ML20033A899
| ML20033A899 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek, Cooper, Arkansas Nuclear, River Bend, Waterford, South Texas, Comanche Peak, Fort Calhoun, Fort Saint Vrain  |
| Issue date: | 09/24/1981 |
| From: | Seyfrit K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT CO., GULF STATES UTILITIES CO., HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO., KANSAS GAS & ELECTRIC CO., LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO., NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT, OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT, PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF COLORADO, TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC) |
| References | |
| REF-SSINS-6835 NUDOCS 8111300125 | |
| Download: ML20033A899 (3) | |
Text
I&J Fl-M IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 81-29 Licensee _
Facility / Docket Number _
Arkansas Power and 1.19ht Company Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 & 2 Little Rock, Arkansas 50-313; 50-368 Nebraska Public Power District Cooper Nuclear Station Columbus Nebraska 50-298 Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station Omaha, Nebraska 50-285 Public Service Company of Colorado Fort St. Vrain Generating Station Denver, Colorado 50-267 s-Gulf States Utilities River Bend Beaumont Texas 50-458; 50-459 Houston Lighting & Power Company South Texas Project Houston, Texas 50-493; 50-499 Kansas Gas & Electric Company Wolf Creek Wichita, Kansas STN 50-482 j
Louisiana Power & Light Company Waterford-3 New Orleans, Louisiana 50-382 Texas Utilities Generating Company Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Dallas, Texas 50-445; 50-446 CYYl?f7 O C { /!f f
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UNITED STATES e
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REGION IV 411 RYAN PLAZA DRlVE, SulTE 1000 g,
%.....,e September 24, 1981 Gentlemen:
The enclosed Test Sumary Report numbers 1 through 10 sumarize infonnation received by NRC during the period from April 1 to August 31, 1981, regarding adverse results from equipment testing. NRC is disseminating these adverse test results to all nuclear power plant licensees and construction pennit holders for information. It should be noted that only the adverse test results that have come to the attention of NRC during this period are provided. Adverse test results obtained during the equipment development phase is not required to be reported to NRC. NRC does not intend to publish successful qualification test results except for equipment previously published as an adverse test result.
Those successful tests will only be published as they are voluntarily brought to the attention of NRC by industry.
You should review the enclosed information for p6:sible applicability to your facilities. No specific response to this information notice is required.
However, if the data is found to be applicable to your facilities, corrective actions and reporting to NRC may be required under the provisions of 10 CFR Part 50 or the reporting requirements of your license.
Questions regarding the details of the enclosed test summary reports should be directed either to the manufacturer of the component or the organization l
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2 that performed the testing (cognizant design and/or test agency).
Both ire listed on each report.
Sincerely,
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Karl V. Seyfri Director
Enclosures:
1.
IE Infonnation Notice No. 81-29 2.
List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices l
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i SSINS No.: 6835 Accession No.-
8103300414 IN 81-29 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 IE Information Notice No. 81-29 September 24, 1981 Page 1 of 11 EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION TESTING EXPERIENCE The following Test Summary Report numbers 1 through 10 summarize information received by NRC during the period from April 1 to August 31, 1981, regarding-adverse results from equipment testing.
It should be noted that only the adverse test results that have come to the attention of NE ' during this period are provided. Adverse test results obtained during the equipment development phase is not required to be reported to NRC. NRC does not intend to publish successful qualification test results except for equipment previously published as an adverse test result. Those successful tests will only be published as they are voluntarily brought.to the attention of NRC by industry.
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r IN 81-29 September 24, 1981 Page 2 of 11 Equipment Qualification Notice No. 1 - Test Summary Report No. 1 Equipment:
Limitorque Valve Operator, Type SMB, Size 00 Test Facility:
Limitorque Corporation Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency:
Westinghouse Electric Corporation Failed Component:
Valve Operator Drive Motor (manufactured by Reliance Electric Co.)
Type of Test:
Environmental Qualification of SMB Class Valve Operators per IEEE 323-1974 (Harsh Environment) and IEEE 382-1972 Description of Failure (s):
Failures 1 & 2 (Dates: 2/28/81 and 4/7/81)
Motors failed during attempted valve operator cycling 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> and 21 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br />, respectively, after initiation of steam spray during performance of the high-energy line break (HELB) accident profile.
Complete valve operators had been pre-aged in accordance with IEEE 323-1974.
Failure 3 (Date: 5/1/81)
Motor failed during attempted valve operator cycling 10 days after initiation of steam spray for HELB accident profile.
No pre-aging had been performed.
Failure Mode:
Failures were mechanis 'l (motor bearings) and electrical (stator
' winding).
There was evidence of steam and chemical flow-through in the motor.
Possible Corrective Action Considerations:
Motor modifications, test chamber design effect, environmental profile requirement review for possible reduction in maximum test temperature may be required for cerrective action.
i Generic Implications:
Similar units, including units in operation, have successfully passed environmental qualification in accordance with IEEE 323-1971 and earlier standards under less severe test conditions.
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IN 81-29 September 24, 1981-Page 3 of 11 Equipment Qualification Notice No. 2 - Test Summary Report No.1 Equipment:
ITT Barton Lot 4 Transmitters, Group A Test Facility: Westinghouse - Forest Hills Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Westinghouse Electric Corporation Failed Component: Not-determined Type of Test: Environmental Qualification of ITT Barton Lot 4 Transmitters, Group A (3 Pressure and 3 Differential Pressure Transmitters Tested, 4/6/81 through 4/27/81)
Description of Failure (s):
1.
Two DP transmitters exhibited noisy output followed by erroneous output during second temperature rainp of the HELB accident profile. Output returneo to normal over the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, but the failure recurred at end of post-accident period on one unit.
2.
One pressure transmitter exhibited noise and erroneous output for forty miautes during the second temperature ramp of HELB accident profile.
Its output then returned to normal for the remainder of the test.
Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Manufacturer is investiq: ting the failures, concentrating on aging methodology, test settp, and duplicating test conditions to establish failure mechanisms.
Generic Implications: Units are identical to Lot 2 units that have successfully passed environmental qualification in accordance with IEEE 323-1971.
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IN 81-29 September 24, 1981 Page 4 of 11 Equipment Qualification Notice No. 3 - Test ' Summary Report No. 1 Equipment:
D. G. O'Brien Electrical Penetration Assembly, Model K Connectors Test Facility:
Sandia National Laboratories / Division 4445 Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency:
NRC/RES, IF Failed Component:
Conductors shorted at connector Type of Test:
Simulated LOCA Environmental Test to Examine Methodology Description of Failure (s): The grommet used in the connector expanded as the result of exposure to high aging and loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) environmental temperatures.
The extrusion of the grommet sealing material stripped insulation from the conductors resulting in electrical grounding during the steam / chemical spray test conditions.
(See also IE Information Notica e'-20.';
Failure Mode:
Insulation was removed as a result of the force of the expanding grommet material.
Connector assemblies were retightened prior and subsequent to thermal aging.
This process contributed to the failure.
Possible Corrective Action Considerations:
Additional testing of the connector is being performed by Duke Power Company and will be reviewed by NRC.
No additional testing will be performed by NRC on the electrical penetration assembly.
Generic Implications:
Application of Model K conriectors is limited to the Catawba, McGuire and Yankee Rowe facilities.
Qualificatica tests to earlier standards were successfully performed by Duke Power and D. G. O'Brien on the Mode' K connectors for the McGuire plant.
(See IE Information Notice 61-20 for more detailed information regarding earlier qualification.)
IN 81-29 September 24, 1981 Page 5 of 11 Equipment Qualification Notice No. 4 - Test Summary Report No.1 Equipment:
Dresser Safety Valve, Model 31709NA Test Facility:
Combustion Lngineering (CE)
Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency:
Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI)
Failed Component:
Not identified Type of Test:
Performance Testing for Pressurized Water Reactur (PWR) Relief a.id Safety Valves Description of Failure (s):
On June 3, 1981, a full pressure steam test was performed on the subject safety valve.
During the test, the valve did not close at the predetermined pressure cnd reopened at a pressure below the original set point after the valve had closed.
The valve did not meet EPRI's safety valve screening criteria.
Failure Mode:
Disassembly of the valve disclosed galling of guiding surfaces and damaged internal parts.
Possible Corrective Action Considerations:
Undergoing evaluation.
Generic Implications:
EPRI advises the following: (1) no operating plant has this valve installed; and (2) the following unlicensed plants plan to utilize them--Bellefonte 1 & 2; Cherokee 1, 2, 3; Palo Verde 1, 2, 3; Perkins 1, 2, 3; and WPPSS 1 & 4.
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IN 81-29 N'
September 24, 1981 Page 6 of 11 Equipment Qualification Notice No. 5 - Test Summary Report No.1 Equipment: Dresser Safety Valve, Model 31739A Test Facility:
Combustion Engineering Cognizant Des;gn and/or Test Agency:
Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI)
Failed Component:
Not determined Type of Test:
Performance Testing for PWR Relief and Safety Valves Description of Failure (s):
On June 25, 1981, a high ramp rate, high back presrure steam test was performed on the subject valve.
During the test, rated flow was not achieved.
The valve did not meet the EPRI valve screening criteria.
Failure Mode:
Not determined Possible Corrective Action Considerations:
Continue testing and data evaluation.
Generic Implications:
EPRI advises the following:
the Dresser 31739A safety valve is being used or will be used on the following plants--Calvert Cliffs 1 & 2; Palisades, Midland 1 & 2; Oconee 1, 2, & 3; Crystal River 3; THI-1; and Millstone 2.
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IN 81-29 September 24, 1981 Page 7 of 11 Equipment Qualification Notice No. 6 - Test Summary Report No.1 Equipment: Dresser Power-Operated Relief Valve (PORK, Model No. 31533VX-30 Test Facility:
Wyle Laboratories 4
Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency:
Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI)
Failed Component: Not determined Type of Test:
EPRI/PWR Safety and Relief Valve Test Program Description of Failure (s):
On May 19 and 20, 1981, a full pressure water seal simulatior test was performed.
On May 20, 1981, full pressure steam and full pressure water seal simulation tests were performed on the subject valve.
During the water tests, the valve remained open for 2 seconds (5/19/81) and 75 seconds (5/20/81) after receipt of a closure signal.
The valve did not meet the EPRI screening criteria (failure to close on demand).
Failure Mode: Not determined.
Disassembly and inspection did not reveal damage that might affect the ability of the valve to open or close on demand.
Possible Corrective Action Considerations:
Continue testing and data evaluation.
Generic Implications:
Information indicates the valve is to be installed in CE and B&W PWRs.
Fort Calhoun has loop seals upstream of Dresser PORVs.
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IN 81-29 September 24, 1981 Page 8 of 11 Equipment Qualification Notice No. 7 - Test Sums.ary Report No. 1 Equipment: Target Rock Power-Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Mode 80X-006-1 Test Facility:
Wyle Laboratories Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency:
Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI)
Failed Component:
Not determined Type of Test:
EPRI/PWR Safety and Relief Valve Test Program Description of Failure (s):
On April 29, 1981, a full pressure (2500 psi) loop seal simulation test was performed on the subject valve.
During the water test, the valve remained open for 12 seconds upon deenergizing the valve for closure, and then closed.
The valve did not pass EPRI's screening criteria.
Failure Mode:
Not determined.
Disassembly did not reveal any damage that would affect future testing.
1 Possible Corrective Action Considerations:
Continue testing and data evaluation.
Generic Implications:
Information indicates that there are presently no valves of this design in operat ing plants but they are planned for use in some plants under construction.
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IN 81-29 September 24, 1981 Page.9 of 11 Equipment Qualification Notice No. 8 - Test Summary Report No. 1 Equipment:
Control Components Inc. (CCI) PORV Test Facility: Wyle Laboratories Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency:
Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI)
Failed Component: Not determined Type of Test:
EPRI/PWR Safety and Relief Valve Program t
Description of Failure (s):
On July 1 and 2, 1981, during steam tests utilizing spring force only for valve closure, valve remained open for approximately 3 seconds prior to closure.
The valve did not pass EPRI's screening criteria.
Failure Mode:
Not determined Possible Corrective Action Considerations:
Continue testing and data evaluation.
Generic Implications:
Information indicates that the CCI PORV is being used or will be used on McGuire 1 & 2 and Catawba 1 & 2.
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IN 81-29 September 24, 1981 Page 10 of 11 Equipment Qualification Noth.e No. 9 - Test Summary Repoit No.1 Equipment:
Crosby Safety Valve 3K6 Test Facility:
Comhustion Engineering C_ognizant Design and/or Test Agency:
Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI)
Failed Component: Not determined Type of Test:
Steam, Low and High Ramp Rate, High Back Pressure Test Description of Failure (s):
8/11/81 - Shortly after test initiation the valve experienced oscillations (chattering).
8/13/81 - During steam test, performed at low and high ramp rates, valve closed at a pressure lower than the EPRI blowdown criteria of 2250 psia (approx. 2210 psia).
l 8/7/81 - Valve oscillated during set point check using air assist devices.
Failure Mode:
Not determined Possible Corrective Action Considerations:
Not determined Generic Implications:
Information indicates that the Crosby Safety Valve 3K6 is being used or will be used on St. Lucie 1 & 2 and Fort Calhoun.
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IN 81-29 September 24, 1981 Page 11 of 11 Equipment Qualification Notice No. 10 - Test Summary Report No. 1 Equipment:
ASCO Soleroid Valves Test Facility:
ASCG/Isomedix, Inc./Wyle Laboratories Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Automatic Switch Co. (ASCO)
Failed Component:
Viton Elastomer Seals in NP 8300 Series Valves Type of Test:
Radiation Simulation for Design Basis Event (DBE)
Descr.ntion of Failure (s):
Recent radiation simulation tests resulted in failure of the valves to shift position.
The Viton seals break down when submitted to gamma radiation exposure ir excess of 20 megarads, adhere to the brass surfaces, and prevent solenoid operation.
Failure Mode:
Solenoid valve will not shift position upon receipt of an operating signal.
Possible Corrective Action Considerations:
Replace Viton Elastomers with Ethylene Propylene Elastomers on valves required to operate under accident conditions following a DBE. [ Note: Ethylene Propylene Elastomers do not break down when exposed to postulattd normal service plus DBE gamma radiation dose rates.
IE Information Notice 80-11 addressed replacement of Ethylene Propylene Elastomers with Viton Elastomers because of failures resulting from inadvertent oil entrainment.]
Generic Implications:
All ASCO Valves Series NP 8300 with Viton Elastomers used in Class 1E circuis' and are exposed to gamma radiation in excess of 20 megarads.
Additional information will be issued following receipt of the vendors final test report.
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IE Information Notice No. 81-29 September 24, 1981 LISTING OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFlRMATION NOTICES Date Issued To Infonnation Subject Issued Notice No.
Potential Loss of Direct 7/21/81 All power reactor holding an Operating 81-21 Access to Ultimate Heat License (0L) or Construction Sink Permit (CP)
Section 235 and 236 7/31/81 All power research reactor, fuel fabrication and repro-31-22 Amendments to the cessing, and spent fuel Atomic Energy Act storage licensees and of 1954 applicants Fuel Assembly Damaged 8/4/81 All power reactor facilities with an 81-23 due to Improper Pos:tioning Operating License (0L) of Handling Equipment or Construction Permit (CP) 81-24 Auxiliary Feed Pump 8/5/81 All power reactor facilities with an Turbine Bearing Failures Operating License (0L) or Construction Permit (CP) 81-25 Open Equalizing Valve 8/24/81 All power reactor facilities with an of Differential Pressure Operating License (0L)
Transmitter Causes Reactor or Construction Permit (CP)
Scram and Loss of Redundant Safety Signals.
81-26 Compilation of Health 8/28/81 All power reactor facilities with an Operating License Physics Related Information (0L) or Construction Pennit Items (CP) 81-27 Flanmable Gas Mixtures 9/3/81 All power reactor facilitief with an Operating License in the Waste Gas Decay (0L) or Construction Permit Tanks in PWR Plants (CP)
Failure of Rockwell-Edward 9/3/81 All power reactor facilities with an Operating License 81-28 Main Steam Isolation Valves (0L) or Construction Permit (CP)
Enclosure