ML20035C462
| ML20035C462 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200002 |
| Issue date: | 03/30/1993 |
| From: | Mike Franovich Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9304080001 | |
| Download: ML20035C462 (27) | |
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UNITED STATES 8
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 March 30, 1993 Docket No.52-002 APPLICANT: ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc. (ABB-CE)
PROJECT:
CE System B0+
SUBJECT:
PUBLIC MEETING OF FEBRUARY 22, 1993, TO DISCUSS THE INTERSYSTEM LOCA (ISLOCA) ISSUE FROM THE CE SYSTEM 80+ DRAFT SAFETY EVALUATION' REPORT (DSFR) n On February 22, 1993, a public meeting was held at the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Rockville, Maryland, between representatives _ of ABB-CE and NRC.
Enclosurs ? provides a list of attendees. _is the material presented by ABB-The purpose of the meeting was to discuss ABB-CE's approach to resolve l u CA as discussed in DSER Open Item 20.2-14 and.
Commission paper SECY-90-016, " Evolutionary LWR Certification Issues and Their.-
Relationship to Current Regulatory Requirements."
i ABB-CE stated that their' primary goal on the ISLOCA issue was to limit and/or.
prevent an off-site radiological release. Rather than designing all low pressure systems to withstand full reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure, ABB-CE has elected to approach resolution of ISLOCA on a mechanistic basis.
7 Under this approach, ABB-CE would evaluate low-pressure systems capability on a case-by-case basis and would credit pressure reduction-from.line resistance 4
(e.g., check valves, filters, orifice plates) and relief valves.as discussed
+
in the January 21, 1993 meeting. ABB-CE would also credit operator action to -
terminate the ISLOCA.
i t
In response, the staff stated that prevention of off-site-doses is the?
l ultimate concern; however, the primary focus should be, to prevent loss of RCS inventory thereby preventing a core damaging event. Subsequently, designing-low pressure systems to withstand an ISLOCA event would provide:a high confidence (e.g., 95 percent) that there would be no catastrophic' rupture of-l the low pressure systems and thereby. limit the loss of RCS inventory.
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In addition, the staff disagreed with ABB-CE's approach that the chemical and volume control system (CVCS) letdown line break envelopes leak rates for instrument lines and other small lines, and consequently would not require upgrading of system pressure capabilities. Resolution of the:ISLOCA concern l
requires upgrading system pressure handling capability to the extent practi-;
cal. As stated in previous staff positions, "to the extent practical" would apply where an engineered resolution is feasible and not prohibitively j
expensive.
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- o. March 30, 1993 The following commitments were made during the meeting:
(1)
ABB-CE should document the rationale for limiting the scope of the ISLOCA evaluation to systems that only communicate through valves. This I
should also capture passive devices that interface with the RCS such as a high pressure seal cooler (HPSC) tube rupture.
(2)
ABB-CE should document the evaluation of instrument lines and why instrument lines were considered not to be a valid rupture location.
(3)
ABB-CE will have the main control room (MCR) design team review the ABB-
)
CE ISLOCA resolution and validate the assumptions (e.g., instrumenta-tion, mode dependent alarms logic, etc.) made for sufficient operator:
action to mitigate the ISLOCA event.
(4)
ABB-CE needs to document more clearly the specific system interfaces and i
provide a qualitative basis for limiting the pressure handling cap-ability of secondary and tertiary systems (other systems connected directly or indirectly to the RCS interfacing system experiencing the pressure transient). This evaluation also includes evaluation of isolation valve capability of the tertiary systems.
Finally, ABB-CE and the staff agreed that a full open mis-positioned valve in systems connected to the RCS interfacing system should bound the ISLOCA analysis versus any assumed leak rates through a properly positioned valve..
However, the staff noted that the isolation valve (e.g., bonnet, gaskets, packing material) would still need to be qualified for ISLOCA pressures and temperatures. At the conclusion of the meeting, ABB-CE stated they intended to elaborate on ABB-CE's position to the staff during the March 1,1993, senior management meeting since ABB-CE's mechanistic approach is a departure from the advanced boiling-water reactor (ABWR) resolution of ISLOCA.
(Original signed by)
Michael X. Franovich, Project Manager Standardization Project Directorate o
Associate Directorate for Advanced Reactors-and License Renewal Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/ enclosures:
See next page j
DISTRIBUTION w/ enclosures:
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EJordan, MNBB3701 MMalloy RJones, 8E23 MRubin, 8E23 SSun, 8E23 HBrammer, 7H15 GThomas, SE23 YCli, 7E23' SAli, 7H15 GGrant, 17G21 0FC:
LA:PDST:ADAR PM:PDSJ/ADAR SC:PDSTeADAR i
j NAME: PShea ry/ tj MXFraofivf c' h:sg TEssig /) (,
DATE: 03/Z(/93'
~03/1ff931 03/3o /93 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY:
DOCUMENT NAME: MSUM0222.MXF
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ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc.
Docket No.52-002 cc:
Mr. C. B. Brinkman, Acting Director Nuclear Systems Licensing ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc.
1000 Prospect Hill Road
.____... inds_or, Connecticut 06095-0500 W
Mr. C. B. Brinkman, Manager Washington Nuclear Operations ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc.
12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330 Rockville, Maryland 20852 Mr. Stan Ritterbusch Nuclear Systems Licensing ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc.
1000 Prospect Hill Road Post Office Box 500 Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500 Mr. Sterling Franks U. S. Department of Energy NE Washington, D.C.
20585 Mr. Steve Goldberg Budget Examiner 725 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. '20503 Mr. Raymond Ng 1776 Eye Street, N.W.
Suite 300 Washington, D.C.
20006 Joseph R. Egan, Esquire Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 2300 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20037-1128 i
Mr. Regis.A. Matzie, Vice President Nuclear Systems Development ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc.
1000 Prospect Hill Road Post Office Box 500 Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500 f
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MEETING ATTENDEES FEBRUARY 22, 1993 NAME ORGANIZATION M. Franovich NRR/PDST i
M. Rubin NRC/DSSA S. B. Sun NRC/NRR/SRXB H. Brammer NRC M. Cross
~ABB-CE J. Longo ABB-CE G. Thomas NRR/DSSA Y.C. Li NRR/DE S. Ali
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ISLOCA f
i MEETING l
2-22'-93 i
i o
DEFINITION o
SCOPE o
DESIGN TOOLS USED T0 i
RESOLVE PROBLEMS FROM ISLOCA o
INTERFACING SYSTEMS WITH-RCS
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INTERFACING BETWEEN SYSTEMS i
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SUMMARY
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i DEFINITION 1
AN EVENT CAUSED'BY LEAKING VALVES OR INADVERTENT OPENING OF VALVES WHICH LEADS TO THE PRESSURIZATION 0F AN RCS-INTERFACING SYSTEM THAT RESULTS IN A LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT i
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SCOPE l
f BASES FOR SELECTING SYSTEMS o
SYSTEMS MUST INTERFACE WITH THE:RCS.
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SYSTEMS OR PORTIONS OF SYSTEMS MUST BE i
LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT o
C0f44UNICATION BETWEEN SYSTEMS MUST BE THROUGH VALVES l
0 SYSTEMS INTERFACING WITH RCS INTERFACIN'G SYSTEMS MUST BE CONSIDERED SYSTEMS EVALUATED o
SAMPLING SYSTEM (SS) o SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM (SIS) j i
o SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (SCS) i o
CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS) q o
CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM (CSS)
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i SCOPE CONT'D j
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P0OL COOLING AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM (PCPS)
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o SOLID WASTE-MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SWS) o HYDROGEN SUPPLIES-o NITROGEN SUPPLIES
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GASEOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (GWS)'
o MISCEllANE0US RADI0 ACTIVE SUMP; o
LIQUID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM-
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AIR SUPPLY j
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O PLANT MAKEUP WATER SYSTEMS j
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ASSUMPTIONS o
VENT, TEST, DRAIN AND LOCAL SAMPLE LINES OPENING TO-ATMOSPHERE WERE NOT CONSIDERED o
NORMALLY CLOSED ISOLATION VALVE (S) o BLIND FLANGES I
o COMBINATION OF AB0VE o
ISLOCA CONSEQUENCES OF PIPING SYSTEMS OR PORTIONS OF PIPING LOCATED WITHIN CONTAINMENT WERE NOT CONSIDERED i
o INSTRUMENTATION LINES HERE NOT CONSIDERED o
SMALL SIZE PIPING / TUBING o
LEAK RATE IS ENVELOPED BY LETDOWN LINE BREAK o
H00P STRESSES LESS THAN ULTIMATE RUPTURE STRENGTH f
o ACTIVATION OF MORE THAN ONE THERMAL RELIEF WAS NOT CONSIDERED o
ALL THERMAL RELIEF VALVE DISCHARGE TO THE EDT o
EDT HAS CAPACITY GREATER THAN 30 MINUTES EDTPRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, LEVEL)RA AtaRhi o
IN MCR o
RCS ISOLATION VALVE CONTROL, INDICATION IN MCR
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- l DESIGN TOOLS USED TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS FROM ISLOCA o
NRC CRITERIA FROM DOCKET 52-001 l
0 THICKER WALL PIPE o
FLOW LIMITING DEVICES o
RELIEF VALVES-o TANKS o
o PRESSURE INDICATION, ALARMS IN MCR
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o ISOLATION VALVE CONTROL, INDICATION IN MCR o
OPERATOR ACTION IN 30 MINUTES o
RESULTANT LEAK LESS THAN LETDOWN LINE BREAK 9
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INTERFACING SYSTEMS WITH RCS i
q SAMPLING SYSTEM i
DESIGN PROVISIONS o
FLOW LIMITING ORIFICES 1
o FLOW WITHIN MAKEUP CAPACITY i
o LETDOWN LINE. BREAK ENVELOPES SAMPLE LINE FAILURE i
o HOOP STRESSES LESS THAN ULTIMATE' RUPTURE l
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STRENGTH o
RELIEF VALVES'FOR EQUIPMENT / PERSONAL
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PROTECTION o
EDT CAPACITY GREATER THAN 30.
MINUTES' i
o EDT PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, LEVEL j
ALARMS IN MCR
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RCS ISOLATION-VALVE CONTROL, INDICATION -
IN MCR CONCLUSION j
o SS INTERFACE WITH THE RCS-IS ACCEPTABLE
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INTERFACING SYSTEMS WITH RCS SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM DESIGN PROVISIONS o
SI PUMP DISCHARGE DESIGN TO 2050 PSI o
COMPLIANCE WITH NRC DOCKET 52-001 o
PUMP RECIRCULATION LINE TO IRWST (FROM CONTAINMENT VALVE TO CONTAINMENT) o OPEN PATHWAY TO CONTAINMENT DESIGN CNANGE o
INCREASE DESIGN PRESSURE OF SI PUMP SUCTION TO 900 PSI o
APPLIES ONLY TO PIPING OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT o
PIPING BETWEEN IRWST AND CONTAINMENT TO REMAIN WITH DESIGN PRESSURE OF 100 PSI o
COMPLIANCE WITH NRC DOCKET 52-001 o
INCREASE DESIGN PRESSURE OF SI PUMP RECIRCULATION LINE TO 900 PSI o
PIPING BETWEEN RECIRCULATION CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE AND CONTAINMENT 1
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i INTERFACING SYSTEMS WITH RCS l
SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM 1
DESIGN CHANGE (CONT'D)
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COMPLIANCE WITH NRC DOCKET-52-001 i
i CONCLUSION t
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o SIS INTERFACE WITH THE RCS IS ACCEPTABLE-if b
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i INTERFACING SYSTEMS WITH RCS l
SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM l
DESIGN PROVISIONS r
o SYSTEM DESIGN PRESSURE 0F 900 PSI j
o COMPLIANCE WITH NRC DOCKET 52-001; O
PUMP RECIRCULATION LINE TO IRWST (FROM j
CONTAINMENT VALVE TO CONTAINMENT) i 0
OPEN PATHWAY TO CONTAINMENT DESIGN CHANGE o
INCREASE DESIGN PRESSURE OF SC PUMP J
RECIRCULATION LINE TO 900 PSI o
PIPING BETWEEN RECIRCULATION-CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE.AND CONTAINMENT o
COMPLIANCE WITH NRC DOCKET 52-001 j
CONCLUSION I
o SCS INTERFACE WITH RCS'IS ACCEPTABLE 1
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- j INTERFACING SYSTEMS WITH RCS j
'i CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM
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~ DESIGN PROVISIONS o
LETDOWN LINE OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION o
FLOW LIMITING ORIFICE o
RELIEF VALVE FOR EQUIPMENT I
j PROTECTION i
o EDT CAPACITY GREATER THAN 30 i'
MINUTES o
EDT PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, LEVEL ALARMS IN.MCR
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o RCS ISOLATION VALVES CONTROL, INDICATION IN MCR o
CHARGING PUMP DISCHARGE LINE DESIGN TO 3025 PSI 0
CHEMICAL ADDITION DISCHARGE DESIGN TO 3025 PSI o
CHEMICAL ADDITION SUCTION FLOW LIMITED o
FLOW WITHIN MAKEUP CAPACITY o
LETDOWN LINE BREAK ENVELOPES LINE FAILURE l
o HOOP STRESSES LESS THAN ULTIMATE RUPTURE STRENGTH l
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r j
m INTERFACING SYSTEMS WITH RCS
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i CHEMICAL AND -VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEN (CONTINUED)
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o CONTROLLED BLEED 0FF OVERPRESSURE 1
PROTECTION j
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'o RELIEF VALVE ON' VOLLME CONTROL TANK-1 o
EDT CAPACITY GREATER THAN 30
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MINUTES l
1 o
RCS ISOLATION VALVES CONTROL, INDICATION IN MCR 1
o OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION ON BLEED 0FF RETURN HEADER INSIDE CONTAINMENT l
DESIGN CHANGE 1
o ADD. RELIEF VALVES TO SUCTION OF EACH j
CHARGING PUMP l
0 SET RELIEF AT 200 PSI MINIMUM a"
o DISCHARGE TO EDT AND SATISFY 30 MINUTE CRITERIA-0 ADD PRESSURE INDICATION,' ALARM T0'.
SUCTION OF EACH CHARGING PUMP i
o INDICATION, ALARM IN MCR 0
ADD PRESSURE INDICATION, ALARM TO LETDOWN LINE.
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INDICATION, ALARM IN MCR j
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'l INTERFACING SYSTEMS WITH RCS i
CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CONTINUED) o INCREASE DESIGN PRESSURE TO 2485 FOR VALVE CH-198 a
o CONTROLLED BLEED 0FF VCT ISOLATION VALVE CONCLUSION o
CVCS INTERFACE WITH THE RCS IS ACCEPTABLE 1
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K INTERFACING BETWEEN SYSTEMS 7
DESIGN PROVISIONS il o
THERMAL RELIEF PROTECTION TO EDT a
o FLOW LIMITING
- l ii o
EDT CAPACITY GREATER THAN 30-i MINUTES o
EDT PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, LEVEL ALARMS IN MCR
'i o
RCS ISOLATION-VALVE INDICATION, h
CONTROL'IN MCR j
o PRESSURE INDICATION, ALARM IN MCR l
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l DESIGN CHANGE 1
i r
o REMOVE BABE INTERCONNECTION WITH SCS-
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PUMP RECIRCULATION LINE:
il o
ADD CONTAINMENT PENETRATION FOR-DIRECT l
1 SUPPLY OF BA TO THE-IRWST FROM'THE BABE-CONCLUSION-
- )
o SIS INTERFACE WITH CVCS IS ACCEPTABLE.
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INTERFACING BETWEEN SYSTEMS Ij SCS WITH CVCS
-l DESIGN PROVISIONS o
THERMAL RELIEF PROTECTION TO EDT.
O FLOW LIMITING j
o
'EDT CAPACITY GREATER THAN 30 MINUTES l
l 0
EDT PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, LEVEL.
ALARMS IN MCR
-0 PRESSURE-INDICATION, ALARM IN MCR j
.I o
ALTERNATE SOURCE OF BA TO SPENT FUEL' il POOL, CVCS o
OPEN PATHWAY TO SPENT FUEL POOL; o
SPENT FUEL POOL LEVEL. INDICATION, ALARM IN MCR i
o SHUTDOWN COOLING PURIFICATION SUPPLYf i
LINE o
LETDOWN LINE-OVERPRESSURE l
PROTECTION l
i DESIGN-CHANGE 0
ADD EXCESS FLOW CHECK TO INTERFACE 0F.
ALTERNATE BA SOURCE (IRWST) i l
^
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INTERFACING BETWEEN SYSTEMS i
DELETE SHUTDOWN COOLING PURIFICATION o
RETURN LINE FROM ION EXCHANGER EFFLUENT.
1 RETURN VIA CHARGING PUMPS i
CONCLUSION SCS INTERFACE WITH CVCS IS ACCEPTABLE o
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INTERFACING BETWEEN SYSTEMS SCS WITH CSS DESIGN PROVISIONS o
CSS PIPING TO SPRAY HEADER ISOLATION VALVE DESIGN TO 900 PSI DESIGN CHANGE o
INCREASE DESIGN PRESSURE OF CSS PIPING FROM HEADER ISOLATION TO-CONTAINMENT TO 900 PSI l
CONCLUSION.
l 0
SCS INTERFACE WITH CSS IS ACCEPTABLE l
L i.
i INTERFACING B E T W E E N-S-Y S T E M S-i SCS WITH SS.
DESIGN PROVISIONS o
FLOW LIMITING o
FLOW WITHIN MAKEUP CAPACITY 1
o LETDOWN LINE BREAK ENVELOPES SAMPLE LINE FAILURES' o
HOOP STRESSES LESS THAN ULTIMATE RUPTURE-
]
STRENGTH-o RELIEF VALVES FOR EQUIPMENT / PERSONNEL.
PROTECTION o
EDT CAPACITY GREATER THAN 30 MINUTES CONCLUSION o
SCS INTERFACE WITH SS IS ACCEPTABLE i
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i INTERFACING BETWEEN SYSTEMS 1
1 SCS WITH PCPS DESIGN CHANGE
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ADD. CONTAINMENT PENETRATION
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PROVIDE SEPARATE SERVICE LINE T0 THE a
o REFUELING POOL o
REQUIRE 900 PSI. PIPING UP-TO AND INCLUDING THE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION-t VALVE INSIDE CONTAINMENT CONCLUSION o
SCS INTERFACE WITH THE PCPS IS ACCEPTABLE l
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1 INTERFACING BETWEEN SYSTEMS J
DESIGN PROVISIONS j
- I o
THERMAL RELIEF PROTECTION TO EDT
]
0 FLOW LIMITING o
EDT. CAPACITY GREATER THAN 30 l
MINUTES j
i o
EDT PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE; LEVEL ALARMS IN MCR j
o RCS ISOLATION VALVE INDICATION I
CONTROL IN MCR l
0 PRESSURE INDICATION,-ALARM IN MCR l
i CONCLUSION l
O SCS INTERFACE WITH CSS INTERFACE-WITH l
CVCS IS ACCEPTABLE l
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INTERFACING BETWEEN SYSTEMS 1
1 I
SCS WITH CSS WITH SS DESIGN PROVISIONS 0
FLOW LIMITING o
FLOW WITHIN MAKEUP CAPACITY
?
o LETDOWN LINE BREAK ENVELOPES SAMPLE LINE FAILURES o
H00P STRESSES LESS THAN ULTIMATE RUPTURE STRENGTH r
o RELIEF VALVES FOR EQUIPMENT / PERSONNEL l
PROTECTION o
EDT CAPACITY GREATER THAN 30 i
MINUTES CONCLUSION o
SCS INTERFACE WITH CSS INTERFACE WITH SS IS ACCEPTABLE j
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INTERFACING BETWEEN SYSTEMS CVCS WITH SS CVCS WITH SMS CVCS WITH HYDROGEN SUPPLIES CVCS WITH NITROGEN SUPPLIES l
CVCS WITH GWS CVCS WITH PCPS CVCS WITH MISCELLANEOUS RADI0 ACTIVE SUMP i
CVCS WITH LWS
-i CVCS WITH AIR SUPPLY i
CVCS WITH PLANT MAKEUP WATER SYSTEMS DESIGN PROVISIONS i
1 o
ALL HIGH PRESSURE SOURCES OF REACTOR COOLANT HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED AND THESE INTERFACES ARE PROTECTED BY THOSE CASES.
CONCLUSION I
o CVCS INTERFACES WITH THE AB0VE IDENTIFIED SYSTEMS ARE ACCEPTABLE
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SUMMARY
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AN ENGINEERING-SOLUTION HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED FOR THE ISLOCA ISSUE o
CHANGES WERE NECESSARY TO SOME SYSTEMS o
INCREASE IN DESIGN PRESSURE
.o o
ADD RELIEF VALVES 1
o ADD PRESSURE. INDICATION, ALARM IN MCR i
o CHANGE SYSTEM INTERCONNECTION POINTS o
ADD CONTAINMENT PENETRATION-l o
ADD EXCESS FLOW CHECK VALVE l
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