ML20037A623
| ML20037A623 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 08/21/1972 |
| From: | Harold Denton US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Deyougn R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8003250631 | |
| Download: ML20037A623 (5) | |
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kJ R. C. DeYeums, Assistant Director for F,73's, L CRYSTAL RIVER ISAR PROBAELS MAXDUM TLOOD DEFICIENCIES FIJL'TP TJM:
Crystal River Nuclear Generating Staticc-Unita LICEI;SII;G STAGE: OL DOCKET ITUMESR: 50-302 RESPOPSI3I2 ERA 3CH: Pda ETanch A Z'QI'"S'"E3 CC'TLETION DA?:: Autunt 16, 1972 ItPFLIC16"S PE3PC;CE DAT/ I'ECESSARY FT ICXT ACTICH PLUC.3D C3 PROJEC": ?!/A DESCRIPr!C!i CF FISPCISE: '.nfor=ntien requested El7IE'4 GTATUS: Avaiting Infc:r.ati:n Enclosed is a tr'rnf of tn2 'ie"ielencies no:+1 in the F3AR en t.H v23cet plant with rer;cet to " lead protection nr y=r t:".mitte.1 to the - 011:='..
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7 Form A1Cdl+ tRev.9-53) AECM 0240 nr. s. oovtFNuDT PRDrTUm2 OFFTE : 1. e O. 40s.M
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1 HYDROLOGIC ENGIIMING SU:EARY FSAR FLOOD PR MECTION DEFICIENCIES CRYSTAL RIVER NUCIEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 3 DOCKET NO. 50-302 To determine the appropriate surge level and coincident wave activity associated with the upper limit of hurricane-type flooding considered reascnably possible at a particular site, the standard method of analysis is to model the surge response of the site to the range of probable maximum hurricane (PMH) parameters identified in NOAA publication liJR 7-97, and super-impose the ceincident wind wave activity on safety related F
facilities that can cccur as a result of the pcstulated winds..
The surge level and wave action resulting frcm the mest critical cetbination of paremeters are echsidered ce be the effects of a EIH. The hurricane par =eters censidered variable for a particular site are the radii of maxio n winds,~the for-ward speed of the hurricane, the =aximum wind speed, and the stem track. Except for the stcrm track, the range of each pr.r=eter is identified in the NCAA publicaticn by a icwer, middle and upper value. For the ec=putatien of the max 1= =
l surge and asscciated wa.ve action, experience has shown that l
the range of possible stem tracks may be quickly reduced to the critical one by careful study of the offshore hydrography.
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The other parameters, hcwever, require consideratien of the potential surge level and wave action over the entire range of possible conditiens. To aid in'the deter =inaticn of the most ggg%4 L-2 ---
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' s ccmputerized critical ecmbination of parameters, a/ surge model is generally quickly empicyedtc/evaluatetheeffectsoftheNOAAidentified range of.hurricant radii, maximum speeds, and translation' speeis.
The FSAR presents the applicant's analysis of a PMH wherein he semised the effects of a slow forward speed, mall radius
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hurricane with a maxi =um wind speed of 138.5 sph. The resulting surge level presented in the FSAR was elevation 2h.6 feet above mean low water (icd). The coincident waves were estimated to-be as =ach as 13 feet high. Preli11 nary ccmputations by-cur concultant, the U. S. Ar J Ccastal Engineering Research Center (CERC), however, indicates that large radius hurricanes moving rapidly over the centinental shelf tcward the site could cause a significantly greater surge (apprcM.=ately 5-11 feet above that precented in the FSAR). No estimates of waves were made-by cur censultant, but had such ec=putations been undertaken they would have indicated waves substantially greater than those-i; presented in the FSAR. We conclude, therefore, that the appli-cant simply did not use the critical ccmbination of parameters necessary to estimate a PMH.
To fally document the nurricane induced flood potentia'!. of the site, and the ability of the plant to safely surv4ve such! events, i
the infomaticn requested in questien 2.1 cf the January 17, 1972' l
letter free R. C. DeYeung to the applicant should be prqvided.
1 as seen as ;cssible to help fir =ly establish the hurricane WI H llB IB 3X n
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design bases. We censider this information basic to the ec==ittent by the applicant to provide protecticn against the~
occurrence of a PMH contained in the PSAR Public Safety L
Zvalustion, ami our stated position therein that we will require such protection.
I Upon the establistment of the correct PMH design bases, the following information is considered necessary to. provide assurance that the plant can be safely shut down and =aintained possible in such a mode. fcr all/ hurricanes up to and including those of probable maximum severity -
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Describe the safety systems and structures necessary t-I to safely shut the plant dcwn and maintaih it in a'shutdcwn cen11tien in the event of severe hurricanes. Protection of.
service water pumps, moters, ard electrical equip =ent, the.
structures housing such equipment, and emergency pcwer facilities should be discussed in detail,
- b.. Cc= pare the wind, wave, surge, and missile induced effects of the P:G with the design bases for those structure-and systems identified in part a. above.. If it is.censidered necessa"/ to keep water cut of structures housing the safety systems necessary for safe. shutdown o.nd ecoldcun, such as may be necessary for the intake structure, identify all exteriol.
i accesses to structures which could allcw water to reach safety.
related equipment and evaluate the capability of the decrs to prevent interier plant ficcding. Por exs=ple, the doors at-
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elevatica 31 feet MU4 into ths main plant. facility can provide pathwaysforfleedwiterunlessadequatelydesignedpoprevent-1 their failure against the static and dynamic effects of hurri-canas.
If the docrs_are not censidered capable of keeping water out of the necessar/ safety creas of the plant (due to the static and dynamic consequences.cf the RG), provide 'an emer6ency procedure which will assure the necessary flood pro-tection. It is noted that-it is not considered necessary that all plant facilities be protected frem such an event,-but rather' thatonly those facilities required for safe shutdown and cool-down be protected.
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