ML20033A221
| ML20033A221 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 10/31/1981 |
| From: | Vanderbeek R EG&G, INC. |
| To: | Scholl R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| CON-FIN-A-6425, TASK-06-07.A3, TASK-6-7.A3, TASK-RR EGG-EA-5602, NUDOCS 8111240929 | |
| Download: ML20033A221 (11) | |
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j EGG-EA-5602 kSs t3fane e ftfer,j OCTOBER 1981 Of SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM TOPIC VI-7.A.3, M
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:f' This is an informal report intended for use as a preliminary or working document 4
Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission g
Under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-76ID01570 g g g g,,,,,
FIN No. A6425 YD 8111240929 811031 PDR RES O
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FORM EG&G300 (Rev.1179)
INTERIM REPORT Accession No.
Report No. EGG-EA-5602
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Contract Program or Project
Title:
Electrical, Instrumentation, and Control Systems Support for the Systematic Evaluation Progres (III)
Subject of this Document:
Systematic Evaluation Program Topic VI-7.A.3, ECCS Actt,ation System, Palisades Nuclear Power Plant Type of Document:
Informal Report Author (s):
R. VanderBeek Date of Document:
October 1981 Responsible NRC Individual and NRC Office or Division:
Ray F. Scholl, Jr., Division Of Licensing This docu ment was prepared primarily for preliminary or internat use. it has not received full review and approval. Since there may be substantive changes, this document should not be considered final.
EG&G Idaho, Inc.
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415 Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
Under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-761D01570 NRC FIN No.
A6425 INTERIM REPORT
OS58J u
e SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM-
. TOPIC VI-7.A.3' ECCS ACTUATION SYSTEM i
l PALISADES NUCLEAR POWER' PLANT l
Docket No. 50-255 t
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October l'981 1
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R. VanderBeek
-EG&G Idaho, Inc.
9-17-81' 1
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4 ABSTRACT This'SEP technical _ evaluation, for the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant, reviews the scope and frequency of periodic testing of the emergency core-
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cooling system and compares the required testing against current licensing criteria.
FOREWORD This report is supplied as pa'rt o'f the " Electrical, Instrumentation, and Control Systems Support for the Systematic Evaluation Program,(II)"
being conducted for the.U.S.: Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of-Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Licensing by EG&G Idaho, Inc.,
Reliability & Statisitics Branch.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission funded the work under the authorization B&R 20-10-02-05 FIN A6425.
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CONTENTS
1.0 INTRODUCTION
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2.0 CRITERIA........................................................
1 3.0 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM.........................................
2 3.1 Description................................................
2 3.2
' Evaluation................................................
3 4.0 SAFETY INJECTION RECIRCULATION ACTUATION SYSTEM.................
4' 4.1 i
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.Descr pt on...............................................
4 4.2 Evaluation.................................................
5 5.0
SUMMARY
5 6.0 REF'ERENCES......................................................
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SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PR' GRAM 0
TOPIC VI-7.A.3 ECCS ACTUATION SYSTEM PALISADES NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
1.0 INTRODUCTION
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The objective of this review is'to. determine if all' Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) components, including pumps and valves, are included in component and system tests, if the scope and frequency of periodic test-ing are identified, and if the test program meets current. licensing.cri-teria. The systems included in the ECCS are the Safety andtheSafetyInjectionRecirculationActuationSystem.{njectionSystem 2.0 CRITERIA General Design Criterion 37 (GDC 37), " Testing of Emergency Core Cool-ing Systems," requires that:
The ECCS be designed to permit. appropriate periodic. pressure and func-tional testing to assure the operability of the system ~as a whole'and to verify, under conditions as close to design as practical.the per-formance of the full operational sequence that brings the system:into operation, including' operation of applicable portions of the protection system,thetransferbetweennormalandemergencypowgrsources,and the operation of'the associated cooling water system.
Branch. Technical Position ICSB 25, " Guidance for the Interpretation of GDC 37 for Testing the Operability of the Emergency Core Cooling System as a Whole," states that:
All ECCS pumps'should be included in the system test.3 ReSulatory Guide 1.22, " Periodic Testing of the Protection System Actu-ation Functions," states, in Section 0.1.a. that:
The periodic tests should duplicate, as closely as practicable, the performanceghatisrequiredoftheactuationdevicesintheeventof an accident.
Standard Review Plan, Section 7.3,' Appendix A, "U'se of IEEE Stan-dard 279 in the Review of the ESFAS and Instrumentation and Controls of Essential Auxiliary Supporting Systems," states, in Section ll.b, that:
Periodic testing should duplicate, as closely as practical, the inte-grated performance from the ESFAS systems and tneir essential auxiliary supporting systems.
If such a " system level" test can be performed only during shutdown, the testing done during power operation must be r
reviewed in detail. Check that " overlapping" tests do, in fact, over-lap from one test segment to another. For example, closing a circuit 1
breakerwiththemanualbreakercontrolswitchmaygotbeadequateto test the ability of the ESFA5 to close the breaker.
Regulatory Guide 1.22 states, in Section D.4, that:
Where actuated equipment is not tested during reactor operation, it should be shown that:
1.
There is no practical system design tnat would permit operation of the actuated equipment without adversely affecting the safety or operability of the plant.
2.
The probability that the protection system will fail to initiate the operation of the actuated equipment is, and can be maintained, acceptably low without testing ti;:: actuated equipment during reactor operation.
3.
The actuated gquipment c.a be routinely tested when the reactor is shut down.
3.0 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM 3.1 Description. The Safety Injection System was originally designed to prevent fuel and cladding damage that could interfere with adequate emergency core cooling and to limit the cladding-water reaction to less than approximately one percent for all break sizes in the primary system piping, up to and including the double-ended rupture of the largest primary coolant pipe, for any break location, and for the applicable break time.
The Safety Injection System when actuated, causes a rapid injection of large quantities of borated water into the primary coolant system, provid-ing rapid cooldown and the added shutdown capability needed when a rupture of a main steam line occurs. The system aise provides the function of removing heat from the primary coolant system for normal reactor cooldown and maintaining a suitable temperature for refueling and mainte,ance. The Safety Injection System consists of (a) Safety Injection and Refueling Water Tank; (b) Low-Pressure Safety Injection Pumps; (c) High-Pressure Safety Injection Pumps; and (d) Safety Injection Tanks. These components are described as follows.
(a) The Safety Injection and Refueling Water Tank. The Safety Injec-tion and Refueling Water Tank contains approximately 250,000 gai-lons of water containing 1,720 ppm boron. This is sufficient boron concentration to provide a 5% shutdown margin with all control rods withdrawn and a new core at a temperature of 60*F.
This is sufficient water to fill the refueling cavity. During safety injection with all injection pumps and containment spray pumps running, the tank will provide approximately 20 minutes of water supply before the pump suction must be switched to the containment sump. The tank is equipped with two separate full-capacity screened outlets which are arranged to prevent simul-taneous plugging.
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(b) Low-Pressure Safety Injection Pumps. The low-pressure safety injection pumps are used to inject large quantities of borated' water into the primary coolant system. They are also used to circulate primary coolant during shutdown to remove residual and decay heat. There'are two pumps, each of.which can circulate sufficient water to keep--the. temperature rise-through the core to less than the full power value with the reactor shut down at the' end of core life.
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(c) High-Pressure Safety Injection Pumps. Three high-pressure safety injection pumps inject borated water'at high pressure into the primary coolant system during emergency conditions.- The pumps are sized to ensure that, following~the rapid depressurization of the primary coolant system and recovering of the core by the safety injection tanks, one high-pressure pump will keep the core covered with a 20% spillage allowance when the recirculation mode starts.
(d) Safety Injection Tanks. Four safety' injection tanks are used to' flood the core with borated water following_a'depressurization of the primary coolant system. The tanks are sized to ensure that three-out-of-four tanks will provide sufficient water to recover the core following a design basis accident.
3.2 Evaluation. Safety injection is automatically initiated upon receipt of a safety injection signal from the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Systems.*
Since the ESF equipment being initiated varies according to whether power is available.from the standby source or the diesel generator, a mode selector switch is provided so that either the normal shutdown or the design base accident portions of the circuit can be. tested separately.
Individual momentary type pushbuttons are provided to' simulate the Safety Injection System in each of the redundant control circuits. The test is in progress only as long as the pushbutton is depressed. Releasing this push ~
button during a test will automatically reset the' Safety Injection System or design base accident sequence relays.
Testing in the "without standby power" mode does not initiate bus load shedding with standby voltage available. After a test, the solenoid-cperated valves will reset automatically. Other equipment that is initiated will continue until it is shut down manually, i
Testing of major portions of the ESF control circuits can be accomplished while the plant is at power. More extensive circuit sequence and load test-ing may be done with the reactor shut down. The test circuits are designed to test the redundant circuits separately so that the correct operation of each circuit may be verified either by equipment operation or by sequence lights. The test circuit design is such that, should an accident occur v
while testing is in. progress, the test will not interfere with initiation of the sofeguards equipment required.
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The system testing of the safety injection pumps and valves begins when the momentary pushbutton switches are depressed, which simulate the Safety Injection System. An alternate method of beginning the test is to trip the two-out-of-four pressurizer low-pressure devices in the initiating circuit matrix at power or shutdown. The bus shedding and the actual sequence loading of the emergency generators can be tested by simulating the loss of standby power.
The system test is considered satisfactory by the licensee if control board indication and visual observations indicate that all components have received the safety injection signal in tne proper sequence and timing i.e., the appropriate pump breakers shall have opened and closed, and all valves shall have completed their travel.
The safety injection pumps are started at intervals not to exceed tnree months. Alternate manual starting between control room console and the C-33 panel are practiced in the test program. During reactor operation, the instrumentation which is necessary to initiate saicty injection is checked daily; the initiating circuits are tested monthly.
In addition, the active components (pumps and valves) are tested every three months to check the operation of the starting cirucits and to verify that the pumps are in satisfactory running order. The test interval of three months is based on the judgment of the licensee that more frequent testing would not significantly increase the reliability (i.e., the probability that the component would operate when required), and that more frequent testing would result in increased wear over a long period of time.
The safety injection tanks are a passive safety feature. In accordance with the specifications, the water volume and pressure in the safety injec-tion tank-are checked periodically during operation. Each safety inJec-tion tanx nas two check valves in series between the tank nozzle and the primary coolant system. The pressure control system between the check valves is also used to test the check valves. The check valve nearest the tank may be tested by opening the pressure control valve. As the pressure between the check valves decreases, the valve will open under the influence of tank pressure.
Basedontheevaluagionofthefinalsafetyanalysisreport,I the and the existing test procedures for the Safety technical specifications Injection System, the system testing does conform to the present criteria for reactor licensing.
4.0 SAFETY INJECTION RECIRCULATION ACTUATION SYSTEM.
4.1 Description. The Safety injection Recirculation Actuation System is designeT to automatically transfer the safety injection pump suction from the Sauty Injection and Refueling Water tank to the containment sump water supply, establishing a recirculation flow from the containment sump via the high-pressure safety injection pumps.
When a safety injection signal is initiated by the engineered safe-guards control system, borated water at a minimum concentration of 1720 ppm boron is initially pumped from the Safety Injection and Refueling Water 4
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tank to the pr_imary coolant system. -When theLSafety Injection and Refueling 7
Water tank level drops below a preset level,-the Safety Injection Recircula-tion Actuation System is actuated and pumps suction is then automatically transfered to the containment sump.; At this. time, the flow. path from.the-
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containment sump is opened, the Safety Injection and Refueling Water' tank flow path is closed, the low-pressure safety injection' pumps are stopped.-
- and water is recirculated from.the sump by the high pressure pumps. Water-from the containment sump'is.also circulated by the containment;sprayLpumpsi 1
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and cooled _by _the shutdown cooling heat exchangers. A; portion 'of. the '
cooled water may be directed,:by operator action, to the suction' of the' high-pressure safety injection pumps.; This will provide cooling water to the core below the saturation conditions existing inside containment.
_4.2 Evaluation'.c Review of the-final safety analysis.reportland'the
-technical-specifications of Palisades indicates that no' specific require.
ment.for_ testing of the Safety Injection Recirculation Actuation System-is-required. With-no testing requirements for,the Safety _. Injection Recircula,
tion Actuation System, the system does not meet the current licensing, criteria.
5.0
SUMMARY
The review of the referenced material has determined the.fol' lowing-in regard to the Palisades Emergency-Core Cooling System testing and test--
ability.
(1)- The Safety Injection System meets the current crit'eriifor test-ability during reactor operation.
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(2) The Safety Injection Recirculation Actuation System does not meet the current criteria for testability during reactor opertation.-
6.0 REFERENCES
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1.
Consumer Power Lompany, Palisades Final Safety-Analysis-Report.(22 Jan 1974, Amendment No. 28).
i' 2.
GeneralDesignCriterion37,."Testingof-EmergencyCoreCoolingSys-l-
tem," of Appendix A,'" General Design Criter.a for Nuclear. Power.
Plants," 10 CFR Part 50, "Domest.ic. Licensing of Production and Utili-zation' Facilities."
i-3.
Branch Technical Position ICSB 25, " Guidance for the' Interpretation of-4 GDC 37 for Testing the Operability of theLEmergency Core Cooling Sys-tem as a Whole."
4.
Regulatory Guide 1.22, " Periodic Test bg cf the Protection. System Actuation Functions."
5.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Standard Review Plan, Section 7.3, 4-Appendix A, "Use'of IEEE Standard 279 in the Review of the ESFAS and Instrumentation and-Controls of Essential Auxiliary-Supporting.Sys-tems."
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6.
Consumer Power Company. Palisades Technical Specifications (June 20 1978 -Amendment No.'41).
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