ML20037A619

Discusses & Makes Recommendations on Outstanding Safety, Steam Sys Design & Max Site Water Level Issues Which Could Delay Operation

ML20037A619
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	08/18/1972
From:	Deyoung R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To:	Anthony Giambusso, Oleary J US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
References
NUDOCS 8003250623
Download: ML20037A619 (6)

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_ gj po J. F. O' Leary, Director'of Licensing TERUt A. Giad usso, Deputy Director for Reactor Projects, Licensing RECCi!XEEDED PC31TIONS ON CRTSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 SAFETT RELATED ISSUES BACKOROUND a

On August 10, 1972,' representatives of Ficrida Power Corporation met with ~

the AEC Comf saionars to discuss the cancellation of Crystal River Unit 4 and delays in completion of Crystal River Unit 3.

Presently, ?lerida Power Corporation is projecting fuel loading for Unit 3 in May l')74.

Our prospective operating license facue date for this unit la Bay 15, 1974 The app'fernt st4ted that any additional delays in plant eperatica veuld enuse grave hardship to the utility. The applicant then identified three outstanding safery incuce, stem rfstes design, n xt:na site ester icvel, and augnented stsffing during startup. which could delsy operatien of Unit 3.

Thia =c :cranhca discusses thsee three 122-ns and proposee a reco-n endatien for action with respoet to each.

DICOCSIC'i The st;atus of the three safety issues has been reviewed and the follering actions are rec'.rz::acaded.

Stes. St sta:2 Destoa Probles In the Crystal River Unit 3 steara systen design there are no isolation valves in the main staan piping between the steam generctor and the turbina stop valve at the turbine chast. This turbina stop valve also acts as a main steam stop valve and contafnment isolation valve. Most other pressurized

.I water reactor plants have isolation valves outside and close to the reactor conem h ant building, Exceptions to the piping system with valves are the Oconee units. These units.have the sa:es valve arrange sent as Crystal River Unit 3, but the entirs steamline flu tha reactor building to the turbine stop valve, including the turbine building itself, is designM to Category I (Seismie) requirements. This is not the cc a for Unit 3.

In ec=pariscu, the design of the Crystal River system is unique.

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Racognising that ground acealerations of the Category I (Seismic) magnitude could possibly result in the failure of all four main steamlines without r.aana of isolation, vs have pursued with the applicent threa different apprcaches to provide a fix to this probim. These three approachse vere:

(1) install isolation valves in each steadine, (2) provide changes to the existing steam systaa to upgrada it to Category I (Saismic) standards, or (3) provide an analysis demonstrating the ability to safely shutdown the plant ami maintain it in such condition with the failure of all four steamlines. 'the applicant has replied that they can safely withstand the consequences of this accident without supplying any details of their analys*.a. In turn we have.ftrnally requestad, but not received, the supporting analysis for this clain.

At the August 10 eeeting, Florida Fever Corporation anpressed concern that va vill eventually requira tha installation of isolatica valves in cach stesdine prior t.o operation of the plant. They stated that this vould result in a thrac-year dalay in startup.

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Tha applicant'a proposed stcca cysten design vsa revicwed end acceptad in the course of the safety review for issuance of a constructica permit.

Consequently, any design changes required in thia sten cycta.2 tould be backfit ite.s subject to the requiremento ef 10 m 50.109. This rule forces tha staff _ to find thct substantial additional orotectica requirm1 for-the public health and saf ety is produced by the backfit. For Crjn 1 River Unit 3, this deter =inatien cannot be%2dn withcut thn accident analysis noted she re, and a fairly schstential staf f re:-inv of eche. There in eene suspicion thet collapse of tna stean 11nns in an earthquaxa might 1 car to con-citions, possibly a returnTo' pcuer and ecca fuel failurso that would inercase the dose above an acceptable lev 41 for this kind of accident.

P.cc2=-endstien It is rec==aaded that the saed for backfit modifications to the stes= system be resolved befort che issuance of an operating license. To properly make this detarnination, the applicant should submit his analysis of the accident described above and the radiological consequences of this accident for staff reviser and evaluation. It is pessibla that-the outco=e of our revie-s may result in a dottr=1catice that nodificatione to the enisting steam systxs will be necessary. Alternately, the *pplicant nty proceed ~with the planning and procurecent of stwalina isolation valvea for installacics during the first refueling outage.

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.3 There is a ten foot difference in maximum water level for the probable-

• • vhw hurricane (PMH) between the applicant's calculation and that by our consultant, Coastal Engineering Research Center. This discrepancy is due to a difference in the selection of the critical combination of parameters to describe the PME.

(See Appendix A for details). This difference in height is large enough to possibly require additional prete tion of stettures and equipzant to ensure cafa shutdown of the reactor plant. L'c have rapestedly brcughtthis concern to the attention of the applicant wit'oeut adequata responsa on his pcrt.

An echan1=ent sloso(ber'n) is providad for protection of the main plant butidings. At tha Avgn:t 10 me n.im 71erida ?cw crporatien stated that in.:recsing the. %150 of thia WM-nt slopvould cost appeni=ately MC-0,000 =d Jalay a:nrtup of the pim f:: cua year.

.it the ti:e of issuance ei tha constreti:n perit Mr Uni: 3, studies vers in p:cgrass by the Hydromateorcim;ical 3 reach ei the Environnental

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Sciences serrican Adra.nintracica (1.5dA) ou sizin.1 c.;c n.wi::-unt probablo hurricans. At that rfwa the applicent statal that the pinut protectica would conforu to tha applic.iLic portions of th.s reviaed ESSA criteria. In light'cf this cc--'-t, any' chnrses er nrdifientions te the pis=t beccu e of hurri y induced vatar icvel era not considered backfit it'ms.

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".It is recommisaded that the applicant provida their cal m1=tional raault and supporting analysis of the nerfeum water level for the FME to the staff as seen as possible, yTha'ascessary.information has been specifically identified is sur request 1.1 ei the Jesuary 17, 1972' letter.from R. C..DeYoung to

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-Unit 3 power plant be capable cf bsing safely shat desnusna =nintsinad in that.condittee. To achieve this end the location of.neesser.ry cceenants and systems such as pumps,~ met' ors, heetfeschengers,~etc., and'the' structures

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housias sumit equipment, anst be reviewed and;eenpared with the salculated

. anzinem' water" level'.t The'information whiah we will mood from the. applicant

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Ito aceplete un reviar will be regnested.prourtly. 'my? ~

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It is further cur ;ceitier that the applicant was ecMtted to this safe shutdotm require.ent at the time of issuance of the conceructica permit.

Cens: nantly, cny change: :: modifi:stien to pre ~id: cuch capstility arising frca the revised hurricanc criteria cust be ec;pleted pric: to p - op.r. m =.

733y ygg Aurpented Staff During Startup t

a Problen pA In reviewing the qualificatiens of the proposed plant staff, va determined that the trainint progrca in conjunction vich educational backgrounds and other applicable

crience of the initially assinned staff vill prmdde perconnel that in cost ensos coat the mini

un requirenants of the Ascrican "stional Standards Instituto ANSI-N18.1 Standcrd for "the Selection and Training of Huciaar rever Plant Personnal." h total plant staff aces not pessees p-isr res tor startup erd eversting experice c neecssary da&q the initial,tsrtup swl operation a! thn facility, hrefsre, ws indicatM that their neraal plev -nif be angrented durie this sensitiv<t perich I t ! Lay the applicant uet with the EC staff to d%ues thia item. 73erida Tener Cerparation stated that the 7f ul Safety Analy + Report (FSAS) was ir.cric:0 in rapertin3 qualiffT'~~

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• '3 plant :t ? ! cnd thu this ustet.d uculd be tpfsted in a Sture n M ent to tha ??AR. We c ed to recssers the nest for magnennn:; the st:ff during ste.m after reviewin:t tha u., dated e terial. To data, this updated r.atarial has navar been received.

, At the Anguet 1G neating the applicant stated that the necessity to augnent his opar: ting stnff could cause a delsy in operation of Unit 3.

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During plant stattup and initial operations, ve trill requira that eartain positions, as identified below, be either normally staffed or otherwise -

segnanted with individuals having prior participatiff, esperische in the >

startup sod power ascension testing program at a remator of eeu;;arabla size and type. The positions for which such esperience is.requirps imalades' -

E (1) Plant Superintendent or Assistant Plant Superintaedent, (2) ~0perations

~,ngid er, ('d IschwJ1 tuppofEF.5 sir.eesW) (L f-i.ry ~.md Eadiatiba 'rrotodion Engineer, (~s) each S'..ift Suparvisor. This requirement.is. net uniese to the Crystal River application. To determine the specifie ' degree eintaff-aug=catation for Unit 3, we r.ust review up-to-date resumes of personnel-

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- 3. F. O' Leary As previously indicated to the app 14rmnt, most applicants must the naad for augmenestion of their staff during the startup and power ascension test period by taking credit for the startup crews routicaly assigned by the vendor and architect-enginaar. This approach 14 acceptable to us, provided tha vendor and A-E crer do, indead, have prior startup exparienca and are present in sufficient numbers and specialties to provide backup to the applicant's staff. An experiansed applicant may possess a staff with sufficient prior asper 4=ama to permit reduction in the estent to which

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his vendor and A-Z must provide backup during the initial period of operation.

Conclusion The abova positions constitute recommendations fer actics on three safaty issues in ragard to tha oper tton of Crystal River Unl: 3.

Becausa cf the applicant's conecrn that these issues may cause delay to the startap of Unic 3, it is intended to impla:nent the recomndations and,.ou.se resolution with the applicant promptly. "ovever, va still plan to postpore the continuation of the genersi mafety revicv m til cheat Ifey 1973 a presently outlined in the 131ue ':cC In this reEard the above recc=candaticas and proposed pirn of actim. us autmitted for approva*.

Ch@Stis'dby

.A. Ghibtssa

[".. C. DcToung, Msistant Director i

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APPENDIX A CAICULATION OF WATER LEVEL FOR MAXIMUM PROBABLE HURRICANE To determine the appropriate surge level and coincident' wave activity associated with the upper limit of hurricane-type flooding consi.dered reasonably possible at a particular site, the standard method of analysis is to model the. surge responsa of the site to the range of probable maximuu hurricane (PMH) parameters identified in NOAA publication HUR 7-97, and super-impose the coincident wind wave activity that can occur as a re-sult of che postulated winds. The surge level and wave action -

resulting from the most critical-combination of parameters are considered-to be the effects of a PMH. The hurricane parameters considered variable for a particular site.are the radii of maximum winds, the forward speed of the hurricane, the maximum wind speed, and the storm track.

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- the range of each parameter is idantified in the NCAA publica-tion by a lower, middle and upper.valua. -For the computation of the maximum surge and associated ~ wave action, experience has shewn that the range of possible storm tracks say be quickly reduced to the critical one by careful study of the offshore hydrography.

However, the other parameters require consideration of the potential surge level and wave action over the entire range of possible conditions. To aid in thc determination of the most critical combination of parameters, a computerized surge model is generally employad to quickly evaluate the ef fects of the NOAA identified range of hurricane radii, maximum speeds, and translation speeds.

The FSAR presents the applicant's analysis of a. PMH wherein the effects of a slow forward speed, small-radius hurricane with a maximum wind speed of 13o.5 mph, are summarized. The resulting surge level was elevation 24.6 ' feet' above mean low water (MLW).

Coincident waves were estimated t'o be as high-as 13. feet.

Preliminary computations by our~ consultant, the U. S. Army Coastal Engineering Research Center (CERC), indicate that large radius' hurricanes moving rapidly over the continental shelf toward the site could cause a sigalficantly greater turgc, approximately 5-11 feet above that presented in the FSAR.

No estimates of waves were made by our cor.sultant, but had such computations been undertaken they would have indicated waves greater than those presented by the applicant. Therefore, we conclude that the applicant did'not use the critical combina-tion of ' parameters necessary to estimate the PMH.

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