ML20034H800
| ML20034H800 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 03/11/1993 |
| From: | Hiland P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20034H787 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-254-93-04, 50-254-93-4, 50-265-93-04, 50-265-93-4, NUDOCS 9303220090 | |
| Download: ML20034H800 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000254/1993004
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION III
Reports No. 50-254/93004(DRP); 50-265/93004(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265
Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company
Executive Towers West III
>
1400 Opus Place Suite 300
Downers Grove, IL
60515
Facility Name: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units I and 2
Inspection At: Quad Cities Site, Cordova, Illinois
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Inspection Conducted:
January 12 through February 22, 1993
Inspectors:
T. E. Taylor
J. M. Shine
P. F. Prescott
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Approved By:
O
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Pat Hilfnd, Chief-
Dat'e .
Reactor Projects Section IB
Inspection Summary
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Inspection from January 12 through February 22, 1993 (Report Nos. 50-
254/93004(DRP): 50-265/93004(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident
inspectors of licensee action concerningi operational safety verification;
engineered safety feature systems; monthly maintenance observation; monthly.
surveillance observation; report review; and events.
Results: Of the areas inspected, one violation regarding inadequate logic
system functional testing was identified in paragraph 7.
In the remaining
areas, two non-cited violations discussed in paragraph 2.a. and 2.c. were~
identified.
9303220090 930312
'gDR
ADOCK 05000254-
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Plant Operation
Operations performance was mixed. Operator response'to events (2' Unit 2
scrams) was very good. Two non-cited violations were identified; one for new
fuel misplacement and the other was a missed Technical Specification
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surveillance. Also, two instances of control rod errors occurred. Operations
involvement for the March 1993 Unit 2 refuel outage on March 7,1993, was :
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considered good.
Radiological Controls
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Performance was steady.
Maintenance and Surveillance
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Performance in this area was mixed.
Preparations for the upcoming refuel
outage have been good. One unresolved item was identified concerning
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calibration of flow indicators for IST and surveillance testing.
Engineerino and Technical Support
Performance in this area was weak. Durii.g the inspection period, one
violation for inadequate functional testing was identified. This item was the
result of the inspectors- review of the HPCI and RCIC dual inoperability on
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February 4, 1993.
Region-based inspectors identified three additional
violations concerning.the HPCI torus suction check valve. This was part of
the dual inoperability evaluation. The Regional inspectors' results were
documented in' Inspection Report 254/265-93005.
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DETAILS
11.
Persons Contacted
Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO)
- R. L. Bax, Station Manager
- B. Strub, Assistant Superintendent - Operations
D. Gibson, Master Mechanic
- B. Moravec,' Engineering and Nuclear Construction Site Manager-
D. Craddick, Assistant. Superintendent - Maintenance
G. Klone, Operating Engineer - Unit 1
J. Kopacz, Operatina Engineer-- Unit 2
D. Bucknell, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor
A. Hisak, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
- R. Walsh, Technical Staff Supervisor
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J. Burkhead, Quality Verification Program Supervisor
K. Leech, Security Administrator
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B. McGaffigan, Assistant Superintendent - Work Planning
J. Hoeller, Training Supervisor
- D. Kanakares. NRC Coordinator - Regulatory Assurance
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- J. Neal, Quality Verification
- A. Pedersen,-Operations Consultant
- Denotes those attending the_ exit interview conducted on. February 22,
1993, or contacted at other times during the. inspection period.
The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other' licensee
employees, . including members. of the technical and engineering staffs;
reactor and equipment operators; shift engineers and foremen;
electrical, mechanical, and instrument maintenance personnel; and
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contract s'ecurity personnel.
2.
Operational Safety Verification' (71707).
The inspectors observed control room operation, reviewed applicable
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logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators. The
inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems',
reviewed tag out records, and verified the proper return to service of
affected components.
Tours of accessible areas of the plant were conducted to observe plant
equipment conditions including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks and-
excessive vibration,.and to verify that' equipment discrepancies were
noted and being resolved by the licensee.
The inspectors observed plant housekeeping and cleanliness conditions-
and verified implementation of radiation protection and physical
security plant controls.
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Inspector observations were:
a.
Recombiner Temperature Surveillance Error
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On-January 14, 1993, the shift control room engineer (SCRE)
noticed that four previous shifts of surveillance readings for
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explosive gas mixture were not initialed as required. During the
verification of recombiner temperatures, the operators were
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required to interpolate the existing graph parameters to determine
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whether the recombiner temperatures were within the required'
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temperature band. However, of the five operators involved, four
noted power <30% instead of interpolating graph parameters as -
required. Areas of weekness identified by the inspector included:
the failure of the SCREs and shift engineers to identify the
anomaly during shift surveillance log reviews and use of a graph
for verifying recombiner temperature that did not include
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operation below 25% power.
This required the operators to
interpolate the existing graph parameters to perform the
surveillance.
The graph was being revised and individuals
involved were counseled on proper surveillance performance and
documentation.
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The missed surveillance for one shift was a violation of the
requirements of the Technical Specifications; however, no Hotice
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of Violation will be issued because the criteria of 10 CFR Part 2,
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Appendix C, paragraph Vll.B.2 were met. This item is considered
closed.
b.
Control Rod Positionino Error
On January 31, 1993, during rod pulls for reactor'startup, two
errors in rod positioning occurred. During initial rod pulls
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prior to criticality, the nuclear station operator (NS0) selected
the H3 instead of the H4 rod and pulled it from 00 to 02. The NSO
identified the error to the nuclear engineer and the shift
management. Subsequently, the control rod was reinserted. The
NS0 was then counseled on use of the' rod worth minimizer and self
check. Later in the startup after criticality, a test of the RCIC
system was needed.. The NSO was directed to insert-rods to set up-
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for the test activity. The HSO had been withdrawing a " group" of
control rods from position 8 to 12 then 12 to 48. Two of the rods
had been pulled to 48 and the third selected.
In error, the NSO
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started to insert the third rod already selected instead of the
two at position 48. Again:the operator identified the error and
notified shift management and the nuclear engineer.
The NSO was removed from the unit and reassigned to the center
desk position. The operator was again counseled on proper rod
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manipulations and attention to detail. Although the HSO committed-
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two rod manipulation errors, the prompt identification and
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notification of management was appropriate and in accordance with
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station procedures. The licensee's response and operator reaction
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to this event was considered adequate. The inspectors had no
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further concerns.
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c.
New fuel Mispositioning
During new fuel receipt and storage activities for the upcoming
Unit 2 outage, a mispositioning of a new fuel assembly occurred.
The fuel handling foreman failed to note the predetermined fuel
location on the nuclear component transfer list (NCTL). After
discovering the error the NCTL was corrected.
The cause of the
event was a failure by the fuel. handling foreman to notice the
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storage of new fuel had been predetermined. On previous shipments
the NCIL was filled in as new fuel was placed in the vaults. A
contributing factor was the lack of communication between the
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nuclear engineer and fuel handling foreman regarding pre-selecting
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new fuel storage locations. The significance of the event was
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considered minimal. The fuel position error did not have any
safety impact. The failure to position fuel in the new fuel vault
per the NC1L was a violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criteria V;
however, no Notice of Violation will be issued because the
criteria of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, paragraph VII.B.2 were met.
This issue is considered closed.
Two non-cited violations were identified.
3.
Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) 5_ystems (71710)
During the inspection, the inspectors selected accessible portions of
the Unit 1/2 emergency diesel generator to verify its operability
status.
Consideration was given to the plant mode, applicable Technical.
Specifications, limiting conditions for operation action, and other
%,.dicable requirements.
Various observations, where applicable, were
made of: hangers and supports; housekeeping; valve positions and
conditions; potential ignition sources; major component labeling,
lubrication, cooling, etc.;-interior conditions of electrical breakers
and control panels; whether instrumentation was properly installed and
functioning and whether significant process parameter values were
consistent with expected values; whether instrumentation was calibrated;
whether necessary support systems were operational; and whether locally
and renotely indicated breaker and valve positions agreed.
Previous
work requests and outstanding work requests were reviewed.
Discrepancies identified included two valve identification tags missing-
and a terminal strip cover out of position. The noted discrepancies did
not effect the system operability.
The technical staff engineer has
resolved the discrepancies. A sample of system operating, surveillance,
and instrument procedures was reviewed for adequacy and accuracy.
The
inspectors had no further concerns.
No violations and deviations were identified in this area.
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Mont'ly Maintenance Observation ~(62703)-
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Station' maintenance activities _ for both safety relatedLand non-safety-
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related systems were observed and/or. reviewed to-ascertain that'
activities were conducted:in accordance~with approved procedures, . .
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regulatory guides, industry codes or standards,: and in conformance with '
technical specifications.
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The following maintenance activities were observed and/or_ reviewed:
Unit 1/2-B HVAC Pressure Transmitter Replacement
Q05814 Unit 1/2 Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Inspe'ction -
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Q05735 Unit 1 HPCI System (2301-39) Check Valve Repair
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Unit 1 Reactor protection system (RPS) reserve? electrical
protective assemblies (EPA) troubleshooting and diagnosis
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Q05233 Unit 2 Correct Cocked Saddle Blocks on Fuse Holder Terminal.
Block EE in 902-39 Panel
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Unit 2 New Fuel- Receipt and Inspection
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Q05736 Unit 2 HPCI System (2301-39) Check Valve Repai_r
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Observations:
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a.
RPS Reserve Electrical Protective Assemblies
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The inspectors _ monitored portions of activities associated with
the Unit 1 RPS reserve EPA. The breaker' opened on'two occasions
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with no apparent cause. Management and electrical, maintenance
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(EM)' personnel demonstrated good support ~ for root ~ cause. analysis;
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EM personnel coordinated well with the operational' analysis group
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in tracking the problem upstream to the voltag'e spiking problem of
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the.' voltage regulating transformer. The licensee , subsequently -
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replaced the transformer. The system engineer made the finding.
and was involved.in the process.
b.
HPCI System Control Power
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On January:11, 1993, the Unit '2 NSO, .during a panel' walkdown,
discovered no light indication existed for the HPCI. motor gear
unit (MGU), motor speed changer-(MSC), and stop valve.
Electrical .
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maintenance (EM) determined the loss of power was.due to a cocked:
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electrical termination saddle on a terminal block to a' fuse in the
125 VDC main fuse wire lug which resulted in a loss of electrical'
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continuity..
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The loss of power affected MSC and MGU motors and light
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indications, stop valve light indication, reset solenoid valve
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-(SV-8), trip solenoid valve. (SV-12), thrust bearing: alarm testing'
solenoid valves- (SV-9 and 11), and the' solenoid valves:for the air
operated (AO) steam trap bypass (2-2301-31) and exhaust; drain-pot:
_(2-2301-32) valves.
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'Previously, an LER was submitted by the licensee for a similar
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problem in.the off-gas system caused by a cocked saddle block.
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Corrective actions taken discovered six other cocked saddle blocks
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(including the-one for HPCI). The repairs were: scheduled for the-
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next refuel outage for both units. -The licensee's. work planning -
process failed to consider these items for any short~ outages prior-
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to the' refuel outages. .This weakness in the work planning process,
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resulted in missed opportunities to correct the identified ~
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deficiencies prior to the failure which occurred on January 11'
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1993. Subsequent to the HPCI event all but one'of the original
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six were repaired.' The one remaining item will be worked during
~the March 1993 Unit 2 refuel outage. ' A caution: tag was-placed on
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the affected panel to identify to personnel working'in the area of.
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the wiring. sensitivity. This condition appeared to be an original-
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construction installation problem. The inspectors have no.further
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concerns'with this item,
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No violations or deviations were identified,
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5.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed surveillance testing and verified one or more of
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the following: testing was performed in accordance with adequate
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procedures; test equipment was properly calibrated; test results
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conformed with technical specification and procedure requirements, and'
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were properly reviewed; and deficiencies . identified during the test'
activities were resolved by the appropriate personnel.
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The inspectors witnessed or reviewed portions of the following test
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activities:
QCOS 300-4 Unit 1 Control Rod Coupling Integrity--Neutron
Instrumentation Response
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QCIS 1000-2 Unit 1 Monthly High Drywell Pressure Scram Functional-
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Test
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QTS 1311-1,3 Unit 1.' Full Core.LPRM Calibration
Unit 2 Differential Pressure Test of (2)-1402-38B '_ .
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QCOS 6600-1 Unit 1/2 Emergency Diesel Generator Monthly Load Test-
Unit 1/2 Diesel Generato'r Cooling Water Flow Calibration
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Observations:
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Unit 1/2 Diesel Generator Water Flow Calibration'
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On february ll,1993, the 1/2 diesel generator was declared
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inoperable because. diesel generator' cooling water flow for- ECCS.
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room coolers and 1/2 diesel generator was less than required.
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This condition was discovered during performance of a routine
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inservice test activity. Review of the circumstances for the low-
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flow showed no apparent reason- for the decreased flow other than
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potential inconsistencies in the calibration process. Calibration
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of the flow' indication instruments was performed as a skill of the
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craft activity. The inspector's initial review identified the
following concerns:
1)
Training did not specifically address calibration of
the Barton flow indicators,
2)
Instructions for the calibration were not clearly
documented, and
3)
Technicians performing the calibration did not refer
to the vendor manual for the calibration activities.
This issue was considered an Unresolved Item pending further
evaluation by the inspectors (254/265 93004-01(DRP)).
b.
Safety Related Contact Test Program
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The inspectors reviewed portions of the Commonwealth Edison safety.
related contact testing program at the Quad Cities station. The
program commitment resulted from issues identified at the Zion
station. The resident and Region-based inspectors discussed the
program status with the station staff and concluded the program
was proceeding adequately.
Review of plant systems covered under
the technical specification was to be completed by January 1994.
The inspectors.will track completion of the program as an Open
Item (254/93004-02(DRS)).
No violations or deviations were identified; .however, one unresolved
item regarding instrument calibration, and one open item regarding
contact testing were identified.
6.
Report Review
During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's
Monthly Performance Report for January 1993. The inspector confirmed
that the information provided met the requirements of Technical Specification 6.9.1.8 and Regulatory Guide 1.16.
The inspector also reviewed the licensee's Station Monthly Performance
Update Report for December 1992.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Dual Unit HPCI and RCIC Inocerability (93702)
On February 4,1993, the licensee identified that- the automatic pump
suction transfer circuits for the high pressure coolant. injection (HPCI)-
and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems were not adequately.
tested. Since the technical specification-(TS) surveillance
requirements were not met for HPCI and RCIC, the licensee entered a 24
hour limiting condition for operation (LCO) and attempted to manually
align the suction paths to the suppression pools (SP). The RCIC systems
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were aligned, filled, vented, and declared operable. However, the-
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licensee was unable to establish " water fill" in the HPCI discharge
piping for either unit. With RCIC operable, the licensee exited .the
associated 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> LCO and entered 14 day LCOs on both units due to
continued HPCI inoperability.
Leaking SP suction check valves allowed a
flow path from the HPCI. discharge piping to the SP. The leakage through
the check valves surpassed jockey fill pump capacity. The licensee
successfully tested the transfer circuits on February 5.
The HPCI check
valves were repaired and tested. The system was declared operable on
February 6, 1993.
The TS required that a logic system functional test be performed for the
HPCI and RCIC systems each refueling outage. The 15 definition of a
logic system functional test required that All relays .and contacts of a
logic circuit be tested from sensor to activated device to ensure all
components are operable in accordance with the design intent. The'
licensee determined the 151CN relay in the SP high water level portion
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of the automatic transfer circuitry was not verified electrh; ally
energized during prior functional tests. Coatequently, the testing
failed to demonstrate functionality of the relay contacts per the intent
of the TS logic system functional test.
Failure to perform adequate
logic system functional testing for the 151CN relay contacts in the HPCI
and RCIC automatic suction transfer circuit is considered a Violation of
Technical Specifications 4.5.C.5 and 4.5.E.5. (254/265 93004-03(DRP))
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On April 9,1990, the licensee's procedure rewrite group identified that
calibration of the low level switches automatic transfer function from
the contaminated condensate storage tank was not performed. After being
informed, electrical and instrument maintenance personnel confirmed the
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finding. Maintenance personnel took no further action. The procedure
group verified that a " functional" test of the automatic suction
transfer was performed. The " functional" test confirmed the appropriate
valves repositioned; however, the test did not demonstrate energization
of all relay contacts.
The procedure rewrite group incorporated
development of the calibration procedures into the procedure rewrite
program. No further corrective action was taken.
"PRC" Engineering Systems performed a review of the HPCI system to
assess overall status of the HPCI preventive maintenance (PM) program.
PRC issued a draft report to the licensee about February 7, 1992.
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executive summary of that report indicated certain calibration and
functional tasks were not performed. The PM coordinator, maintenance
staff supervisor, and HPCI system engineer reviewed the information.
The PM coordinator initiated documentation to add the contacts to the 15
surveillance data base.
In January 1993 the quality verification (QV)
group discovered the discrepancy while reviewing the PRC report, and
informed station management. Technical staff management reviewed the
finding and concluded the TS surveillance was inadequate.
In summary,
information surfaced on two previous occasions which should have
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resulted in resolution of the testing discrepancy prior to the event
date. The inspectors concluded, based on the above, that resolution of
the testing deficiency was untimely.
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Personnel handling the noted findings failed to: apply the proper TS testi
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criteria when-assessing the adequacy of functional testing. The
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inspectors identified a lack of understanding of TS requirements ~ and:a?
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failurt to' inform appropriate managementElevelstof testing deficiencies
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as causal factors of;the event. Through recent experience withithe
safety-related contact testing program the technicalf st'aff personnel who(
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reviewed the QV finding were able to discern the_ operability issue.-
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failure' to promptly-recognize and resolve emergent operability concerns"
was considered a management weakness.
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Maintenance and testing of. the HPCI torus suction check valves appeared
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inadequate, and not commensurate with the: safety. function'of the valve.
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NRC Region III, Division'of Reactor Safety inspectors reviewed the check:
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valve issue discussed above. The results of that' review were documented-
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in Inspection Report 254/265-93005.
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One violation regarding logic system functional testing:was identified.-
8.
Unit 2 Reactor Scram
On January 29, 1993, Unit 2 scrammed due to a high reactor pressure.
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signal. The licensee's immediate investigation ofLthe scram identified
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that " contractors" working in the area'of the high reactorLpressurez
sensing lines was the probable cause. Operator action.in response to
the event was considered prompt and appropriate. .The inspectors review:
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of the scram and discussion with contractors and operations personne1'
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identified that-
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The cause of the scram appeared to be an individual bumping
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or in some manner causing a vibration on the highLreactor~-
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pressure sensing line. No dirtet action by .an _ individual-
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contractor was identified to have-caused the. scram.
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b.
The licensee's contractor overview-program implementation'
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had weaknesses:
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(1)
Theoperationsshiftforemanperforminglthepre-job _
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walkdown did not' identify any specific areas of s
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concern other than to say;that all sensing-lines were.
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sensitive. The sensing line physical arrangement on-
the scaffolding was: configured such that it would be
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easy to inadvertently bump theilines-
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(2)
The operations shift foremen interviewed were not-
aware of management expectations ~for contractor
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overview;
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(3)
Engineering.and construction (ENC) management'
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. expectations were that the assigned ENC engineer.
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should spend.at least-two to three-hoursiduringial
shift at the work area. The ENC engineerLassigned to-
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oversee the work activity didcnot spendia. sufficient'
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amount of time at the job site. ' Unless interested -in
a specific job activity the ENC engineer spent about
30 minutes at the work area during a shift; and
(4)
The contractor foreman directly supervising the
activity had been on the job for the three of the last_'
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five weeks the job was in progress. :The foreman had
not received a walkdown by ENC or operations personnel
of the job site to identify _ sensitive areas. The.
foreman received verbal cautions from the operation _
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shift engineer as-to the sensitivity of the activity.
The licensee's contractor overview program appeared adequate except for
the program implementation weaknesses noted above. -Contractor-
activities will be monitored by inspectors during the March.1993 Unit 2-
refuel outage.
This is considered an Open item pending further review
(254/265-93004-04(DRP)).
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No violations or deviations were identified; however, one open item
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regarding the licensee's contractor overview program was identified.
9.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters which require more information in order _to~
ascertain whether _it is an acceptable item, an open. item, a deviation or.
a violation. An unresolved item disclosed during this inspection is
discussed in paragraph 5.
10.
Open item
Open items are matters which: have been discussed with the licensee;
will be further reviewed by the inspector; and involved some actions on
the part of the NRC, licensee, or both. Open items disclosed during the
inspection are discussed in paragraphs 5 and 8.
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11.
Exit Interview
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The_ inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in
Paragraph I during the inspection period and at-the conclusion of the-
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inspection on February 22, 1993. The inspectors summarized the scope
and results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of-this -
inspection report. The licensee acknowledged the information'and did
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not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection >
could be considered proprietary in~ nature.
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