ML20035D975
| ML20035D975 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 04/08/1993 |
| From: | Burdick T, Hansen J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20035D970 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-266-OL-93-01, 50-266-OL-93-1, NUDOCS 9304140158 | |
| Download: ML20035D975 (10) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III j
l Report No. 50-266/0L-93-01 Docket Nos.
50-266; 50-301 Licenses No. DPR-24; DPR-27 Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Power Company 231 West Michigan Street - P379 Milwaukee, WI 53201 i
Facility Name:
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Examiration Administered At: 6610 Nuclear Road Two Rivers, WI 54241 Examination Conducted: March 15 through 18, 1993 Examiners:
E. L. Benjamin, Contract Examiner, PNL Chief Examiner:
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J. L. Hansen Date l
Approved By:
'f f J
T. Burdick, Chief "
Dat'e /
Operator Licensing Section 2 Examination Summary Examination Administered on March 15 throuah 18. 1993 (Report No. 50-266/0L-93-01(DRS))
Three Senior Reactor Operators (SR0s) and three Reactor Operators (R0s) were administered written and operating requalification (requal) examinations.
Additionally, three SR0s and three R0s were administered only the simulator portion of the operating examination. Two operating crews and one combined staff and operating crew were evaluated on the simulator portion of the NRC examination.
Results: All crews satisfactorily passed the NRC requal examination.
All individuals passed all portions of the examination on which they were evaluated.
In accordance with the criteria of NUREG-1021, Revision 7, Operator Licensing Examiner Standards, ES-601, the Point Beach Nuclear Plant i
l Requalification Training Program was rated as satisfactory.
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Examination Summary 2
The following is a summary of the strengths and weaknesses noted during the performance of this examination.
Strenaths Scenarios were. sed as presented by the facility with minor revisions.
(For details see Section 3c)
Cr'v communication during the tripping of bistables. (rar details see Section 3c)
The use of red and blue tags to identify those participating in the exam. (For details see Section 4)
Weaknesses All changes agreed upon were not initially incorporated into the final exam. (For details see Section 3a)
Criteria provided within the scenartos for evaluating actions taken by the operators was difficult to use.
(For details see Section 3c)
1 REPORT DETAILS 1.
Examiners
- +J. L. Hansen, Chief Examiner, NRC, Region III
- +E. L. Benjamin, Examiner, PNL 2.
Persons Contacted Facility
+G. J. Maxfield, Plant Manager
- +R. D. Seizert, Training Manager
- K. Draska, Training Coordinator
- C. Hill, Senior Training Specialist
- P. Matson, Senior Training Specialist
- J. Schmitz, Training Operations Supervisor U. S. Nuclear Reculatory Commission (NRC)
- +T. Burdick, RIII, Section Chief, OLS 2
- +K. R. Jury, Senior Resident Inspector
- +F. Ehrhardt, Examiner in training
- Denotes those present at the Training Staff exit meeting on March 18, 1993.
+ Denotes those present at the Management exit meeting on March 18, 1993.
3.
Reoualification Trainina Procram Observations The following information is provided for evaluation by the licensee for incorporation into their SAT based training program. No response is required.
a.
Written Examination Strenath.s:
No strengths were observed in this category daring this examination.
Weaknesses:
o Changes to five que.tions that were agreed upon during preparation (prep) week were not incorporated into the final exam sent to the NRC for review. These deficiencies were identified by the NRC examiner and resolved by t'ie facility prior to the administration of the exam.
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Based on the results of the written examination, the following areas showed weaknesses:
i Given specific post accident plant conditions, two of l
three SR0s incorrectly transitioned through E0P-2, faulted steam generator : solation, which would unneccessarily slow recevery from the loss of coolant accident.
Calculation of the shutdown margin given specific plant conditions.
Response of the pressurizer pressure control system during a normal load decrease.
Response of the pressurizer level to a failed open pressurizer safety valve.
Determination of when the evaluation of the liquid release should occur during an accident involving both liquid and gaseous releases in accordance with the emergency plan implementation procedures.
b.
Job Performance Measures (JPMs)
Strenaths:
e The use of both units during the administration of simulator JPMs was well coordinated and significantly reduced the time required for completion of this portion of tSe examination.
l Weaknesses:
Some R0s had difficulty in following the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) when responding to a loss of containment sump recirculation capability.
This resulted in all residual heat removal pumps being secured while mitigating the event.
e Some R0s referred to the Abnormal Operating Procedure (A0P) prior to completing the immediate actions for loss of component cooling water surge tank level. This allowed the level of the surge tank to drop an additional five to ten inches below the alarm setpoint prior to make-up being l
initiated, decreasing the time the cperator had for I
diagnosis of the problem prior to the required reactor trip by approximately 30%.
Some SR0s demonstrated a weakness in using procedural e
guidance to shut a main steam isolation valve locally while performing TS-39, Main Steam Isolation Valve Operability 1
t, l
Trip Test.
Two of three SR0s removed a cotter key connecting the nut to the stem even though the procedure directed cutting the ends of the key flush with the nut to allow installation of a socket. This action delayed or impeded the operator's ability to shut the valve.
c.
Dynamic Simulator Scenarios Strenaths:
e The scenarios were used as proposed by the facility with minor changes.
1 e
Crew validation of the scenarios during the prep week helped to ensure smooth administration.
o All crews used the SR0 to ensure proper repeat-backs and I
acknowledgements during the tripping of bistables.
Weaknesses:
e In some instances, the criteria provided within the scenarios for evaluating actions taken by the operators was difficult to use because it was extremely condensed.
In one instance, the several E0P steps involved in isolating a j
steam generator due to a tube rupture were condensed to a l
single evaluation criteria. The evaluation criteria stated the " DOS /C0 identifies and isolates ruptured SG" but gave no additional guidance on what E0P steps must actually be completed to satisfy this task.
4.
Trainina. Operations. Security. Rad Protection During examination prepor;ti:n and a hinistration, the examiners observed both strengths and weaknesses relating to plant support.
Additionally, a concern regarding common annunciator acknowledgement between the units was identified.
Strenaths:
e The training staff provided excellent support for the examination process and worked well with the NRC examiners both during the prep and exam weeks to create an " examination team".
This helped to ensure a good atmosphere for coevaluation with less stress on the operators.
e The use of a tagging system by the training department to identify those involved in the exam process seemed to work very well.
The tags made it easy to identify both trainers and participants and helped to ensure exam security once the trainers had been involved in the actual NRC requalification exam process.
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A training instructor recognized that a maintenance worker had entered a radiologically controlled area without the proper protective clothing. He told the maintenance worker to remain i
where he was and contacted Health Physics to resolve the matter.
1 The variance between the NRC and the facility grading on the written and operating portions of the examination conformed with existing standards, e
The Security and Health Physics departments provided timely entrance to the plant and radiologically controlled areas.
Weaknesses:
e A maintenance worker was observed entering a radiologically controlled area without the proper protective clothing. The barrier to limit access to the RCA did not extend to a nearby j
handrail and the worker entered the area unintentionally while measuring the handrail.
Concerns:
e A control operator's ability to acknowledge annunciators that are specific to the opposite unit raised a concern. This concern was identified during the performance of a JPM involving loss of level in the unit 2 component cooling water surge tank. The unit 2 Component Cooling Water Surge Tank Level Low annunciator alarmed -
but was acknowledged by unit 1 personnel responding to several unit I alarms associated with performance of a loss of ECCS recirculation capability JPM. The unit 2 control operator was not aware that the annunciator had alarmed and had been acknowledged even though it directly affected his operation of the unit.
Acknowledgement of all unit I and unit 2 control room annunciators by a common button seems to defeat the purpose of the annunciators. This may challenge plant operational safety by forcing the operator to rely solely upon the recognition of abnormal indications to take prompt action to mitigate an event.
5.
Simulator Observations Simulator discrepancies were identified. These discrepancies are noted in Enclosure 3.
6.
Exit Meetino A preliminary exit meeting with the facility training department was held at Point Beach Nuclear Plant on March 18, 1993, and a final exit meeting with Point Beach plant management was held later the same day.
Those attending the meetings are listed in Section 2 of this report.
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c_.
The following items were discussed during the exit meeting:
Strengths and weaknesses noted in this report.
The general observations relating to plant support noted in Section 4.
The preliminary rating of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant requalification training program was presented at the exit meeting. The facility was informed that the results would be documented in this examination report.
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ENCLOSURE 2 RE00ALIFICATION PROGRAM EVALUATION REPORT Facility:
Poi-ach Nuclear Plant Examiners:
J. L. Hansen, Chief Examiner E. B. Benjamin, Examiner Date of Evaluation:
March 15 through March 18, 1993 Areas Evaluated:
X Written X Oral X Simulator Examination Results:
R0 SR0 Total Evaluation Pass / Fail Pass / Fail Pass / Fail (S or U)
Written Exam:
3/0 3/0 6/0 S
Operating Exam Oral 3/0 3/0 6/0 S
Simulator 6/0 6/0 12/0 S
Evaluation of facility written examination grading S
Crew Examination Results:
Crew 1 Crew 2 Crew 3 Pass / Fail Pass / Fail Pass / Fail Operating Examination Pass Pass Pass Overall Proaram Evaluation Satisfactory RIII RIII RIII hf?
'll M SA O Ex'aminer Section Chieff Brdnch Chief Hansen BurdJck Ring 04/oFV93 04/6 /93 04/g/93 1
a ENCLOSURE 3 SIMULATION. FACILITY REPORT Facility:
Point Beach Nuclear 0 an.
Docket Nos.
50-266; 50-301 Operating Tests Administered On: March 16 - 17, 1993 The following documents observations made by the NRC examination team during the March,1993, requalification examination. These observations do not constitute audit or inspection findings and are not, without further verification and review, indicative of non-compliance with 10 CFR 55.45(b).
These observations do not affect NRC certification or approval of the simulation facility other than to provide information which may be used in future evaluations. No licensee action is required in response to these observations.
During the conduct of the simulator portion of the operating tests, the following items were observed:
llEM DESCRIPTION Alarm Screens Unit 2 alarms flashed on unit I alarm screens for approximately 10 seconds with no operator action. The screen then changed back to unit 1 alarms.
"B" SG Level Response The "B" SG level on unit I did not respond with an appropriate water level increase while being filled by auxiliary feed water. The level did not increase for 13 minutes while being supplied with >200gpm AFW.
RCS Temp and Press Response During the static portion of the written exam, the wide range pressure recorder pens failed to O psig and the wide range temperature recorder pen jumped approximately 25 deg. F when the simulator was taken to " freeze". This only occurred on the recorders and not on any of the indicators or plant process computer system.
Letdown Gas Stripper The unit 2 Letdown Gas is ipper Bypass Switch (GS-GW73A) has the "B" on the label crossed out with grease pencil and an "A" printed in as a replacement.
Seal Flow Recorders The unit 2 Seal Flow Recorders (2FR177 and 175) are reversed from their actual control room placement.
Units For Malfunctions The units (1bm/sec) inserted by the booth operator to set leakage rates for the seals are not consistent with indicated operational parameters (gpm) or procedural terminology (gpm). This caused confusion and delays in the exam validation process as the booth operator had to perform calculations to estimate the leak size or go by trial and error.
Other instances l
of this inconsisten:V in units are RCS leak I
rates which must be entered in percent of pipe I
size rather than the leak desired in gpm and RMS
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malfunctions inserted in mc/cc while the instruments read out in mR/hr.
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