ML20037D241

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Forwards Info Re Compliance W/Requirements of Sections Iii.G,Iii.J & Iii.O of App R to 10CFR50.48,per NRC 810220 Request.Addl Info Encl Re Smoke Detector Locations Required by Feb 1979 Fire Protection Safety Evaluation
ML20037D241
Person / Time
Site: North Anna  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 05/19/1981
From: Sylvia B
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To: Clark R, Harold Denton
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
310, NUDOCS 8105220383
Download: ML20037D241 (13)
v • d • e


Text

{{#Wiki_filter:., V1morwrA Ex.ECTRIC Awo Powna CoxPANY Rzczosown.VzmormzA sonst tn <5 N/ May 19,1981 x, Il[ c ) (q E m y 2 MAY 2 21981* / u.s. wcuu nicutArcar w comssion \\ 48 U b 'tt gT\\ Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Serial No. 310 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NOISWB:sav Attention: Mr. Robert A. Clark, Chief Docket Nos. 50-338 Operating Reactors Branch No. 3 50-339 Division of Licensing License Nos NPF-4 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission r NPF-7 Washington, D. C. 20555 Centlemen: FIRE PROTECTION INFORMATION NORTH ANNA POWER STATION NRC letter dated February 20, 1981 requested information from all power reactor licensees licensed prior to January 1,1979 in regard to meeting the requirements of Sections III.G, III.J, and III.0 of Appendix R to 10CFR50.48. The purpose of this letter is to provide the information requested by the February 20, 1981 letter and provide additional information concerning specific smoke detector locations required by the Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report dated February, 1979. Attachment I provides the information required by Section 8 of the NRC letter dated February 20, 1981. In this regard, Vepco has reevaluated the equipment required for safe shutdown as prescribed by Section III.G of Appendix R and concludes that North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 are in compliance with that section. Section III.J which requires emergency lighting units with at least 8-hour battery power supplies in safe shutdown areas will be completed for both Units 1 and 2 no later than November 17, 1981. This modification requires no new installation of lights; only upgrading the power supplies. Section 111.0 requires the installation of an oil collecting system on the reactor coolant pumps. Installation of sesimically designed collection systems are cotsplete on both Unit 1 and Unit 2. Attachment II describes the locations of smoke detectors in three areas. The smoke detector installations listed differ from the prescribed installation given by the Safety Evaluation Report for these areas. The reasons for tha change are also listed in the attachment. 8105 220 3TG 1 Y \\ l

l VIM 01NIA ELECTRIC AND POwEu COMPANY TO In summary, Vepco has reassessed Appendix R to 10CFR50 and concludes thst Nor th Anna Units 1 and 2 are in compliance with 10CFR50.48. If you have any questions or comments, please contact us. Very truly yours, O '2 \\4 % B. R. "iylvia Manager - Nuclear Operations and Maintenance Attachments cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director J I db e a-

ATTACHMENT I IN7ORMATION REQUIRED FOR STAFF REVIEW (Item designation is c.1xtilar to NRC letter dated February 20, 1981.) (a) 'Ih e North Anna Safety Evaluation Report dated February 1979 documented the evaluation conducted by your staf f and Vepco's staff in regard to equipment required for safe shutdown. Further, the Safety Evaluadon Report and Vepco letter Serial No. 1009 dated December 23, 1980 described the modifications required to achieve alternate shutdown capability. (b) Drawings showing the normal and alternate shutdown control and power circuits are being forwarded to the NRC project manager for the North Anna Power Station. (c) All changes to safety systems are required to be accomplished in accord-ance with our Quality Assurance Program which requires standards of the FSAR to be met and the safety question as defined in 10CFR50.59 addressed and satisfied. (d) The two areas that require the alternate shutdown system are described in the Safety Evaluation Report dated February 1979 and are the cable vault and tunnel and the Emergency Switchgear. As documented by the Safety Evaluatiod Report, the alternate sh.down method is independent of wiring in these areas. (e) As stated above, the fact that the alternate shutdown method relies on the appropriate unit's equipment, precludes that any alternate shutdown power source is routed through the area. (f) The alternate shutdown method at North Anna Power Station utilizes the opposite unit's equipment where a fire in a given fire area can be hypotisized to disable redundant equipment essential for safe shutdown. The modifications necessary to provide this shutdown capability are the charging pump cross connect and the fuel building redundant instrument panel. A procedure AP-48 has been developed to operate the cross connect if necessary. Available normal and adnormal procedures would be used to shutdown a plant damaged by fire that did not damage the power supply ' ' and control cables that necessitate the cross connect and fuel building instrument panel. (g) Spare fuses are available for all control circuits used for shutdown equipment. (h) The fire brigade technical specifications require five members. Three members usually are security personnel with the remaining two from opera-tions. Howeve r, the personnel from operations are unlicensed trainees and would not be the type of personnel that would be heavily involved in a shutdown operation in the event of a fire. Operations has evaluated the demands of a fire that required emergency shutdown and have deter-mined that suf ficient manpower is available.

(i) The auxiliary shutdown panel located in the emergency switchgear room contains certain instrumentation and controls to shutdown the plant in the event of an accident as described in the FSAR and simultaneously forced evacuation of the control room. The Safety Evaluation Report required that additional relays were to be added to ensure complete isolation of the main control board from the auxiliary shutdown panel. The modification is complete and the testing procedure associated with the design change functionally tested all equipment to assure the isola-tion relays functioned as required. (j) Revised technical specifications required for the operation of the charg-ing pump cross connect and the fire protection technical specifications have been submitted. (k) The systems required for shutdown have been evaluated as documented in the Fire Protection Systems Review dated April 1,1977 and the Safety Evaluation Report dated February 1979. The systems have been reevaluated following publication of paragraph 10CFR50.48 and the necessary systems required for safe shutdown will be available af ter a fire in any area in accordance with Section III.G of Appendix R. (1) The repair procedures that may be necessary to reach cold shutdown follow-ing a fire are re-routing power cables to the residual heat removal pumps. Procedures to reconnect and splice cables already exist. Sufficient power cable to reconnect a RHR pump will be ordered in a timely manner and willlthereaf ter be required by administrative control to remain on site. REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION A. All equipment required by the alternative method of achieving and main-taining hot shutdown are given by Vepco letter Serial No.1009 dated December 23, 1980 and the North Anna Power Station Safety Evaluation Report dated February 1979. B. The only fire area that conteins equipment that is necessary for shutdown that cannot be circumvented by the alternate shutdown method is the cable vault. This equipment and their function are described below: ~ (1) The 480V breaker for MOV-FW-100B. (2) Trip valve MS111A or M5111B. The equipment listed above is required to operate the auxiliary feed pumps. There are two electric motor driven half size feed pumps and one full size turbine driven auxiliary feed pump. The discharge MOVS and HCVS breakers are located in the cable vault. In the worst case, MOV-FW-100B and trip valve MS111A or MS111B are required to be opened for safe shutdown. MOV-FW-100B is required to be open by technical specifi-I cations. A fire at the breaker could cause the valve to be driven closed. A fire at any point other than the breaker regardless of the severity, ) cannot cause the MOV to be driven closed. The valve will fail as is. If the valve is driven closed by a fire at the breaker, the valve will be j manually reopened.

One trip valve MS111A or MS111B is required to be open to provide steam to the turbine drive. A fire in any one fire area can at the worst cause control power failure to the solenoid controlling the trip valve and will cause the valve to open. A fire cannot cause the valve to remain closed. Attached are drawings describing the equipment locations. C. The above describes the cables that may be required for shutdown that are located in an area that requires circumvention by an alternate system as described by III.G of Appendix R. D. As shown in B, fire induced f ailure of the above mentioned cables will not prevent operation or cause a malfunction of the alternative shutdown method. E. As described above, the cable is not isolated from the fire area but its failure, either by a short or being severed, will not prevent shutdown. 2. (a) The residual heat removal system is the only high-low pressure interface that uses redundant motor operated valves to isolate the primary boundary from a low pressure boundary. (b) The following is a routing of Unit 1 control and power cables for both RHR inlet MOVS (1700 and 1701). Unit 2 is identical. POWER CABLES LOCATION COMPONENT Cable Vault 480V Breakers Electrical Penetration Power Cable Containment MOVS CONTROL POWER LOCATION COMPONENT Control Room Control Switch, Control Wire Emergency Switchgear Room Control Wire Relay Room Comparator, Control Wire Cable Tunnel Control Wire Containment Control Wire Limit Switch (c) Separation of redundant cables in all areas described above is less than 3 hours.

4 (d) The only location that a fire could cause both of the valves to be driven would be a fire in the cable vault where the breakers for MOV1700 and 1701 are locatea. The breakers are powered from sepa-rate emergency buses and Unit 1 breakers are separated by 14 feet and Unit 2 breakers are separated by 19 feet. MOVS usually fail "as is" if the breakers are damaged. The chance of a fire damaging both breakers in such a way as to energize the MOVS is remote since the separation almost meets the 20 feet prescribed by Appendix R and the path between the breakers is made torturous by placement of other equipment, i 7 6 1

_~ I

ATTACRMENT II CHANGES TO SMOKE DETECTOR TYPES 1

DESCRIPTION FROM VEPCO INSTALLED FIRE AREA S.E.R., TABEL 1 COMMITTMENT DETECTOR . COMMENTS Quench Spray Ventilation System Same as S.E.R. Ceiling type See Note 1 Pumphouse Exhaust Duct, and (Supp. 2, detectors for General Area of Item 28) upper and lower lower elevation elevations Boron Recovery General Area None Duct Detectors See Note 2 Building i Decontamination General Area Smoke Detection Duct Detectors See Note 3 Building (Red Book, pg. III-80) + NOTES 3 1 1. The ventilation system exhaust for this area consists of a roof fan and no ductwork, so ceiling-type detectors were installed instead of duct detectors. no exposed combustibles in the area and there is no room for 2. There are transient combustible storage. There is not safety related equipment in this area. 3. There are no exposed combustibles in the area. Radiation levels in some parts of the building make installation and maintenance of ceiling-type detectors very difficult. There is no safety related equipment in this area. 4. References S.E.R. - Safety Evaluation Report " Fire Protection Program for North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2", dated February 1979. Red Book "Fii*e Protection System Review", dated April 1, 1977. Supp. 2 " Supplement 2 To Fire Protecticn Systems Review", dated Jann-a ry 2, 1978. I

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Md I10 ] De-Energiz2d P to A,B to El-En:rgiz:d P to B, A to E 'AG E Atea-MS ATTAc h AENT SOV-M3111B ASCO Ele, 0274 IR 1-8-1-2 HT-8344A71 1MSSAPC701 Cal. 5.5 g, CT REF: Mi-14D P N00 FE-133 m E ESK-6PR LL s, g LSK-5-13 Check y y EK-8A Valve \\ A ,O FK-120 \\ Needle (Det, h8 ) r' "c / Valve FE-18M ' Volume ,1 - Tank L-IL, / To Turbine From Main / 3-SP.P-36 e s yN t / / Drivers Steam Lines. ) TV-MS111B Fisher 476D-1-ES Air To Close JB-596 Fails Open [ 51 l2l FOR INFORMATION ONLY 1MSSAPC700 NOT TO BE USED FOR CONSTRUCT'C.! R POWER 12SvDC 1-EP-CB-23B 1 f, BKR1 CKTIMSSB07( 1MSSAPC704) 1HSS3PK004 l, B l5 l O W c l V l l l. 8 I Emer.Swp.A, 135l4011C ?.n.c o nt.. rd. TBG l 917 is i 'Ll i1 ^ Elev. 0277 ^ l i g Elev. 0254 i 33 REF FE-3AE 3 28 2 1-EI-CB-06B N AUX SHUTDOWN AE g PANEL B 43-TLMS111B TV-MS111B CIDSED IN Ref: FE-3CE CLOSED IN " REMOTE" FE-3GD "CID SE" 1-EI-CB-02 B.Ed. 1-2 Selector switches located at the main control board and auxilicry LOOP ACTION: shutdown panel provides manual control of TV-MS111B which provides steam flow cont,rol to the turbine driver. Note ESK-6PR. d Revision I b E&DCR 659h-1 k E&DCR 23471; Field Rev., h Vepco DC-80-S14, E&DCR OSD-0076-1 YL M CLIENT TITLE BY DATE MAIN STEAM SYSTEM PROJECT PAPS No.1 1i715 J.O. NO. ,.P R EP A R E D j)/ 7/h/h AUXILIARY FEED WMP TURBINE DRIVE @lSSUED BY ^ /k' M /.,. _,-f o<ECKE0 D2C 'S /'a / s 11 L DATE Dece9e'.- I 1975 i . A5 PROVED / AQ) hf; /. @ () } } Q'h @&yj @ QQ$ @ Q3% 4) @ NUMBER REttSIONS BY TY-UUIIl0 DATE '(/f//( 2-/O N J' f /Q // ','?ht 10HR ORIGINAL ~

ATTAC#MEM'T STONE f. CEBSTEQ ENGINEEQiNG COMPOM ATION u==n MS 115 Aren-MS SOV-MS111A Energized P to B, A to E PAGE E]cv. 0274 ASCO De-Energized P to A, B to E Col. 5.5 g HT-8344A71 d 1MSSA00701 COO- ~ REF: Di-14A j, -N00 FE-13B p E u u ESK-6PR B LSK-5-13 Check N A FK-8A Valve T I FK-12C t3 P Needle (Det.h8 ) / Valve FE-18M n

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er & Tanx From Main / 3-SHP-31 / To Turbine m m / Drivers Stear. Lines) TV-MS111A Fisher 476 D-1-ES Air To Close JB-595 s@n I 51 12l FOR IN'FOR9.T!ON ONLV 1MSSAOC700 / 1 MSS 20K004 R T NOT TO BE L PED FOR CONSTF JC',r.., y 1-EP-CB-23A 125 VDC BQ

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c r 1MSSAOC704 ' B-O V B o l V l i s Emerg.SVGR Rm. Cont; , 31l30 l29 l25 23 FAR l43 l l C U Elev. 0254 2B dh 2 REF: FE-3AD 3I% REF: FE-3CD AC FE-3V FE-3GC FE-18M HR 43-TV-MS111A TV-MS111A P00R ORIGINAL 1-EI-CB-06A 1-EI-CB-02 B.BD. 1 -2 LOOP ACTION: Selector switches located at the main control board and auxiliary shutdown panel provides manual control of TV-MS111A which provides steam flow control to the turbine driver. Automatic control can also be e provided. NOTE ESK-6PR.ME&DCR 653h-lMFADCR 23471; Field Rev. CLIENT VEPC0 POWER INDUSTRY GROUP TITLE BY DATE MAIN STEAM SYSTEM PROJECT wapq wn i PREPARED /)M 7/ddJ AUXILIARY FEED PUMP TURBINE DRIVE J O. NO. 11715 CISSUED BY Tf///??/Sm CHECKED (/[f C /g/ir/a TrtIP VALVE TV-MS111A CONTROL DATE December 8,197F APPROVED Jrf, et/S /, o _g @/)f M @hUMhuK O b Y REVISIONS BY W-MS111 A DATE g /,if7t 2-10 -77 F'.mid Rev.}}

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