ML20032D108

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Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in IE Insp Rept 50-219/81-16.Corrective Actions:Meeting Held Between Plant Operations Mgt & Operators to Review Surveillance Performance Procedure
ML20032D108
Person / Time
Site: Oyster Creek
Issue date: 10/26/1981
From: Phyllis Clark
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Kemig R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20032D101 List:
References
NUDOCS 8111130394
Download: ML20032D108 (5)


Text

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION h

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(609)693-6000 P.O BOX 388

  • FORKED RIVER
  • 08731 October 26, 1981 Mr. R. R. Keimig, Olief Projects Branch #2 Division of Resident and Project Inspection U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Mr. Kei1Tig:

Subject:

Oyster Creek Nucle 1r Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 Inspection Report 81-16

'Ihis letter is subnitted in response to your letter of Septater 25, 1981, regarding the findings of the August 4 - Septarber 14, 1981, routine inspection by Mr. J. 'Ihanas.

Enclosed are our responses to the violations.

If there are any questions regarding the enclosed infornntion, please contact me or Mr. Michael Iaggart of my staff at (609) 693-6932.

Very truly yours, y

e Philip R./ Clark Vice President - Nuclear Jersey Central Power & Light Co.

Executive Vice President -

GPU Nuclear Sworn to and subscribed to before me this

  1. -4<I day of

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1981.

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Notary Public PPC:PFC:lse FilVLUS A. KABIS ACTAkY EU UC OF NEW JER$gy MY Commission Expires Aug. 16,1984 enclofure 8111130394 811105 PDR ADOCK 05000219 0

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.Mr. R. R. Keimig Page 2 Octr b r 26, 1981 cc: Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Camission Washington,'D.C.

20555 NBC Resident Inspector Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Forked River, NJ 08731

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Response to Inspection No. 50-219/81-16 The following information provides a response to the " Notice of Violation" contained in the U.S. NRC letter dated September 25, 1981.

~ Violation A:

Technical Specification 6.13.1 states in part, "An individual permitted to enter (a High Radiation Area) shall be provided with... a.

A radiation monitoring device which continuously indicates the radiation dose rate in the area.

b.

A radiation monitoring device which continuously integrates the radiation dose rate in the area and alarms when a pre-set incegrated dose is received.

... (or) c.

A health physics qualified individual...

with a radiation dose rate monitoring device who is responsible fo-providing positive exposure control...."

Contrary to the above, at about 2:30 p.m. on August 18, 1981, an individual entered a high radiation area (500 mrem per hour maximum) on the 75 foot elevation of the reactor building while observed by a health -

physics qualified individual.

Neither individual was provided with a device to continuously monitor the radiation dose rate, continuously integrate the dose rate and alarm at a pre-set integrated dose or any other means of insuring positive exposure control.

This is a Severity Level IV Violatica (Supplement IV.D.)

Re sponse:

The Operations Department individual who had entered the high radiation area was directed by the radiological control technician to exit that area immediately af ter the inspector pointed out that there was no means of monitoring the dose rate. A subsequent critique of the incident detennined that both the radiological control technician and the individual who had entered the high radiation area were familiar with Technical Specification 6.13.1 requirements for entering high radiation areas as a result of the General Employee Training Program. Both individuals involved were disciplined.

The incident was reviewed with Operations personnel at regularly scheduled weekly training sessions and with radiological controls personnel at their weekly scheduled training session.

No additional corrective steps are planned.

Full compliance was achieved on August 18, 1981.

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P:gn 2 Violation B:

Technical Specification 6.8.1 states in part, " Written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained...."

Procedure 106, revision 18 dated August 4,1981, " Conduct of Operations",

Section 4.2.1 states in part, " Station procedures shall be followed at all times..."

Procedure 610.3.005, revision 11, dated May 12,1981, " Core Spray System Instrument Channel Calibration and Test", states in part, "6.2.1.a.

Shut discharge valve V-20-12 and open its supply breaker 6.2.1.b.

Open the supply breakers for V-20-15 and V-20-40...."

Contrary to the above on September 3,1981, while performing surveillance procedure 610.3.005 procedural steps were improperly performed in that the supply breaker for V-20-12 was not opened and V-20-15 and V-20-40 were opened rather than the supply breakers for V-20-15 and V-20-40.

This caused automatic opening of V-20-12 and subsequent injection of chromated water from the core spray system into the reactor.

This is a Severity Level V Violation (Supplement I.E.)

Re sponse :

As stated in the violation there were two problems in the implementation of the subject surveillance procedure. This incident was identified and investigated by Plant Operations Management within the same day of the occurrence.

The conclusion of the investigation showed the main causes to be:

1.

Poor communication between the Control Room and the Equipment Operator assigned to perform the in-plant supply breaker alignment and inadequate review of the equipment operator duties with regard to the Core Spray Test.

2.

Failure to adhere to the words of the procedure.

The Control Room Operator misread the words of the procedure and did not complete a step before proceeding to the next step.

A meeting was held between Plant Operations Management and the operators involved in this procedure at which time the incident and causes were discussed. The importance of communication and procedure adherence were stressed with the operators and an operational event report listing the event, description, cause, corrective action, and

" Lesson Learned" was written and disseminated to all operators as required reading. As a f ollow-up, all core spray system surveillance procedures in addition to the subject procedure will be reviewed and revised as necessary to reduce the chance of misreading the procedural steps.

a.

Pagn 3 l

The subject inspection' repcrt stated the immediate corrective action was to restore the valve lineup and satisfactorily complete the surveillance procedure.- This corrective action achieved full compliance.

Core Spray Surveillance on pumps, valves, and[instrumenation is performed on a routine basis in accordance with Technical Specifications at Oyster Creek.

An event of this type has not been identified to have occurred in the past. operational history of the plant. For this reason, and the fact that compliance with surveillance procedures has not been a concern, we are addressing this as an isolated event. From a generic standpoint, Plant Management is stressing strict ' procedural compliance and are incorporating this requirement in specific detail in the Conduct of Operations _ procedure.

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