ML20033B293
| ML20033B293 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/02/1981 |
| From: | Sherr T NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20033B286 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8112010195 | |
| Download: ML20033B293 (22) | |
Text
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e PROCESSING OF ACCOUNTING DATA IN THE UNITED STATES RELEVANT TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE US/IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT Theodore S. Sherr, Chief Material Control and Accountability Development Branch Division of Safeguards Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Paper Prepared for the IAEA Basic Training Course On The State System of Accounting and Control and Workshop Seminar on Safeguards Information November 2, 1981 Moscow, USSR 811201019S 811112 PDR ORG EFGIAEA PDR
6 PROCESSING OF ACCOUNTING DATA IN THE UNITED STATES RELEVANT T0 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE US/IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT THEODORE-S. SHERR,' CHIEF MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY DEVELOPMENT BRANCH U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 I.
INTRCDUCTION The Agreement between the United States and the IAEA entered into force on December 9, 1980.
Code 10 of that Agreement specifies the requirements for reporting of accounting data to the IAEA.
To satisfy these. requirements, the U.S. is utilizing a centralized computer system which is called the Nuclear Material Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS).
This sytem has been in operation for a number of years for the purpose of satisfying the United States domestic safeguards and management needs.
Certain modifications were made to this system to be responsive to the IAEA reporting requirements.
In.this paper the NMMSS system is described, as well as the U.S. activities associated with establishing systems for reporting under the US/IAEA Safeguards Agreement, and the status of the U.S. reporting to the'IAEA.
II.
THE U.S. NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT AND SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM (NMMSS)-
A.
General Description The Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS) is the U.S. data base and information support system concerning nuclear materials under the control of the United States Government.
It was created to support national safeguards and management objectives.
Some of the major areas in which the services of the NMMSS are being used today include:
Safeguards monitoring of nuclear materials in government and private o
facilities, and their transportation between facilities.
Development of regulatory standards, licensing procedures and policies, o
and safeguards controls for nuclear materials in domestic facilities.
Management of government-sponsored nuclear research, development, o
and production programs.
Administration of toll enrichment services, leases, and sales activities o
of the Federal Government.
o Development and monitoring of import, export, and utilization controls.
Accounting for and controlling of nuclear materials furnished foreign o
governments and industries under the international agreements for cooperation.
2 Support of United States commitments under the International Treaty o
on the Non-Proliferation'of Nuclear Weapons.
1 The Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System has been developed over a period of several years.
Development was started in late 1964, when it was decided to convert the manual records and reporting systems on nuclear materials to a computer-supported information system.
At that time, the manual procedures of record keeping and report preparation i
consumed much personnel effort within the U.S. Government.
Information moved slowly through the organizations and there was much duplication of effort in the flow of information.
Startin'g in 1965, the U.S. Government converted the information on inventories and material balances in the facility reports to a data format for computer processing.
The transaction data system was implemented in 1963, with data prepared from reports filed by the U.S. facility operators.
From these beginnings, system development has proceeded on a continuing basis 4
to upgrade the data systems, to upgrade the computer hardware, to install and utilize electronic communications systems, and tc establish direct data inter-faces with nuclear facilities. Major changes and additions have b(en made during the entire period of development because of changing management and safeguirds requirements.
At the present time, the system encompasses data pertaining to the nuclear research, development, and production programs of the Federal Gosernment, the private nuclear programs subject to Federal regulations, and United States export and import activities.
It operates with a central data base and inter-acting communications with many nuclear facilities and with the headquarters, field, and regional offices of the Department of Energy (00E) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
The central data base is located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, where the system is operated and maintained by the Computer Sciences Division of Union Carbide Corporation's Nuclear Division (UCCND).
The Annex to this paper provides a description of the computer hardware, computer software, l
and the communications system.
[
In the United States, a centralized data base organized around logical
(
information categories and fully supported in a computer and communications j
environment offers the most efficient and effective system design for meeting l
national objectives.
In this design concept, information is reported only once l
and is then processed, categorized, and stored for access or sharing by various users through communication links and interfaces within the integrated data base.
The information that is broadly classified as accounting information is the identification and description of material locations, production, movements, and usage.
It is used by managers at several levels for program planning, facility operations, financial management, and project administration.
Management decisions in the utilization of materials to achieve program objectives interact with safeguards objectives in the application of control mechanisms required to protect the national security.
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e 3
B.
Scope of Information The NMMSS processes information needed by the government under provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and other legislation to regulate the receipt, manufacture, production,
-transfer, possession, use, and import and export of nuclear materials.
The materials are broadly classified'as source materials, special nuclear materials, and other materials. The specific materials in each category are identified in Figure 1.
Source materials, special nuclear materials, and tritium are under various forms of safeguards or regulatory controls.
The remaining materials in the "other" category are high-value materials that are managed in the United States Department of Energy programs and accounted for under special procedures.
Information is processed on nuclear materials (1) owned and used by the United States Government, (2) owned by privata companies within the United States, (3) leased by the United States Government to private companies for domestic use, (4) produced in the United States and leased or sold to foreign governments, and (5) produced in foreign countries under conditions that bring the materials under United States safeguards interests.
The quantities of nuclear materials held or used in all of the above categories are identified and described in sufficient detail to facilitate the coordinated support of safeguards, programmatic, administrative, and financial management objectives.
Data is reported to the system by approximately 100 facilities under contractual requirements of the Department of Energy (00E),1500 facilities licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Cnmmission and Agreement States under government rules j
and regulations, 45 waste burie' facilities operated by 00E contractors and NRC licensees, and 75 foreign naticas or organizations under international agreements for cooperation.
C.
Management and Operation of NMMSS The 00E Division of Safeguards and Security and the NRC Division of Safeguards are responsible for coordination and program direction of the NMMSS. Design, development, and operation of the system are performed by the Computer Sciences Division of the Union Carbide Corporation Nuclear Division.
1 A user group composed of representatives of major DOE and NRC organizational users of the system meets regularly to review activities and to discuss current i
and future requirements.
This group was formed to provide a continuing-forum for identification and discussion of specific needs and requirements. When necessary, task forces and study groups are formed to identify and evaluate potential roles for the system in supporting the overall safeguards and management efforts.
These studies provide guidance for the continuing design and development to ensure that a compatible, integrated system is maintained in the face of changing needs.
Workshops and seminars are held periodically for persons who interact with the system to report data and persons who interact with the system to obtain information.
Seminars are held at different locations throughout the country, and they are planned and designed for participation by 00E contractors, NRC a
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3.a Of interest To DOE NRC Source Materials Normal Uranium X
X
^
X Urar.!um in Cascades X
(Normal and Depleted Portions)
Thorium X
X Special Nuclear Materials Uranium Enriched in U-235 X
X Uranium in Cascades X
(Enriched Portion)
X Plutonium-238 X
X Plutonium-242 X
Other Materials Lithium Enriched in Li-6 X
Helium-3 X
Tritium X
X Neptunium X
Americium-243 X
Curium X
Y
= - -.
Figure l. NUCLEAR MATERIALS OF INTEREST TO DOE AND NRC.
4 licensees, and U.S. Government personnel.
The seminars help meet educational and training needs in developing and implementing the :ystem.
The purpose, concept, design development, and operation of the system are communicated among those persons that interact with the system.
At the same time, problems and difficulties being experienced in the field are identified.
Discussion of current and long-range plans and objectives conveys the overall perspective of the system and its utilization.
The operational range of the NMMSS is the total environment in which the information moves, is processed, and is used.
The boundary of the central
~
system begins with the data interfaces through which data is released by the facility systems and extends to all locations and organizations where tne information is used.
Operations of the central system in Oak Ridge involve the application of computer, communications, and human resources to the receiving and processing of incoming streams of data, updating and maintaining the content and integrity of the data base, and generating and disseminating information from the data base to authorized users.
Several forms of sensitive information are represented in the total collection of information that forms the central data base.
Ali information is maintained under established controls and procedures for the protection and security of the information.
All computer software that directly accesses the data base is developed by the UCCND Ccmpu er Sciences Division under authorizations from CCE and NRC.
Execution of the software to operate on the data base is maintained under the operational control of the Computer Sciences Division.
Reports are issued only upon authorizations by DOE and NRC.
The Division of Safeguards and Security coordinates all authorizing actions within 00E; the Division of Safeguards coordinates all authorizing acticos within NRC.
The two organizations jointly handle authorizations that involve tnth agencies.
Con-tinuing authorizations exist for all of the regular producticn reports.
Information moves through the system on a continuing basis to 00E and NRC safeguards organizations at headquarters and in the field.
Much of the information is disseminated in the form of reports that are produced at routine intervals.
Information on inventories of materials reported to the system by the facilities is disseminated routinely to interested safeguards organizations in the U.S. Government. Material balances are computed for any material and facility, and for any interval within the range of the data base.
Balances form one or more of the components in many of the safeguards uses of the system, particularly in the data analysis applications and in the inspection data packages.
Information on the nuclear materials transactions throughout the industry is transmitted regularly to interested safeguards groups.
Data automatically
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5 undergoes many screening, verification, and monitoring operations for early detection of abnormal conditions. : Direct contacts by the Data Control. Unit to resolve errors in data and promptly return the corrected data to the input stream are designed to support the safeguards uses of the 'information.
Computer-assisted methods of statistically analyzing losses, material unaccounted for, and shipper-receiver measurement differences are in regular use.
Several of these methods-of data analysis are performed on a continuing basis in.the-safeguards data monitoring functions that are' superimposed on the data system.
Methods for monitoring and data analysis reveal deficiencies in the quality and completeness of information in the primary data systems and in the background data systems. They have supplemented the data-edit and verification operations used to upgrade the entire process of recording and reporting data throughout the United States. Monitoring of book inventories against authorized possession limits, comparing measurement limits of error with control limits, and detecting significant differences in shipper and receiver measurements are some of the -
current forms of analysis that alert field or headquarters organizations to
- ossible violations or problems.
D.
NMMSS Data Base The transaction data system is the largest and most active component of the total data base.
It has operated continuously since January 1,1968, receivir.g data on material movements and other forms of change to inventories of material managed or controlled by the United States Government.
Material movements include the transfers of materials between domestic facilities, the transfers of materials into and out of the United States, and foreign retrans-L fers of materials in which the United States has continuing interests.
Other.
forms of inventory _ change normally occur onsite, such as production, decay, fission and transmutation, and operational and accidental losses.
Dif'erences.
between book and physical inventories (MUF) are also reported g
In addition to the changes in physical inventories, transactions are reported to the system on many types of programmatic and financial reclassifications of materials.
Internal transfers of material between or among projects in-the research and production programs are reported since the transfers both within and across facility boundaries are needed to completely eccount for materials in specific projects and programs.
Similarly, sales, lease, toll enriching, and other financial or contractual actions that reclassify material from one category to another, before or after physical movement of the material, are reported to the system to complete the information needed in several areas of management.
For transfers of materials, detailed information is reported on both the shipment and the receipt of materials.
Each movement of material is uniquely identified in the content of the data, providing a specific reference for reporting to the system all of the shipping and receiving actions and any subsequent corrections or adjustments by the shipper or the receiver.
All transactions that occur onsite j
to a facility also have unique identifications within the content of the data.
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- 6' In the individual transactions,' data el'ements identify the type of activity, L
the facilities that are physically involved in'the action, the organizations
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that1have financial ~ responsibilities, the dates of the-specific events,:trans-portation and packaging details, contract and project. identifications and the quantitative and descriptive information about each batch of material. All:
data elements are not applicable-to all types of transactions. _For a ~ specific action involving nuclear material,sa relatively small number _offdata elements 1 describes all facets of' the transaction as -it relates to the purpose of the i
action and to management and safeguards interests.
A continuous and historical record of events reporting the utilization of nucle'ar-materials throughout the industry is recorded and maintained in the transaction I
data base...Each transaction identifies the date of the event being reported.
The date the transaction is received by the_ system is automatically recorded in the: internal record as the transaction is processed, and a' monthly" check-pointing cycle is superimposed on the data to prevent unauthorizedEchanges beyond the checkpoint data and to ensure chronological reproducibility of -
information.
j The -inventory portion of the data system ~ includes the data from periodic material balance reports.
Reports are provided for each material type held by-aLfacility and include the element and isotope weights of all. additions and deletions to the beginning invertory, as well as composition of ending inventory information-and information pertaining to country of origin.
In addition to the primary.
data systems which contain the information reported by;the facilities, there a're background data systems.
The DOE and NRC organizations responsible for i
authorizing and controlling system usage provide the data needed to maintain-the background information libraries.
All information reported by the facilities
~
is examined against this background of authorization and control data as it'is processed into the data base.
Important NMMSS background data systems are.the facility libraries.
Facility libraries are designed and developed to provide the various operating components of the NMMSS with a common reference point for background information on each facility for which data is reported to. the system.
Information contained in the facility libraries is keyed to the reporting.
identification symbol and falls into two general categories, directory infor-mation and authority files. Within these general categories are subsets of L
information.
l A directory is maintained for all U.S. facilities and foreign countries. The L
directory includes information pertaining to the name and location of each facility.
Another directory for all facilities, both active and inactive, contains 'the j
latitude and longitude of each facility.
By retaining ali entries in this segment of the facility libraries, historical data can be produced on any facility that has been involved in the handling and movement of nuclear materials.
i i
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7 Control information is stored in authority files for use in processing current data, and in responding to inquiries where historical data is required.
The authority files provide:
(1) criteria for editing input data, (2) directions for controlling information in reports compiled from the data base, and (3) the secucity classification for various types of facility data and reports.
Possession limits on special nuclear materials as specified in the licenses of the commercial facilities are kept in the authority files.
The status of each facility is recorded so that when a facility becomes inactive the authority information is retained for historical reference.
III.
REPORTING TO THE IAEA UNDER THE US/IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT A.
U.S. Activities Associated with Establishing Systems for Reporting Under the US/IAEA Safeguards Agreement Much of the reporting requirements as set forth in the tenth part of the sub-sidiary arrangements (i.e., Code 10) are similar to the data that is reported to the U.S. Government by U.S. facilities for domestic safeguards and management purposes.
Nevertheless, there are some significant conceptual and administrative differences between the IAEA safeguards reporting and the reporting for domestic safeguards and management purposes.
Examples of these differences are as follows:
The U.S. domestic recuirements have no provisions for " batch" reporting.
Any portion of a nuclear material transaction or inventory in the U.S. system could be considered to be a batch, but this would not satisfy all the Code 10 provisions pertaining to batch reporting.
The reporting for domestic safeguards purposes do not include concepts such as " key measurement points" ar.d the IAEA definition of " Material Balance /cea" differs from that used for domestic safeguards purposes.
The IAEA' material description codes are different from the material
~
composition and usage descriptions used for domestic safeguards and-management purposes. Whereas the IAEA uses the four key word concept to identify chemical, physical, container and quality of the material,-
the U.S. utilizes a system to identify the status of the material within the fuel cycle; e.g.,
100 series represents mining operations, 200 represents milling; 300, enrichment; 400, fabrication; etc., on through reprocessing and reactor products.
Accordingly, there are some cases where no direct relationship between the two systems exist.
There were some new reports introduced as a result of the IAEA Agreement; i.e., the Physical Inventory Listing and the Concise Note.
- Also, the reporting requirements for source material were not the same.
In
~
particular, the U.S. required reporting of only transactions of 1000 kgs or more (as compared to the IAEA requirement of 1 kg).
The IAEA had a more extensive list of-inventory change types (some of tne U.S. changes in inventory were reported as part of the material balance report instead of the ICR; e.g., nuclear production, burnup, operational losses, MUF, and rounding).
4 e
o
8
-There'are a number of administrative differences that are peculiar to the U.S. national data base.
For example, our nuclear facilities have all been assigned one or more Reporting Identification Symbols (RIS), a unique alphabetic three character symbol that identifies a specific account and not necessarily an MBA.
The IAEA requirement to have one line per batch conflicts with other requirements in the U.S. reporting system such as reporting by country of origin of the material, ownership, enrichment contract, and enrich-ment levels.
A complication is introduced by the fact that some facilities in the U.S. are subject to safeguards and others are not.
If the shipper or receiver is not one of the IAEA selected facilities, the facility-is not subject to the Code 10 reporting requirements.
There are other differences in accounting practices that impact on the reporting to the IAEA, e.g., reporting of remeasurements, bias corrections, transfer of heels, and correction procedures.
In spite of all these differences, we have managed to accommodate the needs of the IAEA (i.e., the provisions of Code 10) and domestic reporting requirements through the development of integrated reporting instructions and associated modifications of the NMMSS.
In preparation for implementation of the US/IAEA Safeguards Agreement, a series of activities were required to establish the appropriate authority, modify the U.S. reporting system to be responsive to the IAEA needs, and facilitate imple-mentation in the United States.
These activities included the following:
The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations had to be modified.
This entailed changes to existing regulations as well as establishment of new provisions specifically directed to the implementation of the US/IAEA Safeguards Agreement.
These new provisions are referred to as Part 75.
These regulatory changes became effective on December 24, 1980.
/
The reporting instructions and forms which apply to U.S. facilities had to be modified.
In this regard, the additional reporting require-ments necessary for implementation of the US/IAEA Safeguards Agreement were integrated into the existing DOE and URC reporting instructions.
The modifications to the domestic reporting system were limited to only those changes that were needed to produce the additional data and minimize the total reporting burden on U.S. facilities. This means that the general arrangement of forms, nomenclature, data codes, and many other characteristics retain an orientation that is known and understood throughout the entire U.S. nuclear industry. The infor-mation that will be reported by the facilities will continue to serve' the domestic safeguards needs.
It will simultaneously enable the United States to meet the commitment of reporting safeguards information to the agency.
i 9
There was a need to acouaint the operators of facilities in the United States with the nature.and impact of the provisions of the OS/IAEA Safeguards Agreement.
Four training seminars were held at differ locations in the United States (Washington, D.C.; Las Vegas, Nevada; Lexington,. Kentucky; and Denver, Co~iorado) during the period August-October, 1980.
Topics'inc'uded discussions regarding the US/IAEA Safeguards Agreement, raporting of transactions and inventories, and_
Design Information Questionnaires and Facility Attachments.
There was a need to deve: 9p a new module in NMMSS to enable satisfaction
~
of the reporting requirements under the provisions of Code 10.
These modifications involved the following activities:
System specifications were developed in consonance with the develop-o ment of reporting instrut; ions, procedures, and forms.
Software development and operation of the NMMSS were designed to incorporate the new reporting requirements ai,d to develop and maintain an automated data reporting interface with the Agency.
Computer sof tware was developed to report-the initial inventory o
i data on selected facilities to the Agency, and to provide interim inventory change Jata on provisional material balance areas.
Computer software was developed to process data generated by o
NRC licensees and 00E contractors under the' revised reporting requirements ana Facility Attachments, and to create the complete US/IAEA data interface provided for in the Subsidiary Arrangements and in the Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements, Code 10, " Contents, Format and Structure of Reports to the Agency" i
The portions of design information and Facility Attachment data needed to support the processing, verification, and translation 1
of inventory, _ inventory change and material balance data will j
be stored and maintained in a relational database of the NMMSS.
B.
Current Status of U.S. Reporting to the IAEA When an eligible facility. is selected by the IAEA, orrting is implemented in.
three stages; i.e., the initial' inventory report, in erim reporting, and reporting under the provisions of the Facility Attachment.
I The initial _ report reflects the inventory in the facility on the last day of j
the month in which the facility is selected.
It is produced by the facility in the current U. S. report format, transmitted to NMMSS, processed into the format and structure of a Phytical Inventory Listing (PIL), sent to the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and transmitted to the IAEA in Vienna. Official delivery of the initial report to the IAEA completes the first stage of imple-menting reporting for the facility.
In February 1981, the IAEA selected three U.S.
facilities for initial application of IAEA safeguards under the Agreement.
i The initial inventory reports for these selected facilities were generated and transferred to the IAEA on computer magnetic tape on March 30, 1981.
In September 1981, the IAEA selected an additional facility; an initial report for that facility was transmitted on Octooer 22, 1981.
E
10 The second stage spans the interval of time from the date of the initial. report to the date the Facility Attachment enters into force.
In this stage, Inventory-Change Reports (ICRs) are transmitted to the IAEA, treating the facility as a provisional material balance area.
The first ICR data cycle is one calendar month. The monthly cycle is repeated throughout the interval of interim reporting, with the final ICR cycle for the provisional material balance area being a portion of a calendar month if the Facility Attachment is put in force on a date that is not the end or beginning of a calendar month.
During the interval of reporting as a provisional material balance area, the facility continues to report nuclear material transactions in accordance with the DOE or NRC domestic safeguards procedures in force at the time of selection.
Inventory Change Reports for the IAEA are generated by NMMSS and transmitted through official channels to the IAEA.
The ICR data cycle for interim reporti g will coincide wit.h the transaction data cycle presently in force for domestic requirements.
The closing operation on the tenth day of a month for transactions'which report activities at the facility through the end of the preceding month serves both the domestic require-ment and the commitment of reporting safeguards data to the IAEA.
When the final data cycle for a provisional material balance area is a portion of a month, additional operations must be performed to close the provisional MBA on the specified date, and to transfer the book inventory to the material balance areas as established in the Facility Attachment.
The U.S. reporting to the IAEA is currently at this stage of development.
ICR reports have been trar imitted to the Agency on a monthly basis since March 1981.
The third stage of implementing reporting begins with the report of the nuclear materials inventory in each material balance area on the day the Facility Attach-ment enters into force. At that time, the new data elements and other modifi-cations to data to comply with the requirements of reporting to the IAEA apply for inventory, inventory change and material balance reports.
This stage spans one complete material balance period.
The implementation process rLaches completion when the PIL, MBR and ICRs closing the first material balance perica are transmitted to the IAEA.
Following the implementation phase, reporting continues through each successive material balance period as long as the Safeguards Agreement remains in force or until such time as the facility may be removed from the eligible list.
After the transition from reporting as a provisional material balance area to reporting under the Facility Attachment is completed, ICR data cycles coincide with the U.S. domestic transaction data cycles for as long as the facility is subject to the Agreement or the Protocol.
Transactions captured in one data cycle (processing month cycle) will be the data source for generation of ICRs for reporting to the IAEA.
The ICR data cycle will continue on a monthly basis, including any month that is fragmented into two material balance periods.
-.- ~
11 The facility attachments for the initial three selected facilities are in the final stages of development.
Final drafts of these Facility Attachments include detailed provisions relating to the reporting under Code 10 of the US/IAEA Safe-guards Agreement.
In particular, the key measurement points, measurement methods and bases are defined, and the set of material description codes in which they will be reporting to the NMMSS are specified.
In the case of the reactor facilities, these codes are expected to coincide with the IAEA material description codes.
In the case of the bulk handling facility, the reporting to NMMSS will probably be in terms of the operators material description codes,and NMMSS will make the appropriate transformations to the IAEA codes.
It is contemplated that the Facility Attachments for the three facilities initially selected by the IAEA will enter into force in the near future.
In fact, the final drafts of these Facility Attachments are presently undergoing review by the U.S. and the IAEA technical review group.
The U.S. is prepared to satisfy all the reporting requirements under Code 10 of the US/IAEA Safeguards Agreement as soon as these Facility Attachments enter into force.
Notwithstanding, some unique aspects of Code 10 of the U. S.
agreement appear to be creating problems for the IAEA data processing system.
In particular, the U.S. method of reporting corrections to material accounting data is based on the concept that the inventory is changed as of the date of the recording of the change, whereas the IAEA concept is that the inventory is adjusted at the actual time of the change.
Accordingly, the IAEA desires infor-mation that enables them to identify the original report number and entry number that a correction applies to.
The U.S. is not providing this information specifi-cally, but, rather, in accordance with Code 10, the U.S. is providing other information that could be used by the IAEA to identify the report number and entry number of the corrected transaction.
However, this has proven to be cumber-scme for the IAEA, and we are currently examining the alternative means of pro-viding the report number and entry number as conventionally utilized in the IAEA information system.
In addition, Code 10 of the US/IAEA Safeguards Agreement permits up to 64 char-acter batch name reporting.
This appears to be incompatible with some of the established Code 10's which provide for an 8 character batch name, particularly when trying to match international transactions--shipper to receiver.
- Also, in conjunct. ion with matching international transactions, all shipping or receiving MBAs in the U.S. are not covered by the US/IAEA Safeguards Agreement; therefore, they have not been assigned an IAEA MBA code. We are currently examining alter-native means of solving or mitigating these problems.
A meeting to discuss the various proposed solutions is scheduled later this month in Vienna.
The U.S. will make every effort to arrive at solutions satisfactory to both the
. IAEA and the U.S.
NMMSS INFORMATION FLOW II R C DOE DOWSllC RIS COT S OtERIES M T. lYPE C0 1S i
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1AEA
ANNEX NMMSS SYe*~
"RACTERISTICS INTRODUCTION This Annex focuses on the design.
,) ment, and operational characteristics of the NM'4SS, anu also on the compuse.. ardware and software, communications networks, and human resources that m.de the NMMSS a central system.
Major changes in computer and comun4.:ations technology have occurred since the implementation of the NMMSS in I H4.
In each stage Cf the development and expansion of the system, the capabilities offered by new computer and communications equipment have been utilized, with plans for future capacities and needs taken under consideration.
In addition, the rapidly changing safeguards needs have necessitated signifi-cant budget increases for computer and comunications hardware to maintain continuous operations and reliable services.
COMPUTER H'ARDWARE The UCCND Computer Sciences Division operates three computer facilities in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Computer facilities at the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant (ORGDP) and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) are operated to provide access to and assistance with all aspects of scientific and business computer systems. A facility devoted to the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant is operated at that site.
The network of computer facilities is illustrated in Figure 1.
The NMMSS central data base is operated on the IBM 360/195 and IBM 370/155 computers at the CRGDP site. These computers are intercoupled, with the 370/155 designated as a main processor and the 360/195 designated as a combination main and support processor.
The 360/195 processor is equipped with 6 million bytes of core storage, and the 370/155 with 4 million. The 370/155 has a partition dedicated to the NMMSS. Approximately 1600 million bytes of NMMSS-dedicated disk storage capacity is also available.
COMPUTER SOFTWARE A library of more than 300 computer programs provides input processing, data base support, and data retrieval, and also performs the computational, analytical, and report generating functions. The programming languages used are COBOL, FORTRAN, and Assembler, with COBOL being the primary language.
All source-language programs are maintained directly on disk storage devices under the control of a source-program management software system. The programs are copied automatically on magnetic tape daily for backup protection. At weekly intervals, a tape copy is transferred to a remote storage in a secure vault at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant.
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UCCND COMPUTER SCIENCES DIVISION COMPUTER NETWORK I
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. The load modules, which are the compiled and assembled forms of the programs that are executed on the computers for the production processing operations, are also maintained on a disk library for optimum use of computer time.
COMMUNICATIONS Creatien of a comunications environment for timely flow of information has been a major element in the overall development plan for the system. No facilities for electrical transmission of nuclear materials data were avail-able when the system was first implemented. The problem was further complicated by the need to transmit both classified and unclassified information from many sites +roughout the country. Some of the major communications linkages and networ4s needed by the system are now installed and in regular use. As the process of est.1blishing direct interfaces with contractor and licensee facilities concinues, additional communications hardware will be installed to achieve the timeliness and response characteristics needed in the safeguary program.
Secure Automatic Communications Network (SACNET) - The DOE SAC'4ET is one of the major communications systems used for the flow of data and reports to and from the central data base. SACNET is a computerized system operating on a store-and-forward basis, with the switching center located at DOE-Germantown and the remote terminals located at the field offices and at many of the contractor locations.
Field office and contractor locations transmitting nuclear materials informa-tion to the central data base are shown in Figure 2.
Since SACNET is a secure-system, both unclassified and classified information (up to and including Secret Restricted Data) can be transmitted between or among locations in the network.
Computer Links - Direct links with remote terminals and other computer systems form another major ccmmunications system for exchanging information with the central data base. There are NRC, DOE and contractor linkages with the UCCND Computer Sciences Division computer facility at the ORGDP site. These are also secure links, operating through cryptographic equipment, for transmitting classified and unclassified information.
All of the links are routinely active for normal comunications with the central system except for the DOE-Germantown link which is activated only when the UCCND Computer Sciences Division's SACNET terminal is inoperable. Special switching equipment at the Oak Ridge and Germantown centers connect the SACNET circuit to the main computers to form an ad hoc link.
The DOE Division of Safeguards and Security currently dipends on the SACNET system and the ad hoc link for communications with the NMMSS data base. A com-puter terminal is '~ated at Germantown and a direct communications link with the UCCND Computer : lences Division computer center in Oa'K Ridge is available.
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Two one-way communications circuits are used to connect the unclassified ORNL facility with the classified ORGPD facility. However, information cannot flow in the reverse direction on either circuit. To maintain the security of the classified facility, a physical break exists in the communications circuit that transmits data from the classified ORGDP facility to tne classified ORNL facility.
When 00E and NRC completed arrangements for transmitting data from additional unclassified facilities to the NMMSS data base, the volume and frequency of data traffic exceeded the marginal capacity of the ORNL communications facilities available to the central system. Consequently, a communications terminal devoted mainly to the NMMSS unclassified data traffic has been established.
DEVELOPMENT OF DATA BASE SUBSYSTEMS As mentioned earlier, the data base is designed around logical categories of information. The four primary data systems and the eight background data systems are collectively called the data base, but individually they are referred to as the data subsystems in the data base structure. A data sub-system is identified by its data content, the data-base support programs, and the operations that update and maintain the information.
In addition to the data subsystems, a user subsystem also exists to provide information to organizations sharing the contents of the data base. This subsystem is identified by a set of computer programs that operate on the data base to supply information in any specific subject area for management or safeguards use.
Data Subsystems - The data subsistem files are designed to maintain informa-tion on direct-access, disk-storage devices that are on-line with the computer system. This design characteristic provides continuous availability of the information. All of the files required for quick-response processing of data streams and for priority monitoring and inquiries are maintained in the on-line mode. The less critical and historical files are maintained on disk and magnetic tape devices that are mounted and processed as needed.
The information received by the system is processed and put into the internal data files.
It is maintained in the form and detail received. A combination of programmed procedures and administrative controls on the data cycles secures the information for future reproducibility.
All file components of the data base are uniquely identified and individually maintained.
Specially developed software processes the incoming data, performs the editing and verification functions, and updates the internal files. Current data is processed into the file segments that span the logical intervals of time into the past to support the major usage requirements.
Information in the individual data categories is displaced into the historical file segments at strategic intervals.
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. Since a significant portion of the data is. classified, the data base is operated on a computer configuration with approved hardware, software, admin-istrative, and physical security for protection of the classified national security information. Access to the data base is. controlled and restricted to members of the development and operational service units.
Magnetic tape copies of all data files are maintained for backup protection.
In addition, tape copies of the individual files are created automatically at strategic intervals and transferred to remote storage in a secure vault at Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant.
User Subsystems - The data base exists only to serve the information needs of t 5 arganizations that use it.
For different organizations to effectively share a system, the data that must flow into the system to establish the mechanisms for contractor and licensee reporting must be defined. By defining the data, a strict definition of the data subsystems is established.
Implementation of each data subsystem has been accompanied by the development of computer
- programs to serve the different management and safeguards uses of the information.
In broadening the system to serve other needs, the develop-ment process usually involves the addition of data elements in the primary data systems, the addition of information in the background libraries, or the addition of another data category as a background library.
All of the software components are developed as modular units, with many basic retrieval, computational, and data transformation programs shared or adapted in the use of the data base to meet different user needs.
OPERATION The NMMSS Data Control Unit receives the incoming data, schedules and monitors the processi~ng services, performs the data error-correction functions, and distributes the reports produced by the system. Operation of the Data Control Unit is totally devoted to the servicing of the system.
Personnel are on duty during the hours of 7:45 a.m. through 10:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. The schedule is extended when needed to support the peak stages of the processing cycles.
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Information on shipments of nuclear materials and other types of inventory changes is processed daily. The inventory cycle is closed monthly for the government's production installations, and quarterly for all nuclear facilities.
Material balances are processed monthly, and a new twelve-year forecast is processed annually.
The Data Control Unit contacts the field organizations by telephone to perform the error-correction processing of data rejected in the input processing stages.
This procedure is a monitoring function to assure that action is taken on all of the rejected data. A second purpose is to correct and reenter the data promptly into the input stream.
I The data base is automatically updated as the incoming data is processed.
The Data Control Unit performs the closing operations for each of the monthly, quarterly, semiannual, and annual data cycles. The closing actions are the final error-resolution procedures, and the cycle checkpointing procedures that support the various accounting requirements and protect the data from
- unauthorized changes after closure'of the cycle.
Regularly scheduled reports are generated at the close of the data cycles and
. distributed to users by the available communications channels.
In addition, many user requirements are being met with-exception reports that are products of data scanning, monitoring, and analytical interpretations of the data.
Other reports are requested on a routine or a priority basis.
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t ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF THE CLEANUP 0F THE THREE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT The accident on March 28, 1979, at Three Mile Island Unit 2, damaged the reactor core and resulted in radioactive contamination in a number of areas within the plant.
It is recognized that the cleanup and decontamination of the plant is necessary for the long-term protection of public health and safety.
The scope of the cleanup is comprised of four fundamental activities:
decontamination of the reactor building and equipment; fuel removal and decon-tamination of the primary coolant system; treatment of radioactive liquids; and packaging, handling, storage and disposal of radioactive wastes.
Each of these activities contains in itself a number of major tasks.
For example, fuel removal would involve obtaining access to the fuel by the removal of the reactor vessel head and reactor components above the fuel, detailed inspection of the core, removal of loose debris and removal of fuel assemblies.
These activities may involve the use of special equipment and underwater cutting of machining operations.
Also, the fundamental cleanup activities are not independent of each other.
For instance, the decontamination of building and equipment would first require the cleanup of radioactive containments in the building atmosphere and liquids in the sump to minimize radiation doses to cleanup workers.
Building and equipment decontamination will, in itself, generate additional contaminated liquids that will require treatment.
Characterizing the cleanup situation is further complicated by the nunerous alternatives available for each cleanup task, having varying degrees of potential environmental impacts and effectiveness.
In March 1981, the NRC staff completed a programmatic environmental impact statement which is an overall environmental review of the various cleanup alternatives and the activiites necessary for the Icag-term protection of public health and safety at TMI. We reviewed all the feasible alternatives currently available for each cleanup task and estimated the potential environ-mental impacts.
For each alternative, we estimated potential radiation doses and health effects to the cleanup workers; radioactivity effluent releases to the environment; the potential radiation doses to individuals of the public and associated potential health effects to the population, both during normal cleanup operations and under postulated accident conditions.
Relative cost estimates of the feasible alternatives were included.
(No overall cost estimate on an absolute basis was done by NRC.) The staff also drew conclusions on the potential socio-economic and psychological impacts that could result from the cleanup operations.
The environmental statement was prepared with the assistance of Argonne National Laboratory and Pacific Northwest Laboratory and their sub-contracted consultants and the staff of the NRC's TMI Program Office, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards.
The draft statement was reviewed extensively by federal and local government agencies as well as special groups and the general public.
All the comments were considered and responded to and became part of the final statement.
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2 Nuclear Regulatory Commission has endorsed the statement and indicated that the NRC staff may act on each major cleanup activity if the activity and associated environmental impacts fall within the scope of those already assessed in the environmental statement.
The staff's major environmental conclusions in the statement are:
(1)- Full cleanup of the TMI-2 facility is necessary to reduce the potential for uncontrolled releases of radioactive materials to the environment.
(2) The damaged fuel and radioactive wastes have to be removed from the TMI site to ensure that the island does not become a permanent waste disposal site.
(3)
Existing methods are adequate, or can be suitably modified, to perform all of the necessary cleanup operations without incurring environmental impacts that exceed acceptable limits.
(4) The most significant_ environmental impact will result from the radiation doses received by the work force during cleanup.
The cumulative radiation dose to the entire work force was estimated to be in the range of 2000 to 8000 person-rem.
The associated potential health effect from this dose will be less than one additional cancer death and possibly two additional genetic effects in the descendants of the exposed workers, although zero health effects is not ruled out.
(5) The anticipated releases to the environment can be and must be controlled by criteria which are more restrictive than those of a normally operating reactor plant.
It is estimated that for the entire cleanup, the total body dose to the maximum exposed individual of the public will range from 0.8 to 2.3 mrem for gaseous effluents.
The corresponding increased risk of dying from cancer for that dose range is estimated at 1 in 2 million to 1 in 600,000.
The total cumulative dose which may be received by the entire population within a 50-mile radius of TMI due to the cleanup would range from 10 to 30 person-rem.
This is a small fraction, about 0.01%, of the l
background radiation dose received annually by the same population from l
causes other than releases from TMI.
The staff has concluded that the treatment of the contaminated accident-generated l
water to concentrate and immobilize the entrained radioactivity by an appropriate process is necessary for the safety of the public and cleanup workers. The con-centration of radionuclides remaining in the water after the processing and treatment will be sufficiently low such that it can be temporarily stored safely 1
on site.
The decision on the ultimate disposal of the processed water can be
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deferred.
Although the concentration of radionuclides in the processed water is small, the decision on the disposal of this water has to take into consideration the potential sccio-economic and psychological impacts of the various alternatives.
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3 The staff has concluded that packaging, handling, temporary storage and shipment of the raficactive wastes will not result in significant environmental effects.
Recently, the Department of Energy has proposed to the Congress a waste immobili-zation research and development program on the waste products that will result from the operation of the Submerged Demineralizer System which is being used to process the approximately 500,000 curies of radioactivity dispersed in the approximately 800,000 gallons of contaminated water in the reactor building sump and the primary coolant system.
This waste immobilization research and develop-ment program will include vitrificat1on in addition to other promising approaches.
Potential adverse market effects on residential properties in the vicinity of TMI have also been studied.
According to a recent NRC sponsored study on effects of the accident on property values and sales by the Institute for Research on Land and Water Resources of the Pennsylvania State University, the accident had no measurable effect, positive or adverse, on the residential properties within a 25-mile radius of the plant.
Psychological distress caused by the accident and operations necessary to proceed with the cleanup has declined.
However, a potential remains for temporary increases in distress as various cleanup activities are undertaken.
Both the socio-economic and psychological impacts can be mitigated by better informing the public about the cleanup operations and their relatively insignificant radiological impacts on the offsite environment.
For this reason the NRC staff has and will continue to keep the public informed on the current status and planned cleanup operations at TMI.
The staff has held or sponsored numerous public meetings with citizen organizations and interested individuals of the public.
In addition, the NRC TMI stie office issues a weekly status report, which is available to the public, on the current condition of the plant and informs on the progress of the cleanup activities.
A TMI-2 Advisory Panel, which involves local citizens, the scientific community and representatives of local government, has been set up to advise the NRC Commissioners.
This Panel holds periodic public meetings and makes recommendations to the Comrission throughout the cleanup at TMI. These efforts have helped to minimize individual stress in the TMI area.
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