ML20035F022

Forwards Proprietary SSAR Markups Addressing Dfser Confirmatory Items 7.2.1-1 & 7.2.2.1-3.Encl Withheld

ML20035F022
Person / Time
Site:	05200001
Issue date:	04/06/1993
From:	Fox J GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To:	Poslusny C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML19303F544	List: ML20035F022
References
NUDOCS 9304200183
Download: ML20035F022 (9)

Text

GE Nuclear Energy r;~ m,- x av m o'

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April 6,1993 Docket No. STN 52-001 Chet Poslusny, Senior Project Manager Standardization Project Directorate Associate Directorate for Advanced Reactors and License Renewal Office of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Subject:

Submittal Supporting Accelerated ABWR Review Schedule - DFSER Confirmatory Items 7.2.1-1 and 7.2.2.1-3

Dear Chet:

Enclosed are SSAR markups addressing DFSER Confirmatory items 7.2.1-1 and 7.2.2.1-3. The pages of IED Figure 7.2-9 and TBD Figure 7.2-10 included in this transmittal are modifications to earlier submittals and the proprietary aff: davits under which they were originally issued are applicable to these pages.

Please provide a copy of this transmittal to Jim Stewart.

Sincerely, Y

Jack Fox Advanced Reactor Programs cc: Norman Fletcher (DOE)

Ali Hekmati(GE)

John Pow r(GE)

Bob Strong (GE) 200039 I

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(4) Divisions of Manual Scram Controls gystems provide sensor outputs through the EMS. Analog to digital conversion of these sensor Equipment within a division of manual scram output values is done by EMS equipment. NMS and controls includes manual switches, contacts and PRRM trip signals are provided directly to the RPS L *y NMS and PRRM triploge units.% TB +"Pr**Y b relays that provide an ahernate, diverse, manual b

means toinitiate a scram and air header dump.

3% %fy ' * -

Each division of manual scram controls (1) Neutron Momtoring System (NMS)

C I 7. z. '2.1 - 3 interconnects the actuated load pc ver sources to the same division of scram logic circuitry fot Each of the four divisions of neutron monitoring scram initiation and to both divisions of scram system (NMS) equipment provides separate, iso-logic circuitry for air header dump initiation.

lated, bistable source range monitor (SRNM) trip and average power range monitor (APRM)

(5) Divisions of Scram logic Circuitry trip trnak to all four divisions of RPS trip logics (Figure 7.2-5).

One of the two divisions of scram logic circuitry distributes 120 VAC power to the A solenoids of (a) SRNMTripSignals all FCU's and 125 VDC power to the solenoid of one of the two air header dump valves. The The SRNM's of the NMS provide trip sig-other division of scram logic circuitry d2stributes nals to the RPS to cover the range of plant 120 VAC power to the B solenoids of all HCU's operation from source range through and 125 VDC power to the solenoid of the other start-up range to about ten percent of reac-air header dump valve. The HCU's and air tor rated power. Three conditions moni-header dump valves themselves are not a part of tored as a function of the NMS comprise the the RPS.

SRNM trip logic output to the RPS. These conditions are upscale, short period and The arrangement of equipment groups within the SRNM inoperative. The specific condition RPS from sensors to trip actuators is shown in within the NMS that caused the SRNM trip Figure 7.2-2.

output is not detectable within the RPS.

7.2.1.1.4.2 ini'innng Circuits (b) APRMTripSignals The RPS willinitiate a reactor scram when any The APRM's of the NMS provide trip sig-one or more of the following conditions occur or nals fo the RPS to cover the range of plant exist within the plant:

operation from a few percent to greater than reactor rated power. Four conditions moni-(a) NMS monitored conditions exceed accept-tored as a function the NMS comprise the able limits APRM trip logic output to the RPS. These (b) High Reactor Pressure conditions are high neutron flux. high simu-(c) Low Reactor Water Level (Level 3) lated thermal power, APRM inoperative and (d) High Drywell Pressure reactor internal pump trip. The specific

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(c) Main Steam line Isolation condition within the NMS that caused the j

(f) Low Control Rod Drive Charging Header APRM trip output is not detectable within 1

Pressure the RPS.

CI (g) IIigh Main Steam Line Radiation (b) ":gi S,f____.;."d:q

• D e i el4 d (2) Nuclear Boiler Sptem (NB)(Figure 7.2-6)

'I~ I (i) Turbine Stop Valve Closed (j) Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure (a) Reactor Pressure 1

(t) Operator initiated Manual Scram Reactor pressure is measured at four physi-The systems and equipment that provide trip and cally separated locations by locally mounted scram initiating inputs to the RPS for these condi-pressure transducers. Each transducer is on tions are discussed in the following subsections.

a separate instrument line and provides With the exception of the NMS and PRRh{, all of analog equivalent output through the EMS (co,

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to the DTM in one of four RPS sensor (4) Process Radiation Monitoring System (PRRM) l channels. The pressure transducers and (Figure 7.2-6) l mstrument lines are components of the NB.

(a) Main Steam line Radiation (b) Reactor Water level Main steam line radiation is measured by Reactor water levelis measured at four four separate radiation monitors. Each l

physically separated locations by locally monitor is positioned to measure gamma ra-mounted level (differential pressure) trans-diation in all four main steam lines. The l

ducers. Each transducer is on a separate PRRM then provides a separate bistable l

pair of instrument lines and provides analog output to the DTM in each of the four RPS equivalent output through the EMS to the sensor channels. The radiation monitors DTM in one of the four RPS sensor and associated equipment that determine channels. The level transducers and whether or not main steam line radiation is instrument lines are components of the NB.

within acceptable limits are components of the PRRM.

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(c) DrywellPressure i

(5) O i : SH._.Dclekeb Drywell pressure is measured at four physi-

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cally separated locations by locally mounted

[a) Seismic Activity (Figure 7.2-7) pressure transducers. Each transducer is on i

l a separate instrument line and provides f

Schmic activity is detected by four separate j

l analog equivalent output through the EMS sets of three acceleration switches. Each set l

to the DTM in one of the four RPS sensor of switches provides reactor building bottom ch=nels of the NB.

horizontal acceleration, bottom vertical ac-I celeration and top horizontal acceleration (d) MainSteamLineIsolation(Figure 7.2-4) bistable output through the EMS to the )

C DTM in one of four RPS sensor channels. j 1

Each of the four main steamlines can be isolated by closing either the inboard or the (6) Reactor Protection System (Figure 7.2-3) l outboard isolation valve. Separate position switches on both of the isolation valves of (a) Turbine Stop Valve Oosure one of the main steam lines provide bistable a

output through the EMS to the DTM in one Turbine stop valve clcture i detected by of the four RPS sensor chnnels. Each main separate valve stem positi switches on steam line is associated with a different RPS cach of the four turbine st valves. Each sensor channel. The main steam line position switch provide istable output isolation valves and position switches are throughgJ

"./C to the DTM in one of the components of the NB.

four R S sensor rhnnels. The turbine stop valve are components of main turbine, (3) Control Rod Drive (CRD) System (Figure 7.2-6) ho ever the position switches are ponents of the RPS.

(a) CRD Charging Header Pressure Lod-w r*J c onn= ktons j

(b) Turbine Control Valve Fast Oosure l

C I ~' 'l t W 3 CRD charging header pressure is measured at four physically separated locations by lo-Two separate conditions monitored by the cally mounted pressure transduce-s. Each RPS are indicative of turbine control valve transducer is on a separate instrument line fast closure. These conCtions are fast acting l

l and provides analog equivalent outpat solenoid valve closure and low bydraulic trip l

through the EMS to the DTM in one of the system oil pressure. Fast acting solenoid four RPS sensor channels. The pressure valve closure is deteacd by separate switches transducers and instrument lines are compo-on each of the four valves. Each position nents of the CRD system.

switch provides bistable output through she-t l

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-int $ta the DTM in one of the four RPS logic will initiate a reactor scram when a trip sensor channels. Low hydraulic trip system condition exists in any two or more division trip oil pressure is detected by separate pressure logics. At the scram logic level no bypasses are C I

f. 2.'2. t, 3 switches on each of the four turbine control possible.

valve hydraulic mechanisms. Each pressure switch provides bistable output through the (1) ChannelSensors Bypass MMS to the DTM in one of the four RPS

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sensor channels. The fast acting solenoid A separate, manual, keylock switch in each of the valves and turbine control valve hydraulic four divisions provides means to bypass the col-mechanisms are components of the main lective trip outputs of the assocated sensor chan-turbine, however the position and pressure nel. The effect of the channel sensors bypass is switches are components of the RPS.

to reduce all four division trips to a coincidence b,v.4 _ w-< J cowne ch on t of two out of three tripped una channels. In-(c) ManualScram terlocks between the four divisions of trip logic prevent bypass of any two or more sensor chan-Two manual scram switches and the reactor nels at the same time. Once a bypass of one mode switch provide the means to manually sensor channel has been established, bypasses of initiate a reactor scram independent of con-any of the remaining three sensor channels are ditions within the sensor channels, divisions inhibited.

of trip logics and divisions of trip actuators.

l Each manual scram switch is assocated with A channel sensors bypass in any channel will one of the two divisions of actuated load bypass all trip initiating input signals except those power.

trip signals received from the NMS.

In addition to the scram initiating variables (2) Division Triplegic Unit Bypass monitored by the RPS, one bypass initiating variable is also monitored.

A separate, manual, keylock switch in each of the four divisions provides means to bypass that divi-(d) Turbine First Stage Pressure sions trip unit output to the scram logic. The effect of the division trip logic bypass is to reduce Turbine first stage pressure is measured at the scram logic to a coincidence of two out of four physically separated locations by locally three tripped divisions. Interlocks between the m unted pressure transducers. Each pres-four division trip logic bypasses prevent bypass of J

CI 7.2 1 1,3 sure transducer is on a separate instrument any two or more division trip logics at the same gg,,J line and. provides analog equivalent output -

time. Once a bypass of one division of trip logic cowe a chor, througt!S "."' to the DTM in one of the has been established, bypasses of any of the four sensor channels. Within the RPS divi-remaining three division trip logics are inhibited, sions of trip logics this variable forms a bypass compon at of the turbine stop valve (3) MSL Isolation Special Bypass (Fgure 7.2-4) and turbine control valve closure trip logic.

A separate, manual, keylock switch associated 7.2.1.1.4.3 RPS Logic with each of the four sensor ebnnels provides means to bypass the MSL isolation trip output The combination of division trip, scram, reset signal from the sensor channel to all four and bypass logist make up the overall RPS logic divisions of trip logie. This bypass permits l

is shown in Figure i 10. Each division trip logic re-continued plant operation while any one MSL is ceives trip inputs i 31 four sensor channels and isolated without causing a half scram condition.

I NMS divisions and provacs a scaled-in trip output to Tbc effed of the MSLisolation special bypass is the scram logic when the same trip condition exists to reduce the MSL isolation trip function in all in any awo or more sensor chaancls or NMS four dmsions of trip logic to a coincidence of two divisions. At the division trip logic levelvarious trips out of three sensor channel MSLisolation trips.

l l

and trip initiating conditions can be bypassed as Interlocks between the four dmsions of trip logic described in the following subsections. The scram prevent MSL isolation special bypass in any 715 Amendment 5

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ABM 2mioarr Standard Plant wa conjunction with the pressure relief system is fission products from the fuel. The high radia-adequate to preclude over-pressurizing the tion trip setting is selected high enough above nuclear system, the turbine control valve background radiation levels to avoid spurious fast-closure scram provides additional margin to scrams yet low enough to promptly detect a gross the nuclear system pressure limit. ihe turbine release of fission products from the fuel. More control valve fast-closure scram setting is selected information on the trip setting is available in Sec-to provide timely indication of control valve fast tion 73.

closure.

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(6) Main Stcamline Isolation Since high seismic activity is a source of potential The main steamline isolation valve closure can damage to the plant, a reactor trip is initiated result in a significant addition of positive reactiv-upon indication of such high seismic activity.

ity to the core as nuclear system pressure rises.

There is one trip signal associated with each of The main stesmline isolation scram setting is se-( the four RPS instrument channels.

lected to give the earliest positive indication of main steamline isolation without inducing spuri-711.1.8 Containment Electrical Penetration ous scrams.

Assignment (7) Low Charging Pressure to Rod hydraulic Control Electrical containment penetrations ne assigned to Unit Accumulators the protection systems on a four-division basis (Subsections 711.1.4.1 and 4.6).

The RC hydraulic system normally supplies charging water at sufficient pressure to charge all Each penetration is provided with a NEMA-4 en-scram accumulators of the individual rod hydrau-closure box on each end providing continuation of the lic control units (RHCUs) to pressure values that metal wire ways (Subsection 711.1.4.6).

I will assure adequate control rod scram insertion rates during a full reactor trip or scram. A low 711.1.9 Cable Spreading Area Description charging water pressure is indicative of the po-tentialinability to maintain the scram accumula-The cable spreading areas adjacent to the control tors pressurized. A reacto-trip is inidated after room are termed cable rooms and electrical equip-a specified time delay, before the charging water ment rooms. A description of the separation criteria pressure drops to a value that could eventually used in these rooms is in Section 83. Cable routing result in slower than normal scram speed control through the cable rooms is shown on raceway plans by rod insertion.

reference in Section 6.7.

(S) Drywell High Pressure 711.1.10 Main Control Room Area High pressure inside the drywell may indicate a Virtually all hardware within the RPS design scope break in the reactor coolant pressure boundary, is located within the four separate and redundas*

It is prudent to scram the reactor in such a situa-safety system logic and control (SSLC) cabinets in thc tion to minimize the possibility of fuel damage main control room except the instrumentation for and to reduce energy transfer from the core to monitoring turbine stop valve closure and turbine the coolant. The drywell high pressure scram control valve fast closure, and turbine first stage setting is selected to be as low as possible without pressure. The panels are mount:d on four separate inducing spurious scrams.

control complex system steel floor sections which, in turn, are installed in the main control room. Th:

(9) Main Steamline High Radiation major control switches are located on the principal console.

High radiation in the vicinity of the main steamlines may indicate a gross fuel failure in the core. When high radiation is detected near the steamlines, a scram is initiated to limit release of Amendment 5 7.2-11 l

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f The cooling (ventilating) systems important for 7.2.1.1.11 Control Room Cabinets and 'Ibelr Contents proper operation of RPS equipment are described in

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Section 9.4.

The SSLC logic cabinets, which contain the RPS, for Divisions 1,11,111, and IV include a vertical 7.2.1.2 Design Bases board for each division. The vertical boards contain digital and solid state discrete and integrated circuits Design bases information requested by IEEE 279 is used to condition signals transferred to the SSLC discussed in the following paragraphs. These IEEE from the essential multiplex system (EMS). They also 279 design bases aspects are considered separately j

contain combinational and sequential logic circuits for. from those more broad and detailed design bases for j

the initiation of safety actions and/or alarm this system ci':d in Subsection 7.1.2.2 annunciation, isolators for electrical and physical j

separation of circuits used to transmit signals (1) Conditions between redundant safety systems or between safety and nonsafety systems, and system support circuits Generating station conditions requiring RPS pro-such as power supplies, automatic testing circuits, tective actions are defined in the Technical etc. Load drivers with solid-state switching outputs Specifications, Chapter 16.

l for actuation solenoids, motor control centers, or s

switchgear may be located in the control room eet (2) Variables j

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• i c2 t.1.2 1-3 The generating stadon variables which are moni-The principal console contains the reactor mode tored cover the protective action conditions that switch, the RPS manual scram push button switches, are identified in Subsection 7.2.1.2.L l

the RPS scram reset switches and the bypass switches for the low RCS accumulator charging (3) Sensors pressure.

A minimum number of LPRMS per APRM are rl 7.2.LI.12 Test Methods that Enhance RPS required to provide adequate protective action.

t i

Reliability This is the only variable that has spatial l

dependence (IEEE 279, Paragraph 3.3).

Surveillance testing is performed periodically on i

the RPS during operation. This testing includes (4) OperationalLimits i

sensor calibration, response-time testing, trip channel actuation, and trip time measurement with Operationallimits for each safety-related van-simulated inputs to individual trip modules and able trip setting are selected with sufficient sensors. The sensor channels can be checked during margin to avoid a spurious scram. It is then operation by comparison of the associated control verified by analysis that the release of radioactive room displays on other channels of the same material following postulated gross failure of the i

variable. Fault-detection diagnostic testing is not fuel or the reactor coolant pressure boundary is being used to satisfy tech spec requirements for kept within acceptable bounds. Design basis surveillance.

operational limits in chapter 16 are based on operating experience and constrained by the 7.2.1.1.13 Interiock Circuits to Inhibit safety design basis and the safety analyses.

Rod Motion (5) Margin Between Operational Limits Interlocks between the RPS and RC&IS inhibit rod withdrawal when the CRD charging pressure trip The margin between operationallimits and the bypass switch is in the '3YPASS* position. These in-limiting conditions of operation (scram) for the terlocks assure that no rods can be withdrawn when reactor protection system are in Chapter 16, conditions are such that the RPS cannot re-insert Technical Specifications. The margin includes rods if necessary.

the maximum allowable accuracy error, sensor response times, and sensor setpoint drift.

j 1

7.2.1.1.14 Support Cooling System and HVAC Systems Descriptions U 12 Amendment 20

ABWR zwime Standard Plant Rev B same protective function are independent and (i) neutron flus trip; physically separated to accomplish the decoupling of the effects of unsafe environmental (ii) short neutron flux period; and l

factors, electric transients and physical accident consequences and to reduce the likelihood of in-(iii) channelinoperative; teractions between channels during maintenance operations or in the event of channel malfune-(c) drywellhigh pressure trip;and dons.

1 (f) reactor vessel high pressure trip (7) Control and Protection System Interaction (Para" graph 4.7)

Other variables, which could affect the RPS scram function itself, are thus monitored to The channels for the RPS trip variables are elec-induce scram directly. These are:

l trically isolated and physically separated from the plant control systems in compliance with this (g) low charging pressure to rod HCU accumu.

design requirement.

lators I

Multiple redundant sensors and channels assure

@ high seisnue activity.

j that no single failure can prevent protective action.

• ne detection of main steamline isolation valve i

position and turbine stop valve position is an ap-1 Multiple failures resulting from a single credible propriate variable for the reactor protection event could cause a control system action system. The desired variable is toss of the reac-(closure of the turbine stop or control valves) -

tor heat sink; however, isolation or stop valve clo-resulting in a condition requiring protective sure is the logical variable to inform that the action and concurrent prevendon of operation of steam path has been blocked between the reactor a portion of the RPS (scram signal from the and the heat sink.

turbine stop or control valves (see Subsection 7.2.1.1.4.2(4). The reactor vessel high-pressure Due to the normal throttling serion of the turbine

• 'i and hi h-power trips provide diver.c protection control valves with changes in the plant power S

for this event.

level, measurement of control valve position is not an appropriate variable from which to infer i

(8) Derivation of System Inputs (Paragraph 4.8) the desired variable, which is rapid loss of the

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reactor heat sink. Consequently, a measurement l

l

' The following RPS trip variables are direct mea-related to control valve closurr rate is necessary.

sures of a reactor overpressure condition, a reactor overpower condition, a gross fuel damage Protection system design practice has discour-l condition, or abnormal conditions within the aged use of rate sensing devices for protective reactor coolant pressure boundary:

purposes. In this instance,it was determined that detection of hydraulic actuator operation would i

(a) reactor vessellowwaterleveltrip; be a more positive means of determining fast -

closure of the control valves.

(b) main steamline high radiation trip; (c) neutron monitoring (APRM) system trip control (EHC) oil lines which initiates fast clo-sure of the control valves is monitored. These (i) neutron flux trip and measurements provide indication that fast clo-sure of the control valves is imminent.

l (ii) simulated thermal power-,

l This measurement is adequate and is a proper (d) neutron monitoring (SRNM) system trip; variable for the protective function, taking into consideration the reliability of the chosen sensors Amendment 5 7.2-22

ABWR maar Standard Plant nr.. e Table 7.2-1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SPECIFICATIONS Reactor vessel 0-1500 pdg Pressure-high pressure tranrmitter/

trip module Drywellhigh 05 psig Pressure-pressure transanter/

trip module r

i l

Reactor vessel 0-135 level-low water inches H O transmitter /

2 level 3 trip module l

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Low charging pressure 0-2500 psig Pressure to rod HCU accumulators tranunster/

trip module Turbine stop Fully open Position valve closure to switch fully closed l

Turbine control 01600 psig Pressure-valve fast switch closure Fully open Position i

to switch i

fully closed Main steamline Fully open Position-i isolation valve to switch l

closure fully closed j

i

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Neutron Monitoring APRM or SRNM See system Trip /No Trip Section 7.6 0

Main steamline 1-10 mR/hr Gamma high radiation detector C"I 7.'2 1-1 High scismic activity l

Turbine first -

Pressure-stage pressure transmitter /

trip module Amendment 5 7.2-29 l

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Table 7.2-2 CHANNELS REQUIRED FOR FUNCTIONAL PERFORMANCE OF RPS This table shows the number of sensors required for the functional performance of the reactor protection system.

i Channel Descrintion

1. Sensors l

Neutron Monitoring System (APRM) 4 I

NeutronMonitoringSystem(SRNM )

10 i

l Nuclear System high pressure 4

4 Drywell high pressure

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Reactor vessellow Icvel 4

Low Charging Pressure to Rod Hydraulic Control l

Unit Accumulator 4

l Main steamline isolation valve position 8

Turbine stop valve position 4

2 Turbine control valve fast closure 8

l l

Turbine first-stage pressure (bypass channel) 4 Main steamline radiation 4

( High seismic activity by l

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7. '/.1 - 1 i

1 1In all modes except RUN 2 Four limit switches on FASV and four oil pressure switches 72-30 Amendment 5.

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