ML20034C477

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Proposed Tech Specs,Addressing Containment Spray Recirculation Phase Function
ML20034C477
Person / Time
Site: Zion  File:ZionSolutions icon.png
Issue date: 04/27/1990
From:
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20034C475 List:
References
NUDOCS 9005030371
Download: ML20034C477 (17)
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Text

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SURVEILLANCE 1 !!!!!ING CON, . 6,. FOR OPERATION REQUIREMENT PAGE 3. 11 6cneral 4.0. 21a 27c tMses 4.1 licactor Protection Instrementation and Logic 4.1 28 leases 37 3./ Reactivity Control and Power Distribution 4.2 39 3.7.1 I?nactivity Control 4.2.1 39 J.2.? Power Distribution Limits 4.2.2 45-3.2.3 Control Rod System Operability (per unit) 4.2.3 51 3.2.d UNU Parameters 4.2.4 55 !!ases 64 3.3 Reactor Coolant System (per unit) 4.3 -73 3.3.1 Uperational Components 4.3.1 73 Cases 77b 3.3.2 Pressurization and System Integrity 4.3.2 79 Bases 90 3.3.3 teakage.(per unit)- 4.3.3 95 Bases 98 3.3.4-Structural Integrity 4.3.4 99 -Bases 118~ 3.3.5 Chemistry (per un1J 4.3.51 120 Bases 122 3.3.6 Specific Activity-4.3.6: 123 flases 125 3.4 Safeguards Instrumentation and Control 4.4 127 Bases 144 .5 Reactor Containment Fan Coolers 4.5 146" Ilases 148 [ 3.6 Containment Spray 4.6 150 h -444-S C./ rwAarlmerrr SA09v Shrm.. EtJ - do .3. s.1 c>aancs sace Ae,aus rm P/xse surcM Yc..L 1szs B ese-s. lABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)~

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  • 0/: :110 1 1..

_____m__ __~ -._. _ _. ~ _ _. _ _

h Component Component Component Name Number Comconent Name Number Containment Spray Pump 1A (2A) CSOOl-1A (2A) Containment Spray Pump-lC(2C) CSOOO3-lC(2C) (motor driven) (dicsc1 driven) G"*dd"r 9"f' b u ^!< Nc h a M M cpray ::: _pw Pge Mfa4) ciumc na-mcw C c p x y :: ;.d c r. V ; 1 rseu n.s E sc Mov-CSooos cr Va_ve rov,u,j gAc Mov-CSoo2 /Chc)6hten 57zP STOY.4 dot /hE [] }Y SwAv Aaarnaz ra sA t% Ecueme Eductor Suction V717 sw Virtvr - MOV-CS0008* Vatus -MOV-CS00lO* ' Ccarpa> incur rdnv Aim.o IA (24) /kmR' loV1AdmEttf S 4?s W AvP /c lbc)POgen rr y m y_'-r ume - re -recd-MOV-CS0007 cpray ::: dar Valv rrar-taw Mov-CSooo3 c JA 69) >?ne 7;n a To in t%) Resme Srao n'kW-CSoo 47 .t/A w t Containment Spray Pumpto (2g3 CSOO2-13 (2B) (motor - driven) - thchJinerTr $frm' RimP 18 lZs5 hisc Rct Sprcy !!: dar Valv; r w r.ed r/A u/s 'E MOV-CS0004 SiyrW R1ain2 Ta 16 Nob dhiertR STbP Eductor Suction Vc17 vdtue MOV-CS0009*' idurade Sfmv dna la /ceJ umoe ~ ' Spray. ::ader 7617e Srze v/t/E -MOV-CS0005 /B (28) fn2 ~ 'I? Aid *1"o 1ANB.) RcfdER NOJ-csoosD

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  • Iodine Removal.Only W [ouTAdneur 5=n**

fecaskia.A 71u3 i ihrt Ef%7D/] O/Jt.9' -~ ~ ~ Containment' Spray l System Components- _ TABLE 4.6-1 153 Ch820C I!O-3' Date: AUG 2 1974 . _ = .1 - 1_

O O a is justifible in terms of pressure Bamis: 5-ph reduction and iodine removal capability 3.6 The d ntainment raytds designed to since the remaining two containment reduce containment pressure and to remove spray r, umps and four containment fan iodine from the containment atmosphere. h,4M' coolers will be operational. jfgrp The heat re oval capacity of onetspray pump ///// /[,isatleastequivalentto_/ The time established for the spray afdl,tive/dddd of the reactor.tpftk is based on the time for the heat' ' removal capacity of-three (fan deffd f)M It is coolers (1). The system is designed to gf more desirable to complete the repair 7 deliver, with only one(pump running, of the tank than to underEo,d/ N#rf.the tran-enough NaOH solution to the containment ~ sients involved withadd/f /)i to form an 8.8 Ph solution in the re-(.'/w M fueling water and spilled reactor coolant ~ The 40 gallon supply of diesel fuel wpter after the fefueling)fater /torage fank has been emptied. (2 The final supplies sufficient run time to insure f gg solution which will contain 0.6 weight that the RWST is empty before the spa:ay d,Lg/ percent of NaOH in the containment dierel runs out of fuel. de-im will insure that the removal rate of Gh-wnf 5'un Ano iodine will be as stated in Section (1) FSAR, Figure 14.3.4-12 14.3.5.4 of the PSAR, and will ore-vent the revolatilization of iodine (2) PSAR Section 6.4 upon recirculation from the sump. (3) FSAR Section 14.3.4 (O F.5M section G.Y. 2 The containment pressure reduction anelysia is based on the operation of 7 -rte tfa' is-r" Sufrui-S eM7ea wTec rs THr (bAsworJmern 5/cr.y a wern bun Nd TM' HJ'fCL Md PfA56. [U Dr AW'PCWF7'MI SME two, spray pumps and three containment fan coolers (3). The loss of one of e g, w g; sjpAs m snou w 9, e e g w p_ m a g y the three spray pumps for 48 hours j 1 L'c:,sunt. HerYr & rr % + L 6 % 2 T 5 % 75 771 171f Bre 5'n/tm E Qg 'g mmeG" cf SufPL91?JG JLM7CR FfuM W CudTPodrmE'An- &earcuaiso A) Surne 'ro in 'lh'o G)n/TAidisarrY ffA13 kb>2utATobe) 1%st kiWS [4.). OfcTAW of: Ono-Midr> MW '~o^/ RoVLD B4 11/E Sr6 W /N T)tr >&CsRCuiA~rict) fn M C /S T l DWMrDR. t>SirM EmtnCc,ErJC!f. CADEfmOAf /TOCEDdres. T Titr t a s O F onic e wo covmoMihrW~~ Gfen.9 $CcdCULAhl AA5r S};7UG RR l NbC 'S NOTIf'AO'E

  • YEE#5 Of fPi35uPC Arbac 7]OA) A Nb l43 tar 6 If57?fdth*L- (Aff* OIL /lJ*, Su./c5 n,c fe'mAiuvS 4)V%NMCAir-SR.% /0rifGsLA w flucr SnrEW1 PND 'T/tfw Nt'/'CTD/E 0LTM) MEAT' StJ 0 & E P.5 uJo LL. LC' DPCO9~/ ort??C. /9 A'fh_i2 /kReab CW

'T DU.G hits aterJ BVnscco Evsr_d upoaj : r) AssueiNg wanr tne froomatont n,7 nee cogrni>Jiviciv;-- 96% LWiMuirritn) flin57 S5GTEV1 Ofttc R w c n ot) / f= LUTCtriffh 72> 2c S'o, AND ) < S Garpa ru tr atirH Aid 1%;p SVgp deccimeprw 3.6.3. d), ai,nc8 AMMje3 nrr cAnr mops ne AA) sNtPsRA&F se saure CW wnne 7b Rr SysrsM. m....

6 7 of Me Gmtaana,& % hstra ood the Gmlans.d 9ns11 Aareaar,Lo y a$,. The H Nr LMm 4.6 are, active components (pumps and valves) 'gre;3ddag f36d/ f te be t :t:d 2::tt.17 to" verify that the pumps are in satisfactory running order and'that the valves are free'to move. The test interval ~is based on the judgement that more frequent testing would not significantly increase the reliability and would result in increased wear over a long period of time. The refueling outage system test demonstrates proper automatic operation of the Containment Spray System. With the pumps blocked from starting, a-test signal is-applied.to initiate automatic action and verification is made that the components #receivedthe' signal. This g#. test demonstrates the operation of the automatic circuitry, the' valves, and pump circuit' breakers. Verification of NaOH concentration each quarter is more than pdequate.to verify its availability:because of the extremelyf stable nature of this solution.- a O e 155 - =.. .=

y Bases 3.8 and 4.8 (Continued) The availability of the systems is demonstrated by The pressure and volume limits for the accumulators immediately demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the assure'that the required amount of water is injected [ components redundant to the failed one, as well as with the' required boric acid concentration following the OPERABILITY of the inter-related systems and a loss-of-coolant accident. The. limits are based on the standby AC and DC power supplies that feed the values used for the accident. analyses. (4) them. The continued availability of these p components during the repair period is demonstrated The five component coolingLsystem pumps and three by repeating these tests daily. heat exchangers are. located in the Auxiliary Building and are a shared system between Units-I and 2..The Assuming a reactor has_been OPERATING at full rated components are accessible for repair after a-p power for at least 100. days, the magnitude of the loss-of-coolant accident. During the recirculation decay heat decreases after initiating MODE 3.. phase following a loss-of-coolant accident on a unit, Thus, the requirement for core cooling in case of a. only one component cooling pump and heat exchanger is postulated loss-of-coolant accident while in the required for minimum safeguards of that unit. MODE 3 condition is significantly reduced below the Therefore, a minimum' requirement of tour component requirements for a postulated loss-of-coolant cooling pumps and three heat exchangers for two accident during POMER OPERATION. Putting a reactor OPERATING units provides sufficient redundancy. (5) f P in the MODE 3 condition significantly reduces the potential consequences of a loss-of-coolant A total of six service water pumps are installed; accident, and also allows more free access to some only one service water pump is required immediately of the engineered safeguards components in order to following a postulated loss-of-coolant accident. (6) effect repairs. '(See p. 195) """ " ~ * " O Failure to complete repairs within the' allowable' time after going to the M00E?3 condition is N Sc"I DN 4"5 3 dur/n7 f4- /derks p,cc. _L/ considered indicative of a requirement for major = rw m acu m i A,asc m: agcfr,co, 7A= 7wo Area,r,s /m maintenance and therefore'in-such a case, the'.

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[ reactor in general-is to be put into the MODE 5 Fm A w el,rre#ece,rco w :s w. %;r,A ff,a condition. wg nrJ & Aw.Jeo n> sand nrcaven ca) wroe rz> tw dornPnJn1M SWM : AYe,WakvJ Amse.%STCFL s4 M T2r TW ' The limits for the accumulators and refueling water Syy.r_u /vtrer2on MJ A,np5 Amo cefre, racer. Gyp <,ug t storage tank insure the. required amount of water y g with the required boron concentration is available /. for injection into the primary coolant system M. Fua) ' famu - or #h4 Ar/o Sr A</ne_r *A9 /3r following a. loss-of-coolant accident and are based-AiFAuodEd 7b wr IcT AYcipclumm. N/C5E' on the values used for the accident analysis (4).-. E/ourmM der hc /f AcewpoAdm af,7y MWS OfER9%>A s"focEDuess, (6). E.;7.C.;.t %. !!! *. !M 'asm. 4 W s-mas,, .,4 wm-- m.j w,,_,.,_ .._m.,_ .mu

4 Bases 3.8 and 4.8 (Continued) The M g k2 h 7 of the [ervice M ter [ystem ensures The channel calibration of the hydrogen monitors that 5:;f ficient cooling capacity is available for requires disassembly and electronic testing, continued operation of safety related equipment adjustment and reassembly of the instrument during normal and accident conditions. In the therefore the refueling cycle frequency is deemed splitdischargeheader/p////fdfmode with separate discharge headers), two /(////fXds] Unit,1 & 2 adequate. pumps and one standby are required for normal The instrumentation, equipment, and pJocedures for operation. In the cross-tied discharge header t)e testy which are required on the Jent11ation f.f////fri/ mode (Unit 1 & 2 with cosemon discharge filter fystem will generally conform to the header), three pumps have sufficient ca acity/ f recommendations of ANSI N510-1975. normal operation but five pumps to be ./Ml/,or with only one pump from either unit satisfying this The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring requirement for the other unit, are required to instrumentation *nsures that sufficient information provide sufficient redundancy. In.an accident or is available on selected plant parameters to shutdown mode, only one pump per unit is required. monitor and assess these variables during and following an accident. This capability is Forthe[ervicejater[ystem,thed Nbk consistent with the recommendations of Regulatiry requirements include consideration of.the. standby Guide 1.97 -" Instrumentation'for Light-Water-Cooled AC & DC power supplies so that a single failure of-Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions the "0" diesel will not cause a common mode failure During and Following an Accident," December 1975 in the fervice jifeater /ystem;- "0" diesel powers the and NUREG-0578, "TRI-2 Lessons' Learned Task Forve emergency busses for service water pumps 1A and 2A. . Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations". A[ydrogenRecombiner[ystemisinstalledtoremove y the containment atmosphere following a the hydrogen and oxygen gases that accumulate in y 5 Ipss-of-coolant accident. (7)- The containment. (1) FSAR Chapter 9 g #ydrogenjionitoringIystem1susedtodeterminethe (2)_ FSAR Section 6.2 effectiveness of this-system. (3) FSAR Section 6.2.3 ' y .(4) FSAR Section 14.3 (M FSAR Section 9.3-M { FSAR Section.9.6 & FSAR answer to question 9.1 FSAR Section 6.8 g f y r Gt4 O 6.2 J /.3 0792t/0793t 195 '0355A L_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - ' - ~ ~ ~ ~ ^ ~~~~ ' ~ ^ ' ~

~ ;pb - L.. - SURVEILLANCE

'=

' LIMITING CONDITION FOR.' OPERATION REQUIREMENT

PAGE r

3.0 General 4.0 .27a 27c ~ Bases 3 Reactor Protection Instrumentation and Logic 4.1 28 37 Bases 2 Reactivity Control and Power Distribution 4.2 39 3 2.1 Reactivity control 4.2.1' "39-S.2.2 Power Distribution Limits 4.2.2 45' 3.2.3 Control Rod Systes Operability (per unit) 4.2.3 51~ 3.2.4 .DNB Parameters 4.2.4-55-64 Bases 3.3 Reactor Coolant System (per unit) 4.3 '73 4.3.1 -73 ~3.3.1 Operational Components F7b Bases-3.3.2 Pressurization and System Integrity 4.3.2 7 9..' Bases-. 90:, 3.3.3 Leakage (per unit) 4.3.3 95 98 Bases 3.3.4 Structural Integrity 4.3.4 .99 - 118 Bases 3.3.5 Chemistry (per unit) 4.3.5' 120 122-Bases 3.3.6 Specific Activity 4.3.6 -- 123 125: Bases 4.4: 127- '3.4 Safeguards Instrumentation and Control '144 - Bases ~ 3.5 Reacter Containment Fan-Coolers' 4.5~ '146 148! Bases 4.6 150 3.6-Containment Spray.. '4.6.1 150 -- 3.6.1 Containment; Spray System. 3.6.2 Containment Spray Recirculation Phase System:-

4.6.2

,152a. Bases ~ ~ ~ 15 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS-(Continued); >/0940T .ii' TSC 90-01

COMPONENT NAME COMPONENT NUMBER Containment Spray Pump 1A (2A) (Motor Driven) CS001-1A (2A) Containment Spray Pump 1A(2A) Discharge Isolation MOV-CS0002 Valve l Spray Additive to lA(2A) Eductor Stop Valve MOV-CS0008

  • l Containment Spray Pump 1A(2A) Header Stop Valve MOV-CS0003 l

1A(2A) RHR Train to 1A(2A) Header Stop Valve MOV-CS0049 # l Containment Spray Pump 1B (2B) (Motor Driven) C5002-1B (2B) Containment Spray Pump 1B(23) Discharge Isolation --MOV-CS0004 Valve Spray Additive to IB(2B) Eductor Stop Valve MOV-CS0009

  • l Containment Spray Pump 1B(2B) Header Stop Valve MOV-CS0005 l

1B(2B) RHR Train to 1B(23) Header Stop Valve MOV-CS0050 # l Containment Spray Pump 1C (2C (Diesel Driven)) CS003-lc-(2C) Containment Spray Pump IC(2C) Discharge. Isolation MOV-CS0006 Valve l Spray Additive to 1C(2C) Eductor Stop' Valve MOV-CS0010

  • l Containment Spray Pump 1C(2C) Header Stop Valve MOV-CS0007-~
  • Iodine Removal only.

l

  1. ' Containment Spray Recirculation Phase System only Containment Spray System Components

. TABLE 4.6-1 .'18310/18450 153 TSC 90-01 . -. _ +. _ _ _ ~. -... -, _. - .. ~

Basis: a. ' 3.6 The Containment Spray System is designed to reduce containment pressure and to remove iodine from the containment atmosphere. The heat removal capacity of one containment spray pump OPERATING, is at least equivalent to the heat removal capacity of three containment fan coolers (1). The system is designed to deliver, with only one containment spray pump running, enough NaOH solution to the containment to form an 8.8 pH solution in the refueling water and spilled reactor coolant water after the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) has been emptied (2). The final solution which will contain O.6 weight percent of NaOH in the containment will insure that the removal rate of iodine will be as stated in Section 14.3.5.4 of the FSAR, and will prevent the revolatilization of iodine upan recirculation from the sump. The containment pressure reduction analysis is based on the operation of two containment spray pumps and three containment fan coolers (3). The loss of one of the three containment spray pumps for 48 hours is justifiable in terms of pressure reduction and iodine removal capability, since the remaining two containment spray pumps and four containment fan coolers will be operational. The RWST supplies borated water to the Containment Spray during the injection phase. In the recirculation phase of containment spray operation, the source of water to the containment spray headers may be transferred to the Residual Heat Removal System (RHR). The RHR System is capable of supplying water from the containment - recirculation sump to the two Containment Spray Recirculation Phase Systems (4). Operation of containment spray in the recirculation phase is controlled by the operator using Emergency Operating Procedures. The loss of one of two Containment Spray Recirculation Phase Systems for 7 _ days is justifiable in terms of pressure reduction and iodiae removal capability, since the remaining Containment Spray Recirculation Phase System and at least three reactor containment fan coolers will be operational. A repair period of 7 days has been developed based upon:

1) assuring with high reliability that the Containment Spray Recirculation Phase System will function if required to do so, and 2) is compatible with the same' period'for an inoperable RHR Pump System (Specification 3.8.3.D), which-provides the source of water to the system.

The time established for the spray additive tank is based on the time for COLD SHUTDOWN of the reactor.. It is more desirable to complete the repair of the tauk than to undergo the transients involved with going to COLD SHUTDOWN. The 40 gallon supply of diesel fuel provides sufficient run time-to insure that the RWST is empty before the l diesel-driven containment spray pump runs out of fuel. (1) FSAR, Figure 14.3.5-12 (3) FSAR Section 14.3.4 (2) FSAR Section,6.4 .(4) FSAR Section 6.4.2 l 18310/18450 154 ISC 90-01

[ J.~ 4.6 The active components of the Containment Spray Systems and the Containment Spray Recirculation Phase Systems (pumps-and valves) are periodically tested to verify.that the' pumps are in satisfactory. running order anc that thel - valves are free to move. The test interval is based-on the. judgment that more frequent testing would not significantly increase the reliability and would result in increased wear over.a. long period of time. The refueling outage system test demonstrates proper automatic operation of'the Containment Spray System..With the pump blocked from starting, a' test signal is applied to initiate automatic action and verification is made j that the components have rec.sived-the signal. This test demonstrates the_ operation'of the automatic: circuitry, the valves and pump circuit breakers. Verification of NaOH concentration each quarter is more than adequate to verify its availability because of.the extremely stable nature of this solution. L 155- ?TSC 90-0l? ~ ~ 18310 2.. m= w-we m- =- 'NM=*'e '^'-b" ____.Lx s .-or'.[.w+%.m.n+My

h es 3.8 and 4.8 (Cont'd) The OPERABILITY of the Service Water System ensures The channel calibration of the hydrogen monitors that sufficient cooling capacity is available for requires disassembly and electronic testing, continued operation of safety related equipment adjustment and reassembly of the instrument during normal and accident condi* ions. In the therefore the' refueling cycle frequency is deemed split discharge header OPERATING mode (Unit 1 & 2) adequate 4 with separate discharge headers), two OPERATING pumps and one standby are required for normal The instrumentation, equipment, and procedures for operation. In the cross-tied discharge header the tests which are required on the Ventilation Filter OPERATING mode (Unit 1 & 2 with common discharge System will generally conform to the recommendations header),'three pumps have sufficient _ capacity for of ANSI.4510-1975. normal operation but five pumps to be OPERABLE, with only one pump from either unit satisfying this The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring requirement for the other unit, are required to instrumentation ensures that suf ficier.t information provide sufficient redundancy. In an accident-is available on selected plant parameters to monitor or shutdown mode, only one pump per unit is required. and assess these variables during and following an accident. This capability is consistent with the For the Service Water System, the OPERABILITY recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, requirements include consideration of the standby " Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear: Power AC & DC power supplies so that a single failure of Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following the "0" diesel will not cause a common mode failure an Accident," December 1975 and NUREG-0578, "TMI-2 in the Service Water System; "0" diesel powers the Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short emergency busses for service water pumos lA and 2A. Term Recommendations". ~A Hydrogen Recombiner System is installed to remove the hydrogen and oxygen gases that accumulate in the contain-ment atmosphere following a loss-of-coolant accident. (7) The containment Hydrogen Monitoring System is used to determine the effectiveness.of this system. (1) 'FSAR Chapter 9 (2) FSAR Section 6.2 ~ (3)' FSAR Section 6.2.3 (4) FSAR Section 14.3 (5) FSAR Secticn 9.3 (6) FSAR Section 9.6 &'FSAR answer to question 9.1 -(7) FSAR Section'6.8 1 (8) FSAR Section 6.2.2.1.3 l TSC 90-01 18310 195 1 m- +-.

...i.... LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 3.6.2 CONTAINMENT SPRAY RECIRCULATION PHASE SYSTEM: 4.6.2 CONTAINMENT SPRAY RECIRCULATION PHASE SYSTEM (Table 4.6-1): A. Two Containment Spray Recirculation Phase Systems A. Surveillance and testing of the Containment shall be OPERABLE and capable of providing Spray Recirculation Phase Systems components containment spray with water supplied by independent (MOV-CS0049 & MOV-CS0050), shall be Residual Heat Removal Pump Systems taking suction performed in accordance with the Inservice from the containment recirculation sump. Testing Program for ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 pumps and valves per Section XI of the APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2,3, and 7 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable addenda as required by 10CFR50, ACTION: With one Containment Spray Recirculation Phase Section 50.55.a(g), except where specific System inoperable and at least three reactor written relief has been granted by the NRC containment fan coolers OPERABLE: pursuant to 10CFR50, Section 50.55.a(g)(6)(i).

a. Restore the inoperable system to an OPERABLE status within 7 days, or
b. Be in Mode 3 within 4 hours and after a maximum of 48 hours in MODE 3, be in MODE 5 within the-following 12 hours.

-/0940T 152a TSC 90-01

ATTACHMENT C EVALUATION OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS Conenonwealth Edison has evaluated this proposed amendment and determined that it involves no significant-hazards considerations.- According to 100FR 50.92(c), a proposed amendment to an operating license involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of_the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: 1. Involve a significant increase in-the probability or consequences-of an accident previously evaluated; or 2. Create a possibility of a new or different kind of accident f rom any accident previously evaluated; or 3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. This proposed change does not result in a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously evaluated. The y probability for an accident is independent of the changes being proposed. The l Containment Spray Recirculation Phase System function is not a precursor to any accident assumed in the Final Safety Analysis Report. The function of the Containment Spray Recirculation Phase System is to mitigate the consequences l of an accident. Therefore, through the establistunent of a Limiting Condition For Operation, the consequencea of an accident will remain the same..The proposed change involves the d <elopment of a new-specification defining the i requirements of the Containment Spray System during the recirculation phase of i operation. This Limiting Condition For Operation has been establishedLto. ] assure that the lowest level of functional capability and performance-required ~ for safe operation of the facility is met. Remedial actions have been specified to require a plant shut.down when a Limiting Condition-For Operation . p i is not met. Through these actions, the consequences for an accident would remain within the limits established in the Final Safety' Analysis Report. The remedial actions specify an allowable outage time period not to exceed 7' i days. This time period is acceptable based on the philosophy of' allowing a l single level of degradation without total loss of functional capability. This l level of degradation is conservative based on the safety function of the j system, and the ellowable outage time period specified for other Engineered Safety Features of similar safety significance. Surveillance requirements have been specified to assure that the system and components are tested j routinely. These tests will assure that facility operation will be maintained within the Limiting Conditions For Operations. This specification has been derived using the analyses and evaluations included in the Final Safety Analysis Report. This proposed chango does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. It does not involve the addition of any new or different type of equipment, nor does this change involve the operation of equipment required for safe operation of the facility in a manner different from those addressed in the Final Safety Analyses Report. /0940T 1

L,* EVALUATION OF SIGNIFICANT llAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS (Continued)- The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. This change is being proposed to provide a clearly defined Limiting Condition For Operation for the Containment Spray System during the recirculation phase of a Loss-of-Coolant-Accident-(LOCA). The allowable outage time periods are consistent with those used for systems of similar safety significance at Zion Station. In the recirculation mode of operation, the Residual lleat Removal (Rl!R) Pump System, a part of _ the fmergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), supplies the recirculation water to the Containment Spray Recirculation Phase System from the containment recirculation sump. Therefore, the allowable outage time periods have been selected to be I consistent with the RIIR Pump System. The Containment. Spray Recirculation Phase System includes a requirement to verify at least 3 RCFCs are operable. Analyses have been performed demonstrating that a total loss of containment spray during the recirculation phase, would not result in a significant increase in containment pressure. The RCFCs can accommodate the. assumed post-LOCA heat loads. Loss of containment spray recirculation function does result in an increase in temperature and pressure, but these increases are well within all design limitations and margins. i i '/0940T 2 i

EE ATTACIMENT D Environmental' Assessment Statement 1 This proposed Technical Specification amendment'does not involve a change in the installation or use-of the facilities or components located within the I Restricted Area as defined in-100FR20. Commonwealth Edison has determined ]l l' that this Technical Specification amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the. types of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no exposure. Accordingly, this-Technical Specification amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in~100FR Section 51.22 (c)(9). Pursuant to 100FR51.22(b), no environmental impact statement'or .i environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the granting of. l this Technical Specification amendment. 1 l I u l l i i [ t 1 1

4 -Esses 3.8 and 4.8 (cont'd) The availability of the systems is demonstrated by The pressure and volume limits for the accumulators immediately demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the assure that the required amount of water is injected components redundant to the failed one, as well as with the required boric acid concentration following a the OPERABILITY of the inter-related systems and loss-of-coolant accident. The limits are based on the the standby AC and DC power' supplies that feed them. values used for the accident analyses. (4) The continued availability of these components during the repair period is demonstrated by repeating these The RWST supplies borated water to the Emergency Core tests daily. Cooling System (ECCS) during the injection phase. In the recirculation phase of operation. the two Residual Assuming a reactor has been OPERATING at full rated Heat Removal (RHR) pumps are realigned to take suction power for at least 100 days, the magnitude of the from the containment recirculation sump. The RHR pumps decay heat decreases after initiating MODE 3.

Thus, may then be aligned to supply recirculation water to the requirement for core cooling in case of a postulated the Containment Spray Recirculation Phase Systems, and loss-of-coolant accident while f in the MODE 3 condition is to the Saf ty Injection (SI) pumps and Centrifugal significantly reduced below the requirements for a Charging pumps for cold leg recirculation. Later in postulated loss-of-coolant accident during POWER the accident,.ECCS. flow from the RHR and=SI pumps may

' OPERATION. Putting a reactor in the MODE 3 condition be realigned to hot leg recirculation. These significantly reduces the potential consequences evolutions are done in accordance with Emergency of a loss-of-coolant accident, and also allows more free Operating Procedures. (8) access to some of the engineered safeguards components in order to effect repairs. The five component cooling system pumps and three heat exchangers are located in the Auxiliary Building and Failure to complete repairs within the allowable time are a shared system between Units 1 and 2. The after going to the MODE 3 condition'is considered indica-components.are accessible for repair after a tive of a requirement for major maintenance and~therefore loss-of-coolant accident. During'the recirculation in such a case, the reactor'in-general is to be put into phase following a loss-of-coolant accident on a unit, the MODE 5 condition. only one component cooling pump and heat exchanger is required for minimum safeguards of that unit.. The limits f.or the accumulators 'and Refueling Water Storage 'Therefore,a minimum requirement of four. component Tank (RWST), insure the requised amount of water with the cooling pumps and three heat'exchangers.for two required boron concentration is available for injection OPERATING units. provides suf ficient redundancy. (5)~ into the primary coolant' system following aLloss-of-i coolant accident and are based on values used for the A total of 'six service water pumps are installed; only accident analysis (4). one service water. pump is required immediately following a postulated loss-of-coolant accident. (6) (See p.195) TSC 90-01'

18310 194 x-.

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