ML20034E515
| ML20034E515 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 02/19/1993 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20034E514 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9302260260 | |
| Download: ML20034E515 (4) | |
Text
.
p c%
+f 9jg UNITED STATES j
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
n
{
- i WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555
\\...../
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION i
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 186 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-59 POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET N0. 50-333
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated September 25, 1992, the Power Authority of the State of New York (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the James A.
FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, Technical Specifications (TS). The requested changes would add operability and surveillance requirements to Tables 3.12.1,
" Water Spray / Sprinkler Protected Areas," and 4.12.1, " Water Spray / Sprinkler System Tests," to reflect a plant modification that improves fire protection at the FitzPatrick plant,. The modification installed an automatic fire suppression system in the battery room corridor.
The new suppression system is a wet pipe design with fusible link sprinklers that are heat actuated to-allow for sectionalized fire suppression capability.
2.0 EVALUATION Nuclear power plants use the concept of defense-in-depth to achieve the required high degree of safety by using echelons of safety systems.
This concept is also applicable to fire safety in nuclear power plants. With respect to the fire protection program, the defense-in-dapth principle is aimed at achieving an adequate Salance in:
a.
Preventing fires from star ting; b.
Detecting fires quickly, suppressing those fires that occur, putting them out quickly, and limiting their damage; and c.
Designing plant safety systems so that a fire that starts in spite of the fire prevention program and burns for a considerable time in spite of fire protection activities will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
The primary objective of the fire protection program is to minimize both the probability and consequences of postulated fires.
In spite of steps taken to reduce the probability of fire, fires are expected to occur.
Therefore, means 9302260260 930219 PDR ADDCK 05000333 P
L
. are needed to detect and suppress fires with particular emphasis on providing passive and active fire protection of appropriate capability and adequate capacity for the systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe plant shutdown l,.
alth or without offsite power.
The licensee has proposed adding the Battery Room Corridor fire suppression system to Technical Specification (TS) Tables 3.12.1 and 4.12.1 to reflect a-plant modification that improves fire protection at the FitzPatrick plant.
Specifically, during the 1992 refueling outage, the licensee installed a fire suppression system in the Battery Room Corridor to improve the ability of the plant fire protection system to suppress fires. The new suppression system is I
a wet pipe design wf th fusible link sprinklers that are heat actuated to allow for sectionalized fire suppression capability.
The system is automatically initiated when the nearby temperature reaches the melting point of the fusible link.
The system is a Class H system thtt will be Seismic Class II supported.
The licensee has evaluated the potential for flooding and water damage events in the Battery Room Corridor and has determined that these events will not affect the ability of the plant to achieve and maintain safe shutdown from the control room. This evaluation concluded that the affects of the postulated fire in the Battery Room Corridor.are more severe than those from viater damage. Therefore, the addition of sprinklers provides a net safety benefit 1
since the response time to such a fire is reduced with a corresponding i
reduction in potential fire damage.
In addition to the new fire suppression
]
system, the Battery Room Corridor is protected by an existing fire detection i
I capability consisting of ionization smoke detectors.
These detectors alarm in the control room when initiated.
In addition, a system pressure switch, installed with the new suppression system, will indicate actuation by alarning in the control room.
The proposed limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for the new Battery Room Corridor suppression system are consistent with those j
already established for existing s',milar fire protection systems (wet pipe i
system with closed sprinklers) and those described in NUREG-0123, " Standard 1
Technical Specifications for General Electric Boiling Water Reactors,"
l Revision 3, dated Fall 1980. Specifically, from the time that water spray
(
and/or sprinkler protection for any of the areas listed in TS Table 3.12.1 is made or found inoperable, backup fire suppression equipment and a continuous fire watch will be established for the unprotected area within I hour.
If the l
water spray and/or sprinkler protection system for any area listed in TS Table 3.12.1 cannot be restored to an operable status within 14 days, a written report to the Commission outlining the action taken, the cause of inoperability, and plans and schedule for restoring the system to an operable i
status shall be prepared and submitted within 30 days. The surveillance requirements for the new Battery Room Corridor suppression system consist of performing a header integrity inspection once every 1.5 years.
These proposed
1 3-limiting conditions for_ operation and surveillance requiremer,ts for the Battery Room Corridor suppression system assure that this new suppression system is maintained and verified operable through periodic surveillance and provide appropriate compensatory measures if.the system becomes inoperable.
In conclusion, the NRC staff finds that the addition of a new suppression system for the Battery Room Corridor improves the-ability of the plant fire protection system to suppress fires and limit fire damage, furthermore, the potential for flooding and water damage has been evaluated and found to be less limiting than other analyzed events including a fire in this' area. Also, the limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements are adequate to assure that this new suppression system is maintained operable through periodic surveillance and provide appropriate compensatory measures if the system becomes inoperable.
Therefore, the NRC staff finds the proposed TS changes acceptable.
3.0 SJAJE CONSULTATION In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New York State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment.
The State official had no comments.
4.0 EN11RONMENTAL CONSIDERATION The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC. staff has determined.
that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, anu no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (57 FR 58249).
Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
j 4 i
5.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public, Principal Contributor:
Brian C. McCabe Date: February 19, 1993 5
i t
1 l
s 4
E
February 19, 1993 Docket No. 50-333
-Mr. Ralph E. Beedle Executive Vice President - Nuclear Generation Power Authority of the State of New York 123 Main Street White Plains, New York 10601
Dear Mr. Beedle:
SUBJECT:
ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT FOR JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (TAC N0. M84882)
The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 186 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-59 for the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application transmitted by letter dated September 25, 1992.
The amendment adds operability and surveillance requirements to Tables 3.12.1,
" Water Spray / Sprinkler Protected Areas," and 4.12,1, " Water Spray / Sprinkler System Tests," to reflect a plant modification that will improve fire protection at the FitzPatrick plant.
The modification installed an automatic fire suppression system in the battery room corridor.- The new suppression system is a wet pipe design with fusible link sprinklers that are heat actuated to allow for sectionalized fire suppression capability.
A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Reaister notice.
Sincerely, Original Signed By:
Brian C. McCabe, Project. Manager Project Directorate I-l Division of Reactor Projects " 1/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation-
Enclosures:
1.
Amendment No.186 to DPR-59 2.
Safety Evaluation cc w/ enclosures:
See next page PDI-1:LA PDI-1:PM _
SPLB / D d,
0GC PDI-1:D CVogan CF BMcCabe:skA CMcCrIcken
$i}loni RACapra N
A///93 9- // /93 A /?/93 t/II,/93
% //f /93
/ /
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
~
FILENAME: FIT 84882.AMD rw-u'cc d
clp p-k