ML20037A815
| ML20037A815 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 07/29/1968 |
| From: | Dunn E, Evertz H, Snapp R FLORIDA POWER CORP. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8004070696 | |
| Download: ML20037A815 (36) | |
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U:iITED ST,'.TES OF AMEP.1CA A1EMIC E!!Ei'.GY CC:fISS10.N In the M1tter of
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FLORIDA POWER COPTORATI0I:
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DOCKET No. 50-302
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(Crystal River Unit 3
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thclear Generating Plant)
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In corpliance with directions of the Atomic Scfety and Licensing Board at the put.lic hearing in the ccptioned r.atter at Crystr,1 River, Florida on July JA and 17, 1968, and in accordance with Stretion 2.754 of the Con =issicn's " Rules of Practicc", 10 CFR Part 2, the Applicant, Florida Power Corporation, respectfully submits the attached propcsed findings of fact and conclusienc of law in the form of a proposed initial decisioa.
This 29th day of July,1968.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Edgar 11. Dann, Jr.
EDGAR h. DU:3, JR.
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Florida Po.ect Euilding f
101 - 5 th Street South CGCKETEC P. O. Box 14042 h
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St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 d
JUL 311953&
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/s/ Harry A. Evertz, III C[,* ].fj}~l tr>
HARRY A. EVERTZ, III
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Florida Power Building
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c/l 6 M 101 - 5 th Street South P. O. Box 140!:2 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 Roy B. Snapp 1725 "K" S tree t, U.U.
Washington, D. C. 20006 Counsel for Florids rouer Corporation N E UE H-I b
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CS:KU I:Juics F201 L UTk. Fi.C. 50 30D.
July 29, 1968 UNITED STATES OF ACRICA ATOMIC ENERGY C0:CIISS10:1 In the Matter of
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FLORIDA POWER Ce tPO!%TIO::
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DOCKET No. 50-302
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(Crystal River Unit 3
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Necicar Generating Plant)
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PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 2
JUL 31195> 1 CONCLUSIONS OF LAU SUL::ITTED BY 7
3 TIE APPLICANT, FLORIDA PO'.'ER CORPORATIO:i ylly$.[
(IN TIE FOPJi 0F A PROPOSED INITIAL DECISIO:;)*
t.g Stater ent of the Proceeding Co rY 1.
This proceeding involves the license application flied by Florida Power Corporation (Applicant) with the Atomic Energy Corfnission (Cc =1ssion) under Section 104b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (the Act), as amended.
In its Application, as cupplesented and amended, the Applicant has requested, among other things, authority to construct a closed cycle pressurired water reactor, to be known as Crystal River Unit 3 Nuc1 car Generating Plant, to operate initially at 2452 thermal megawatts and to be located directly on the Gulf of Mexico, in the Northwestern extrec.es of Citrus County, Florida, approximately 7 miles Northwest of the Town of Crystal River and 70 miles from Tampa, Florida (Su=ary, pp. 1, 3 and 4; Safety Evaluation, pp. I and 4).
In this document, the transcript is cited as "T.p.
", the Applicant's Su cary Description of Application (T.p. 264 et seq.)
a s " Suc~a ry", the Staff's Safety Evaluation (T.p. 276 et se q. )
as " Safety Evaluation'_', and the Application, as supplemented and amended (T.p. 222 et seq.) as " Application".
2.
The Application was reviewed by the Regulatory Staff (Staff) of the Commission which concluded that the Applicant has satisfied all Coa-mission requirements for the issuance of a construction per=it (S sfe ty Evaluation, pp. 65 and 66).
The Application was also reviewed by the Ad-visory Cornittcc on Reactor Safeguards which concluded that the Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Concrating Plant can be constructed at the proposed site with reasonabic assurance that it can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public (Safety Evaluation, Appendix A).
3.
On May 29, 1968, the Commission issued a " Notice of Hearing on Application for Provisional Construction Permit" in the captioned matter which set out the issues to be considered and initially decided by this Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, appointed by the Commission to conduct the proceeding, as a basis for determining whether a provisional construc-tion permit should be issued to the Applicant (33 FR 8235).
4.
On April 29, 1968, the State of Florida filed a petition to participate in the proceeding pursuant to Sectibn 2.715(c) of the Con-mission's " Rules of Practicc",10 CFR Part 2.
Such participation was alloued by this Atomic Safety and Licensing Board at the prehearing confor-ence hcid on June 19, 1968.
The State of Florida did participate in the proceedings by the prcsentation of unsworn stater.ents by several State officials at the public hearing on July 16,1968 (T.p. 188 et seq.).
All of such statements supported the Application of Florida Power Corporation.
l S.
On June 14, 19,68, the City of Gainesville, Florida, and the Gainesville Utilities Department (collectively called "Gainc;ville") filed a Petition for Leave to Intervene and a Motion to Broaden the Issues.
l Gainesville rested its standing to intervene in the proceeding upon its 2-1
expectation of becc=ing a customer of the Applicant pursuant to a pending and disputed order of a Federal Fower Conr.issien Presiding Examiner. Gaines-ville alleged that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to grant Applicant a license under Section 104b of the Act because the facility was not an experimental reactor but that it had cornercial value. Gainesville also atte=pted to broaden the issues to include its right to a share of the ownership of the proposed nucicar facility, whether it had practical value and hence should be licensed under Section 103 of the Act, and that tho Coc=ission should consider anti-trust tutters.
The Applicant filed its Answer in opposition to Gainesville's Petition and Motion vigorously deny-ing Gainesv111c's present standing to intervene and further denying the legal sufficiency of Gaincov111c's Petition. The Staff filed its Answer opposing the Motion to Broaden the Issues but consenting to Gainesville's intervention, limited to the proposed contesting of the jurisdictional issue of whether or not the Commission could lawfully issue a construction permit for the proposed facility under Section 104b of the Act.
6.
On Jun ' 28,1968, this Atomic Safety and Licensing Board entered its Order denying Gainesville's Motion to Broaden the Issues, but granted the Petition to Intervene, limited to the issue whether the nuclear reactor facility proposed to be constructed and operated by Florida Power can be l
authorized pursuant to Section 104b of the Act.
i 7.
The proceeding is a " contested procccding", as defined by Section l
2.4(n) of the Com ission's " Rules of Practice".
8.
Pursuant to the Notice of Hearing and in accordance with the re-quirczents of the Act and the Commission's Regulations, a prehearing confer-ence was held by this Board in the Crystal River Elecentary School Auditorium, Crystal River, Florida, on June 19, 1968. A public hearing was held by this Eoard on July 16 and 17,1968, to consider the issues specified for a contested proceeding and to consider the further question raised by the Intervenor as to whether the Application was properly filed under Section 104b of the Act.
Evidence was introduced at the hearing by the Applicant and by the Staff.
The Intervenor presented no direct evidence other than a copy of a letter dated April 18, 1968, from the Applicant to the Division of Reactor Licensing, pertaining to Applicant's request for an exemption from the provisions of Section 50.10(b) pursuant to Section 50.12 of the Commission's " Rules of Practice". A number of persons made limited ap-pearances.
Findings of Fact 9.
The Applicant is an electric utility corporation that is soundly financed and has the financial qualifications to construct and operate the Crystal River Nuclear Plant. Its financial position compares favorably with those of the electric utility industry as a whole. Its current Dun and Bradstreet credit rating is the highest (AhA1) and Moody's Investors Serv-ice rates the Company's first mortgage bonds as Aa (high grade), and its convertibio debentures A (high-medium grade).
(Loader Testimony, T.pp. 230 and 231).
10.
It plans to finance the cost of construction of the proposed fa-cility as an integral part of its normal construction program for plants and necessary attendant facilities through the use of funds internally generated and from funds derived from the sale of various senior securities in the same general manner as it finances the construction of conventional plants. The estinated construction costs for the Crystal River Unit 3
Nuclear Generating Plant, including the initial cost of fuel, will be
$126,000,000. Approximately 45 percent will come from internal sources and the balance will be financed from the sale of securities (Loader Testironv. T.pp. 229 and 230). The total construction enpenditures by the Applicant for the five-year period 1968 - 1972, including the cost of nucicar fuci, are estimated at $365,000,000 (Loader Testimony, T.p.
229).
11.
The Applicant is responsible for the overall design and construc-s.
tion of the Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant. Gilbert Assoc 1-ates, Inc., has been retained to render general consulting servicer throughout design and construction, and to perform the design of the reactor building (Rodgers Testimony, T.pp. 254 and 255).
The Babcock'& Wilcox Corapany (B & W) will design, manufacture, deliver and erect a couplete nuclear steam supply system, associated engineered safeguards systems, and fabricate its fuci elenents (Rodgers Testinony, T.p. 253).
Florida Pouer Corporation is pur-chasing and constructing the Crystal River Unit 3 Nuc1 car Generating Plant in the same manner as it handles its conventional fossil-fueled units.
Florida Pouer Corporation has had extensive experience in the design and construction of large electrical supply systems (Rodvers Testimony, T.pp.
250 and 251; Safety Evaluation, p. 48). The Applicant's program to assure that very high standards of quality control are maintained and accomplished by the manufacturers of all components of its nucicar steam supply system, as well as by all contractors performing crection wo:k at the site, is the most comprehensive and elaborate such program to be stated for the record (T.pp. 435 - 443, and 452 - 471).
12.
The Crystal River Unit 3 Nuc1 car Generating Plant site is directly f
- l on the Gulf of Mexico, in the northwestern extremes of Citrus County, Florida.
The Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant will be a part of the Crystal River Project which includes one coal-fired plant now in service and a second coal-fired plant under construction.
The station will have a 4,400-foot exclusion radius and will be in an area remote froa population centers. All property within the 4,400-foot exclusion radius is owned in fee si=ple by and is under Florida Power's co:plete and full control. The site is characterized by underlying limerock which is geo-logically co=petent to support the loads to be imposed upon it; freedom from flooding; an abundant supply of cooling water from the Gulf of Mexico; an on-site fossil-fueled station capabic of supplying c=crgency power; and favorable conditions of hydrology, geology, seis= ology and =cteorology (Rodgers Testirony, T.pp. 248 and 249; Safety Evaluation, pp. 4 - 8).
13.
The Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant is planned for operation in 1972. The reactor is similar in concept to others now in operation, under construction, or recently licensed by the Co==ission (Summary, p. 2).
It is expected that the reactor will operate initially at a core power level up to 2452 thermal megawatts, and all physics and core and thermal hydraulics information submitted in support of the Ap-plication is based on a core design for cominal operation at that level.
It is expected, however, that the nuclear steam supply system will be capable of ultimate nominal operatien at a core power of 2560 thortal l
megawatts (including 16 JMt contribution frc= the reactor primary coolant pumps). The facility systc=s, engineered safeguards and contain=ent arc designed consistent with safe operation at this ultimate power IcVel l
(Rodcers Testirony, T.p. 245). Before operation at any pcwer Icvel above i
l I
2452 MJt is authori:ed by the Cc= mission, the Commission must perform a safety evaluation to assure that the core can be operated safely at the higher power Icvel (Safety Evaluation, p. 1).
14.
The cactor will be fueled with slightly enriched uraaium dioxide pc11ets contained in zircaloy tubes. Control of reactivity will be provided by a combination of neutron absorber and movable control rods. The neutron absorber, boric acid, is dissolved in the reactor coolant for the purpose of centro 111ng the long-term reactivity changes of the core and provide cold shutdown.
Silver-Indium-Cadmium control rods clad in stainicss steci are.
erployed to control short-tena changes in reactivity IcVels and to provide fast shutdown capability (Rodgers Testimony, T.pp. 245 and 246; Safety Evaluation, pp. 9 - 10).
15.
Incore instrumentation, consisting of self-pot:cred neutron detec-tors, will be located at pre-selected locations within the core (Rodgers Testimony, T.p. 246; Safety Evaluation, p. 9).
This instrum2ntation will allow confirmation of reactor design parameters by monitoring core perform-ance.
The fuel core will be supported within a heavy-walled steel reactor vessel, through which water will be pumped to remove heat generated in the l
core. This therc.a1 encrgy will be transferred to two once-through steam l
generators (Rodgers Testimony, T.p. 246; Summary, p. 10).
The steam produced will be used to drive a conventional turbine-generator outside the containment building (Safety Evaluation, p. 10), and will gener-ste initially about 655 megawatts of ciectricity. Ultimately, it is expected that the unit will hcvc a gross elcetrical capability of about 885 megavatts (Rodgers Testimony, T.p. 246).
l l
16.
There are numerous systens, components and featurcs incorporated 1
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into the statica to protect the public (Su mary, pp. 12 L 20). The first line of protection against the release of fissien products from the reactors is the fuel pc11 cts themselves, with their high capability for retaining fission products within their oun physical structure. The fuel pellets are inserted in zirconium metal tubes which are designed and selected to with-stand without failure much higher terperatures and pressures than those to which they will be subjected, thus preventing the escape of fission products.
In the unlikely event of fuel tube failure for whatever cause with a release of any contained fission products, these fission products would retain with-in the liquid reactor coolant systen contained in the primary coolant piping loops all of which are sdthin the reactor building containment structure (Rodcers Tcstimony. T.pp. 246 and 247).
17.
The enginccted safeguards systems are designed to protect against j
the consequences of failurcs in the reactor system frca very small breaks up to the complete doubic-enf ed rupture of the largcct reactor coolant pipe in the system (36-inch ID pi, ).
Engineered safeguards include systems to prevent the release of fission products from the fuel to the reactor build-l ing atmocphere; systems to reduce the pressure in the reactor building and thereby reduce Icahage of fission products from the building; and systems to collect and filter leakage from the reactor building penetrations fol-lowing an accident (Sunmary, pp. 13 - 14).
l 18.
Protection is provided by supplying adequate cooling water to the core to prevent excessive overheating of the fuel rods and subsequent release 1
of the contained fission prodact. This ecoling unter is provided by three l
engineered safeguards systems. A high pressure injection system supplics low temperature, borated water to the reactor coolant systen at any pressure
. t
up to full operating pressure.
This system, which is nortc11y in operation to supply sec1 injection and takeup water, will protect the reactor syctc=
against s=cil fcilures. Two pressurized core flooding tanks auteratically discharge borated wcter directly to the reactor vessel if the reactor systc=
pressurc falls below 600 psig, and a low pressura injectica system supplies borated water to rcrove deccy heat from the reactor folleuing an accident.
These latter two systems afford protection cgainst the larger recctor coolant system failures. The pressure in the reactor building following a loss-of-coolant cecident is limited by two separate and independent heat removal systems. One system contains three separate fan cad cooler units.
The other system contains redundant sprcy headers which spray low terperature borated water into the reactor building ateosphere to cool it.
Each of these systets without the other hcs th: heat-rcroval ccpability of naintaining tha rcactor building pressure belou its design pressure icyc1 (summary, pp. 13 - 14; Safety Evaluation, pp. 38 - 43).
19.
As still a further containment, the reactor building encloses and contcins the entire recctor coolcnt system to prevent the release of radio-active fluids cnd vapors to the environment in the remote event of an acci-dent.
In the Crystal River Unit 3 Mucicar Genercting Plant the reactor coolcnt system will be housed in a prestressed, post-tensioned concrete reactor containment building in the shape of a cylinder.
The inside di-a=cter of the building is 130 feet and the inside height will be 187 feet.
The rccctor containnent building will rest on an integral reinforced con-crete slab approxi=ately 10 feet thick.
The vertical valls will be approxi-mately 3-1/2 feet thick cnd the donc approricately 3-1/4 feet thick. The building will bc lined internc11y with 3/8 inch welded stec) plate to provide 9-
vapor tightness.
The reactor building containnent structure is designed to limit radioactivity release, in the event of an accident, to values well belou 10 CFR 100 guidelines published by the Atomic Energy Conmicsion in the Federal Register (todners Testimony, T.pp. 247 and 248; safety Evcluation, pp. 29, 51 - 57; S urnary, pp. 12 - 13).
20.
The nuclect steam supply systen for the Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant is similar in concept to several projects aircady in operation, under construction, or recently licensed by the Atomic Energy Commission.
The preliminary design is based on the technical data which have been developed in the nucicar industry and on data developed by B & W which is specifically related to the Crystal River Plant Unit 3.
To com-plete the final detcil design of some components, additional technical inforuation will be obtained (Summary, p. 22).
21.
The folleuing are the arcas of plant design which (under the Com-mission's definition) require rescarch and development in order to produce additional technical data which will be utilized to finclize d-7 details:
A.
Once-through Stect Generator Steady-state conditions and operational transients will be investigated in conjunction with the control system to be used for the once-through steam generator. Vibration tests, including steam generator response to primary system blow-down, will be investigated and the thermal response to both primary and secondary blowdowns determined.
B.
Control Rod Drive Unit Test Prototype tests on the control rod drives vill be conducted under opercting teuperature, pressure, flow and water che.-
istry to provide information on the operability and reliability of the system.
C.
In-core Neutron Detectors The self-powered in-core neutron detectors are currently under test in the Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant.
D.
Thermni and 1!ydraulic Programs The Applicant has proposed ccaled ilou distribution tests on the vessel and internals and rod bundle tests to determine local mixing and flow effects.
Further experirental cud analytical work will be done to deternine the limiting heat fluxes at vcrious positions within the fuc1 bundic.
E.
Emergency Core Cooling The Applicant vill include cmergency core cooling in the de-velopmant program. Specifically (a) the corpletion of the analysis of the spectrum of small break sizes in the loss-of-coolant accident, (b) the development of the analytical tech-niques for determ! ing blowdown forces on reactor internals, and (c) demonstration that the injection coolant vill cool the core including consideration of core bypass or formation of a vapor lock.
F.
Fuel Rod Failure The Applicant plans to further develop the various failure rades of the fuel rods during the losr.-of-coolant cecidcut, such as clad uc1 ting, cutectic forration, bulging, splitting, or brittle failure, will be exc:dned in en experitz.catal prograte to assure the continued, core cooling ccpability during a loss-of-coolart accident.
C.
Xenou Oscillations l
The Applicant plcus to further develop analyticci techniques l
to determine whether xenon oscil,lations can occur.
If oscilla-l tions are possible a system for controlling the oscillations j
will also hdyc to be developed.
H.
Iodine Removal Systen The resecrch and devcicpnent program of the Appliennt includes i
I studies on decemposition under normal and accident conditiona, materials corpatibility, iodine re.novc1 characteristics, and l
compatibility with boron compounds. Also included will be l
parallel. tests on alternate chenical solutions, and tests on l
spray efficiency during conditions of spray water hotter than ambicnt atmosphere.
(Sur.33ry, pp. 22 - 25; Safety Evaluction, pp. 58 - 60; T. pp. 315 -
l 347).
i I
I 22.
At the prehearing confercace the Eocrd directed a number of qucs-tions and concerns to the Appliennt and the Regulctcry Staff (T.pp. 66 - 86).
t 11 -
i At the pt.clic hearing held in Crystal River, Florida, on July 16 and 17, 1968, the !.pplicant and the Staff were cost responsive to the Board's questions cnd concerne.
The Board's inquiries were satisfied and it j
finds thtt the cnsvors and responses given by the Applicant and the Staf f vere es corplete auf thorough as reasonably possibic at the construction permit secge of the licensing procedures conterplated by the Atocic Energy Act of 1954, as amcaded, and the Cc:alssion's Rulcs and Regulations. The specific qucstions and concerns of the Board and the transcript citation to the response of the party ansucring are as follous:
The Board inquircd of the Regulctory Staff as to those a.
factors they considered in concluding that design-bcsis cecident doces vould be within Part 100 Guidelines. The Eoard finds that the fceters considered by the Stcff cde-quately support its conclucien that design-basic cecident doses vill be sdthin Pcrt 100 Guidelines (T.pp. 312 - 314).
b.
The Board asked the Applicant to describe et the pub-lic hearing the current status of the research cud develop-ment itens described in the Applicction.
The Board finds that the t.pplicent has satisfactorily responded to this inquiry (T.pp. 315 - 347).
c.
The Board askad the Applicant to respond to its con-i cern regarding operating tcrperaturcs of pressurized water recetors.
The Ecard finds that the Applicant hcs satisfcetorily responded to this inquiry (T.pp. 347 - 358).
d.
The Eotrd cshed the Staff to respond to the Board's concern with the use of sodium thiosulphnte sprays to
renove iodine from the containment building atmosphere and the possible decorposition of tbc sedium thioculphate.
The Board finds that the Stcf f has satisfcetorily re-sponded to this inquiry (T.pp. 358 - 364 and 471 - 478).
e.
The Eoard asked the Staff to respond to the Board's concern with organic iodine fractions, the enount of iodine which is non-removable, and the effect on off-site doses of iodinc. The Board finds that the Staff has satisfactorily responded to this inquiry (T.pp. 364 -
378).
f.
The Eccrd inquired of the Staff whether or not there was any problem arising out.of using a lou population
- one of five miles, and from the feet that the necrest population ccater of 25,000 persons or nare is fif ty-five rtiles avcy.
The Board finds that the Staff has satisfactorily responded to this inquiry (T.pp. 401 -
403).
g.
The Eocrd csked the Appliccnt to respond to the Board's concern with the foundation grouting progren of the nuclect plcnt. The Bocrd finds that the Ap-plicant has satisfactorily responded to this inquiry (T.pp. 403 - 409).
h.
The Locrd requested the Applicant to respond to the Board's concern with the chloride stress corrosion and the use of stainless steel in the nuclect fccility.
The Applicant's response to this concern has been satis factory (T.pp. 40"> - 411 cnd 468 - 471).
13 -
r
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- i. The Board asked the Applicant to respond to its con-cern regarding the experience of the J. A. Jones Construc-tion Company at Oyster Crech.
The Board finds that the Applicant has satisfactorily responded to this inquiry (T.pp. 411 - 414).
J.
The Board asked the Staff to respond to its questiens regarding the testing of cooling fan motors. The Board finds that the Staff has satisfactokily responded to this inquiry (T.pp. 414 - 420).
k.
The Board asked the Staff for its ccaments with regard to the Fish and Wildlife Service's sucscsted monitoring program in Appendices H-1, H-2 end H-3 to the Safety Evaluation. The Bocrd finds that the Stcff's co cents are scticftetory (T.pp. 420 - 431).
1.
The Beard cched the Applicent for itc cor2ents with regard to the possible use of filters in licu cf a spray system to reduce releases of iodine. The Board finds that the Applicant's response to this inquiry is satis-factory (T.pp. 431 - 435).
m.
The Board asked the Applicant to outline for the Board its quality control program and how it would assure itself that the desired results will be hcd from the components intended to be utilized in the project. The Board firAs that the Applicant's rc-spense to the inquiry is satisfactory (T.pp. 435 - 443 and 462 - 471).
The Board asked the Staff to co= ment on the building n.
wake factor used in its Safety Evaluation. The Loard finds that the Staff's response to this inquiry is satis-factory (T.pp. 444 - 44S).
23.
Wf th respect to Cainesv111e's contention that the Coccission lacks jurisdiction to license the proposed nuclear facility under Section 104b of the Act, this Board specifically finds that Florida Pouer has properly and laufully filed its Application to construct the Crystal River Unit 3 Nuc1 car Generating Plant under Section 104b of the Act for the reasonc that (a) other pressurized water reactors such as the Oconce Units and Three Mile Island will not provide sufficient operating experience prior to the projected schedule for operation of Crystal River No. 3 to influence m:Jor ccr.nponents end therchy change their develep=cntal charactcr (Duke Proceedings, Doche t No's. 50-269, 50-270 and 50-287, Initial Decision dated Novembcr 3,1967; and See T.p. 289); and (b) there are associated with the Crystal River No. 3 reactor specific research and developacnt items characteristic of the cases which have been considered to date by the Co: mission. The only evidence on this point that Gainesville adduced in this entire proceeding was in cross-c::anination of Mr. J. T. Rodgers (T.pp. 301 - 311).
Mr. Rodgers stated that he personally believed the nucicar plant would be reliable and that the plant would be vital to Florida Power's cicetrical systen, however, operating difficultics or un-forescen delays would not be fatal to the systc='s relichility.
24.
On the bacis of uncontroverted testirany (Ucccher Testimony, T.pp. 315 - 347) adduced at the public hearing on July 16 and 17,19%,
l l
it now appears that the research and development progran cited in the l
Safety Evaluation and in the Summary Description of Application, while similar in many respects to that of the Oconec Units and Three Mile Island, is equally applicahic to Crystal River Unit 3.
The conclusions that will be reached as a result of the research and development program must be committed to the manufacture of the nuclear steam supply system for Crystal River Unit 3 long before the Oconee Units and Three File Island will have come into service and they will not have demonstrated any operating economies or competitiveness with conventional generating plants before Crystal River Unit No. 3 is in a very advanced stage of cons truc tion.
In order for the Crystal River Unit No. 3 to be availabic for operation as scheduled during 1972, the f.pplicant has aircady had to make com.nitments for major equipment for said unit, including the nucicar stcam supply system and the turbine gencrator. The operation and limited performance experience of other similar pressurized water reactors, such as Oconce No. 1 and Three Mile Island, will not influence the major core ponents of Crystal River Unit 3 or the research and development program applicabic to it (Summary, p. 2).
25.
The construction and operation of the proposed facility will pro-vide information bearing upon whether or not the type of pressurized water reactor has practical value for industrial or commercial purpoces, such information relating to design and construction at an economic cost; the achievement of full pouer output, continuity of service and load carrying capability on electric systems, and the technical cnd economic operation of the nuclear fuel cycle in connection with such facility.
26.
The reactor planned for the Crystal River Unit No. 3 Nuclear Generating Plant is larger in capacity by a facter of approximately two than the largest pressurized water reactor operational today. At least until reactors of conparable size have demonstrated by operation their reliability, technical feasibility and econouie competitiveness with other types of gen-erating facilities, the Crystal River Unit No. 3 reactor cust be considered
" develop =cntal".
No evidence was adduced at the public hearing which would tend to establish that any pressurized water reactor of the type and size of the Crystal River reactor will demonstrate technical feasibility and eco-nomic competitiveness prior to planned operation of Crystal River Unit No.
3 Nucicar Generating Plant.
27.
The activitics to be conducted under the permit applied for will be within the jurisdiction of the United States, and all of the Directors and principal officers of the Applicant are United States citizens. The Applicant is not o::ncd, controlled or dominated by any alicn, foreign cor-poration or foreign govern = cat (See Application for Licenses, Iten No. 1 of Joint Exhibit A, T.p. 222; Loader Testinony, T.p. 234).
Conclusions Upon consideration of the entire record in this proceeding, and in the light of the findings and discussions hereinabove set out, this Atonic Safety and Licensing Board has concluded that:
1.
In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR E50.35(a):
a.
The Applicant has described the proposed design of the Crystal River Unit 3 Nucicar Gencrating Plant, in-cluding, but not limited to, the principal architectural and engineering criteria for the design, and has identi-ficd the major features or components incorporated therein for the protection cf the health and safety of the public; b.
Such further technical or design information as may be required to complete the safety analysis and which can reasonably be left for later consideration, will be sup-plied in the final safety analysis report; c.
Safety features or components which require research and development have been described by the Applicant and the Applicant has identified, ana there will be conducted, a research and development program reasonably designed to resolve any safety questions associated with such features or components; and d.
On the basir of the foregoing, there is reasonabic as-surance that (i) such safety questions will be satisfactorily resolved at or before the latest date stated in the Applica-tion for completion of construction of the proposed facility and (ii) taking into consideration 'the site criteria con-tained in 10 CFR Part 100, the proposed facility can be con-structed and operated at the proposed location without undue risk to the health and safety of the public; 2.
The Applicant is technically qualified to design and construct the proposed-facility; 3.
The Applicant is financially qualified to design and construct the proposed facility; 4.
The issuance of a permit for the construction of the facility will not be ininical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and 5.
A.
The Crystal River Unit No. 3 Muclear Generating Plant is a " develop cntal" reactor to the same extent as the Oconee Units and Three Mile Island. There is no evidence that the operation of these or any other reactors will have a major influence on its design characteristics or major components; B.
Under the statutory language and the Commission's construction of it in its Memorandum and Order dated De-cember 5,1967, in Matter of Philadelphia Electric Con-pany, and in its Decision of January 3,1968, in the Duke Power Company case, and more recently in its Decision of June 5,196S, in the Philadelphia Elcetric Company case, the proposed facility here is a utilization facility in-volved in the conduct of'rcsearch and development activi-ties leading to the demonstration of the practical value of such type of facility for industrial or ce=mercial pur-poses. There is substantial and' uncontradicted evidence in the record ref1ceting:
(1) A number of aspects of research and develop-mont needed to complete the design of certain components for the Crystal River Unit No. 3 1
Nuclear Generating Plant (Findings of Fact No.
21), and (2) That the constructicn and operation of the i
proposed facility will provide information de=cn-i i
strating whether or not this type of pressurized l
l.
wat'er reactor hcs practical value for cornercial or industrial purposes (Findings of Fact 1;o. 25);
C.
The Applicant has sustained its burden of proof as to the jurisdiction of the Bocrd and all other d.atters perti-nent to its Application; and D.
The Application is properly filed under and licenses may be issued under Section 104b of r.he Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
THEPIFORE, PURSU/l:1 TO THE ACT lliD THE CO:2:ISSIO::'S FIGULATIO!;S, IT IS ORDEPID THAT:
1.
Subject to review by the Co==lssion upon its own motion or upon the filing of execptions in accordcnce with the " Rules of Practicc",
10 CFR Part 2, the Director of Regulation is directed to issue to Florida Pouer Corporation a provisional construction permit for Crystal River Unit No. 3 Nuclear Generating Plant pursuant to Paragraph 104b of the Act substan-tially in the for= of Appendix A to the Notice of Hearing in this proceed-ing, within 10 days from the date of issuance of this decision; and 2.
In accordance with 10 CFR E2.764, good cause not having becn shown to the contrary, this initial decision shall be inmediately effec-tive.
ATOMIC SAFETY ll D LICENSING E0ARD Dated this day of
, 1968.
Dr. Eugene Greuling Dr. Hugh C. Paxton Mr. Sanuel W. Jensch bumq
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1.
This prc:c ccin; invcircs the rpplic. tica er Florida Pcrer Corperc> ion (1.;;.lict. t ), d :. t t ' /. c;r e '. 10, 15 5'/, c r ' five c ren ' ;. cat s, thercle, d-t < d :c:; ;ctivol;. Jr ' ry 15, 1953, Tcerrn y 7, 1553, D rch 1, 192,'crch 11, 1950, crd 'pril 3, 15C3, (het cinciter colicetivci; referred to cs "the ep;.lication")
filed under 5 10' E. cf the Atomic Energy Ac t o f 193!., es curaded (the "Ac t")',
for a conctruction perr it to ccastruct a pres a riccd Uctcr reactor, designed to cpertte initially at pcrer Icvcis up to 2l,52 tegc: ctts (therr:1), to be leccted ca the Applicent's i:,733 scrc site leccted on thc Culf of I:e:.ico abcut 70 miles no"th of Tc.,,2, Floride, cn:' seven znd one-hcif c;iles north of the Teun of Cryctal River, Florida.
(Safcty Evalection, p. 2; Joint Exhibit /..)
2.
The cpplication res revic; cd by t'.a rc;ulctcry staff (staff) of ti.c 1.te-ic Eners Cc:.iszica (C c is, ion) anich concludce that the b
1
t' n
2-proper :d f acilit;.
cc-be ec: r tru::cd e t ti.: prcpercd ritc. thout en,'u rish to the tcrith cni c:f:t;, c i t'.c p ublic. (j:fct;, E clection, p. 61.)
The cpplicr t:en vc cito revic d t;. th: 1.dviscry Cer I t t e c. c n T.c c c t o r Scfecuerde rhich ec:.cicf2d th:t the prcportd rcccter ec: be ccnstructc' at the proptr:d site with rc:: r.:ble crterr.n:c thct it ecn tc cp :ctcd without unde rish to the hccith end c:fety of the public.
(Sa fc ty hvaluatica; Lp;.andi: 1;. )
3.
On I y 29,1553, the Cc:::istica irsur d c 'Zotice of F. crir; c:
Applicctice fcr c Provirienc1 Cen tructica Ferr.it" in the ecpticn:d rctter thich co:tcin:d the ir:ccr to Ic cc..:Idcrcd cnd initicily d::Idct by this i.te:-ic Scic tv c:.d Licc:c in..1 ;rd (th: " ::rd") dcs!..nc ted bv 4
the Ccraiscion to eccd ct this pre ctdir; cs c tesis for deter:..Inir; whether a provisicmc1 constructica permit should be irrucd to the Applicant.
(Scfcty Evalec tion, p. 3; Tr., p. 93.) The 1:etice of Ecarin; vcc published c: June 1, 1913, in the Fcdcrcl Rccistcr (33 F.R. S235).
4 On April 29, 1953, a ::otice of A p: art::ce ves filcd by the l
State of Floride regestin; parris:Icn to p:rticipctc in the prc:ctding pursuant to ; 2.715(c) of the Cc::_aisticu's " Rules of Frcetice", 10 CFR Part 2.
With the constat cf the 1.pplicent and the stcff, the interventica vcc clicced.
3 5.
Cn E:y 29, IEi?, a retitien fer lec.c to Intcrvon cnd ::: Lien to Ererdcn Irru2s was filcd by the City cf C'irecville, Floriin, and the Cair:svillt Utilitier Ecp:rtcent. TL: Fctition rFiscd severci centt ntions i: eludin; c challct';c to tha jur:sdiction of t!.e Ceris:!ca to isccc c ccartructica pt: nit under Scctic: 105 b. cf the Act.
Ey order of this Eocrd detcd June 28, 1955, the Fctiticn to Interven: wcs grruted, linited to the jurirdictionel issue, rnd th: 1:otion to Erecden 1sse:S ves acaicd. As c rcsult of this interver:tien, the procccdin; bcccc.c a ec Ttested pro:ccdin; es defin:d by 10 CF2 s 2.l.(r.).
6.
At the hc t.rin:;, stetemnts vere exte by ::nti.ruici F. Reed, on bchtli cf the Eensrrble Cirufe R. Eirk, Jr., Covctner cf the Strte of Floridc; cnd by T. T. Turulull, Esq., Assis trnt Atte:nry Cencrrl of Floride en bahnif cf the Eonercble spestcrd 1.. Ecllsad, U. S. Screter frer.' the Stcte of Florida; Cecr;c A. Srath:rs, U. S. Scnctor fre.2 the State of Flo:ida; the Eonortbic Uillica C. Crt:3r, Con;rcsta.n, Eth District of Florida and the Florida Air cnd Ucter Follution Control Cerr.is s ion.
Statcrents varc clso prescnted by Er.ndolph Ecd;cs, Director, Florid: Eocrd of Ccascrvation; R. W. Ueod, Chief, Fisheric Divisien, Florida Cane and Frcsh Ucter Fich Ccrctissien; B. Kenncth Catlin, en behalf cf the Flcrida Fublic Service Cc=.issien; Ed rin C. Uillit.:, :. D.,
en bchcif cf Uilton Scuder, M.D., State Eccolth Officer, Florida Stctc Eccrd of Eccith. Lit:ited appearsnces, pursucnt to the provisiens of e
6 s
4 10 CFR $ 2.715(c) of the Concissicn's "rtule: of Prcetice", were c:de by 1,*illic:a E.1:ensch; Eovard Zeller, Fedcrcl Foter Fellution Centrol Adninistrction; Loucli Brycat, Citrus County, Flerida; Kenneth D.
Morri
., on beh lf of the Floride Auduben Society; Eobert S. Sholtes, Frofessor cf Environmental Fnsincerins, University cf Florida; Mrs. Ecica C. Morrison, cppccring for Norton L. Moltos; and Dcvid A.
Gavin, on behcif of the Crystcl River Council.
(I r., p p. 112-218.)
7.
A Pre-Uccring Conference was hcid on Jane 19, 196S, et Crystal River, Floride, and a Eccrins vcs hcid et the scne picce cn July 16-17, 1960, pursucnt to the notice of Ecarin;. At the Eccrin; cvidcoce ecs prescated by the Appliccut, thic staff and the Intervenor.
Findin"s.of F ct n -
8.
The Applicent is e corporation ortcnited under the 1cus of the State of Florida 'cnd is soundly fincnced and has sipiificant resources et its ccar.cnd.
It plans to fincnce the cost of construction of the i
propcsed facility cc an intc;rci part of its total construction progren, naccly, in the ordinary course of business thrcu;h funds derived from operations and through short tera borrouin;s and the issucnce and sale of securitics. Appliccat is financicily qualified to design and con-struct the proposed facility.
(Iovejoy testinony, pp. 3-4; Tr., pp.
229-231.)
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5-9.
The I:ucitar project ::cnegcr fc-r the Crystc1 River fccility is airo the Chief 1-:cchtnical Engineer c.f the ec p:ny cud rcparts dircetly to the cenp:ny Prcsident. A ccastruction sc: tion hceded by th-Construction ::9:n;cr is pcrt of the ::cchenical Er.;ir.ccring l'crertnent and vill supcrvise end ccorCint.tc construction of the facility. This section hcs cnperience in pouer plcat ccastruction anncccment, havit.;
c::ereired t!iis sepervision en ell tajor plants in the FIO systen. All supervisory personnel vill be t.:n with entcasive operctin; and c cin-tencace enpericacc in fossil-fucIcd stcen-cicctric plcnts, cnd vill te given nuclecr train *r3 Trainin; vill include selected colle;c courscs, spe:ici nucicer ca;ir:ecrin; courses cc.nducted by E17 an' other ecurscs in reacter oport' ion instruction c.t the E:" facilitics et Lynchburg, Virginia. Operater treinces vill spend si.n ronths in trainin; ct sa operating plant, The E".' Comp ny hrs cntensive background in supplyin; nec1ccr stcca supply systcas. Gilbert Associctes Ecs been associcted with nuc1 car designs since 1955, includius the Metrepolitan Edisen t
Three Mile Icicnd and the Rochester Gas & Electric Ginna plant. The l
l J. A. Jcncs Cenpeny, gcncral contractor, has worked for the Atenic Encrgy Cennission in building the gasceus diffucion plant at Csk Ridge and a cajor pcrt ci the Ecnford Plant.
(Safety Evaluctica, pp. 4S-49; Tr., pp. 251-255.)
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- 10. The site is on the Gulf cf Mcnico, cheet 70 miles north of Tercpe, Floride. The site consists of 4,735 acres of 1snd ewned by the Applicant. There ere r.o residents within threc end one-half miles of the reactor. Within ten tiles of the proposed recetor, the populction in 1967 ucs 3,300 cad within trenty tiles, the population was cbout 6,000. The ncarest populatien center uith core than 25,000 residents (Gainervillc, Florida) is fif ty-five tiles fron the site. A significcnt increase in llc five-ten mile rene population dcasity is projected for the 40 yccr life of the plcnt prircrily as e rcruit of en increcce in the populction of the Tcra of Cryctal itiver, fron siishtly cver 3,000 people to crer 25,000 p opic. The site geclecy is charccterized by lines cac thich has been subjected to soluticnin3 tith resultin; voids and chennels. The Appliccnt proposes a cencolidctica routin; progran to fill the voids and chenacis, confine potentici settlencat-inducins zones, and ciniaize solution rates. A curtain of greut cround the foundation area vill contro1 grounduatcr. This procedure was used successfully during the ccastruction of Unit 2, on the site.
(Safety Evaluation,
- p. 5; Tr., pp. 24S-249.)
- 11. The nuclect stcan supply systea consists of a lisht water todcreted and coelcl prescuriced vcter reactor (I'.3) which transfers heat to tro onec-throvsh stesn gencrctors fron which stcea passes to the turbine generator. The recetor core is cceprised of 177 fuc1 D**D
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9 '
. assc=blic: centainin; lex-cnrich-:nt urt.nium dioxide pellets vithin
- frecloy tubcs. F.cectivity centrol vill be tecceplished by c cen-bination of 69 control rod cluster cs:cnblics end by lic,uid poisen (boric ccid) in the rcactor ccolant. The 69 centrol red esse::.blics are withdrten and inserted by a rcck and pinica drive cese:bly.
Neutron flux icyc1, high or leu resctor system pressure, hi;h ecolcnt temperature, er lou coolant flou cr.n initir.tc a reactor trip threu;h the rccctor protectien instrencatation which de-cnctgizcs the regnetic clutch:s en the control rods End scrans the-Icactor. Externci neutrcn detectors and 52 in-cerc detector assemblics will be provid:d to tonitor neutron flu > distributicas.
(Safety Evaluf. tion, pp. 9-10,17; Tr., pp. 245-246.)
12 The nuclecr steca supply sy ten is essentially identical in desi;n to thct of the Duke Feuer Company's Oconce Mucicar Stetion, Units 1, 2 and 3,' and the Metropoliten T.disen's Thrce Mile Isicud Station, prcviously cuthorized for construction by the Cornissien.
(Safety Evclu tion, p.11; Summary, p. 22.)
i 13 The proposed plant incorporates nutcrdus systers, coepenents, l
l and featurce for the protection of plant personnel and the public.
The containment con'sists of a stecl-lined, prestressed cencrete cylinder t
l vith a shallou deced reef cnd a flat foundction slab designed to with-stand a containment pressure of 55 pounds per squcrc inch. The con-1 l
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tainment structure vill have adequate cep:bility for c suitabic in-service survcilicace progrca.
(5:fety Evcirttion, pp. 29-30; Tr.,
pp. 247-24S; Surrary, pp.11-12.)
14 Reductica ef containnent building pressure to cssure contain-cc:.t intcgrity undcr' accident conditions is provided by:
(c) Contcintant spray purps thich tche vetcr initially from the boreted vatcr storcge tcnk and then froa the contcin c. cat surp cnd deliver it to the contain..cnt cttosphcre threesh redundent sprey hecdcrs, cad (b) Three energency ccolin; units, each consisting of a fan and c tube cooler for transferring heat froa the contcinment att.ocphere to the recctor building cncrgency cooling cyctcm.
(Scfety Evaluatien, pp. 42-44; Setecry, pp.13-14.)
- 15. The plant design provides protection against clad telting for the entire spectrua of reactor coolant systea failures. The protection is provided by the c=crgency core coolin; systen which '
consists of both pcssive flooding systc=s end putping systems. T.c D
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The passive floodins systen consists of tuo pressuri cd cere flooding tanks which autonatically dischcrse barcted veter into the reactor vessel in the event that the reactor systca pressure drops belou 600 psi.
The pumping systen consists of tro completely independent sub-systens.
Ecch sub-sy ten contains both a high pressure and a lou p cssure injection purp. Either sub-systen, in conjunctica with the core flooding tenks, is ccpabic of protecting the core for eny sice Icak up to end including the doubic-ended rupture of the largest reactor coolcat pipo. Either sub-systca een supply cooltnt directly frca the borated catcr stere;c tcnh or by recirculction fren the Reactor Lufldin; surp threv;h hect exchangers uhich ecol it before it is returned to cool the core.
(Scfcty Evclustion, pp. 35-39; Sur.nsry,
- p. 13-14.)
16 An iodine ' " fixing" cdditive will be tixed eith the containment sprey vetcr to renove iodine from the containnent cttasphere after a loss-of-coolent accident. Tuo sprays are provided and either spray has the design capability to recove sufficient iodine fron the contcin-l
' cent atmosphere to reduce potential doses at the site boundcry to l
Part 100 limits, or 1 css. The Applicent hcs sc1ceted sodiun thioculfate l
I as the cdditive. However, the resecrch pregrams also include citernate chenical solutions. L'hile the renovcl factors needed to ecct site Suidelines appcor to be availcbic under laboratory conditions, the l
stability and cocratibilit'y of the additives under sccident cend.ition,s A
m wM.JUXAsL
,- have not yet been proven. The Applictnt has outlined a resecrch cnd develepacnt progrch desisned to previde adequcte inforection to justify the use of a chemical sprcy as cv engineered safcty fecture.
(Safety Evcitation, pp. 43-45; Tr., pp. 432-435 and 471-494.)
17.
In crder to develop the final design of the projcet, further infortation and data cre needed. Such additional data vill be ccquired fron rcsecrch end development projects cnd by evcluction of opercting reactor c>:pericace concerning the follo:.ing'itens:
(a) ' Onec-through steau gencrctor; (b) Control rod drive unit; (c) In-core neutron detectors; (d) Core thereci cad hydrculic d'esign; (c) Eacrgency corc cooling and core bcrrel check valves; (f) Xcnon oscillctica control; (g) Uic of sodium thiosulphctc for iodine recovel; and (h) Fuc1 rod failure cachenisms during LOCA.
Such progrces are reasonably designed to resolve any safety questiens associcted uith the features ncted above and will provide data necessary to construct the p:oposed facility in accordance with the criteric cad specificctions set forth in the application. The successful congiction D**D D[ 1 J ' J
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, of the rescarch cad develop = cat prcgram and the ccastructica and cparction of the proposed facility vill provida informatien bearing upon its prcetical value for industrial or cc:=2rcial purposes.
(Safety Evcluation, pp. SS-f 0; Suensry, pp. 22-25; ir., pp. 289-295.)
- 18. The applicction centrias a description of the site and the basis for its suitability, a detailed description of the proposed facility including those rccctor systcas and features which cre esecntial to safety, an analysis of the scfety features provided for in the fccility design, and cn cycluatica of various postcicted accidents cnd hczcrds involved in the operation cf such a fccility and the enginecrcd safety fcctures provid:d to limit their cffect. Additional testinony end docucentary cvidence relctive to these c.s.tters is included in the evidenticry record. Also included in the cpplicctica is evidence of the fincncial qualificctions of'the Applicant and the technicc1 qualifications of the Applicent, including those of its contrceters, to design cnd construct the fccility. The stcff's rcvicu of the appliccticn explains the censiderction which var given by the staff to the important safety fcctures of the proposed facility and the significence cssigned to those systcas and features inportant to the preventien and c:itigation of cccidents.
(Saf,cty Evaluation; Sunmary of Application; Joint Exhibit A.)
- 19. The cctivitics to be conducted under the partit applied for will be within the jurisdiction of the United States, and all of the
. Directors and principal officers of the Applicant are United States citicens. The Applicant is not concd, controlled or dcrincted by any alien, forcisa cerporation or foreign govdrnc:nt.
(Sa fety Evaluaticn,
- p. 64 ; Tr., p. 234; Jcint Exhibit A, Itc.? I.)
Conclusicas Upon consideration of the entire record in this proceeding, and in the light of the findin;s and discussicas hereintbove set out, this Atomic Safety and Licensin; Eoard has concluded that:
1.
In accordarcc rith the provisions of 10 C;-E s 50.35(a)
(a) The Applicant has describ:d the proposed design of the facility, includin;, but not linited to, the principal architectural and en;inscring criteria for the design and has identified the tajor featurcs or ccaponcnts
-incorporated therein for the protection of the health and safety of the public; i
I (b) Such further technical or design infotration as may be required to coupletc the safety anclysis and which i
l can be reasona'bly be Icft for later censideration vill bc supplied in the final safety analysis report; l
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l
. (c) Scfety features er co1ponents which require resecrch and develop..ent have been described by the Applicant and the Applicant hcs identificd, cnd there vill be conducted, a rescarch cad develept:nt prc;ren recscucbly designed to rcsolve any safety quecticas associated with such features or components; cnd (d) On the bcsis of the foregoins, there is reccon-abic cssurance that (1) tuch safety questions vill be satisfactorily received at er before the latest date stated in the application for ec: piction of centtruction of the proposed facility, cnd (ii) tchinc into considerstica the site criteric centcined in 10 CFR part 100, the propcced facility can be constructed and operated at the proposed location without undue rish to the hecith end scfcty of the "public.
2.
The Appliccat is technically qualified to dccign and construct the proposed fccility.
3.
The Applicant is fincncic11y qoclified to design and construct the prop $ced facility.
- 4 The issuance of a pernit for the construction of the facilities vill not be inimicci to the cex_2en cefc.,sc and security or to the hecith and screty ef the public.
5.A.
The proposed Cryctal River Unit 3 fccility is a utilicaticn facility involved in the conduct of research cud dcvelopment activitics leading to the de cnstrction of the practical value of such fccility for industrici er cernercial purposes. Mer.orandua and Order detcd Deccaber 5, in the t'attc r of PMicdelphie E1cetric Ccennv; Dccicicn, dated Janucry 3,1968, in the Dtter of Duhc re"cr Cenmenv, Docket 1:os.
50-269, 50-270 and 50-287; and Decision, dated June 5, 1963, in the Matter of Philcde bhic Electric Cc aca.v. Dechet !:os. 50-277 and 50-270.
There is substcntial evidcace in the rccerd reficcting:
(1) A nurbcr of ccpcets of rcsecrch and developnent necded to cenplcte the design o f certcin ccapencuts for the Crystal River Unit 3 facility, and (2) That the constructica cnd operctica of this utilization facility vill constitute a deronstrction
(
that will provide a basis for ccn=creial evcluction.
B.
The Applicant has susteincd its burden of proof as to the jurisdiction of the Eccrd and all other cctters portinent to its applicatien.
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. C.
The cpplicctio:. is preperl, filed under end licen. cs r:cy be issued undcr Sccticn 104 b. cf the Act.
Order Pursurnt to the Act cud the Comissica's Ec;ulationn, IT IS OF.DI.:E!)
TW.7, subject to re;icu by the Ce:mirnion upon its ern notion or upon the filin; of execptions in accordcnce t:it.h the " Rules of Prectice",
10 CFR Part 2, the Director of Ecsulctica is directed to issuc to Floride Forer Corporrtion c provi.sicaci conctruction per.ait pursernt to Section 104 b. of the t.ct subctrutially in the foru of Ap;cadi:< A to the I:otice of 1:ctring in this procccdin; t:ithin 10 dcyr fro:' the date of isse nce of this dccisien.
IT IS FI'12E OEL3D, in ceccrdcncc 5:ith 10 CFR S 2.7C4, gecd crucc not hcvins -bcen shwn to the contrcry, this initici decirien chall be itrcdiately effective.
ATO:aC SAFI.TY AD LICD:5II:3 E0!a'I)
Dated e t F.cthesda,1:sry1rnd,
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this 29th dr.y of July, 1550.
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