Text

Amends 174,177 & 145 to Licenses DPR-33,DPR-52 & DPR-68, Respectively,Clarifying Actions Required in Limiting Conditions for Operation 3.7.B.4 Re Standby Gas Treatment Sys
	ML20033G781
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	03/30/1990
From:	Black S; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20033G782	List: ML20033G781; ML20033G785;
References
	NUDOCS 9004120116
	Download: ML20033G781 (51)
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l

g wAswiwovow. o. c. noons e

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i TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY l

DOCKET NO. 50-259 l

i.

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 AMENDitENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE t

Amendment No. 174 License No. DPR-33 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Comission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated March 6, 1990, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act),

and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and l

E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

6 i

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~

i 2

e 2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR.33 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.174, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMNISSION 4h

%=

Suzanne Black, Assista. Director for Projects TVA Projects Division Office of Nuclear P.eactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: March 30, 1990 l

l ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.174 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-33 00CKET NO. 50 259 Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages l

identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change. Overleaf

and overflow ** pages are provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE INSERT 3.7/4.7-13 3.7/4.7-13 3.7/4.7-14 3.7/4.7-14*

3.7/4.7-15 3.7/4.7-15 3.7/4.7-16 3.7/4.7-16 3.7/4.7-17 3.7/4.7-17 3.7/4.7-18 3.7/4.7-18*

3.7/4.7-47 3.7/4.7-47 3.7/4.7-43 3.7/4.7-48 3.7/4.7-49 3.7/4.7-49**

3.7/4.7-50 3.7/4.7-50**

3.7/4.7-51 3.7/4.7-51**

3.7/4.7-52 3.7/4.7-52**

3.7/4.7-53 3.7/4.7-53**

3.7/4.7-53a**

T f

+

5.7/4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

(

LIMITING CORDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.7.B.

Standby Gas Treatment System 4.7.B.

Standbv Gas Treatment svatam

[

1.

Except as specified in 1.

At least once per year, Specification 3.7.B.3 below, the following conditions all three trains of the shall be demonstrated.

standby gas treatment system shall be OPERABLE at all a.

Pressure drop across l

times when secondary the combined HEPA t

containment integrity is filters and charcoal

required, adsorber banks is less than 6 inches of water at

t. flow of 9000 cfm (i 10%).

b.

The inlet heaters on l

i l

each circuit are tested in accordance i

with ANSI N510-1975, and are capable of an output of at least 40 kW.

c.

Air distribution is uniform within 20%

across HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers.

)

BFN 3.7/4.7-13 Unit 1 Amendment !!o,174

3.7/4.7 CONTAINKENT SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.7.B. Standby cas Treatment System 4,7.B.

Standby can Treatment System

2. a. The results of the in-place

2. a. The tests and sample cold DOP and halogenated analysis of hydrocarbon tests at 1 10%

Specification 3.7.B.2 design flow on HEPA filters shall be performed at and charcoal adsorber banks least once per operating shall show 199% DOP removal cycle or once every and 199% halogenated 18 months whichever hydrocarbon removal when occurs first for standby tested in accordance with service or after every ANSI N510-1975.

720 hours0.00833 days 0.2 hours 0.00119 weeks 2.7396e-4 months of system operation and following significant painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation cone communicating with the system.

b. The results of laboratory

b. Cold DOP testing shall carbon sample analysis be performed after shall show 190% radioactive each complete or partial methyl iodide remcyal when replacement of the HEPA tested in accordance with filter bank or after any ASTM D3803 (130'C, structural maintenance 95% R.H.).

on the. system housing,

c. System shall be shown to

c. Halogenated hydrocarbon operate within 110% design testing shall be flow.

performed after each complete or. partial replacement of the charcoal adsorber bank or after any structural maintenance on the system housing.

I i

BFN 3.7/4.7-14

)

Amendment tio. 143 1

)

3. 7/4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS b1MITINGCONDITIONS't0ROPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.7.B.

Standby Gas Treatment System 4.7.B.

Standby Cas Treatment-System 4.7.B.2 (Cont'd) d.

Each train shall be operated a total of at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months every month.

e.

Test sealing of gaskets for housing doors shall be performed utilizing chemical smoke genera-tors during each test performed for compliance with Speci-fication 4.7.B.2.a and Specification 3.7.B.2.a.

3.

From and after the date that 3.

a.

Once per operating cycle h

one train of the standby gas automatic initiation of treatment system is made or each branch of the stand-found to be inoperable for by gas treatment system any reason, REACTOR POWER shall be demonstrated j

OPERATION and fuel handling from each unit's controls.

is permissible only during the succeeding 7 days unless

b. At least once per year

{

j such circuit is sooner made manual operability of l

OPERABLE, provided that the bypass valve for during such 7 days all filter cooling shall be active components of the demonstrated, other two standby gas treatment trains shall be

c. When one. train of the 4

operable.

standby gas treatment system becomes inoperable i

the other two trains shall be demonstrated to be OPERABLE within 2 l.

hours and daily l

thereafter, l

4.

If these conditions cannot j

1 be met:

i l

l a.

Suspend all fuel l

handling operations, core alterations, and activities with the potential to drain any reactor vessel containing fuel.

BFN 3.7/4.7-15 Unit 1 Amendment No. 174

3.7/4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS s

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.7.B. 11ADdby Cas Treatment System 4.7.B.

Standby Gas Treatment System 3.7.B.4 (Cont'd) b.

Place all reactors in at least a HOT SHUTDOWN CONDITION within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in a COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITION within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

3.7 C. Secondary containment 4.7.C.

Secondary containment 1.

Secondary containment integrity 1.

Secondary containment shall be maintained in the surveilJance shall be reactor zone at all times performed as indicated except as specified in below:

3.7.C.2.

a.

Secondary containment capability to maintain 1/4 inch of water vacuum under calm vind

(< 5 mph) conditions with a system leakage rate of not more than 12,000 cfm, shall be demonstrated at each refueling outage prior to refueling.

2.

If reactor zone secondary 2.

After a secondary containment integrity cannot containment violation is be maintained the following determined, the standby gas l

conditions shall be met:

treatment system vill be l

operated immediately after a.

Suspend all fuel handling the affected zones are operations, core altera-isolated from the remainder tions, and activities with of the secondary the potential to drain any containment to confirm its reactor vessel containing ability to maintain the fuel.

remainder of the secondary containment at 1/4-inch b.

Restore reactor zone of water negative pressure secondary containment under calm vind conditions.

integrity within 4 hears, or place all reactors in at least a HOT SHUTD0v01 CONDITION within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in a COLD SHUT-DOWN CONDITION within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

BTN 3.7/4.7-16 Unit 1 Amendment No. 174

l 2.7/4.7 CONTA110ENT SYSTEMS

(

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREKENTS 3.7.C, Egeendary Containment 3.

Secondary containment integ-rity shall be maintained in the refueling zone, except as specified in 3.7.C.4 4

If refueling zone secondary containment cannot be maintained the following conditions shall be mets a.

Handling of spent fuel and all operations over spent fuel pools and open reactor wells containing fuel shall be prohibited.

b.

The standby gas treatment system suction to the refueling zone vill be blocked except for a controlled leakage area sized to assure the achieving of a vacuum of at least 1/4-inch of water and not over 3 inches of water in all three reactor l

zones. This is only appli-cable if reactor zone inte-grity is required.

D.

Primary Containment Isolation D.

Primary Containment Isolation Valves Valves l

l 1.

When Primary Containment-1.

The primary containment Integrity is required, all isolation valves isolation valves listed in surveillance shall be Table 3.7.A and all reactor performed as follows:

coolant system instrument line flow check valves shall be a.

At least once per oper-i l

OPERABLE except as specified ating cycle, the OPER-l in 3.7.D.2.

ABLE isolation valves that are power oper-ated and eutematically initiated shall be tested for simulated automatic initiation and in accordance with Specification 1.0.MM, tested for closure times.

BFH 3.7/4.7-17 l

Unit 1 Amendment No. 174

3.7/4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.7.D.

Primary Containment Isolation 4.7.D.. Primary Centainment Isolation Valves Valves 4.7.D.1 (Cont'd) b.

In accordance with Specification 1.0.MM, all normally open power operated isolation valves shall be functionally tested, c.

(Deleted)

I d.

At least once per operating cycle the operability of the reactor coolant system instrument line flow check valves shall be verified.

2.

In the event any isolation valve 2.

Whenever an isolation valve.

d specified in Table 3.7.A becomes listed in Table 3.7.A is inoperable, reactor operation inoperable, the position of may continue provided at least at least one other valve in one valve, in each line having each line having an an inoperable valve, is OPERABLE inoperable valve rhall be and within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months either:

recorded daily, a.

The inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status, or b.

Each affected line is isolated by use of at least one deactivated containment isolation valve secured in the isolated position.

3.

If Specification 3.7.D.1 and 3.7.D.2 cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in the COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITION within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

BFN 3.7/4.7-18 Unit 1 Anendment No. 159

y.7/4.7 BASES (Cont'd)

The primary containment leak rate test frequency is based on maintaining adequate assurance that the leak rate remains within the specification. The leak rate test frequency is based on the NRC guide for developing leak rate testing and surveillance of reactor containment vessels. Allowing the test intervals to be extended up to 10 months permits some flexibility needed to have the tests coincide with scheduled or unscheduled shutdown periods, t

The penetration and air purge piping leakage test frequency, along with the containment leak rate tests, is adequate to allow detection of leakage trends. Whenever a bolted double-gasketed penetration is broken and remade, the space between the gaskets is pressurized to determine that the seals are performing properly.

It is expected that the majority of the leakage from valves, penetrations and seals would be into the reactor building. However, it is possible that leakage into other parts of the facility could occur.

Such leakage paths that may affect significantly the consequences of accidents are to be minimized.

The primary containment is normally slightly pressurized during periods of reactor operation. Nitrogen used for inerting could leak out of the containment but air could not leak in to increase oxygen concentration.

Once the containment is filled with nitrogen to the required concentration, determining the oxygen concentration twice a week serves as an added assurance that the oxygen concentration vill not exceed 4 percent.

3.7.B/3.7.C Standby Gas Treatment System and Secondary Containment The secondary containment is designed to minimize any ground level release of radioactive materials which might result from a serious accident. The reactor building provides secondary containment during reactor operation, when the dryvell is scaled and in service; the reactor building provides primary containment, if required, when the reactor is shutdown and the dryvell is open.

Because the secondary containment is an integral part of the complete containment system, secondary containment is required at all times that primary containment is required as well as during refueling.

The standby gas treatment system is designed to filter and exhaust the reactor building atmosphere to the stack during secondary containment isolation conditions. All three standby gas treatment system fans are designed to automatically start upon containment isolation and to maintain the reactor building pressure to the design negative pressure so that all leakage should be in-leakage.

High efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters are installed before and after the charcoal absorbers to minimize potential release of particulates to the environment and to prevent clogging of the iodine absorbers. The charcoal absorbers are installed to reduce the potential release of radiciodine to the environment. The in-place test results should indicate a system leak tightness of less than 1 percent bypass leakage for the charcoal absorbers and a HEPA efficiency of at least 99 percent removal of DOP particulates. The laboratory carbon sample test results should indicate a radioactive methyl iodide removal efficiency of at least 90 percent for expected accident I

BFH 3.7/4.7-47 Unit 1 Amendment ho. 174

3.7/4.7 &&iEl (C:nt'd) conditions.

If the efficiencies of the HEPA filters and charcoal absorbers are as specified, the resulting doses will be less than the 10 CPR 100 guidelines for the accidents analyzed. Operation of the fans significantly different from the design flow will change the removal efficiency of the HEPA filters and charcoal absorbers.

Only two of th9 three standby gas treatment systems are needed to clean up the reactor building atmosphere upon containment isolation.

If one system is found to be inoperable, there is no immediate threat to the containment system performance and reactor operation or refueling operation may continue while repairs are being made. If more than one train is inoperable, all fuel handling operations, core alterations, and activities with the potential to drain any reactor vessel containing fuel must be suspended and all reactors placed in a cold shutdown condition, because the remaining train would provide only 50 percent of the capacity required to filter and exhaust the reactor building atmosphere to the stack.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude movement of a component to a safe, conservative position. Operations that have the potential for draining the reactor vessel must be suspended as soon as practical to minimite the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Draindown of a reactor vessel containing no fuel does not.present the possibility for fuel damage or significant fission product release and therefore is not a nuclear' safety concern.

4.7.B/4.7.C Standby Gas Treatment System and Secondary containment Initiating reactor building isolation and operation of the standby gas l

treatment system to maintain at least a 1/4 inch of water vacuum within the secondary containment provides an adequate test of the operation of the reactor building isolation valves, leak tightness of the reactor building and performance of the standby gas treatment system. Functionally testing the initiating sensors and associated trip logic demonstrates the capability for automatic actuation.

Performing these tests prior to refueling vill demonstrate secondary containment capability prior to the time the primary containment is opened for refueling.

Periodic testing gives sufficient confidence of reactor building integrity and standby gas treatment system performance capability.

The test frequencies are adequate to detect equipment deterioration prior to significant defects, but the tests are not frequent enough to load the filters, thus reducing their reserve capacity too quickly. That the testing frequency is adequate to detect deterioration was demonstrated by the tests which showed I

no loss of filter efficiency after two years of operation in the runted shipboard environment on the US Savannah (ORNL 3726.).

Pressure drop across the i

combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers of less than six inches of water at the system design flow rate vill indicate that the filters and adsorbers are not clogged by excessive amounts of foreign matter.

Heater capability, pressure drop and air distribution should be determined at least once per operating cycle to show system performance capability.

The frequency of tests and sample analysis are necessary to show that the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers can perform as evaluated. Tests of the charcoal adsorbers with halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant shall be performed in accordance with USAEC Report DP-1082.

Iodine removal efficiency tests shall BFH 3.7/4.7-48 Unit 1 Amendment No. 174 l

l

4.7/4.7 BASES (C:nt'd)

+

follow ASTM D3803. The charcoal adsorber efficiency test procedures should allow for the removal of one adsorber trav, emptying of one bed from the tray, mixing the adsorbent thoroughly and obtaining at least two samples. Each sample should be at least two inches in diameter and a length equal to the c

thickness of the bed.

If test results are unacceptable, all adsorbent in the system shall be replaced with an adsorbent qualified according to Table 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.52.

The replacement tray for the adsorber tray removed for the test should meet the same adsorbent quality. Tests of the HEPA filters with DOP aerosol shall be performed in accordance to ANSI N510-1975. Any HEPA filters found defective shall be replaced with filters qualified pursuant to Regulatory Position C.3.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52.

All elements of the heater should be demonstrated to be functional and operable during the test of heater capacity. Operation of each filter train for a minimum of 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months each month will prevent moisture buildup in the filters and adsorber system.

With doors closed and fan in operation, DOP aerosol shall be sprayed externally along the full linear periphery of each respective door to check the gasket seal. Any detection of DOP in the fan exhaust shall be considered an unacceptable test result and the gaskets repaired and test repeated.

If significant painting, fire or chemical release occurs such that the HETA filter or charcoal adsorber could become contaminated from the fumes, chemicals or foreign material, the same tests and sample analysis shall be performed as required for operational use. The determination of significance shall be made by the operator on duty at the time of the incident.

Knowledgeable staff members should be consulted prior to making this determination.

Demonstration of the automatic initiation capability and operability of filter cooling is necessary to assure system performance capability.

If one standby gas treatment system is inoperable, the other systems must be tested daily.

This substantiates the availability of the operable systems and thus reactor operation and refueling operation can continue for a limited period of time.

3.7.D/4.7 D primary Containment Isolation Valves Double isolation valves are provided on lines penetrating the primary containment and open to the free space of the containment.

Closure of one of the valves in each line would be sufficient to maintain the integrity of the pressure suppression system. Automatic initiation is required to minimize the potential leakage paths from the containment in the event of a LOCA.

Groue 1 - Process lines are isolated by reactor vessel low water level (378")

in order to allow for removal of decay heat subsequent to a scram, yet isolate in time for proper operation of the core standby cooling bystems. The valves in Group 1, except the reactor water sample line valves, ate also closed when process instrumentation detects excessive main steam line flow, high radiation, low pressure, or main steam space high temperature. The reactor i

water sample line valves isolate only on reactor low water level at 378" or main steam line high radiation.

BFN 3.7/4.7-49 Unit 1 Arendnent No.174 f

3.7/4.7 BASES (Cast'd) f Groue 2 - Isolatica salv6s *Ja closed by reactor vessel lov vater level (5.58")

or high dryvell pressure-h.e Group 2 isolation signal also " isolates" the reactor building and starts the standby gas treatment system.

It is not desirable to actuate the Group 2 isolation signal by a transient or spurious signal.

Groun 3 - Process lines are normally in use, and it is therefore not desirable to cause spurious isolation due to high dryvell pressure resulting from nonsafety related causes. To protect the reactor from a possible pipe break in the system, isolation is provided by high temperature in the cleanup system area or high flow through the inlet to the cleanup system. Also, since the vessel could potentially be drained through the cleanup system, a low-level isolation is provided.

Groues 4 and 5 - Process lines are designed to remain operable and mitigate the consequences of an accident which results in the isolation of other process lines. The signals which initiate isolation of Groups 4 and 5 process lines are therefore indicative of a condition which would render them inoperable.

Groun 6 - Lines are connected to the primary containment but not directly to the reactor vessel. These valves are isolated on reactor lov vater level

($38"), high dryvell pressure, or reactor building ventilation high radiation which would indicate a possible accident and necessitate primary containment isolation.

Greue 7 - Process lines are closed only on the respective turbine steam supply valve not fully closed. This assures that the valves are not open when HPCI or RCIC action is required.

Group B - Line (traveling in-core probe) is isolated on high dryvell pressure or reactor lov vater level (538"). This is to assure that this line does not provide a leakage path when containment pressure or reactor water level indicates a possible accident condition.

The maximum closure time for the automatic isolation valves of the primary l

containment and reactor vessel isolation control system have been selected in consideration of the design intent to prevent core uncovering following pipe breaks outside the primary containment and the need to contain released fission products following pipe breaks inside the primary containment.

In satisfying this design intent, an additional margin has been included in specifying maximum closure times. This margin permits identification of degraded valve performance prior to exceeding the design closure times.

In order to assure that the doses that may result from a steam line break do not exceed the 10 CTR 100 guidelines, it is necessary that no fuel rod perforation resulting from the accident occur prior to closure of the main l

steam line isolation valves. Analyses indicate that fuel rod cladding perforations would be avoided for main steam valve closure times, including instrument delay, as long es 10.5 seconds, i

BTH 3.7/4.7-50 Unit 1 I

Amendr.ent No. 174

307/4.7 &&111 (Cont'd)

These valves are highly reliable, have low service requirements and most are normally closed. The initiating sensors and associated trip logic are also checked to demonstrate the capability for automatic isolation. The test interval of once per operating cycle for automatic initiation results in a failure probability of 1.1 x 10-' that a line will not isolate. More frequent testing for valve operability in accordance with Specification 1.0.MM.

i results in a greater assurance that the valve will be operable when needed.

The main steam line isolation valves are functionally tested per Specification 1.0 MM to establish a high degree of reliability, i

The primary containment is penetrated by several small diameter instrument I

lines connected to the reactor coolant system. Each instrument line contains a 0.25-inch restricting orifice inside the primary containment and an excess flow check valve outside the primary containment, i

3.7.E/4.7.E control Room Emeraenev Ventilation j

l

+

The control room emergency ventilation system is designed to filter the control room atmosphere for intake air and/or for recirculation during control j

j room isolation conditions. The control room emergency ventilation system is

+

designed to automatically start upon control room isolation and to maintain the control room pressure to the design positive pressure so that all leakage should be out leakage. During cycle 6, CREVS has been declared inoperable only because it does not meet its design basis for essentially zero unfiltered inleakage. Reactor power operations and fuel movement are acceptable until just prior to startup for unit 2 cycle 7.

During cycle 6, CREVS must be demonstrated to be functional by performing all applicable surveillances.

In the event that the applicable surveillances are not successfully performed, the actions required by the LCOs must be complied with.

High efficiency particulate absolute (HEPA) filters are installed prior to the charcoal adsorbers to prevent clogging of the iodine adsorbers. The charcoal adsorbers are installed to reduce the potential intake of radiciodine to the control room.

The inplace test results should indicate a system leak tightness of less than 1 percent bypass leakage for the charcoal adsorbers and a HEPA efficiency of at least 99 percent removal of DOP particulates. The laboratory carbon sample test results should indicate a radioactive methyl iodide removal efficiency of at least 90 percent for expected accident conditions.

If the efficiencies of the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers are as specified, the resulting doses will be less than the allowable levels stated in Criterion 19 of the General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

Operation of the fans significantly different from the design flow vill change the removal efficiency of the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers, r

If the system is found to be inoperable, there is no immediate threat to the control room and reactor operation or refueling operation may continue for a limited period of time while repairs are being made.

If the system cannot be repaired within seven days, the reactor is shutdown and brought to Cold Shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or refueling operations are terminated.

BTN 3.7/4.7-51 Unit 1 1

l Amendnent t;o. 174 l

l

(

3.7/4.7 RASES (C:nt'd)

Pressure drop across the combined KEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers of less than six inches of water at the system design flow rate will indicate that the filters and adsorbers are not clogged by excessive amounts of fereign matter.

Pressure drop sheuld be determined at least once per operating cycle to show system performance capability.

The frequency of tests and sample analysis are necessary to show that the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers can perform as evaluated. Tests of the charcoal adsorbers with halogenated hydrocarbon shall be performed in accordance with USAEC Report-1082.

Iodine removal efficiency tests shall follow ASTM D3803. The charcos1 adsorber efficiency test procedures should allow for the removal of one adsorber tray, emptying of one bed from the tray, mixing the adsorbent thoroughly and obtaining at least two samples. Each sample should be at least two inches in diameter and a length equal to the thickness of the bed.

If test results are unacceptable, all adsorbent in the system shall be replaced with an adsorbent qualified according to Table 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.52.

The replacement tray for the adsorber tray removed for the test should meet the same adsorbent quality. Tests of the HEPA filters with DOP aerosol shall be performed in accordance to ANSI N510-1975. Any HEPA filters found defective shall be replaced with filters qualified pursuant to Regulatory Position C.3.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52.

Operation of the system for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months every month will demonstrate operability of the filters and adsorber system and remove excessive moisture built up on the adsorber.

If significant painting, fire or chemical release occurs such that the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber could become contaminated from the fumes, chemicals or foreign materials, the same tests and sample analysis shall be performed as required for operational use. The determination of significance shall be made by the operator on duty at the time of the incident.

Knowledgeable staff members should be consulted prior to making this determination.

Demonstration of the automatic initiation capability is necessary to assure system performance capability.

4 3.7.T/4.7.T Prima ry Containment Purre System The primary containment purge system is designed to provide air to purge and ventilate the primary containment system. The exhaust from the primary containment is first processed by a filter train assembly and then channeled through the reactor building roof exhaust system. During power operation, the primary containment purge and ventilation system is isolated from the primary containment by two isolation valves in series.

HEPA (high efficiency particulate air) filters are installed before the charcoal adsorbers followed by a centrifugal fan. The in-place test results should indicate a leak tightness of the system housing of not less than 99-percent and a HEPA efficiency of at least 99-percent removal of DOP particulates. The laboratory carbon sample test results should indicate a BTN 3.7/4.7-52 Unit 1 Amendment lio. 174

i

, 3.7/4.7 RASES (CInt'd) l I,

radioactive methyl iodide removal efficiency of at least 85-percent.

l Operation of the fans significantly different from the design riow will change

(-

the removal efficiency of the KEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers.

l If the system is found to be inoperable, the Standby Gas Treatment System may i

be used to purge the containment, l

l Pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers of less than 3.5 inches of water at the system design flow rate will indicate that the l

filters and adsorbers are not clogged by excessive amounts of foreign matter.

Pressure drop should be determined at least once per operating cycle to show system performance capability.

The frequency of tests and sample analysis are necessary to show that the HEPA l

filters and charcoal adsorbers can perform as evaluated. Tests of the l

charcoal adsorbers with halogenated hydrocarbon shall be performed in accordance with USAEC Report-1082.

Iodine removal efficiency tests shall l

follow ASTM D3803. The charcoal adsorber efficiency test procedures should l

allow for the removal of one adsorber tray, emptying of one bed from the tray, l

mixing the adsorbent thoroughly and obtaining at least two samples. Each l

sample should be at least two inches in diameter and a length equal to the l

thickness of the bed.

If test results are unacceptable, all adsorbent in the system shall be replaced with an adsorbent qualified according to Table 1 of I

Regulatory Guide 1.52.

The replacement tray for the adsorber tray removed for the test should meet the same adsorbent quality. Tests of the HEPA filters with DOP aerosol shall be performed in accordance to ANSI N510-1975. Any HEPA filters found defective shall be replaced with filters qualified pursuant to Regulatory Position C.3.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52.

If significant painting, fire, or chemical release occurs such that the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber could become contaminated from the fumes, chemicals or foreign materials, the same tests and sample analysis shall be performed as required for operational use. The determination of significance shall be made by the operator on duty at the time of the incident.

Knowledgeable staff members should be consulted prior to making this determination.

BPN 3.7/4.7-53 Unit 1 Arendment No. 174

4 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LETT BLANK.

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5FN 3*7/4.7-53a Amendment No. 174 l

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w meos'o UNITED $TATES

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g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o

t W ASHING T ON, o. C. M466 l

I TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY DOCKET NO. 50-260 l

r BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE t

l Amendment No. 177 License No. OPR-52 l

1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated March 6,1990, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act),

l and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; l

l B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

Thereisreasonableassurance(1)thattheactivitiesauthorizedby this amendment can be conducted without endangerin0 the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and l

E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2-1 4

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-52 is hereby l

amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 177, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with I

the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f

h t

i s

QC6h ONW 6 rtit

~ Suzanne Black, Assisl)nt Director l

for Projects l

TVA Projects Division Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

i Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of issuance:

March 30, 1990 i

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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 177 j

)

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-52

)

i DOCKET NO. 50-260 Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

Overleaf

and overflow ** pages are provided to maintain document completeness.

i REMOVE INSERT i

3.7/4.7-13 3.7/4.7-13 3.7/4.7-14 3.7/4.7-14*

3.7/4.7-15 3.7/4.7-15 3.7/4.7-16 3.7/4.7-16 3.7/4.7-17 3.7/4.7-17 3.7/4.7-18 3.7/4.7-18*

3.7/4.7-47 3.7/4.7-47 3.7/4.7-48 3.7/4.7-48 3.7/4.7-49 3.7/4.7-49**

3.7/4.7-50 3.7/4.7-50**

3.7/4.7-51 3.7/4.7-51**

3.7/4.7-52 3.7/4.7-52**

3.7/4.7-53 3.7/4.7-53**

3.7/4.7-53a**

i t

,3.7/4.7 C6HT1118ENT SYSTEMf 0

LIMITING CORDITIONS FOR CPERATION

' $URVE!LLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.7.3.

Standby can Treatmant $vatsa 4.7.B.

fitndbv Can Treatment tvatta 2.

Except as specified in 1.

At least once per year,

$pecification s.7.B.3 below, the following conditions all three trains of the shall be demonstrated.

standby saa treetsent system shall be OPERABLE at all a.

Pressure drop across times'When secondary the combined MEFA containment integrity is filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less required.

than 6 inches of water at a flow of 9000 cfm (i 10%).

b.

The inlet heaters on each circuit are tested in accordance a

vith ANSI N510-1975, and are capable of an output of at least 40 kW.

c.

Air distribution is 1

uniform within 20%

across HEFA filters and charcoc1 adsorbers.

l l

l BTN 3.7/4.7-13 Unit 2

/rtr.drer.t !:0, 177

3.7/4.7 ColffAllHEltT SYSTEMS f

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OptRAf!0N SUWE!LLANCE REQUIREMENTa e

3.7.B. $1=dbv can Treate.ent $vaten 4.7.3.

Standby can Treatment Svatem

2. a. The results of the in-place

2. a. The tests and sample cold DOP ani halogenated analysis of hydrocarbon tests at i 10%

Specification 3.7.B.2 design flow on KEPA filters shall be performed at and charcoal adsorber banks least once per operating i

shall shov 199% D0p removal cycle or once every and 1995 halogenated 18 months whichever hydrocarbon removal when occurs first for standby tested in accordance with service or after every 1

ANS! N510-1975.

720 hours0.00833 days 0.2 hours 0.00119 weeks 2.7396e-4 months of system operation and following i

significant painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation rene i

communicating with the system.

b. The results of laboratory

b. Cold D0p testing shall carbon ca.mple analysis be performed after shall show 190% radioactive each complete or partial methyl todide removal when replacement of the HEpA tested in accordance with filter barA or af ter any j

a ASTM D3803 (130'C, structural maintenance 95% R.H.).

on the system housing.

c. System shall be shown to

c. Halogensted hydrocarbon l

operate within 210% design testing shall be l

flov, performed after each complete or partial replacement of the charcoal adsorber bank i

)

or after any structural maintenancr/ on the r

l system housing.

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BTH 3.7/4.7-14 Mendment !!0.140 Unit 2 P. arch 3. 1900 I

i

D.7/4.7 CONTAfl8EElff BYSTDtB i

D LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

$URVE!LLANCE REQUIREMENTS

(

3.7.3.

Standbv Can Treatment Svatem 4.7.B.

Standby can Treatment i

Evatem 4.7.B.2 (Cont'd) t d.

Each train shall be i

operated a total of at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months every i

month.

e.

Test sealing of gaskets i

for housing doors shall be performed utilizing i

I chemical smoke genera-tors during each test performed for l

compliance with Spect-j fication 4.7.B.2.a and i

Specification 3.7.b.2.a.

3.

From and after the date that 3.

a.

Once per operating cycle h

j one train of the standby gas automatic initiation of treatment system is made or each branch of the stand-i found to be inoperable for by gas treatment system i

any reason, RE/CTOR POWER shall be demonstrated I

OpIRATION and fuel handling from each unit's controls.

is permissible only during j

the succeeding 7 days unless

b. At least once per year such circuit is sooner made manual operability of OPERABLE, provided that the bypass valve for during such 7 days all filter cooling shall be active compenents of the demonstrated.

l other two standby gas treatment trains shall be

c. When one train of the

[

operable, standby gas treatttent system becomes inoperable j

the other two trains shall be demonstrated to be OPERABLE within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months and daily thereafter.

l f

i 4

If these conditions cannot be mett j

a.

Suspend all fuel handling operations, i

l core alterations, and activities with the j

potential to drain any reactor vessel cent u int, fuel.

F 3.7/4.7-15 BrN Unit 2 Arendrent I:o. 177

1 3.7/4.7 CONTAllDENT SY$ TEM $

o LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.7.3. Standby C a Treatment $vatem 4.7 B.

Standbv Cas Treatrent-3 SYatem 3.7.B.4 (Cont'd) b.

Place all reactors in at least a HOT SHUTDOWN CORDITION within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in a COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITION vithin the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

3.7.C. Steendary containment 4.7.C.

Secondary containment 1.

Secondary containment integrity 1.

Secondary containment shall be saintained in the surveillance shall be reactor zone at all times performed 4; indicated except as specified in below:

3.7.C.2.

a.

Secondary containment capability to maintain 1/4 inch of water vacuum under calm vind

(< $ mph) conditions with a system leakage rate of not more than 12,000 cfm, shall be demonstrated at each refueling outage prior to refueling.

2.

If reactor zone secondary 2.

After a secondary containment integrity cannot containment violation is be maintained the following determined, the standby gas conditions shall be mets treatment system vill be operated immediately after a.

Suspend all fuel handling the affected zones are l

operations, core altera-isolated from the remainder tions, and activities with of the secondary the potential to drain any containment to confirm its reactor vessel containing ability to maintain the fuel.

remainder of the secondary containment at 1/4-inch b.

Restore reactor zone of water negative pressure secondary containmtnt under calm vind conditions.

l integrity within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , or place all reactors in at least a H07 SITJTDOWN CONDITION vithin the next l

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in a COLD SHUT-DOWN CONDITION vithin the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

BTN 3.7/4.7-16 Unit 2 Amendment !;o. 177

.1.7/4.7 contrAf tserwr sysitns

)

LIMITING C0lrDITIONS FOR OPERATION

$URVI!L1ANCE REQUIREMENTS e

l 3.7.C.

sacandary cc,ntainment 3.

Secondary containsent intes-rity shall be maintained in the refueling mone, except as specified in 3.7.C.4 4

If refueling rene secondary f

containment cannot be maintained the ic11oving conditions shall be set:

1 t

a.

Handling of spent fuel and j

all operations over spent fuel pools and open reactor ve11s containing fuel shall

[

be prohibited.

b.

The standby gas treatment system suction to the refuelins rene vill be blocked except for a j

controlled leakage area l

sired to assure the achieving of a vacuum of l

at least 1/4-inch of vater I

and not over 3 inches of

)

vater in all three reactor rones. This is only appli-cable if reactor tone inte-i grity is required.

f D.

Pr irta ry Cent a lrut ent Isolation D.

Primary C ent aireten t 1selatien Valves Valves I

1.

When primary Conteinment 1.

The primary containment l

l Integrity is required, all isolatten valves j

isolation valves listed in surveillance shall be Table 3.7.A and all reactor performed as follovst coolant system instrument line flow check valves shall be a.

At least once per oper-OPErdBLE except as specified sting cycle, the OPER-t in 3.7.D.2.

ABLE isolation valves i

that are power oper-l l

ated and automatically i

initiated shall be tested for simulated automatic initiation j

and in accordance with Specification 1.0.m.

tested for closure times.

BTH 3.7/4.7-17 Unit 2 t.ncrc er,t 40. 177

3.7/4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS o

e LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OFERATION

$URVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS C

3.7.D.

Primary Containment faelatien 4.7.D.

Primary Centainment laelation Valves Valves 4.7.D.1 (Cont'd) b.

In accordance with Specification 1.0.MM, all normally open power operated isolation valves shall be functionally tested.

c.

(Deleted) d.

At least once per operating cycle the operability of the reactor coolant system instrument line flow check valves shall be verified.

2.

In the event any isolation valve 2.

Whenever an isolation valve specified in Table 3.7.A becomes listed in Table 3.7.A is inoperable, reactor operation inoperable, the position of may continue provided at least at least one other valve in one valve, in each line having each line having an an inoperable valve, is OpIRABLE inoperable valve shall be and within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months eithers recorded daily, s.

The inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status, or b.

Each affected line is isolated by use of at least one deactivated containment isolation valve secured in the isolated position.

3.

If Specification 3.7.D.1 and 3.7.D.2 cannot be met, an orderly shutdovn shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in the COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITION within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

BTN 3.7/4.7-18 Unit 2 Amendment No. 155 Iovember 22, 1006 l

3 7/4.7 1 ASIS (Cont'd) j.

The primary containment leak rate test freq;ancy is b:s:d on sei;taining o

adequate assurance that the leak rate remains within the specification. The i

leak rate test frequency is based on the NRC guide for developing leak rate testing and surveillance of reactor containment vessels. Allowing the test l

intervals to be extended up to 10 months permits some flexibility needed to have the tests coincide with scheduled or unscheduled shutdown periods.

1

]

The penetration and air purge piping leakage test frequency, along with the containment leak rate tests, is adequate to allow detection of leakage 4

i trends. Whenever a bolted double-gasketed penetration is broken and remade, 1

the space between the gaskets is pressurized to determine that the seals are q

)

performing properly, it is expected that the majority of the leakage from l

J valves, penetrattans and seals vould be into the reactor building. However, 1

l it is possible that leakage into other parts of the facility could occur.

l l

Such leakage paths that say affect significantly the consequences of accidents are to be minimited.

j I

l The primary containment is normally slightly pressurized during periods of l

1 reactor operation. Nitrogen used for inerting could leak out of the containment but air could not leak in to increase oxygen concentration. Once the containment is ft11ed with nitrogen to the required concentration, j

i determining the oxygen concentration twice a week serves as an added assurance that the oxygen concentration vill not exceed 4 percent.

i 1

l 3.7.B/3.7.C

$_tandby Gas Treatrent System and Steendary Centainment The secondary containment is designed to minimite any ground level release of 3

j radioactive materials which might result from a serious accident. The reactor i

building provides secondary containment during reactor operatien, when the dryvell is sealed and in service; the reactor building provides primary i

containment, if required, when the reactor is shutdown and the dryvell is i

Because the secondary containment is an integral part of the complete l

open.

containment system, secondary containment is required at all times that i

primary containment is required as well as during refueling.

l The standby gas treatment system is designed to filter and exhaust the reactor l

building atmosphere to the stack during secondary containment isolation i

conditions. All three standby gas treatment system fans are designed to automatically start upon containment isolation and to maintain the reactor building pressure to the design negative pressure so that all leakage should be in-leakage.

High efficiency particulate air (HEFA) filters are installed before and after i

the charcoal absorbers to minimite potential release of particulates to the environment and to prevent clogging of the iodine absorbers. The charcoal absorbers are installed to reduce the potential release of radiotodine to the envirenment. The in-place test results should indicate a system leak tightness of less than 1 percent bypass leakage for the charcoal absorbers and a HEPA efficiency of at least 99 percent removal of DOP particulates. The laboratory carbon sample test results should indicate a radioactive methyl iodide removal efficiency of at least 90 percent for expected accident l

l l

t BTN 3.7/4.7-47 Unit 2 i

tren&ent No. 177 4

307/4.7 && lit (Cont'd) conditions.

If the efficiencies of the NEFA filters and charcoal absorbers are c

as specified, the resulting doses vill be less than the 10 CTR 100 guidelines for the accidents analysed. Operation of the fans significantly different from the design flow will change the removal efficiency of the HEPA filters and charcoal absorbers.

Only two of the three standby gas treatment systems are needed to clean up the reactor building atmosphere spon containment isolation.

If one system is found to be inoperable, there is no immediate threat to the containment system performance and reacter operation or refueling operation say continue while repairs are being made.

If more than one train is inoperable, a11' fuel handling operations, core alterations, and activities with the potential to drain any reactor vessel containing fuel sust be suspended and all reactors placed in a cold shutdown condition, because the remaining train vould provide only 50 percent of the capacity required to filter and exhaust the reactor building atmosphere to the stack. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude movement of a cosponent to a safe, conservative position. Operations that have the potential for draining the reactor vessel must be suspended as soon as practical to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release.

Draindown of a reactor vessel containing no fuel does not present the possibility for fuel damage or significant fission product release and therefore is not a nuclear safety c onc e rn.

4.7.B/4.7.C Standby Cas Treatment System and Seeendary Centainment Initiating reactor building isolation and operation of the standby gas treatment system to maintain at least a 1/4 inch of water vacuum vithin the secondary containment providea an adequate test of the operation of the reactor building isolation valves, leak tightness of the reactor building and performance of the standby gas treatment system.

Functionally testing the initiating sensors and associated trip logic demonstrates the capability for automatic actuation.

Performing these tests prior to refueling vill demonstrate secondary containment capability prior to the time the primary containment is opened for refueling. Periodic testing gives sufficient confidence of reactor building integrity and standby gas treatment system performance capability.

The test frequencies are adequate to detect equipment deterioration prior to significant defects, but the tests are not frequent enough to load the filters, thus reducing their reserve capacity too quickly. That the testing frequency is adequate to detect deterioration was demonstrated by the tests which shoved no loss of filter efficiency after two years of operation in the runned shipboard environment on the US Savannah (ORNL 3726).

Pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers of less than six inches of water at the system design flow rate vill indicate that the filters and adsorbers are not clogged by excessive amounts of foreign matter. Heater capability, pressure drop and air distribution should be determined at least once per operating cycle to show system performance capability.

The frequency of tests and sample analysis are necessary to show that the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers can perform as evaluated.

Tests of the charcoal adsorbers with halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant shall be performed in accordance with USAEC Report DP-1082.

Iodine removal efficiency tests shall BTN 3.7/4.7-46 Unit 2 Amendment No. 177 1

i

,$.7/4.7 RASIS (Cont'd) follow ASTM D3803. The charcoal adsorber efficiency test procedures should allow for the removal of one adaerber trav, emptying of one bed from the tray, mixing the adsorbent thoroughly and obtaining st least two samples. Each i

sample should be at least two inches in disseter and a length equal to the thickness of the bed.

If test results are unacceptable, all adsorbent in the systen shall be replaced with an adsorbent qualified according to Table 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.52.

The replacement tray for the adsorber tray removed for the test should meet the same adsorbent quality. Tests of the HEPA filters with DOP aerosol shall be performed in accordance to ANSI N510-1975. Any HEPA filters found defective shall be replaced with filters qualified pursuant to I

Regulatory Position C.3.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52.

j All elements of the heater should be demonstrated to be functional and operable during the test of heater capacity. Operation of each filter train i

for a minimum of 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months each month vill prevent moisture buildup in the filters and adsorber system.

I With doors closed and fan in operation, DOP aerosol shall be sprayed i

externally along the full linear periphery of each respective door to check the gasket seal. Any detection of DOP in the fan exhaust shall be considered an unacceptable test result and the gaskets repaired and test repeated.

j i

If significant painting, fire or chemical release occurs such that the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber could become contaminated from the fumes, chemicals or foreign material, the same tests and sample analysis shall be performed as required for operational use. The determination of significance shall be made by the operator on duty at the time of the incident.

Knowledgeable staff members should be consulted prior to making this determination.

Demonstration of the automatic initiation capability and operability of filter i

cooling 1.s necessary to assure system performance capability.

If one standby gas treatment system is inoperable, the other systems must be tested daily, I

l

.This substantiates the availability of the operable systems and thus reacter operation and refueling operation can continue for a limited period of time.

i 3.7.D/4.7.D Primary Centainment Isolation Valves Double isolation valves are provided on lines penetrating the primary containment and open to the free space of the containment.

Closure of one of the valves in each line vould be sufficient to maintain the integrity of the pressure suppression system. Automatic initiation in required to minimite the potential leakage paths from the containment in the event of a LOCA.

Group _1 - Process lines are isolated by reactor vessel low water level (376")

in order to allow for removal of decay heat subsequent to a scram, yet isolate in time for proper operation of the core standby cooling systems. The valves in Group 1, except the reactor water sample line valves, are also closed when process instrumentation detects excessive main steam line flov, high l

radiation, low pressure, or main steam space high temperature. The reactor water sample line valves isolate only on reactor Icv vater level at 378" er main steam line high radiation.

BTH 3.7/4.7-49 Unit 2 trent ent !.0. 177 r

3.7/4.7 &&$11 (Cont'd) o Crono 2 - Isolation valves are closed by reactor vessel low vater level (538")

c or high dryvell pressure. The Group 2 isolation signal also isolates" the reactor building and starts the standby gas treatment system.

It is not desirable to actuate the Group 2 isolation signal by a transient or spurious signal.

Grouc 3 - Process lines are normally in use, and it is therefore not desirable to cause spurious isolation due to high dryvell pressure resulting from nonsafety related causes. To protect the reactor from a possibic pipe break in the system, isolation is provided by high tesperature in the cleanup system area or high flow through the inlet to the cleanup system. Also, since the vessel could potentially be drained through the cleanup system, a low-level isolation is provided.

Grouon 4 and 5 - Process lines are designed to remain operable and mitigate the consequences of an accident which results in the isolation of other process lines. The signals which initiate isolation of Groups 4 and 5 process lines are therefore indicative of a condition which would render them inoperable.

Gitsr_ft - Lines are connected to the primary containment but not directly to the reactor vessel. These valves are isolated on reactor low vater level (538"), high dryvell pressure, or reactor building ventilation high radiation which would indicate a possible accident and necessitate primary containment isolation.

Greud 7 - Process lines are closed only on the respective turbine steam supply valve not fully closed. This assures that the valves are not open when HPCI or RCIC action is required.

creue B - Line (traveling in-core probe) is isolated on high dryvell pressure or reactor lov vater level (538"). This is to assure that this line does not provide a leakage path when containment pressure or reactor vater level indicates a possible accident condition.

l The maximum closure time for the automatic isolation valves of the primary containment and reactor vessel isolation control system have been selected in consideration of the design intent to prevent core uncovering following pipe breaks outside the primary containment and the need to contain released fission products following pipe breaks inside the primary containment.

In satisfying this design intent, an additional margin has been included in specifying maximum closure times. This margin permits identification of degraded valve performance prior to exceeding the design closure timet.

l In order to assure that the doses that may result from a steam line break do not exceed the 10 CTR 100 guidelines, it is necessary that no fuel rod l

perforation resultinf from the accident occur prior to closure of the main steam line isolation valves. Analyses indicate that fuel rod cladding perforations vould be avoided for main steam valve closure times, including instrument delay, as long as 10.5 seconds.

BTN 3.7/4.7-50 Arendrent No. 177 l

3.7/4.7 AA111 (Cont'd) l

(

These valves are highly reliable, have lov service requirements and most are normally closed. The initiating sensors and associated trip logic are also j

i-checked to demonstrate the capability for automatic isolation. The test i

interval of once per operating cycle for automatic initiation results in a j

failure probability of 1.1 x 10-' that a line vill not isolate. More frequent testing for valve operability in accordance with Specification 1.0.MM, I

I results in a greater assurance that the valve vill be operable when needed.

i l

The main steam line isolation valves are functionally tested per Specification 1.0.MM to establish a high degree of reliability.

j q

The primary containment is penetrated by several small diameter instrument i

4 lines connected to the reactor coolant system. Each instrument line contains I

a 0.25-inch restricting orifice inside the primary containment and an excess r

flow check valve outside the primary containment.

I 3.7.E/4.7.E Centrol Reen Emeraency Yentilatien j

+

The control room emergency ventilation system is designed to filter the i

control room atmosphere for intake air and/or for recirculation during control l

l room isolation conditions.

The control room emergency ventilation system is i

I designed to automatically start upon control room isolation and to maintain

)

the control room pressure to the design positive pressure so that all leakage 4

should be out leakage.

During cycle 6. CREVS has been declared inoperable i

only because it does not meet its design basis for essentially zero unfiltered I

inleakage. Reactor power operatiens and fuel movement are acceptable until i

just prior to startup for unit 2 cycle 7.

During cycle 6, CREVS must be j

demonstrated to be functional by performing all applicable surveillances.

In the event that the applicable surveillances are not successfully performed, the actions required by the LCOs must be complied with.

1' High efficiency particulate absolute (NEPA) filters are installed prior to the i

charcoal adsorbers to prevent clogging of the iodine adsorbers. The charcoal l

adsorbers are inatt11ed to reduce the potential intake of radiciodine to the j

control rooni.

The inplace test results should indicate a system leak tightness of less than 1 percent typass leakage for the charcoal adsorbers and I

a KEPA efficiency of at least 99 percent removal of DOP particulates.

The i

laboratory carbon sample test results should indicate a radioactive methyl iodide removal efficiency of at least 90 percent for expected accident conditions.

If the efficiencies of the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers are as specified, the resulting doses vill be less than the allevable levels stated in Criterion 19 of the General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants Aprendix A to 10 CTR Part 50.

Operation of the fans significantly different from the design flow vill change the removal efficiency of the HEPA l

filters and charcoal adsorbers.

If the system is found to be inoperable, there is no immediate threat to the control room and reactor operation or refueling operation may continue for a limited period of time while repairs are being made.

If the system cannot be i

repaired within seven days, the reactor is shutdown and brought to Cold Shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or refueling operations are terminated.

i BTN 3.7/4.7-51 Unit 2 i

t Amendment No. 177

3.7/4.7 M&M (Cont'd) o i

Pressure drop across the combined MEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers of less 4

s than six inches of water at the system design flow rate vill indicate that the l

filters and adsorbers are not clogged by excessive amounts of foreign matter.

Pressure drop should be deterstned at least once per operating cycle to show q

systna perfersance capability.

The frequency of tests and sample analysis are necessary to show that the MEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers can perform as evaluated.

Tests of the charcoal adsorbers with halogenated hydrocarbon shall be performed in accordance with USAEC Report-1082.

Zodine removal efficiency tests shall follow ASTM D3803.

The charcoal adsorber efficiency test procedures should allow for the removal of one adsorber tray, emptying of one bed from the tray, aizing the adsorbent thoroughly and obtaining at least two samples. Each sample should be at least two inches in diameter and a length equal to the thickness of the bed.

If test results are unacceptable, all adsorbent in the system shall be replaced with an adsorbent qualified according to Table 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.52.

The replacement tray for the adsorber tray removed for the test should meet the same adsorbent quality. Tests of the MEPA filters with DOP aerosol shall be performed in accordance to ANSI N510-1975. Any MEPA filters found defective shall be replaced with filters qualified pursuant to tegulatory Position C.3.6 of Regulatory Guide 1.52.

Operation of the system for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months every month will demonstrate operability of the filters and adsorber system and remove excessive solsture built up on the adsorber.

If significant painting, fire or chemical release occurs such that the NEPA filter or charcoal adsorber could become contaminated from the fumes, chemicals or foreign materials, the same tests and sample analysis shall be performed as required for operational use. The determination of significance shall be made by the operator on duty at the time of the incident.

i Knowledgeable staff members should be consulted prior to making this determination.

I Demonstration of the automatic initiation capability is necessary to assure system performance capability.

i.7.r/4.7.T Primary Centainment Purae System The primary containment purge system is designed to provide air to purge and ventilate the primary containment system. The exhaust from the primary containment is first processed by a filter train assembly and then channeled l

through the reactor building roof exhaust system. During power operation, the primary containment purge and ventilation system is isolated from the primary i

containment by two isolation valves in series, i

MEPA (high efficiency particulate air) filters are installed before the charcoal adsorbers followed by a centrifugal fan. The in-place test results l

I l

should indicate a leak tightness of the system housing of not less than 99-percent and a HEPA efficiency of at least 99-percent removal of DOP particulates. The laboratory carbon sample test results should indicate a i

I F

BFN 3.7/4.7-52 Unit 2 Amendment No. 177 f

i

,' 3.7/4.7 kiSES (Cont'd) radioactive methyl iodide removal efficiene'y of at least 85-percent.

f Operation of the fans significantly different from the design flow vill change the removal efficiency of the NEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers, i

If the system is found to be inoperable, the Standby Gas Treatment System may be used to purge the containment.

1 Pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers of less than 3.5 inches of water at the system design flow rate vill indicate that the filters and adsorbers are not clogged by excessive amounts of foreign matter.

j Pressure drop should be determined at least once per operating cycle to show system performance capability.

The frequency of tests and sample analysis are necessary to show that the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers can perform as evaluated. Tests of the charcoal adsorbers with halogenated hydrocarbon shall be performed in accordance with USAEC Report-1082. Iodine removal efficiency testa shall follow ASTM D3803. The charcoal adsorber efficiency test procedures should allow for the removal of one adsorber tray, emptying of one bed from the tray, mixing the adsorbent thoroughly and obtaining at least two samples. Each sample should be at least two inches in diameter and a length equal to the j

thickness of the bed.

If test results are unacceptable, all adsorbent in the system shall be replaced with an adsorbent qualified according to Table 1 of 1

Regulatory Guide 1.52.

The replacement tray for the adsorber tray removed for i

the test should meet the same adsorbent quality. Tests of the KEPA filters with DOP aerosol shall be performed in accordance to ANSI N510-1975. Any HEPA I

filters found defective shall be replaced with filters qualified pursuant to Regulatory Position C.3.6 of Regulatory Guide 1.52.

j If significant painting, fire, or chemical release occurs such that the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber could become contaminated from the fumes, i

chemicals or foreign materials, the same tests and sample analysis shall be performed as required for operational use. The determination of significance shall be made by the operator on duty at the time of the incident.

Knowledgeable staff members should be consulted prior to making this j

determination.

t BrN 3.7/4.7-53 Unit 2 Arendrent No.177 t

0 THIS PAGE IN7tN710NALLY LETT BLANK.

i l

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l l

l BTS

3. W. -53a t'nf :

Arendment No. 177

'e, WITED ST ATES NUCLE AR RECULATORY COMMIS$10N

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i WatMlWOTON,0.C.306M

(

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l TENNE $$EE VALLEY AUTHORITY l

l I

DOCKtT NO. 50 296 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 3 j

l AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE l

Amendment No. 145 License No. DPR-66 l

1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that 7

A.

The application for amendment by Tentessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated March 6.1990, complies with the stancards and t

requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act),

e and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR l

Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendMnt can be conducted without endangering the health and i

safety of the public. and (ii) that such activities will be i

f conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

I I

l l

)

2-2.

Accordingly, the license is ownded by changes to the Technical Specifications as ir.dicated in the attachment to this license amndment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR 68 is hereby amanded to read as follows:

j (2) Technical Specifications i

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.145, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM25510N l

6h PFW

(; Suzanne Black, Assisilint Director for Projects l

i TVA Projects Division l

Office of huelear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical i

Specifications Date of Issuance: March 30, 1990 i

1 t

l

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.145 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. OPR-68 o

DOCKET NO. 50 296 Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating tne area of change. Overleaf

and overflow" pages are provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE IN$ERT 3.7/4.7-13 3.7/4.7-13 3.7/4.7-14 3.7/4.7-14*

3.7/4.7-15 3.7/4.7 15 3.7/4.7-16 3.7/4.7-16 3.7/4.7 17 3.7/4.7-17 l

3.7/4.7-18 3.7/4.7 18*

i 3.7/4.7 47 3.7/4.7 45 3.7/4.7-48 3.7/4.7-46 3.7/4.7-49 3.7/4.7 47'*

i 3.7/4.7-50 3.7/4.7-4r/*

3.7/4.7-51 3.7/4.7-49**

3.7/4.7-52 3.7/4.7-50**

f 3.7/4.7-53 3.7/4.7-51**

3.7/4.7-51a" f

I t

{

T 3.7/4.7 CONTillDtENT SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.7.B.

Standbv Can Treatment Svatta 4.7.B.

11andbv Cas Treatment System 1.

Except as specified in 1.

At least,once per year, j

specification 3.7.B.3 below, the following conditions all three trains of the shall be demonstrated.

standby gas treatment system ahall be OPERABLE at all a.

Pressure drop across i

I times when secondary the combined HEPA containment integrity is filters and charcoal f

adsorber banks is less

required, l

than 6 inches of water at a flow of 9000 cfm l

(i 10%).

b.

The inlet heaters en each circuit ete l

tested in accordance vith ANS! N510-1975, and are capable of an

~

output of at least I

40 kW.

c.

Air distribution is uniform within 20%

across HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers, i

i

?

I l

i i

BFN 3.7/4.7-13 Unit 3 Arendrent I;o.145

3.7/4.7 CONTAINMENT SY$TEMS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

3.7.8. Stand)v can Treatment Svatam 4.7.B.

Ltandbv Can Treatment

,I Svatem

2. a. The results of the in-place

2. a. The tests and sample cold DOP and halogensted analysis of hydrocarbon tests at i 10%

Specification 3.7.8.2 design flow on KEPA filters shall be performed at and charcoal adsorber banks least once per operating t

shall show 199% DOP removal cycle or once every i

and 199% halogenated 18 months whichever hydrocarbon removal when occurs first for standby t

l tested in accordance with service or af ter every l

ANS! N510-1975.

720 hours0.00833 days 0.2 hours 0.00119 weeks 2.7396e-4 months of system d

operation and following t

significant painting, fire, or chemical

)

release in any 1

ventilation rene communicating with the system.

b. The results of laboratory

b. Cold DOP testing shall carbon sample analysis be performed after j

i shall show 190% radioactive each complete or partial methyl iodide removal when replacement of the HEPA tested in accordance with filter bank or after any l

ASTM D3803 (130'C, structural maintenance l

95% R.H.).

on the system housing.

[

c. System shall be shown to

c. Halogenated hydrocarbon operate within $10% design testing shall be i

flov.

performed after each complete or part.ial replacement of the charcoal adsorber bard:

or after any structural i

maintenance on the i

system housing.

l r

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i 1

BrH 3.7/4.7-14 Unit 3 i

Amendment No. 114 i

Februa ry 12, 1900

[

0

'3.7/4.7 C0lrTA110Elff $YSTEMS LIMITING CONDITIONS TOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.7.B.

Standby Can Treatment $vatem 4.7.B.

Standby can Treatment

$Ya t ta 4.7.B.2 (Cont'd) d.

Each train shall be operated a total of at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months every month.

e.

Test sealing of gaskets for housing doors shall be performed utilising chemical smoke genera-tors during each test performed for compliance with Spect-fication 4.7.B.2.a and Specification 3.7.B.2.a.

h 3.

Trom and after the date that 3.

a.

Once per cperating cycle cne train of the standby gas automatic initiation of treatment system is made or each branch of the stand-found to be inoperable for by gas treatment system any reason, REACTOR POWER shall be demonstrated 0)IRATION and fuel handling from each unit's controls.

is permissible only during the succeeding 7 days unless

b. At least once per year such circuit is sooner made manual operability of OPERABLE, provided that the bypass valve for during such 7 days all filter cooling shall be active components of the demonstrated.

other two standby gas treatment trains shall be

c. When one train of the d

operable.

standby gas treatment system becomes inoperable the other two trains shall be demonstrated to be OPERABLE within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months and daily thereafter.

4 If these conditions cannot be mett a.

Suspend all fuel handling operations, core alterations, and I

activities with the potential to drain I

any reactor vessel containing fuel.

l-BTH 3.7/4.7-15 Unit 3 Arendrent tio. 145

3.7/4.7 CONTAINMENT SY$TEMS LIMITING CORDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.7.B. Standby can Treatment Svatem 4.7.B.

Standby can Treatment _

System c

3.7.B.4 (Cont'd) b.

Place all reactors in at least a HOT SHUTDOWN CONDITION within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in a COLD

$NUIDOWN CONDITION within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

3.7.C. Seeenda ry centainment 4.7.C.

Seeendary containment 1.

Secondary containment integrity 1.

Secondary containment i

shall be maintained in the surveillance shall be reactor tone at all times performed as indicated i

except as specified in below 3.7.C.2.

a.

Secondary containment j

capability to maintain j

1/4 inch of water vacuum under calm vind

(< 5 mph) conditions with a system inleakage i

rate of not more than 12.000 cim, shall be demonstrated at each l

refueling outage prior to refueling.

I 2.

If reactor zone secondary 2.

After a secondary containment integrity cannot containment violation is be maintained the following l

determined, the standby gas l

conditions shall be mett treatment system vill be operated immediately after a.

Suspend all fuel handling the affected zones are operations, core altera-isolated from the remainder tions, and activities with of the secondary the potential to drain any containment to confirm its reactor vessel containing ability to maintain the fuel.

remainder of the secondary containment at 1/4-inch b.

Restore teactor zone of water negative pressure secondary containment under calm vind conditions, integrity within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , or place all reactors in i

at least a HOT SHUTDOWN l

CONDITION within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in a COLD SHUT-DOWN CONDITION vithin the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

BTH 3.7/4.7-16 Unit 3 Amendment No. 145

,L 7 /4. 7 CONTif10EENT SY$7]MS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPEkATION

' SURVEILLANCE _REQU!kEMENTS h

3.7.C.

Secondary containment

(

3.

Secondary containment intes-rity shall be saintained in the refueling zone, except as specified in 3.7.C.4.

4 If refueling tone secondary containment cannot be saintained the following conditions sl.all be sett a.

Randling of spent fuel and all operations over spent fuel pools and open reactor wells containing fuel shall be prohibited.

b.

The standby gas treatment system suction to the refueling rene vill be blocked except for a controlled leakage area sized to assure the achieving of a vacuum of at least 1/4-inch of water and not over 3 inches of vater in all three reactor renes. This is only appli-cable if reactor zone inte-grity is requitec.

q D.

Primary Centainment Isolatien D.

Primary Centainment Irelatien i

Valves Valves 1.

When primary Containment l

1.

The primary containnent Integrity is required, all j

isolation valves isolation valves listed in surveillance shall be Table 3.7.A and all reactor performed as follows:

1 coolant system instrument line flow check valves shall be a.

At least once per oper-OPIRABLE except as specified

{

ating cycle, the OTER-l i

in 3.7.D.2.

ABLE isolation valves that are power oper-i ated and automatically I

initiated shall be 7

tested for simulated automatic initiation and in accordance with Specification 1.0.MM, i

tested for closure times.

BpH 3.7/4.7-17 Unit 3 Arend cr,t fio. 140 l

3.7/4.7 C01rTAf tettfrf $YSTDi1 e

o LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVIILI.ANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.7.D.

Primary contat =amt faelatien 4.7.D.

higerv Containment feelation valves Yalves 4.7.D.1 (Cont'd) b.

In accordance with spect ficatton 1.0.191, i

all normally open power operated isolation valves shall be functionally tested.

j c.

(Deleted) i d.

At least once per operat.tng cycle the operabtlity of the reactor coolant system instrueent line flow i

check valves shall be verified.

2.

In the event any isolation valve 2.

Whenever an isolation valve specified in Table 3.7.A becomes listed in Table 3.7.ti is l

inoperable, reactor operation inoperable, the position of may continue provided at least at least one other valve in one valve, in each line having each line hoving an an inoperable valve, is OPERABLE inoperable valve shall be and within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months either recorded daily, a.

The inoperable valve is restored to OTIRABLE status, or b.

Each affected line is isolated by use of at least one deactivated containment isolation valve secured l

1 in the isolated position.

l 3.

If Specification 3.7.D.1 and 3.7.D.2 cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in the COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITION within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

i BTN 3.7/4.7-18 Unit 3 Amendrent No. 130 Novenber ??,1988

.h7/4.7 RA1I1 (Cont'd)

I The primary containment leak rate test frequency is based on maintaining l

sdequate assurance that the leak rate remains within the specification. The

(

5 leak rate test frequency is based on the NRC guide for developing leak rate testing and surveillance of reactor containment vessels. Allowing the tent intervals to be extended up to 10 months permits some flexibility needed to have the tests coincide with scheduled or unscheduled shutdown periods.

l s

The penetration and air purse piping leakage test frequency, along with the l

containment leak rate tests, is adequate to allov detection of leakage l

trends. Whenever a bolted double-gasketed penetration is troken and remade, l

i the space between the gaskets is pressurized to determine that the seals are performing properly.

It is expected that the majority of the leakage from valves, penetrations and seals vould be into the reactor building. However, it to possible that leakage into other parts of the facility could occur.

such leakage paths that say affect significantly the consequences of accidents l

are to be minimited.

i j

The primary containment is normally slightly pressurized during periods of l

reactor operation. Nitrogen used for inerting could leak out of the l

containment but air could not leak in to increase oxygen concentration. Once i

l the containment is filled with nitrogen to the. required concentration.

determining the oxygen concentration twice a week serves as an added assurance l

j that the oxygen concentration vill not exceed 4 percent.

t l

3.7.B/1.7.C st andbv Cas Treatnent System and su endary Centainment i

I 1

I The secondary contaitsent is designed to minimite any ground level release of l

radioactive materials which might result from a serious accident. The reactor building provides secondary contaitsent during reactor operation, when the

[

dryvell is sealed and in service: the reactor building provides primary containment, if required, when the reactor is shutdown and the dryvell is open. Because the secondary centaitsent is an integral part of the complete containment system, secondary contaitsent is required at all times that primary containment is required as well as during refueling.

The standby gas treatment system is designed to filter and exhaust the reactor building atmosphere to the stack during secondary containment isolation conditions. All three standby gas treatment system fans are designed to automatically start upon contaitsent isolation and to maintain the reactor building pressure to the design negative pressure so that all leakage should be in-leakage.

t High ef ficier.cy particulate air (REPA) filters are installed before and af ter the charcoal absorbers to minimize potential release of particulates to the i

environment and to prevent clogging of the iodine absorbers. The charcoal absorbers are installed to reduce the potential release of radiciodine to the environment. The in-place test results should indicate a system leak tightness of lest than 1 percent bypass leakage for the charcoal absorbers and a HIPA efficiency of at least 99 percent removal of D0p particulates. The laboratory carbon sample test results should indicate a tadioactive methyl iodide removal efficiency of at least 90 percent for expected accident BTN 3.7/4.7-45 Unit 3 Arer.drer,t M. 145

307/4 7 MRI (Cont'd) 0 o

conditions.

If the efficiencies of the HIPA filters and charcoal absorbers are an spec uted, the resulting doses vill be less than the 10 CTR 100 guidelines for the accidents analyzed. Operation of the fans significantly different from the design flev vill change the removal eificiency of the HIPA filters and h

charcoal absorbers.

Only two of the three standby gas treatment systems are needed to clean up the reactor building atmosphere upon containment isolation.

If one syntese is found l

to be inoperable, there is no immediate threat to the containment system performance and reactor operation or refueling operation may continue while i

repairs are being made.

If more than one train is inoperable, all fuel j

handling operations, core alterations, and activities with the potential to drain any reactor vessel containing fuel eust be suspended and all reactors placed in a cold shutdown condition, because the remaining train vould provide only 50 percent of the capacity required to filter and exhaust the reactor building atmosphere to the stack.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude movement of a component to a safe, conservative position. Operations that have the potential for draining the reactor vessel must be suspended as soon as practical to minimite the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release.

Draindown of a reactor vessel containing no fuel does not present the possibility for fuel damage or significant fission product release and therefore is not a nuclear safety j

concern.

4.7.B/4.7.C 3,1,gdby Gas Treatment Svatem and Secondary Cent a inrregt.

1 Initiating reactor building isolation and operation of the standby gas treatment system to maintain at least a 1/4 inch of water vacuum within the secondary containment provides an adequate test of the operation of the reactor I

building isolation valves, leak tightness of the reactor building and performance of the standby gas treatment system.

punctienally testing the initiating sensors and associated trip logic demonstrates the capability for I

automatic actuation.

Performing these tests prior to refueling vill demonstrate secondary containment capability prior to the time the primary containment is opened for refueling. Periodic testing gives sufficient confidence of reactor building integrity and standby gas treatment system performance capability.

The test frequencies are adequate to detect equipment deterioration prior to significant defects, but the tests are not frequent enough to load the filters, thus reducing their reserve capacity too quickly. That the testing frequency is adequate to detect deterioration was demonstrated by the tests which showed no loss of filter efficiency after two years of operation in the ruined shipboard environment on the US Savannah (ORNL 3726).

pressure drop across the combined HIPA filters and charcoal adsorbers of less than six inches of water at the system design flow rate vill indicate that the filters and adsorbers are not clogged by excessive uounts of foreign matter. Hester capability, pressure drop and air distribution should be determined at least once per operating cycle to show system performance capability.

The frequency of tests and suple analysis are necessery to show that the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers can perform as evaluated. Tests of the charcoal adsorbers with halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant shall be performed in accordance with USAEC Report DP-1082.

Iodine removal efficiency tests shall BpH 3.7/4.7-46 Unit 3 l

Amendment No. 145 l

l

o s

3.7/4.7 1 AIL 1 (Cont'd) follow ASTM D3803. The charcoal adsorber efficiency test procedures aheuld

/'

allow for the removal of ene adserter_trav, enptying of one bed from the tray, 5

mixing the adsorbent thoroughly and obtaining at least two samples. Each staple should be at least two inches in dinneter and a length equal to the thickness of the bed.

If test results are unacceptable, all adsorbent in the syaten shall be replaced with an adsorbent qualified according to Table 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.52.

The replacement tray for the adsorber tray removed for the test should meet the sane adsorbent quality. Tests of the MIPA filters with DOP aerosol shall be perf ormed in accordance to ANS! N510-1975. Any HIFA filters found defective shall be replaced with filters qualified pursuant to Regulatory Position c.3.6 of Regulatory Guide 1.52.

All elements of the heater should be demonstrated to be functional and operable during the test of heater capacity. Operation of each filter train for a minimum of 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months each month vill prevent moisture buildup in the filters and adsorber system.

With doors closed and fan in operation DOP aerosol shall be sprayed externally along the full linear periphery of each respective door to check the gasket seal. Any detection of DOP in the fan exhaust shall be considered an unacceptable test result and the gaskets repaired and test repeated.

If significant painting, fire or chemical release occurs such that the HIPA filter or charcoal ad6erber could become contaminated from the fumes, chemicals or foreign material, the same tests and sample analysis shall be performed as required for operaticnal use. The determination of significance shall be made by the operator on duty at the time of the incident.

Knowledgesble staff members should be consulted prior to making this determination.

Demonstration of the autcmatic initiation capability and operability of filter cooling is necessary to assure system performance capability. If one standby gas treatment system is inoperable, the other systems must te tested daily.

This substantiates the availability of the operable systems and thus reactor operation and refueling operatien can continue for a limited period of time.

3.7.D/4.7.D Primary Centainment Isolatien Valves Double isolation valves are provided on lines penetrating the primary containment and open to the free space of the containment.

Closure of one cf the valves in each line vould be sufficient to maintain the integrity of the pressure suppression system. Automatic initiation is required to minimise the potential leakage paths from the containment in the event of a LOCA.

GIsyg_1 - Process lines are isolated by reactor vessel lov veter level (376")

in order to allow for removal of decay heat subsequent to a scram, yet isolate in time for proper operation of the core standty cooling systems.

The valves in Group 1, except the reactor vater sample line valves, are also closed when process instrumentation detects excessive main steam line flow, high radiation, low pressure, or main steam space high temperature. The reactor water sample line valves isolate only en reactor lov vater level at 37B" or main steam line high radiation.

BTN 3.7/4.7-47 Unit 3 Artndrent No. Ild

f 3.7/4.7 1Alts (Cont'd)

Creum 2 - ! solation valves are closed by reactor vessel lov veter level (538")

i er high dryvell pressure. The Group 2 1 solation signal also " isolates" the l

l reactor building and starts the standby gas treatment system. It is not desirable to actuate the Group 2 isolatten signal by a transient or spurious 1

j signal.

Groun 3 - process lines are normally in use, and it is therefore not desirable to cause spurious isolation due to high dryve11 pressure resulting from 1

nonsafety related causes. To protect the reactor from a possible pipe break in the systes, isolation is provided by high temperature in the cleanup system area or high flow through the inlet to the cleanup system. Also, since the l

vessel could potentially be drained through the cleanup system, a low-level

)

isolation is provided.

)

4

)

Creues 4 and 5 - process lines are designed to remain operable and mitigate l

the consequences of an accident which results in the isolation of other process lines. The signals which initiate isolation of Groups 4 and 5 process lines are therefore indicative of a condition which vould render them l

l inoperable.

Group _.1 - Lines are connected to the primary containment but not directly to 1'

the reactor vessel. These valves are isolated on reactor lov vater level

($38"), high dryvell pressure, or reactor building ventilation high radiation which would indicate a possible accident and necessitate primary containment i

1 isolation.

Crout 7 - process lines are closed only on the respective turbine steam supply f

)

j valve not fully closed. This assures that the valves are not open when HpCI

]

or RCIC action is required.

j i

Greue 8 - Line (traveling in-core probe) is isolated on high dryvell pressure 1

or reactor lov vater level (538"). This is to assure that this line does not l

provide a leakage path when containment pressure or reactor water level indicates a possible accident condition.

i The maximum closure time for the automatic isolation valves of the primary containment and reactor vessel isolation centrol system have been selected in l

l consideration of the design intent to prevent core uncovering following pipe e

breaks outside the primary containment and the need to contain teleased I

fission products following pipe breaks inside the primary containment.

l In satisfying this design intent, an additional margin has been included in specifying maximum closure times. This margin permits identification of degraded valve performance prior to exceeding the design closure times.

In order to assure that the doses that may result from a steam line break do

[

not n.ceed the 10 CPR 100 guidelines, it is necessary that no fuel rod perforation resulting from the accident occur prior to closure of the main steam line isolation valves. Analyses indicate that fuel rod cladding perforations vould be avoided for main steam valve closure times, including J

instrument delay, as long as 10.5 seconds.

BPN 3.7/4.7-48 Unit 3 1

Amendment No. 145 j

, 3.7/4.7 AMil (Cont'd)

These valv s cre highly reliable, have low service' requirements and test are normally closed. The initiating sensors and associated trip logic are also checked to demonstrate the capability for automatic isolation. The test interval of once per operating cycle for automatic initiation results in a failure probability of 1.1 x 10-7 that a line vill not isolate. More frequent testing for valve operability in accordance with Specification 1.0.MM results in a greater assurance that the valve vill be operable when needed.

I The main steam line isolation valves are functionally tested per Specification 1.0. m to establish a high degree of reliability.

l The primary containment is penetrated by several small diameter instrunent lines connected to the reactor coolant system. Each instrument line contains a 0.25-inch restricting crifice inside the primary centainment and an excess flow check valve outside the primary containment.

3.7 E/4.7.E Centrol Reem Enertenev Ventilation l.

The control room emergency ventilation system is designed to filter the control room atmosphere for intake air and/or for recirculation during control room isolation conditions. The control room emergency ventilation system is designed to automatically start upon control room isolation and to maintain the control room pressure to the design positive pressure so that all leakage should be out leakage. During cycle 6 CREVS has been declared inoperable j

only because it does not teet its design basis for essentially zero unfiltered inleakage.

Reactor power operations and fuel movement are acceptable until just prior to startup for unit 2 cycle 7.

During cycle 6 CREVS must be J

demonstrated to be functional by performing all applicable surveillances.

In the event that the applicable surveillances are not successfully performed.

l the actions required by the LCOs must be complied with.

High efficiency particulate absolute (KEPA) filters are installed prior to the charcoal adsorbers to prevent clogging of the iodine adsorbers. The charcoal adsorbers are installed to reduce the potential intake of radiciodine to the control room. The inplace test results should indicate a system leak i

tightness of less than 1 percent bypass leakage for the charcoal adsorbers and a HEPA efficiency of at least 99 percent removal of DOP particulates. The lateratory carbon sample test results should indicate a radioactive methyl iodide removal efficiency of at least 90 percent for expected accident conditions.

If the efficiencies of the HIPA filters and charcoal adsorbers are as specified, the resulting doses vill te less than the allovable levels stated in Criterion 19 of the General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, Appendix A to 10 CTR Part 50. Operation of the fans significantly different frein the design flev vill change the removal efficiency Of the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers.

If the system is found to be inoperable, there is no immediate threat to the control room and reactor operation or refueling operation may continue for a limited period of time while repairs are being made.

If the system cannot be repaired within seven days, the reactor is shutdown and brought to Cold Shutdovn within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or refueling operations are terminated.

l BTN 3.7/4.7-49 i

Unit 3 Amendnent No.1G

3.7/4.7 R&851 (Cont'd) l Pressure drop across the combined REPA filters and charcoal adsorbers of less f

than six inches of water et the system design flow rate will indicate that the

t filters and adsorbers are not clogged by excessive amounts of foreign matter.

9 Pressure drop should be determined at least once per operating cycle to show

]

system performance capability.

The frequency of tests and sample analysis are necessary to show that the NEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers can perform as evaluated. Tosts of the charcoal adsorbers with haloganated hydrocarbon shall be performed in I

accordance with USABC Report-1082.

Iodine removal efficiency tests shall i

follow ASTM D3803. The charcoal adsorber efficiency test procedures should allow for the removal of one adsorber tray, emptying of one bed from the tray, l

mixing the adsorbent thoroughly and obtaining at least two samples. Each sample should be at least two inches in diameter and a length equal to the l

thickness of the bed.

If test results are unacceptable, all adsorbent in the system shall be replaced with an adsorbent qualified according to Table 1 of Regulerory Guide *...u.

The replacement tray for the adsorber tray removed for j

the test should tm 8: the same adsorbent quality. Tests of the HEPA filters with D0P aerosol wall be perform b accordance to ANSI R$10-1975. Any HEPA filters found defective shall be rap hced with filters qualified pursuant to Regulatory Position C.3.d of ReguDtvry Guide 1.52.

Operation of the system for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months every month will demonstrate operability of the filters and adsorber sytten and remove excessive moisture built up on the adsorber.

If significant painting, fire or chemical release occurs such that the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber could become contaminated from the fumes, chemicals or foreign materials, the same tests and sample analysis shall be performed as required for operational use. The determination of significance shall be made by the operator on duty at the time of the incident.

Knowleds'eable staff members should be consulted prior to making this determination.

Demonstration of the automatic initiation capability is necessary to assure system performance capability.

3.7.F/4.7.F Primary Containment Purte System The primary containment-purge system is designed to provide air to purge and ventilate the primary containment system. The exhaust from the primary containment is first processed by a filter train assembly and then channeled t

through the reactor building roof exhaust system. During power operation, the l

primary containment purge and ventilation system is isolated from the primary j

containment by two isolation valves in series.

J HEPA (high efficiency particulate air) filters are installed before the charcoal adsorbers followed by a centrifugal fan. The in-place test results should indicate a leak tiahtness of the system housing of not less than 99-percent and a HEPA efficiency of at least 99-percent removal of DOP particulates.

The laboratory carbon sample test results should indicate a BFN 3.7/4.7-50 Unit 3 Amendment No. 145

3.7/4.7 1A112 (Ctat'd) radioactive methyl iodide removal efficiency of at least 45-percent.

Operation of the fans significantly different from the design flow will change the removal efficiency of the HEPA filters and charcoal attorbers.

If the system is found to be inoperable, the 8tandby Cas Treatment System may be used to purge the containment.

Pressure drop across the combined REPA filters and charcoal adsorbers of less than 8.5 inches of water at the system design flow rate will indicate that the filters and adsorbers are not clogged by excessive amounts of foreign matter.

Preasure drop should be determined at least once per operating cycle to show system performance capability.

The frequency of tests and sample analysis are necessary to show that the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers can perform as evaluated. Tests of the charcoal adsorbers with halogenated hydrocarbon shall be performed in accordance with USAEC Report-1082.

Iodine removal efficiency tests shall follow ASTM D3803. The charcoal adsorber efficiency test procedures should allow for the removal of one adsorber tray, emptying of one bed from the tray, mixing the adsorbent thoroughly and obtaining at least two samples. Each sample should be at least two inches in diameter and a length equal to the thickness of the bed.

If test results are unacceptable, all adsorbent in the system shall be replaced with an adsorbent qualified according to Table 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.52.

The replacement tray for the adsorber tray removed for the test should meet the same adsorbent quality. Tests of the HEPA filters with DOP aerosol shall be performed in accordance to ANSI N510-1975. Any NEPA filters found defective shall be replaced with filters qualified pursuant to Regulatory Position C.3.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52.

If significant painting, fire, or chemical release occurs such that the KEPA filter or charcoal adsorber could become contaminated from the fumes, chemicals or foreign materials, the same tests and sample analysis shall be performed as required for operational use. The determination of significance shall be made by the operator on duty at the time of the incident.

Knowledgeable staff members should be consulted prior to making this determination.

BTN 3.7/4.7-51 Unit 3 Amendment No. 145 l

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l THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LETT BLANK.

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l BFN 3."/4.7-31a L*ni t 3 Amendment No. 145 1

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