Perry plant, in January and February of 1978, when NRC inspections indicated certain instances where the Perry quality assurance program was being ipproperly implemented.
CEI immediately issued stop work orders in five safety-related areas.
These were documented in a letter dated February 8, 1978, from NRC to CEI, known as an Immediate Action Letter.
CEI immediately engaged in corrective actions, which resulted in an improved quality assurance program, implemented to NRC's satisfaction.
All work done prior to the stop work orders was reinspected to assure compliance with NRC standards.
Work was resumed on the first of the five stop work areas on February 18, 1978.
Work in other areas resumed on March 17, 1978 and April 14, 1978.
On May 15, 1978, work resumed in the last of the work areas.16 In a letter dated March 5, 1980, from the NRC to Senator Glenn (attached hereto as Attachment 1) that was prompted by 16 Sunflower referred to this as a six-month work stoppage.
Tr. 339-40. -
~-
Mr. Wilt's letter to Senator Glenn, William J.
Dirks, Acting Executive Director for Cperations, stated:
Subsequently (to the stop work orders], CEI took aggressive actions to correct deficiencies, including a complete revision of the Perry Quality Assurance Program from the corporate lo. vel to the detailed site working procedures; a restructuring of the QA/QC organization, including the replacement of a number of management level QA/QC personnel with more capable individuals; a major change in the site construction organization to provide more effective control of site contractors; and transfer of the engineering and scheduling functions
.d personnel from the corporate headquarters te a.e site.
Our Region III office instituted an augmented inspection program for the Perry plant to review in detail the revised QA program, to assure that the requirements of the new program were effectively implemented, and to assure that the construction which had been completed under the previous program was acceptable.
Inspections subsequent to the issuance of the Immediate Action Letter indicate that the performance of CEI improved measurably.
This is evidenced by the fact that 36 noncompliances were identified by Region III at Perry in 1978 (22 of which were cited in the first six months), and only nine noncompliances were found in 1979.
Thus, the record does not support sucflower's allegation that the plant has not been constructed in accordance with applicable standards.
More to the point, however, at this stage of the proceedings, is that Sunflower has not presented a legally adequate contention.
The contention is far too broad to meet the Commission's specificity requirements and, as a result, presents an issue impossible to litigate.
As bases, Sunflower off-handedly submits three years' worth of inspection reports, failing even to cite the relevant portions.
Given the detailed prior knowledge of this issue by Sunflower's counsel, -
there can certainly be no good cause for the late submission of these reports.
Sunflower has not met the requirements of section 2.714(b), and the contention must be rejected.
Contention 9(2) (Nozzle Cracking).
Tr. 349-52.
Sunflower did not respond to Applicants' May 22 brief on this contention, other than to admit that they did not know whether or not the contention has a basis.
Tr. 351.
Contention 9(3) (Geologic Fault; See also CCRE Contentions 11(a) and (b)).
Tr. 352-63.
The only new information provided by Sunflower was the occurance of a " mild tremor" last year.
Tr. 353.
Sunflower did not, however, allege that the tremor exceeded the Perry plant's seismic design criteria and, in fact, admitted that it was not alleging a deficiency with the plant.
Tr. 356-7.
With respect to CCRE Contention 11(a) and (b), CCRE argued that a new fault had been discovered subsequent to the con-struction permit hearing.
Tr. 360.
However, the existence of this fault was discussed in the FSAR, and CCRE was not able to allege any deficiencies in the Applicants' treatment of the fault in the FSAR.
Tr. 363.
Thus, the contentions should not be allowed for the reasons stated in Applicants' May 22 briefs.
CCRE's June 10 brief (p. 6), appears to admit that Contention 11 is a challenge to 10 CFR Part 100 and then._
" suggests that a waiver of those regulations might be in order under 10 CFR sec. 2.758(b)."
That regulation establishes explicit procedures for petitioning that a Commission regula-tion be waived.
CCRE has made no attempt to comply with those procedures.
Contention 9(4) (Cooling Tower Asbestos).
Tr. 364.
Sunflower was unable to provide a basis for this conten-tion.
Tr. 364.
Contention 9(5) (Porous Concrete).
Tr. 364-5.
Sunflower had no response to Applicants' May 22 briefs.
Contention 9(6) (Operations of Davis-Besse).
Tr. 365.
The last two sentences of Contention 9 relate to the operation of the Davis-Besse facility.
Sunflower withdrew that contention.
Tr. 365.
Contention 10 (Decommissioning).
Tr. 365-72.
Sunflower added nothing, and had no response to Applicants' May 22 brief on this contention.
Sunflower clarified that the last allegation in the contention, that Applicants have " failed to establish satisfactorily financial protection to protect the public during the decommissioning process', is the same issue as that raised in Sunflower's Contention 2.
Tr. 371-2. - _.
Contention 11 (ECCS Test'ng).
Tr. 372-387.
In this contention, Sunflower lists five ECCS areas or items which they allege "have not been completely tested."
As stated in Applicants' brief, this contention is an impermissible challenge to the Commission's requic.. ions in 10 C.F.R. 550.46 and Appendix K to Part 50.
Section 6.3 of the FSAR, Vol. 12, contains a description of the Perry ECCS and design bases, including a discussion of the system design and performance evaluation.
In section 6.3.1.1.1, the FSAR states:
The functional requirements (for example, coolant delivery rates) specified in detail in Table 6.3-1 are such that the system performance under all LOCA conditions postulated in the design satisfies the requirements of paragraph 50.46.
Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling System for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Reactors" of 10 C.F.R. 50.
In section 6.3.3, Performance Evaluation," the FSAR states that:
The performance of the ECCS is determined through application of the 10 C.F.R. 50 Appendix K evaluation models and then showing conformance to the acceptance criteria of 10 C.F.R. 50.46.
NEDC-20566 (Reference 1),
" General Electric Company Model for Loss-of-Coolant Analysis In Accordance with 10 C.F.R. 50 Appendix K" provides a complete description of the methods used to perform the calculations.
These methods are summarized herein.
Thus, section 6.3 of the FSAR describes how the Perry ECCS meets the NRC's performance standards embodied in its regula-I tions.
At the Special Prehearing Conference, Sunflower was unable to point out any aspects of the regulations which it alleged would not be met by the Perry ECCS.
Tr. 393-85. 1
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o Sunflower stated that the basis for the contention was section 1.5.1.2 of the FSAR (Vol. 1).
Tr. 373.
Nothing in that section (or elsewhere) suggests that NRC's ECCS regula-tions are not being met, or even that completion of the tests is required for licensing the plant.
Sunflower has provided no bases for its contention 11.
Contention 12 (Cooling System Cracks and Corrosion).
Tr.
c 327-91.
Sunflower withdrew this contention in favor of CCRE's Contention 13.
Tr. 391.
Contention 13 (BWR Scram System).
Tr. 391-3; 394-7.
Sunflower was unable to explain this contention, provide a basis, or respond to Applicants' May 22 b:lef.
Tr. 396-7.
Contention 14 (Airplane Crash Probabilities).
Tr.
397-410.
In its original contention, Sunflower alleged that an unidentified airport near the plant " intends to expand," and that the probability analysis in the FSAR for airplane crashes does not account for the increased air traffic.
At the Special Prehearing Conference, Sunflower identified the airport as the Lost Nation Airport, Tr. 397, but provided no additional information.
Sunflower did not elaborate on the extent of the expansion, nor did it explain how an expansion of activities at the Lost Nation Airport would adversely affect Applicants' analysis. I
The FSAR describes Lost Nation Airport as being 15 miles southwest of the plant site, with an ertimated annual activity of about 70,000 movements.
The airport management would like to continue to expand operations at Lost Nation, but no definite growth plans are anticipated at present.
FSAR, 52.2.2.5, pp.
1 2.2 2.2-12 (Vol. 1).
The crash probability analysis is found at section 3.5.1.6 of the FSAR, pp. 3.5 3.5-11a (Vol. 6).
It was performed in accordance with the NRC's standard criteria for determining air crash probabilities as outlined in the NRC's Standard Review Plan 3.5.1.6.
According to the NRC criteria, an airport more than 10 miles away from a plant does not contribute significantly to the air crash probacility for the plant unless 2
it has more than 1000d movements per year, with d being the distance from the site in miles.
For the Lost Nation Airport, the limiting amount of activity would be 1000 x (15)2 or 225,000 movements.
This is over 300 percent of the current level of activity at Lost Nation.
These figures were discussed at the Special prehearing Conference.
Sunflower had no response.
Tr. 408-10.
Sunflower j
has not met the requirements of 10 CFR 52.714 as to this contention; it should be deniede i
i i
i
( l l
Contention 15 (Anticipated Transients without scram).
Tr.
414-18.
Sunflower provided no new relevant information pertaining to this contention.
Applicants would note, however, that ATWS is now the subject of an on-going rulemaking proceeding.
Subsequent to the Special Prehearing Conference, the Commission, on June 16, 1981, voted to publish for comment its rulemaking proposals.
Contention 16 (Electrical Wi: Ang).
Tr. 418-19.
This contention was withdrawn by Sunflower.
Tr. 418-19.
Contention 17 (Containment Vessel Buckling).
Tr. 419-30.
Sunflower shed no additional light on this contention.
As to Sunflower's allegation that final testing of the containment vessel had not yet been conducted, Sunflower had no basis for suggesting that the tests would be improperly conducted, or that there was reason for concern about the outcome of the l
tests.
Tr. 421-22.
Sunflower was not even able to identify l
l the tests it had in mind.
Tr. 429-30.
Applicants continue to object to this contention for lack of basis.
Contention 18 (Control Rod Ejection).
Tr. 430.
The contention was withdrawn by Sunflower.
Tr. 430.
Contention 19 (Cooling Lake).
Tr. 430.
The contention was withdrawn by Sunflower.
Tr. 430.
Contention 20 (ECCS Pump Sunction Line).
Tr. 431-34.
Sunflower provided no new information.
The contention alleged a blockage of water which would cause the emergency sump pump to operate unreliably.
The Perry containments do not have sump pumps, and Sunflower was unable to explain where they thought the blockage would occur.
Tr. 434.
The contention must fail for lack of basis.
Contention 21 (Diesel Generator Reliability; See also CCRE Contention 2).
Tr. 434-35, 437-43.
Neither Sunflower nor CCRE provided additional informa-tion.
Applicants object to both contentions for the reasons stated in Applicants' May 22 briefs.
It should be noted that the Commission decision reviewing Florida Power & Light Co.
(St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 2), ALAB-603, 12 NRC 30 (1980), was issued on June 15, 1981.
CLI-81-12, 13 NRC ALAB-603 was cited by OCRE as support for its conten-tion.
The Commission decision did not address diesel generator reliability per se, but held that ALAB-603 did not establish station blackout as a design basis event.
Contention 22 (Valve Indication) and 23 (Coating and Cleaning Stainless Steel Components).
Tr. 443.
Both contentions were withdrawn by Sunflower.
Tr. 443. _ _ _ _ - _ - - - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ -.
II.
CCNTENTIONS OF OHIO CITIZENS FOR RESPONLIBLE ENERGY Contention 1 (Clam Biofouling) Tr. 444-445, 538-545.
OCRE's Contention 1 raises the issue of certain Asiatic clams (corbicula fluminea) causing biofouling in the Perry units' " source of process water".
Applicants' May 22 brief pointed out that CCRE had provided no basis for the presence of corbicula in the vicinity of the Perry facility.
OCRE's June 10 brief merely declares the statement that "[t]here is at least a fifty percent chance that Lake Erie is suitable of (sic] corbicula" is based upon the research of Jeff Alexander of the University of Dayton.
We are left to wonder as to the nature and applicability of this research, and how it can serve as a basis for alleging that the area of Lake Erie in the vicinity of the Perry facility might be suitable for corbicula growth.
Applicants respectfully submit that an adequate basis for the contention has not been provided.
Contention 2 (Diesel Generator Reliability).
See discussion of Sunflower Contention 21.
Contention 3 (Radiation Blocking Agent) Tr. 559.
This contention was accepted by Applicants and the Staff..
Contenticn 4 (Steam Injury) Tr. 446-447, 559-560.
Applicants' objection to this contention was based on its lack of any relevance to the Perry facility in that it dealt with a pre-operational event involving a prassurized water reactor, prior to fuel loading, involving (according to OCRE)
" technicians and maintenance workers." OCRE's June 10 brief (p.
- 3) now asserts that The issue is neither site-cor reactor-specific.
It is a cuneric technical safety issue, i.e. steam valve maintenance programs are common to all LWR's.
OCRE fails to provide any basis for this unsupported assertion.
OCRE's June 10 brief states, without explanation or support, that the " technicians and maintenance workers" injured in the Sequoyah accident, while not reactor operators, were
" vital in the event of problems arising outside the control room."
Again, OCRE has provided no indicatio7 that the injured workers at Sequoyah were in any way a part of the plant staff involved in operating that plant.
As noted ir Applicants' May 22 brief, the accident at Sequoyah occurred before fuel loading.
Tennessee Valley Authority has infor.ned Applicants that the individuals involved in the accident were not in fact a part of the plant ataff, but instead were TVA craft workers involved in the construction of the plant and not its opera-tion.
l _ _ -
CCRE's June 10 brief also raises at least one new issue, clearly outside the scope of its original contention 4.
OCRE now suggests that unplanned steam discharges can harm the fittings and seals within the valves.
OCRE then suggests " internal inspection [of valves] prior to reconnection to the pressure boundary."
This claim is un-related to OCRE's original cantention 4, which dealt with the question of personnel loss from steam accidents.
Aside from the absence of any showing of good cause for belatedly raising this issue at this time, the lack of any relevance between this new assertion and the Sequoyah accident underlying CCRE's original claim, and the failure to provide a basis, this claim is also a cha11onge to the Commission regulations.
See 10 CFR 550.55a(g)(3)(iii)-(v), which referencesSection XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
For all these reasons this new issue should be rejected.
Contention 5 (Hydrogen Bubbles) Tr. 561-562.
See discussion of Sunflower Contention 7.
Contention 6 (Reactor Pressure Vessel Cracking) Tr.
562-569.
App 124 ants' May 22 brief pointed out that this contention must be rejected for violating the Commission's Indian Point,
rule.
Consolidated Edison Co. of New York (Indian Point Unit No. 2), CLI-72-29, 5 AEC 20 (1972).
Neither CCRE's arguments at the Special Prehearing Conference nor its June 10 brief made any attempt to provide the "special circumstances" required by Indian Point.
Nor has OCRE provided any specificity as to the alleged defects in the pressure vessels or the tests that are performed.
And CCRE has also failed to show why the contention is not a challenge to the Commission regulation setting forth the requirements for in-service inspection programs.
OCRE's June 10 brief merely argues that the Perry pressure vessels would break before they would leak, thus negating an in-service inspection program based on moisture detection devices.
The relevance of the chain of argument is that i
CCRE assumes Applicant's inservice inspection
~
program will rely chiefly on moisture detection devices to alert operators of cracks.
CCRE June 10 brief, p. 5 (emphasis added).
OCRE provides no basis for this assumption, which in fact is false.
As Applicants' pointed out in their May 22 brief, the requirements for the in-service inspection program for the reactor pressure vessels are specified by Commission regulation, 10 CFR 550.55a(g)(3), which in turn referencesSection XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
Section XI provides that the in-service inspection program will utilize a material surveil-lance program (see FSAR, vol. 11, 55.3.1.6) as well as vol-umetric (ultrasonic), surface penetrant, and visual._
I examinations (see FSAR, vol. 11, 55.2.4).
See Section XI, Table IhB-2600-1.
CCRE's June 10 brief repeats, without further elaboration, the claim in its original centention that Applicants might not be able to repair any cracks found in the pressure vessels after irradiation and that Applicants "should identify the technology / procedure [they] will rely on to affect such r0 pairs."
In fact Applicants have identified these procedures.
As stated in the FSAR, vol. 11, S5.2.4, p. 5.2-36, The repair procedures for Class 1 components will comply with the requirements of Article IWB-4000 of Section IX [of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code).
The reactor pressure vessels are class I components.
- FSAR, vol. 11, p. 5.2-37.
Contention 7 (Premature Decommissioning).
See discussion of Sunflowe.. Contention 2.
Contention 8 (Computer Surveillance of Reactor Pressure Vessel) Tr. 569-571.
OCRE did not respond to Applicants' opposition to this contention, either at the Special Prehearing Conference or in its June 10 brief.
Contention 9 (Machining Defects in Reactor Pressure Vessel) Tr. 571-573.
CCRE's only elaboration of this contention was the statement that OCRE essentially wants to know what tests will be performed on the pressure vessel and there must be evidence that these tests will be proper tests.
Tr. 571.
As pointed out in Applicants' May 22 brief, p. 13, further testing is already provided for and will be carried out in accordance with applicable ASME Code requirements.
CCRE has not even alleged that this testing is inadequate, let alone provided a basis for that a'. legation.
Contention 10 (Demonstrable Need).
See discussion of Sunflower Contentions 3-5.
Contention 11 (Plant site) Tr. 573-590.
See discussion of Sunflower Contention 9(3) with respect to Contentions 11(a) and 11(b).
With respect to Contentions 11(c) and 11(d), CCRE provided no responses to Applicants' opposition, either at the Special Prehearing or in its June 10 brief.
Contention 12 (CANDU Alternative) Tr. 590-594.
OCRE has provided no new arguments in support of this contention. __
Contention 13 (Pipe Break - Scram Discharge Volume).
Tr.
594.
This contention was admitted by the Licensing Board.
Tr.
594.
III. CCNTENTION OF TOD KENNEY Kenney presented a fourteen-part contention orally, for the first time, during the second day of the Special Prehearing Conference.
Tr. 595-603.
Applicants requested, and the Licensing Board agreed, that Kenney be required to submit his contention in writing, along with the bases therefore, to give the other parties opportunity to respond.
Tr. 603-7.
In addition, the Licensing Board required Kenney to provide a showing of good cause as to why the contention was being submitted so late.
Tr. 596.
On June 8, 1981, Kenney submitted a document entitled, l
"Intervenor's Amended Contention," which was a list of fourteen items related to Applicants' emergency plan contained in Appendix 13A of the FSAR, Volume 16.
The only reason cited by Kenney as cause for the belated submission of his contention was an article from the May 16, 1981, Pittsburgh Post Gazette cor.cerning "new research on the recalculation of the effects of nuclear radiation on people done by Dr. Edward Radford."
The prehearing conference brief which the Licensing Board directed _
the parties to file--and which Kenney did not file--was due on May 26, 1981.
Kenney's failure to explain why this "new information" was not raised in the May 26 briefs or at some time prior to June 8 remains unexplained.
Kenney's last minute citation of the Radford information can hardly constitute good cause for his subsequent lapses.
Furthermore, the Radford information has no bearing on evacuation plans -- the subjact of the contention.
Kenney's June 8 filing describes the new information as follows:
Dr. Radford believes that the probabilities for contracting any form of cancer after irradiation will be quadrupled.
Yet evacuation requirements are not dependent on the results of Dr. Radford's "new research."
Rather they are established by NRC regulation, IG CFR SS50.33(g), 50.47(c)(2), 50.54(s)(1),
and Appendix E to Part 50, and by statute, NRC Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1980, Puh.
L.
No.96-295.
Thus, any challenge to the NRC's evacuation requirements is a challenge to NRC regulations and Congressional mandate not appropriate in this proceeding.
Finally, the "new information" is largely unrelated to the contention.
At the prehearing conference, Kenney stated that, "a majority of these points I bring up are concerning new information," Tr. 596-97, and in his filing he stated that "many of the concerns deal directly with new information."
l l l l
\\
r However, only four of the fourteen items presented (items 1, 4,
5, 6) even assert a relationship to the "new information."
Kenney makes no attempt to show how Dr. Radford's dissenting views on the effectc of radiation form a basis for, or even relate to, these parts of his contention for which he cites "new information."
Thus, the article concerning Dr. Radford falls far short of constituting a showing of good cause for Kenney's untimely contention.1 Following are discussions of each of the fourteen items of Kenney's contention.
1.
Kenney alleges that the definition of "Affected Person," FSAR, App. 13A, S1.0(2), p. 1-1, Vol. 16, is defi-cient, requires recalculatior., and renders Applicants' emergency plan " fatally defective."
The definition reads as follows:
2.
Affected Person - Individual who has been pnysically injured or radiolog-ically exposed as a result of an accident to a degree requiring special attention, e.g.,
first aid, or personnel decontamination.
17 As will be discussed below, Kenney's allegations are so lacking in specificity, as well as being deficient in other respects, that the Licensing Board need not address the merits of the "new information" brought forth by Kenney.
At the special prehearing conference, Kenney cited an article in the May 22, 1981, issue of Science, Tr. 596-7, which discussed the views of Dr. Edward Radford on the risks associated with exposure to radiation.
A follow-up article in the June 19, 1981, issue of Science discussed the reactions of Dr.
Radford's peers.to his ideas, and put a rather different light on the information relied upon by Kenney.
Science reported much disagreement with Dr. Radford's theories, and no support.
Copies of both articles are attached as Attachments 2 and 3.
f Kenney has not explained how or why this definition, as used in the emergency plan. causes the plan to be fatally defective.
There is nothing to recalculate, as alleged by Kenney, because the definition does not involve a calculation.
Kenney also alleges that the definition does not state how decontamination will be " facilitated."
The purpose of a definition is not to explain how an action (i.e., decontamination) is to be facil-itated.
The contention makes no sense.
Since Kenney has not explained how the definition adversely affects the emergency plan, and has provided no basis for such an explanation, the contenticn should not be admitted.
2.
This contention says simply that the definition of
" Contaminated Arer",
Id.,
51.0(10), p. 1-2, is " deficient."
Kenney does not explain how, why, or in what respects the definition is deficient.
Nor does he provide a basis.
- Also, as in item 1 above, he has not explained how or why the definition renders the plan defective.
Applicants object to this contention for lack of specificity and basis.
3.
Kenney here alleges that the definition of " Dose Projection,"
Id.,
51.0(14), p.
1-2, is deficient because it is not calculated with off-site monitorc with " continuous readout of current ionizing radiation."
Kenney appears to have misread the definition.
What Kenney is describing is a current
)
measurement of dose, not a projection of dose.
The dose projection, based on the types and quantities of radioactive materials released and the appropriata meteorological transport._
and dispersal parameters, is used to estimate and predict in advance the doses that may subsequently occur for purposes of determining the appropriate protective action to be taken.
Kenney has given no explanation of why the definition of dose projection is deficient, and how such deficiency affects the emergency plan.
4.
This contention alleges that the definition of
" Emergency Action Levels,"
Id.,
51.0(15), p. 1-3, is deficient and should be " recalculated."
Applicants' definitions are in accordance with 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App.
E, SIV(c) and, as cited in the definition, the emergency action levels are consistent with Appendix 1, " Basis for Emergency Action Levels for Nuclear Power Facilities," to NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November, 1980.
Kenney has failed to explain which levels are deficient and why.
The contention is unmanageable; it lacks basis and specificity, and must therefore be disal-lowed.
5.
Kenney next alleges that the definition of " Plume Exposure Pathway",
Id.,
S1.0(36), p.
1-5, is deficient, and "that the pathway would have to be enlarged."
In addition to the fact that Kenney does not explain how it is deficient, or give the basis for this proclamation, the definition of the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone is contained in the Commission's regulations at 10 C.F.R.
SS50.33(g),
50.47(c)(2), 50.54(s)(1) Appendix L.
Thus, the contention lacks basis and specificity, and is an impermissible challenge to the Commissien's regulations.
6.
This contention alleges that the definition of
" Protective Action Guides",
Id., 51.0(42), p.
1-6, is defi-cient, and that the guides have to be " recalculated."
- Again, Kenney has not related the definition to the emergency plan, has not explained how the definition renders the emergency plan defective, has not identified the deficient guides, has not explained how any such guides are deficient, and has provided no basis for the allegation.
The contention must be rejected for lack of specificity and basis.
7.
In item 7 of the contention, Kenney seems to be making two separate allegations with respect to the emergency planning zones (EPZ).
The first allegation is that the plume exposure pathway EPZ must be " changed and enlarged."
As discussed in response to item 5 of Kenney's contention, above, the EPZ is defined in the Commission's regulations, and this allegation is therefore an impermissible challenge to the regulations.
The second allegation is somewhat confusing.
Kenney alleges that the monitoring program in the second EPZ, or ingestion pathway EPZ, should include human monitoring.
The.
A
monitoring program is set up to monitor crops, dairy cows, water, and other relevant components of the ingestion exposure pathway to detect increased levels of I-131 as early as possible in the food chain.
Its purpose is to detect contami-nation prior to ingestion so as to prevent exposure to humans, not to use humans as a monitoring indicator.
Applicants' monitoring program is in accord with the criteria in NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," which is incorporated into the Commission's emergency plan regulations, 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b).
Kenney has given no explanation or basis for his contention that Applicants' emergency plan is defective because humans are not used as monitors in the ingestion pathway EPZ.
8.
Kenney here states that Applicants' " Emergency Classifications" are defective, but lists only one alleged
- defect, i.e.,
that Applicants make no mention of deploying monitoring teams during a Classification 2 emergency (alert).
Kenney has apparently overlooked the descriptions of assessment actions in the FSAR, App. 13A, S6.2, Vol. 16.
At 56.2.2, p.
6-8, the FSAR states that radiation monitoring teams will be dispatched for Alert classification emergencies.
The conten-tion therefor lacks basis and should be excluded.
9.
Kenney alleges that the off-site monitoring program should include monitors which provide continuous readout )
[
indications.
Kenney gives no explanation of why this is necessary, or even preferable, as compared to the off-site monitoring program described in the FSAR.
Applicants' moni-toring program conforms to the criteria in NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," which is incorporated into 10 C.F.R. 550.47.
The emphasis there is on the ability to predict and project doses based on meteorological data and effluent release data so as to determine the appropriate corrective action to take.
The information provided by fixed monitors would not leave time to implement protective actions.
To the extent instantaneous readouts are necessary, e.g.,
to confirm projected dose rates, mobile teams will be dispatched to the appropriate areas.
Fixed monitors which may or may not be within the plume area on a given day cannot be relied upon for this information.
This contention should be disallowed for lack of basis.
10.
Kenney next alleges that Applicants should provide for stockpiling potassium iodide at two hospitals.
Applicant have previously agreed to the admission of a similar contention (cCRE Contention 3).
However, for the reason discussed earlier related to lack of timeleness and failure to make a showing of good cause, Applicants object to the admission of this conten-tion.
e...
11.
Kenney alleges that the emergency plans are " fatally defective" because agreements with local communities are not
" formally reached and therefor not binding."
Kenney fails to tell us which agreements he believes are not binding and why that renders the plan fatally defective.
The contention must be rejected for lack of basis.
12.
Kenney's next allegation is that the plan is " fatally defective" because there is no provision for " payment to local communities for planning or maintenance of the evacuation plans."
Nowhere is there a requirement of either NRC or the Federal Emergency Management Agency for payment to be made to local communities.
The contention is outside the scope of this proceeding.
Furthermore, Kenney has provided no explanation as to why such payments are required.
13.
The next allegation is that Applicants "may suffer financial difficulty and would therefore be hampered in safely operating the nuclear facility." Kenney states that the "Muny Light anti-trust suit case" would be "a factor which would influence this." This allegation has nothing to do with evacuation plans, supposedly the subject of this contention.
Applicants have objected to a similar contention (Sunflower Contention 2) as discussed earlier in this brief.
Kenney's allegation is even more amorphous.
Kenney has provided no explanation as to why the "Muny Light anti-trust suit case" would conceivably impact on the safe operation of the Perry.
(
4...
facilities.
Applicants object to this contention on the grounds that it lacks both basis and specificity.
14.
The last allegation, that the human population is not part of the radiological monitoring program, is essentially the same as item 9 above, and is inadmissible for the same reasons.
Respectfully Submitted, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWERIDGE
\\
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Sy -
L_o N44af'E. Silberg Bruce W.
Churchill Counsel for Applicants 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036 (202) 822-1000 Dated: July 6, 1981 4..
F L
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UNITED STATES
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ATTACHMENT 1
[
e NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION yg WASHINGTON. o. C. 20555 WBO g
5 The Honorable John Glenn United States Senate Washington, DC 20510
Dear Senator Glenn:
This is in response to your letter dated Novemb,er 29, 1979, which requested that the NRC review and reply--to a letter from Mr. Daniel D. Wilt concerning the construction of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant.
In his letter,Mr. Wilt raised specific questions regarding the construction practices of the licensee, Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI), and the inspection approach used by the NRC at Perry.
With regard to the Comais.sion practices concerning correction of constructicn defects, it is NRC policy that construction defects be corrected prior to issuange of the Operating License.
Defects found during inspections are brought to the licensee's attention through formai enforcement actions, which may take the form of written notices of violation or agreements to stop work depending on the severity of the defects.
Mr. Wilt's letter discussed the Immediate Action Letter of February 8,1978 issued by our P,egion III office which confirmed halting of safety related construction activities at the Perry site and the steps to be completed prior to resumption of work.
This Immediate Action Letter resulted from findings of significant deficiencies in site construction practices and the Perry Quality Assurance Program during Region III inspections in January and early February 1973.
Following issuance of the Immediate Action Letter our Regional Director met with the President of CEI to discuss the importance of top management involvement in the Perry project and the need for broad and timely corrective action.
Subsequently, CEI took aggressive actions to correct deficiencies, including a complete revision of the Perry Quality Assurance Program from the corporate level to the detailed site working procedures; a restructuring of the QA/QC organization, including the replacement of a number of management level QA/QC personnel with more capable individuals; a major change in the site construction organization to provide more effective control of site contractors; and transfer of the engineering and scheduling functions and personnel from the corporate headquarters to the site.
Our Region III office instituted an augmented inspection program for the Perry plant to revie'w in detail the revised QA program, to assure that the requirements of the new program were effectively implemented, and to assure that the construction which had been completed under the previous program was acceptable.
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The Honorable John Glenn -
Inspections subsecuent te -the issuance of the Immediate Action Letter indicate that the perfo.m:ance of CEI i= proved measurably.
This is evidenced by the fact that 36 nonconpiiances were identified by Region III at Perry in 1978 (22 of cich were citec in the first six months), and only nine noncompliances were found in 1979.
In Mr. Wilt's reference to the July 1979 inspection, he stated that the report noted a "corpleta breakdown in the inspection verification program by CEI." The NRC inspection r? port referred to one specific site contractor, Newport News Industrial Corocration (NNIC),.and did not refer to a complete breakdown of the CEI progran.
Both CEI and NRC identified problems with the NNIC work at Perry during early 1979, and were working to correct the problems.
In Sentenbar 1979, CEI stepped all NNIC on-site' work and cancelled the NNIC contracts for installation of the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS).
In October 1979, CEI contracted with General Electric (the NSSS equipment supplier) to complete the NSSS inst.allation work, which is now approximately 20 percent complete.
The NSSS installetion work has been stopped since September, while CEI and NRC assure that the General Electric work procedures are acceptable and that GE nas assigned qutified personnel to perform the work.
Mr. Wi.it's letter tiso raiseo questions con:erning the NRC's inspection program, particularly sita regard to the fact that the NRC inspectors do not observe all si e c:nstructi:n a:tivities.
As explained to Mr. Wilt during his Nove. ber 1-73 nesting wita Region III personnel, the purpose of the NRC inspec-icn pro;ran is t: provide assurance, thrcugh a sampling inspection prograa, taa: -he licersee and its contractors are performing safety-related construction and irspec. ion activities in accordance with NRC requirements.
This is cone tarcu;n reviews of the licensee and contractor quality assurancia prograss and selec ed w:rk procedures; review of the qualifications of selected personnel perf:rai g construction and inspection activities; and by direct o:serva. ion of certain construction and inspection activities.
The areas selected for reviaw and observation by the NRC inspectors are determined by establishad NRC inspecti:n procedures and by the judgment of the inspectors, based on their experien:e a.,d training in specialized technical areas and on their knowledge of proble.ms which have be~en identified at other sites.
When probleas are noted, the inspection sa ple is broadened.
Mr. Wilt refers to a 1978 GAO study as indicating that the NRC sees only 7 percent of the actt.al construction.
This, in fact, is not what the GAO report states.
Rather, GO reacrted that inspectors spend about 7 percent of their inspection time observing tests.
Mr. Wilt failed to recognize that additional inspection time is devcted to observing completed construction and work in progress.
Our reccrds show that more than 25 percent of the NRC inspectors' time 'at the ?erry site during the 18 conth period discussed in Mr. Wilt's letter was spent in cbserva-ion of work activities.
In view of the need to review in ce ail all of the completely revised site QA programs and work procedures during the sa:e period, 25 percent is considered an appropriate allocation of the inspectors' on-site time for observation of work activities.
=
m
(
The Hcnorable John Glenn The NRC observes those activities that are considered to be most important to safety.
It turns cut that the NRC observes less than 1 percent of all of the work that takes place en-site.
The NRC's a'pproach to safety is not dependent on 100 percent observation of work by NRC.
NRC recuires that a formalized quality assurance program be implemented by the licensee and that the licensee audits the effectiveness of that program.
Supple nenting the inspection approach previously described is the redundancy designed in safety systems.
In addition, all safety related components and structures a're tested prior to the start of operations, and the testing prograr. continues through the life of the plant.
Many of these tests are observed and reviewed by NRC inspectors.
The NRC Resident Inspector ?Fogram presently provides for placing a full-time resident inspector at the Perry Site in mid-1980.
That move will< increase the.nu ber of direct inspection hours.
The resident inspector will continue to be supported by specialist inspectors frca the Regional Office.
I hope this will be useful in responding to Mr. Wilt's inquiry.
Please contact this office if we can be of any further assistance.
Sincerely,
[I William J. Dircks Acting Executive Director for Operations bcc:
Cleveland Electric and Illusinating Co.
P.O. Box 5000/55 Pt.blic Square Cleveland, Ohio 44202 ATTN:
Mr. D. R. Davids:n, Vice President, Engineering l
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Did it produce neutrons or mostly gamma rays?,
Thavs tecalculated the data on the radia-Hiroshima and Nagasaki and produced y,,g;,,,, of,y, y,,y,y,, y;, y;,,,sim, som unexpected results.Their statistics factor of 6 to 10. Since the effects on epidemiologist at the University of Pitts-
'sh:w that most of the cancer caused by human health remain the same, one must burgh. The risk estimates in the final thise bomb's came from low LET gamma conclude that, the gamma rays were more report of July 1980 were not as high as rays,' suggesting that this common type toxic than had been thoug.'.t.
Radford argued they should be nor even of radiation is more hazardous than had If this rescatch proves correct-and it as high as those in the 1972 report.
been assumed before.
has survived a few peer challenges al-Neither Radford nor Rossi endorsed the The impetus for the revision comes ready-it wiii necessitate the rewriting of document.
p-imarily from Livermore# where physi-mai.; basic documents on the hazards of Rossi concedes that the Livermore cists William Loewe and Edgar Mendel-radiation, including the chief attempt to calculations may do away with the evi-schn list year used a compt;ter to recon-define such risks published in 1980 by dence for his theory that neutrons were struct the two explosions. Their findings the. National Academy of Sciences. That responsible for the high cancer incidence are being checked and complemented by study, the work oithe Committee on the in Hiroshima. But he does not expect to a group at Oak Ridge led by George Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation alter his general view that the hazards of Kerr. He began work on a similar project (the BEIR report), was fraught with con-radiation are exaggerated. Radford, in in 1977, shelved it, and then returned to troversy on this very question.
contrast, says the new Hiroshima data the task in earnest when Loewe's data Although much of the BEIR report vindicate his position and invalidate Ros-became known. Dean Kaul of Science was released to the press in May 1979, si's. Funhermore, Radford considers the Applications, Inc., in Chicago also car-the Academy decided to reca*i and re-BEIR 1980 report obsolete and expects ried out some early calculations that write it because of dissension among the that the probabilities it gives for the risk sparkrd interest in the issue. Kerr, Kaul, authors. Some of them, led by Columbia of dying of cancer after exposure to and hss Marcum of Research and De-University biophysicist Harald Rossi, ar.
gamma radiation will be doubled. Like-velopment Associates in Santa Monica, gued that the paper overstated the can-wise, he thinks the probabilities for con-California, have been funded by the De-cer-causing effects oflow LET radiation.
tracting any form of cancer after irradia-l ftnse Nuclear Agency to explore the Their arguments leaned heavily on Japa-tion will be quadrupled.
problem and check some of the old as-nese data and particularly on the thesis The importance of the new research is sumptions which have not yet been reex-that many of the cancers in Hiroshima that it completely changes the scheme of j amin:d.
were produced by high LET neutron radiation doses that people are supposed Although they differ in some of the radiation.
to have received in Japan, particularly in details they stress, all of these scientists Using the old Hiroshima radiation data Hiroshima. Until now, it was thought agree that the accepted figures for high as evidence, Rossi argued that the BEIR that the Hiroshima blast was unique in LET (neutron) radiation at Hiroshima committee should lower the cancer risk that it produced a large field of fast are grossly overstated. For example, the estimates published in an cariier BEIR neutrons, a high LET form of radiation.
neutron radiation at a distance of 1180 report in 1972. Instead, the committee Neutron radiation is considered more
! meters from the epicenter of the blast raised the risk estimates. Rossi consid-dangerous than low LET radiation, a appears to have been overestimated by a cred this an alarmist move and withdrew category that includes x rays, electrons, his support from the document. In the and gamma rays. Its singular presence in The imns -low 1.ET* and "high LET' ifor end, the Academy felt compelled to Hiroshima was said to make the cancer imearenergytransrernterertothe physicasquahiyor write a report that effectively split 'he risk found there anomalous. Most of the
'Ur"sy as t5mNs "adn*$ Nr'seIa'Nc Ide, difference between Rossi's point of view radiation people encounter is not of this s
e dectrons. gamma rays. and x rays. Egh LET mda-and that of his chief adversary, the com-kind. The wastes from nuclear reactors, nee *aEs'o*f nYron"s"aNp">i[ni."'*
. mittee chairman, Edward Radford, an for example, emit gamma rays. Thus, a 900 oowso 5 1>05224900s01.0@o Copyright C 1981 AAAS SCIENCE. VOL 212. 22 M AY 1981
r number of scientists have always consid-the number of neutrons thought to have more sense for the Department of Ener-
~
ered Hiroshima a special, high-risk case, been present is now so small that one gy or the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-andin studying the peacetime hazards of must account for their effects by increas-sion to pay for this work, and "the radiation, they have discounted some of ing the estimate of their potency. The electric power people really should be the cancer data from that city.
resultant killing power of neutrons is interested," according to Auton. It is As it happens, the cancer mortality
" incredible," Auton says. Industrial important that the new research be credi-data from Hiroshima are the most valu-safety rules would have to be revised,
!?!e. Auton agrees that it would be best if able in the world. Unlike the data from reducing exposure limits for neutron ra-the sponsor were an independent group Nagasaki, they are abundant enough to diation to one-tenth of the present limits. not associated with the weapons reveal a clear relationship between doses For criticaljobs, companies would have gram or the nuclear industry.
of radiation received and ill effects. That relationship is defined by a linear equa-
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say prccisely what that pattern will look u.s. wore.
L like, because now the doses must be Hiroshima,1945 recalculated for each radiation victim.
Some concrete buildiny urvived the blast.
But most of the researchers who spoke to Science said the new data would prob-to employ ten times as many people.
Arthur Upton, the former director of ably increase the risk estimates for gam-On the other hand, the health physics the National Cancer Institute and an ma radiation.
community rnay abandon the Rossi prin-expert in radiobiology, has followed this l
Radford, an advocate of this point of ciple and conclude that nearly all the controversy closely since he learned of i'
view, claims that the argument over Hi-cancers in Hirosnima were produced by the new bomb data last fall. It is an ll roshima and its mortality data has been a gamma rays, not neutrons. That news important issue, he says, and should be t
i distraction from the main body of scien-will not be welcome either.
the subject of more research, sponsored tiSc evidence. He says the 1980 BEIR Auton wishes frankly that someone by a neutral scientific organization such i
report miscalculated in emphasizing else were funding this research, which he a thejoint U.S.-Japanese Radiation Ef-mortality data so heavily, for death cer-thinks is importa it for future health and fects Research Foundation. If the new tificates do not give a very accurate energy policy. Eis office is doing it be-dose estimates are correct, Upton says, reading of the number of cancers or cause "nobody else was interested."
"I am not sure one can substantiate the I
even cancer deaths in a community. Rad-The controversy has been brewing for at Rossi thesis." It may remain important ford thinks it was a mistake to pay so least 4 years, for that is how long it has for radiobiology, for there are differ-much attention to Rossi's theory about been since a government consultant first ences in the way that plants and animals deaths in Hiroshima, for he claims the raised serious questions about the valid-respond in the laboratory to high and low l
theory is contradicted by "90 percent" ity of the Hiroshima data. According to LET radiation. Upton agrees with Rad-of the epidemiological data on record. Auton, however, it was just 5 months ford that the new data greatly strengthen He 'is pleased that the Hiroshima data ago that he was approached by Harold the argument that there is no " safe" may now look consistent with all the Wyckoff, chairman of a special commit-level of exposure to radiation, in that rest.
tee assigned to study this question for every incremental bit of exposure in-
"The implications are far reaching for the National Council on Radiation Pro-creases the chances ofinjury.
health regulation and nuclear power in tection and Measurements. It is a private One of the" curious aspects of this this country in general," says David organization that collects and publishes research is the manner in which it was Auton, a physicist in the office of target radiation risk information. Since no oth-published. The record serves as a com-and damage assessment of the Defense er agency would fund the research, Au-pelling argument for declassifying as i
Nuclear Agency. His office is funding ton says, he agreed to have the Defense much as possible of what is done at the research at Oak Ridge that may con-Department pick up the tab for work government labs, for many of the as-firm the new dose estimates. As he de-being done at Oak Ridge, and thus come sumptions in this case might have been scribes the situation, the health physics up with some answers for Wyckoff. The challenged sooner had the underlying community faces a nasty dilemma,if the funding began about a month ago.
data been available for scrutiny.
I new bomb data are accurate. On one "This work is of marginal interest to The Rosetta stone of Japanese radia.
hand. the standard setters may adhere to us and we really can't afford to spend tion dosimetry is known as T65D, which l
Rossi's principle, which maintains that very much money studying civil ef-stands 'or tentative dose estimates com-many of the cancers produced in Hiro-fects," Auton says, but it is important to piled in 1%5. The figures were assem-shima were caused by fast neutrons. But resolve the uncertainties. It might make bled by physicist John Auxier of Oak
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R'idg2 in a prinst; king rnalysis of mea.
classified because it described in detail years of research on health effects in sur ments made during and after the. the mak up cnd radioactive output of the Japan, were never described in detail in Jap 1nese' blists, intirviews with th2 Littl2 Boy (Hiroshima) and Fat Man 1977, however, the government pub-bombardiers, and a test explosion in the (Nagasaki) bombs. Auxier's methods of lished a quasi-technical narrative by Nevada desert. Some of his work was computing the doses, which underlie 15 Auxier (Ichiban, Energy Research and Development Administration, TID 27080) giving some additional informa-tion on Auxier's methods.
Technology Transfer Reappraised As questions about these figures arose in tne late 1970's, the National Council on Radiation Protection (NCRP) asked Transfer of technology from industrialized countries to developing coun-Auxier tojustify his estimates with more tries emerged in the 1970's as a highly charged issue in the so-called North-supporting information. After working South dialogue. Less-de; eloped countries protested that control of technol-on this project for several months, Aux-ogy by the industrialized North keeps them in a state of technological ier explained that he could not reproduce dependence.
all the data because some had been lost.
A report *just issued by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and He explained to Science that when Oak Development (OECD) in Paris questions major assumptions on which the Ridge was reorganized in 1972, he was t:chnology transfer debate has been conducted. It argues that technology moved from one place to another, and transfer has been mutually beneficial for industrialized and for developing his old classified files were left behind in c;untries, or at least some of them.
his laboratory. Auxier says that the ree-
~
De report notes that technology transfer has helped a group of "industri-ords division at Oak Ridge made a mis-alizing" developing countries to participate, on stronger terms,in the world take in shipping the files: the valuable trading system. These include Brazil, Mexico, South Korea Taiwan, Hong data were sent to the shredder.
Kong, and Singapore.
The NCRP continued to ask for confir-De report's main challenge to the notion of technological dependence is mation of the T65D numbers because its cssertion that " technological monopolies are temporary," that change is they had become important in the debate propelled by a " technology cycle." New technology introduced in one on the hazards of radiation and because country is transferred under tight control first to other developed countries new data were becoming available. In and then to less-developed countries. As licensing and sale of the technolo-19i5, the Los Alamos Scientific Labora-gy spreads, it becomes standardized.
tory in New Mexico, a deapons design Proof that this process is working is seen in the rise in imports by center, released an estimate of the radio-
' industrial countries of manufactured goods from deve:cping countries.
active output of the Hiroshima bomb for Moreover, some industrializing countries are themselves exporting technol-the first time. The figures were not pub-ogy, mostly in the form of turnkey plarts and equipment.
lished, but given in a private letter to C.
' Feedback from technology transfer also affects industrial countries. The P. Knowles of Research and Devdop-impact has been most conspicuous in the decline of traditional industi's, n[otably clothing, footwear, and light manufacturing, that have faced off.
ment Associates, who was trying to help the Defense Nuclear Agency pin down shore competition. Loss of jobs has created a protectionist oacklash that the precise explosive power of the Fat includes criticism of technology transfer. But, says the report, technology Man bomb. This is one of the key uncer-tiansfer has benefited the United States and other OECD countries by tainties in the record; some say the blast creating export markets for their capital goods indust-ies during a period of equaled the power of 12.5 kilotons of slow growth.
TNT, and others say it may have been as l
By focusing on the industrializing countries, the report offers a selective potent as 15 kilotons. Several peop'e in i
vi;w of the problems facing developing countries. It does note in passing the weapons and biophysics community thit for the poorest countries, the cost ofimported oil, trade deficits, and soon obtained copies of the letter, in-foreign debt make the outlook bleak. Even for the industrializing countries, cluding Kerr at Oak Ridge and Kaul at the burden of energy costs, deficits, and debt have " led to pessimism Science Applications. Using the new regirding future financing of development."
data and computer techniques no, avail-The report was prepared by the staff of OECD, which is essentially a club able when Auxier did his research. Kaul of governments of western industrial nations plus Japan. OECD serves as a and Kerr in separate projects came up j
datn gathering and intergovernmental policy-planning organization. It is, with numbers that were at odds with the thrrefore, not surprising that the report assesses technology transfer mainly T65D results.
from the sellers' point of view.
Kerr's IPboratory is the best equipped in broad terms, what the report's authors say is occurring is a major and best funded for this expensive com-restructuring of the international industrial system. For the industrial puter work, Kaul says, and for that rea-countries an " adaptive strategy" is counseled. With a two-way trade in son it has been given the primary respon-industrial products now established, the North can retain its comparative sibility for reviewing the old numbers.
advantage only by keeping its "innovatory capacity" at a high level.
Kerr's task is complicated by the fact Pressure to transfer R & D activities to developing countries will build as that he is in a sense Auxier's successor their scientific infrastructures strengthen. The report borrows from Lewis at Oak Ridge and works just down the Carroll to observe that industrial countries must " keep running to stay in hall from this senior official whose work the same place."-JOHN WA1.SH he has been asked to review.
Auxier, meanwhile. says that his data
- NortMSwth Technology Transfers: The Adjustments Akrad. Orsatuzatum for Economec Cooperanon and Desciopment. Pans, IW1. s12.
are the best available. not likely to be changed much by the work oflatter-day i
em
revisionists. Mis judgment is widely re.
it. Earlier controversies have taught him argues that there is no evidence showing spected. As the grand old man in this to move cautiously in matters as impor-that neutrons were present in signific fi, eld, he is in a position to influence tant as this, and he still thinks there quantities in Hiroshima.
funding decisions on new research. Aux-could be some weak esses in the new Loewe, Kerr, Auxier, and others in ier told Science there is no need for an bomb data.
this controversy will present their argu-independent review of the discrepancies This stalemate existed for several ments at a meeting sponsored by the between his data and Kerr's, expressing years until the summer of 1980 when Radiation 'tesearch Society on an opinion which may have made it Loewe decided to rework the calcula-Minneapolis. Auton calls it "the begin difficult to get the present review start-tions. He started the project because the ning of an important dialogue," on ed. Auton, the Defense Nuclear Agency old Hiroshima data and Rossi's recent which he probably will not be able to official who makes the funding deci-wamings about the potency of neutrons attend because the new Administration i
sions, says that he bu great respect for worried people in the lab. Livermore has reduced the bureaucracy *s travel Auxier's work, a respect based as much scientists are involved in weapons re-lowances. But Auton hopes the meetin; on Auxier's standing in the community search and are frequently exposed to will lead to a general and..: depend as on his ability to " drag out corrobora-neutron radiation. They wanted to know review of the issues. "If the weapo i
tive data."
more about he dangers. Loewe's inves-folks" make it a strictly internal project, Kerr has never published any of his tigation, completed last October, found he says, "I just have a concern that work outside the laboratory, he says, both 'the Hi oshima data and Rossi's nobody will believe the results."
because he prefers to be " timid" about principl.e to be unsubstantiated. Loewe
-Et. tor Mansnat.t.
d r 'em Science Ac viser Post Has Nominee in iew t
iW The job, tumed down by several candidates, may now be offered y
t2 a man who is not a member of the science establishment The choice of science adviser to Presi-
=
Such concerns are abruptly dismissed
(%g.. -, - v..-M by Keyworth's supporters. Although he j
dent Reagan has been narrowed down to
" ((
a smgle candidate: George A. Gay)
M
" lacks obvious credentials, that doesn't Keyworth, a 41-year-old physicist from T d, y -
M e.
.h'8 mean he will not do a superbjob " says the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory-
.WM [
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one. Agnew scoffs that "he has all the l
h right credentials--all he doesn't have is i.
Although the job had not formally been 1-offered to Keyworth as of this writing, N4
%m? Ih6 20 years membership in the club." In a Administration officials expect an an-k 7.jM telephone interview with Science, Ag-
_My T@
new also said that he thinks much of the nouncement by the end of May, but
- 4-ya caution that something could still go gy unease about Keyworth is simply due to asry even at this late stage of the selec-wh the fact that he is an outsider "If you
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NM y. N;.d get a bunch of chickens together and you tion process.
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p When Keyworth's name came up as a 6
ggg put in a new rooster, they start clucking
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potential candidate late in April, it drew tW "
and running around," he remarks.
a mixture of surprise and unease from 8~
b W.Z As for Keyworth's shortage oflinks to the scientific establishment. The surprise O.
?,,A-g M{aiaCl that " defense w stems from the fact that Keyworth is U/
p virtually unknown outside his field. And d Administration, and somebody who has l,
the unease is related to the fact that his Outsider causes unease the respect of the people in the defense candidacy was being vigorously support-la b meder & ah W 6e past ed by Edward Teller, the so-called "fa-Gndidore George Keyworth four years, yo~u have had a geologist m ther of the hydrogen bomb," and Harold charge, and the defense community has Agnew, president of General Atomics "a very good scientist who is a let broad-suffered."
and former director of Los Alamos. Both er than his background would indicate."
How did somebody from outside the are well known for theit hawkish defense His background does not, however, traditional ranks of candidates for sci-views.
include service on the usual round of ence adviser get selected? Keyworth
{
Those who know Keyworth describe government science committees. Hence says he was approached about the job him as smart and personable. His re-he has little experience with federal sci-carly in April, and "it came as a surprise search has been concerned mostly with ence policy and has made few links to to me." The post was formally offered in nuclear structure and low-energy nuclear the scientific establishment. "He doesn't March to Arthur Bueche, head of re-reactions, and for the past 3 years he has provide any channel between the nation-search ard development at General Elec-directed the physics division at Los Ala-al (scientific) community and the White tric, but he was forced to turn it down for g
mos. One scientific colleague, Arthur House," complains one veteran of sci-personal reasons. Several other people Kerman of MIT, desenbes Keyworth as ence and government affairs.
were subsequcntly sounded out about j
SCIENCE. '<0L. 212. 22 M AY 1981 00%-8075/sim3:2.ov03500.5n/0 Copynght c 1981 AAAS 90) l$
-Naws and Commsnt
~
NeWA-Boma Data Shown to Raciation Experts m
ATTACHMENT 3 Conference goers are impressed with the revised picture of Hiroshima, but foresee little change in risk estimates Minneapolis. Physicist Wmiam Loewe Measurements (NCRP), said, "I would to complete the research quickly and spoke at the annual meeting of the Radia-strongly disagree with anyone using this shore up the $100 million investment in tion Rrsearch Society here on 31 May data to determine risk coefficients." It is Japanese data.
and gave the first public presentation of too early to do that, he said.
Second, Jablon said, "I think it's go-thz wtrk he and Edgar Mendelsohn have Loewe agreed that it would be wrong ing to be absolutely necessary in this done tt the Lawrence Livermore Na-to draw broad conclusions based on his murky situation that any dosimetry sys-tiina! Laboratory. ney have drastically preliminary work, but he did tell the tem that is finally decided upon be r revised the estimates of radioactive fall-Mim:apolis Tribune that he thought the sonable in terms of biological influen out from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki new data will have a negligible impact on that we know about... And since the at:mic bombs. He most important sin-risk figures. Others, such as Warren Sin-problem is of wider scope gle fmding they reported was that no clair, president of the NCRP and an physia. cerhaps it would be advisable to neutron radiation of any statistical signif-organizer of the meeting, were stronger consider adding some biologic icanes wa: present at Hiroshima, sug-in their denunciation of Radford, sug-tise to the [NCRP] task force."
gesting that nearly all the bomb.related gesting that the i.aw Livermore data may Bird, Jablon said, "I think that the cancers were produced by gamma rays.
even make radiation look less harmful way this whole problem developed is If correct, this means there are no good than before.
very unfortunate. Most of us, certainly I, human data for judging the toxicity of If the sponsors of the meeting were heard about the problem... by word of n:utron radiation.
unhappy with the way Loewe's work mouth. He next thing was to receive The audience was receptive, and sev-was presented to the public, other mem-pieces of paper which were not for publi-eral old hands said they found Loewe's bers were as unhappy with the way the cation, quotation, or citation.... I am work impressive. No general consensus information had been circulated (or not told the Japanese Diet is about to have a was resched on whethe~r or not Loewe's circulated) within the community. Per-debate on the subject, and still there is data should replace the old estimates of haps the most outspoken was Seymour nothing published that one can atomic radiation prepared in 1965 by Jablon, the National Academy of Sci-and rebut or accept or whatever."
John Auxier of the Oak Ridge National ences* staff officer for joint U.S.-Japa-NCRP President Sinclair responded
- Laboratory.
nese research on late effects of atomic by saying that there was already one Most cf the participants agreed on one radiation. He is a veteran observer.
biologist on the NCRP task force, and thing, however: they were unhappy with Jablon rose during the general discus-that he would consider adding more l
the way the news of the possible revision sion to make three points. The NCRP when'an attempt is made to extra health effects from the bomb data. One of the physicists who has been at work uGiven the unique experience at Hiroshima on the problem the longest, George Kerr it really is appalling to think that we of oak Ridge National Laboratory, said that he thought the data had not been stand here 36 years later, debating or-
~ published sooner because they were not 8
strong enough to stand up to peer re-ders of magnitude in the doses," Seymour view. crwo relevant papers have now Jablon said.
b*"
b*i"*d '
techm.'"l notes:"'F'^ '^7d" **
ca
" Revised dose esu-mates at Hiroshima and Nagasaki," by Loewe and Mendelsohn, and ',*Implica-
, was rrported, and they were annoyed by has known since 1976 that there might be tions of new Hirosh the interpretation given by University of flaws in the Japanese data, he pointed dose es'imates: Cancer risks and neutron Pittsburgh eM.miologist Edward Rad-out. "Meanwhile, the EPA is busy set-RBE," by Tore Straume and R. Lowry ford, who has said that it may be neces-ting (occupational radiation] standards; Dobson.)
i sary to double or quadruple the risk other people interested in standards have Radford, who is not a member of the
- figures for getting cancer after exposure been making noises. It really is urgent Radiation Research Society, skipp
. to radiatioa (Science,22 May. page 900). that we get on with this job.... Given meeting. He expressed disappointmen Speaker after speaker echoed the theme the unique exr'rience at Hiroshima and however, at the attitude that "we can't
.ounded early in the meeting, that not Nagasaki and the tens of millions of say anything until we have everything in
, enough work has been done to permit a dollars which have been spent trying to hand," as he described it. According to l conclusion such as the one Radford accumulate the human biological data,it Radford, that attitude can be used to l reached. Harold Wyckoff, chairman of a really is appalling to think that we stand delay reaching any conclusion: "It's task force created in 1976 expressly to here,36 years later, debating ordert of what the tobacco industry did for years review this problem for the National magnitude in the doses." He pleaded with the epidemiological evidence relat-
! Council on Radiation Protection and with federal officials present to give aid ing cancer to smoking. The IM4 00%-8073/8110619.lM4s00.5&O Copyright C 1981 AAAS SCIENCE. YOL 212.19 JUNE 1988
-.m
o W
'WeJ1, thr.t last study wasn't perfect, so which, ha claims, is to minimize ths_ paper, Rossi said he considered it just
' -ie'll ikore it.' "
dangers of radiation.
"an interestint exercise," no more. He
' ne net effect of the new research, Harald Rossiis a Columbia University believes that i' the Livermore data are Radford insists, is not hard to summa-biophysicist who challenged Radford's correct, they will make it impossible to rize: the radiation data for the two cities views as alarmist when both were serv-say anything conclusive about neutrons of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are now liic-ing on the BEIR committee. (Radford in Hiroshima.
ly to come ot.t.aoking very similar.
was the chairman.) Rossi argued that the An important civeat applies to all of "You can state that as a general princi.
hazards of gamma radiation were exag-the recent work on radiation in Japan: it pie," says Radford, "and I do state it.
gerated, and he cited the Japanese bomb does not include conections for changes That being the case, they confirm the data to support his case. As part of this in the shielding provded by buildings or fact that it was primarily gamma rays thesis, Rossi put forward the idea that by body tissue. According to Jess Mar-that produced the cancers, and that the many of the fatal cancers at Hiroshima cum, a contractor for Oak Ridge for a neutrons, for all practical purposes, con-had been caused by neutrons, not gam-review of the data, sign.ficant revisions tributed so little that they're not impor-ma rays. Neutron radiation is found rare-of the Livermore dose estimates may be tant."
Radford believes that the Livermore data strengthen his argument that a lin-
- Accord.ing to Jess Marcum, s.ignificant ear no-threshold modelis the correct one for describing the carcinogenic effects of
~ rgyj3jons of the Livermore dose estimates exposure to low levels of radia*.!on. And if this is correct, he says, the risk esti.
may be neCessary before one can reach
~
mates published by the National Acade.
a Conclusion about toxicity, my of Sciences in its 1980 report on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR) should be restated. He thinks the risks for contracting fatal cancer from ly in nature, and as a practical matter it is necessary before one can reach a conclu-i radiation should be doubled. He would of concern only to people exposed to sion on toxicity. Marcum says he has i
fix the risk at 250 to 500 excess deaths nuclear weapons and the innards of oper-spent about I month researching shield-per rad of increased radiation per 1 mil-ating nuclear plants. Rossi's work ing by buildings and has discovered that f
lion people, not 100 to 250 deaths, as he prompted the NCRP to send out a spe-the estimates of gamma doses in many i
says BEIR and' other documents have cial advisory to weapons hboratories cases will have to be lowered. In the area f
fixed it. Radford would also like to see waming them that their safety standards ofinterest,1000 to 1700 meters from the i
the risks stated in terms of cancer inci-might be inadequate because neutrons epicenter of the blast, Marcum calcu-dence, not mortality, so as to recognize might be more dangerous than had been lates that indoor gamma ray doses will that real injury is done by cancers which thought. That was 3 years ago, have to be reduced by a little more than do not necessarily kill. Including these Loewe and Mendekohn were swept 60 percent. The net effect, he believes,
. figures, Radford says, would make it into this debate in 1979 because they will be to make gamma doses for individ-necessary to further raise the main risk worked at Livermore, a weapons lab, uals in Hiroshima about the same as in coefficient used in the BEIR report.
and were concerned about the NCRP the old estimates produced at Oak Ridge.
Loewe did not discuss Radford's inter-advisory. Livermore did not change its in 1965, while the Nagasaki doses will be pretation at the meeting, except to say safety standards, but it did finance some lower than the 1965, figures.
that he could not understand how such computer work by Loewe and Mendel-In addition, George Kerr of Oak Ridge views could be supported. Loewe said sohn, who attacked the evidence for is recalculating the shielding effect of he did not see how one could draw a Rossi's thesis. Their calculations, now body tissue for certain " target" organs l
straight line through the old or new radi-made public, do not demonstrate that such as the breast, thyroid, colon, and so ation etfects data. Indeed, two scientists neutrons are safe. They s:mply show that on. Marcum reports second hand (Ke::
from Livermore who have been working neutrons were so scarce in the Japanese is in Europe) that the net effect of this
- n conjunction with Loewe, Tore Straume blasts that one cannot measure their ef-final adjustment may be to produce no and R. I. awry Dobson, presented a paper fects with aGuracy. At the same time, change in the leukemia risk factors for suggesting that the new bomb data may the Livermore work significantly in-the two cities, but to increase slightly the lower the risk estimates for low doses of creases the estimate of gamma radiation risk for breast cancer, bringing the latter gamma radiation. They, too, were skep-in Hiroshima and slightly decreases the into agreement with U.S. medical data tical of all that Radford had said.
gamma radiation in Nagasaki.
on breast cancer caused by x-rays. If r
So many variables have been cited in Using this data, Dobson and Straume true, this is an " extraordinary conclu-l this controversy that it may be worth-have made preliminary new estimates of sion," Marcum says, because it will give while explaining just which data belong the toxicity of gamma and neutron radia-credibility to the research done by to whom. Radford, first of all, has done tion. Their paper cencludes, among oth-Loewe, Marcum, and Kerr, as well as to no new research on this issue. He is an er things, that if one uses the total cancer the Japanese epidemiological data.
l epidemiologist with strong opinions on deaths as a guide, low doses of gamma One of the few things that is clear in all l
the subject, and he has seized upon radiation look less harmful than before.
this is that Livermore's research has Loewe's work as fresh evidence to sup. (Other statistical guides produce differ-irreversibly toppled the status quo. It port his view that many documents un-ent results.) They also suggest that it also seems clear that the federal govern-derstate the hazards of low-level radia-may still be possible to blame the small ment would be well advised to finance tion. Radford also says that in defending number of neutrons in Hiroshima for the work necessary to bring a new esti-this outlook he is working agair.st the many of the cancer fatalities. Asked mate of radiation dosimetry into focus as i
professional bias of health physicists, about this part of the Straume. Dobson quickly as possible.-Euor MARSHALL
~
19 JUNE 1981
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UNITED STA'. ES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULJ?ORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of
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CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING
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Docket Nos. 50-440 COMPANY, Et Al.
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50-441
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(Operating License)
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Units 1 and 2)
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Churchill l
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July 6, 1981 1
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA r
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS, ION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of
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CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING
)
Docket Nos. 50-440 COMPANY, et al.
)
50-441
)
(Perry Nuclear Power Plant,
)
Units 1 and 2)
)
SERVICE LIST
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