ML20032B382
| ML20032B382 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 05/18/1981 |
| From: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | Mark J Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20032B379 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8111050489 | |
| Download: ML20032B382 (2) | |
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UNITED STATES
[ps arcg, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON
'y ri WASHIN iTON, D. C. 20555
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..,,e MEMORANDUM FOR:
J. C. Mark, Chairman Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards FROM:
William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
EMERGENCY PLANNING AT NUCLEAR FACILITIES DURING AND FOLLOWING NATURAL EVENTS Your memorandum of March 16, 1981 recommended that the NRC staff give fu: ther consideration to the development of emergency plans and the operability of equipment needed to deal with nuclear emergencies which result from natural disturbances such as earthquakes.
You also advised that FEMA be requested to review the capabilities of local emergency and disaster organizations to cope with multiple emergencies as might result from a major earthquake followed closely by an accident at a nuclear power plant.
In a memorandum dated November 3,1980, Brian Grin,es, NRC, had requested John McConnell, FEMA, to review tha State and le:al planning efforts for the areas around California nuclear power plant sites with respect to earthquakes i
and around the Trojan site with respect to volcanic phenomena and how these i
can best be addressed in the planning process.
FEMA has directed the appropriate
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FEMA regional offices to take such factors into account in their review of offsite preparedness.
In letters from Robert Tedesco, NRC, to licensees and applicants for nuclear power plants in California, the licensees and applicants were requested to revise emergency plans to include description of potential complicating factors which might be caused by earthquakes which either initiate or follow the initiation of accidents, and the provisions and procedures for coping with such events. The California licensees have informed the NRC staff that results of their studies should be completed by June 1981, and will be incorporated into their site emergency plans, and will also be offered to State and local authorities for inclusion into State and local emergency plans.
We would expect that California licensees will need to show that comunications to offsite authorities are available after moderate earthquakes and that means to augment ststion staff, assuming roads are disrupted, are available.
In such cases an alert condition within the plant because of j
effects on tion-safety equipment might be warranted.
An arrangement for feedback of offsite conditions to the plant therefore would be appropriato to assist the lictnsee in making optimum protective action recommendations.
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s J. C. Mark.
With respect to plants other than those discussed above, we have considered the impact of natural events such as earthquakes in regard to emergency preparedness associated with nuclear power plants. The current criteria for evaluation of emergency preparedness were developed to cover a wide range of events. Specifically, evacuation time estimates are required to consider adverse conditions which night reasonably be expected to occur during the plant lifetime. We have concluded that additional requirements, such as the design of additional facilities, structures, and systems to spacifically withstand earthquakes are not necessary.
In particular, no special seismic design of public notification systems, environmental monitoring capability or cocrunications equipment is contemplated. A seismic event coincident with a significant accident at the plant is of very low likelihood.
In addition, ooderate seismic events would likely create a scenario in which events slowly develop prior to the occurrence of a radioactive release.
Sufficient time would be available for existing backup or alternate means of notification and monitoring to be effective. Except in California, these earthquakes are not significant enough in magnitude and frequency to warrant special considerations in the review of emergency preparedness.
We agree with the Comittee's coment with regard to exercises and will consider the occasional use of earthquake-induced failures of non-safety equipment as an initiating event for an exercise.
Subsequent failures of safety equipment would need to be postulated to provide a significant release scenario.
(Signcd)Ml;ian J.DirtU William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
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cc: Chairman Hendrie Comissioner Gilinsky Comissioner Bradford Comissioner Ahearne S. Chilk H. Denton V. Stello n.
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V
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SUITE 202, WALNUT CREEK PLAZA WALNUT CREEK. CALIFORNIA 94596 o.,,e October 7, 1981 Docket Nos.
50-275 50-323 Pacific Gas and Electric Company P.O. Box 7442 San Francisco, California 94106 Attention:
Mr. Philip A. Crane, Jr.
Assistant General Counsel Gentlemen:
Subject:
NRC Inspection - Diablo Canyon Units 1, 2 This refers to the inspection conducted by Mr. D. M. Kunihiro, Team Leader, and other NRC team members on August 19, 1981 of activities authorized by NRC Lvnstruction Permit Nos. CPPR-39 and CPPR-69 and to the discussion of our findings held by Mr. Kunihiro with Mr. Jim Shiffer and other members of your staff at the conclusion of the inspection.
Areas examined durin9 this inspection are described in the enclosed inspection report.
Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and plans and observation:; by the NRC team members.
No items of noncompliance with NRC requirements were identified within the scope of this inspection.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosed inspection report will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.
If this report contains any information that you believe to be exempt from disclosure ur. der 10 CFR 9.5(a)(4), it is necessary that you (a) notify this office by telephone within ten (10) days from the date of this letter of your intention to file a request for withht' ding; and (b) submit within 25 days from the date of this letter a written application to this office to withhold such infor-mation.
If your receipt of this letter has been delayed such that less than seven (7) days are available for your review, please notify this office promptly,-so that a new due date may be established.
Consistent with section 2.790(b)(1), any such application must be accompanied by an affidavit executed by the owner of the information which identifies the document or part sought to be withheld, and which contains a full statement v Y
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- October 7, 1981 of the basis on which it is claimed that the inforretion should be withheld from public disclosure.
This section further requires the statement to address with specificity the considerations listed in 10 CFR2.790(b)(4). The information sought to be withheld shall be incor-porated as far as possible into a separate part of the affidavit.
If we do not hear from you in this regard within the specified periods noted above, the report will be placed in the Public Document Room.
Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be glad to discuss them with you.
Sincerely, H. E. Book, Chief g
Radiological Safety Branch 4
Encitsure:
IE~Jnspection Report Nos.
50-275/81-21 50-323/81-15 cc w/o gncl:
W.A.Rpnond,PG&E R. C. Thgrnberry, PG&E W
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L U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OF]FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION V 50-275/81-21 & 5 50-323/81-15 Report No.
Docket No.59-275, 323 License No.CPPR-39, 69 Safeguards Gror, Linnsee:
Pacific Gas an:1d Electric Company P. O. Box 74422 San Francisco.. California 94106 Facility Name: Diablo Canyon Unit 1, 2 Inspection at: San Luis Obiscoo County, California
.!Auguust 18-20, 1981 n
Inspection conducted:
Inspectors:
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K. [cown/Eme'gency PrepaNdness Mordina' tor
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F. Wenslawski, Chief, Retctor Radiation Protection Date Signec
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'H. Book, Chief, Radiological Safety Branch Eate Signed Sumary:
Inspection on Auo:.st 18-20, 1981 (Report Nos. 50-275/81-21 and 50-323/81-15 Areas Inspected:
An-c.nced inspection of the emergency plan exercise and associated critique. The inspection involved 110 hours0.00127 days <br />0.0306 hours <br />1.818783e-4 weeks <br />4.1855e-5 months <br /> onsite by eight NRC inspectors aN observers.
RV Form 219 (2) y' [2(a 0 Results:,j No items of rencompliance or deviations were identified.
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1.
iersons Contacted Station Staff
- R. Thornberry, Plant Manager
- W. Kaefer. Technical Assistant to the Plant Manager
- J. Boots, Supervisor, Chemistry and Radiation Protection
- R. Patterson, Plant Superintendent
- W. Keyworth, Senior, Power Production Engineer - Emergency Plc ming and Licensing Corporate Office
- J. Shiffer, Manager of Nuclear Operations
- S. Skidmore, Supervisor Nuclear Generation Engineer
- J. Townsend, Supervisor Nuclear Generation Engineer
- W. Fujimoto, Senior Nuclear Generation Engineer
- R. Locke, Senior Counsel
- Attended exit interview 2.
Pre-Exercise Activities a.
Emergency Plan Review - Prior to the exercise the inspectors reviewed relevant portions of the licensee's Emergency Plan, Revision 2 and 3, and procedures used to implement the plan.
The Emergency Plan provides for the implementation of the ~
planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47, 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, and specific acceptance criteria contained in NUREG 0654/ FEMA-REP-1.
b.
Exercise Scenario Review - The emergency exercise scenario, developed by EDS Nuclear Inc. for the licensee, met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F. The inspectors attended briefings by the EDS Nuclear Inc. exercise controllers on July 24 and 31,1981 and August 17, 1981. Minor changes to the scenaHo were made pursuant to discussions between the inspectors and represen-tatives of EDS Nuclear Inc. at the July 24, 1981 meeting.
The scenario provided for a sequence of simulated events which required the mobilization of the licensee's emergency organiza-tion beginning with an Unusual Event and progressing through sequentially escalating classes to a General Emergency.
The scenario included events which necessitated and allowed for activation of appropriate offsite agencies as well.
Some time compression was written into the scenario to coordinate the overall involvement of licensee, state and local organizations participating in the exercise. The sequence of simulated events was coordinated in advance with State representatives to provide art opportunity for exercising the state and local emergency response organizations.
However, the details were known to only three utility personnel who were providing l
assistance to EDS Nuclear Inc.
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Emergency Exercise Simulated emergencyr conditions began at about 7:00 a.r.. on August 19, 1981 and the on: site exercise activities were terminated at about 3:00 p.m. on the same day.
The exercise was bacsed on the following major sequence of simulated events at the power plant.
Time Event 7:02 a.ra.
A fire is detected in the Unit 2, 12KV startup switchgear, EL.85' of tne north end of the Unit I and Unit 212KV startup switchgear trip out and a loss of 230KV offsite power results.
Diesel generators 1-1,1-2 and 1-3 automatically start on a 12KV startup bus undervoltage signal.
7:10 a.n.
The Turbine Building fire protection system appears.to be inoperable.
It is suspected that the fire protection system was not properly restcred to service following recent testing activities. Manual fire fighting efforts are ineffective.
The fire increases in intensity and threatens vital csble in the cable spread-ing rooms above on EL.104' of the Turbine Building.'
7:40 a.ra.
The fire on EL.85' in the north end of the Turbine Building is reported to be under control.
7:50 a.m.
The fire on EL.85' in the north end of the Turbine Building is reported to be totally extinguished.
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The Unit 1 12KV startup switchgear has been 7:55 a.m.
restored to operability.
Apparently, it tripped out due to the fire, but was not dsmaged. As a result, 230KV offsite power has been restored to availability.
8:00 a.m.
A Bank D rod cluster control assembly (RCCA) is ejected from the reactor core. The reactor
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trips, followed by the turbine. Auxiliary i
power transfers to the startup buses. The steam dump system activates and functions normally.
The safety injection system ini-tiates as reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure and temperature decrease.
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. 8:01 a.m.
The motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps start normally and provide the steam generators with feedwater.
Containment high radiation and
!high humidity alanns received.
8:10 a.m.
7he Shift Foreman is notified that the
. Radiation Protection Monitoring (RPM) Tech-mician, Auxiliary Operator and Electrician, who twere working on containment fan cooler unit 1-2, have taen contaminated. Upon hearing a loud crash and the sound of escaping steam, the men ihurriedly attempted to ex n the containment.
The electrician fell and appears to have broken
'his left leg.
All three men were contaminated prior to exiting the containment through the personnel hatch cn EL.140'.
8:40 a.m.
The reactor is in a stable, hot shutdown condition.
The charging pumps have stabilized RCS pressure at 2235 psig and continue to provide makeup for coolant lost through the RCCA ejection break.
RCS T is 5420F. The plant operations staff a
is anahzing all available data, and preparing to cool down and deprassurize the RCS.
9:00 a.m.
As the ambulance carrying the injured and contaminated electrician leaves the Diable Canyon access road (immediately outside the Avila Beach gate), it collides with a station wagon traveling at a high rate of speed.
The people in the ambulance are knocked unconscious in the collision.
Personnel arriving at the accident scene are not certain which occupants are contaminated.
9:10 a.m.
To remain within Technical Specification RCS I
pressure-temperature cooldown limits, it is I
estimated that depressurization of thit RCS will l
take approximately 3 to 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. At that time, residual heat removal system operation will be initiated to bring the reactor to a cold shutdown condition.
9:20 a.m.
The Control Room receives continuous indication of high activity inside the containment.
Containment integrity has precluded any release of radiation to the environment.
I 10:15 a.m.
Depressurization of the RCS is proceeding in l
, a slow, but orderly and stable manner.
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10:30 a.m.
Due to an electric power system grid disturbance, there is a loss of all 230KV and 500 KV offsite power.
10:35 a.m.
Diesel generators 1-1,1-2 and 1-3 have picked up all vital loads.
However, the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps fail to start.
10:45.a.m.
The Electric System Dispatcher Shift Supervisor informs the Shift Foreman that offsite power will be unavailable for four to six hours.
11:00 a.m.
All steam generators boil dry resulting in the loss of the priinary system heat sink.
11:05 a'.m.
RCS temperature and pressure are rapidly increasing.
11:10 a.m.
All pressurizer power-operated relief valves (PORV) fail closed as actuation pressure is reached (or if early actuation is attempted).
11:12 a.m.
The Control Room receives indication of fuei damage in the reactor core and a rapidly increasing hydrogen concentration in the containment.
The hydrogen recombiners appear to be inoperable.
11:45 a.m.
A hydrogen explosion occurs inside the containment as explosive concentration limits are reached.
Containment purge exhaust valves RCV-11 and RCV-12 are damaged and appear to be partially open as the unit vent particulate, radiogas and iodine monitors all indicate very high activity levels.
-2:15 p.m.
The motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps are restored to service and feedwater is now being delivered to the steam generators.
2:45 p.m.
The maintenance team repairs and closes containment purge exhaust fan manual valve 35.
The release from the plant is terminated.
4.
Post Exercise Critique The inspectors attenced the licensee critique held on August 20, 1981, during which licensce exercise participants discussed the exercise results.
During the critique, the inspectors noted that the discussion included the identification of problem areas and suggestions for improvenent, and that the participant comments were documented.
In response to certain comments and suggestions, personnel were specifically assigned and instructed by utility management to take appropriate corrective actions.
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Exit Interview following the licensee's self-critique, the inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in paragraph 1.
The team leader summarized the purpose and stope of the inspection and each inspector presented his individual comments on aspects of the exercise perscnally observed by the inspector (Attachment A). The nature of the exercise observations did not necessitate discussion of, or commitments tn specific correctiv measures.
However, one aspect of the utility emergency response concept of operation was discussed as not being in conformance with the onsite emergency organization staffing criteria specified in NUREG 0654, II B. J.
and Table B-1.
The licensee was advised to reevaluate his present staffing concept (see attachment A, para.1.) and to consider alternative approaches, and that this issue would be reexamined during the emergency planning appraisal. (81-21-01)
On the basis of the eight NRC inspector observations made in the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Emergency Operations Facility, and on observations made of other in-plant and on-site emergency response activities the inspection team has concluded that the exercise was well planned and executed, and met the objec-tives set forth in Attachment B; that the exercise demonstrated the licensee's overall capability to implement their Emergency Plan and procedures; and that no observations were made that would indicate that appropriate measures would not or could not be taken to protect the public health and safety in the event of a radiological accident at the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant.
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Attachment A Specific Coments 1.
Emergency Operations Facility The utility's concept of operation calls for the corporate Manager of Nuclear Operations to assume the position as the Offsite Recovery Manager (ORM), and to control the utility Emergency Operations
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Facility (E0F) and all emergency response activities. This concept necessitates traveling from San Francisco to San 1.uis Obispo.
In order to minimize travel time the utility has contracted special
& transportation for this purpose. The exercise demonstrated the capability to perform this relocation in a relatively short period of time (approximately two and one half hours after initial notifica-tion).
However, it is desirable that the EOF be fully activated and operational within a shorter period of time to perfonn the following functions:
Management of overall licensee emergency response, Coordination of radiologica and environmental assessment.
Determination of recommended public protective actions, and Coordination of emergency response activities with federal, state, and local agencies.
Although the EOF was manned within one hour by plant personnel their primary authority and responsibility was limited to liaison duties.
Presently, the Plant Superintendeot who is located in the TSC retains the authority and r.esponsiblity for all utility emergency response activities until the arrival of the ORM.
In order to relieve the plant staf f of these re:;ponsibilitics, the time frame for for full activation of the E0F should be no greater than one hour.
2.
Onsite radiation monitoring (a) The wind direction status should be provided to the field monitoring teams during initial activation and updated ac-cordingly whenever changes occur so that team personnel can tr.ke necessary protective actions.
(b) A HP-240 detector probe should be included as part of the field monitoring team's emergency equipment.
This piece of equipment is necessary to perform certain radiation monitoring functions outlined in implementing procedure EPR-2, Attach-ments 8. " Release of Airborne Radioactive Materials" (c) Chem / Radiation Protection Technicians should be reminded that analyses of particulate air samples, iodine samples, contamina-tion surveys and environmental samples must be performed in areas free of significant background radiation fields.
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(d) The need for performing contamination surveys to ascertain L
loose surface contamination levels onsite and in plant during an accident should be considered for the purpose of determin-E ing protective actions for field monitoring teams and occupied inplant and site areas 3.
Other in-plant response activities s
a.
Fire brigade B
The exercise demonstrated that a timely dispatch of the fire
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E brigade could be made to a fire scene, and that they could follow procedures for informing the shift foreman, calling the 7
back up fire brigade, requesting Calif. Div. of Forestry (CDF) assistance, and isolating ventilation systems and doors around the fire area.
e However, based on the observed performance of the fire brigade at the simulated location of the fire it appeared that the fire brigade members had not performed any pre fire planning and did not fully understand fire behavior and fire fighting techniques.
Specifically, the door through which the team entered was not the oest.
Location of house (hose) lines and C02 reels was better at another entry point. Pre-planning might have resulted in entry through the more suitable access B-point.
In addition, the manner in which the members entered the fire area, standing up with no hose line in place, inay indicate a lack of trairiing in fire behavior and proper fige fighting techniques..The failure to attempt use of the CO (Cardox) system and to determine and rectify fire suppression
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Jystems may also indicate the need for additional training.
r No one attempted to find a bcck up.<ater supply or to check supply valves or pumps.
Members seemed content to secure ventilation to the room, shut doors, and await the arrival of CDF. After considerable time had elapsed one me.aber of the i
fire brigade finally wheeled the 150# extinguisher, that was p
about 50 feet away, over to be used.
This should have been done as soon as the controller at the fire scene issued the message which indicated that certain fire fighting systems were not effective.
The observed shortcomings in the responses of the involved players (fire brigade) may have been a result of the lack of i
realism in the fire situation, or a lack in understanding on the part of the players as to their expected extent of play in the exercise, a.id not necessarily due lack of training or p
knowledge of correct procedures.
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Injured and Contaminated Worker Tids portion of the exercise indicated that notifications to the proper plant personnel, i.e., control room and access control personnel could be made.
It also demonstrated the RPMs capability to quickly respond to the area in anticontami-nation clothing with some first aid supplies (gurney, splints) and radiation instruments. '-
However, consideration should have been given to taking and wearing protective masks until it was determined that no airborne bazard existed.
Also clean clothing (full suits of anti"C"s) and throw away blankets should have been taken to a clean area where contaminated personnel could be removed from the area without spreading contamination.
At the first aid station the prime concern appeared to be over the r.ontamination, (a few thousand counts) on the victims pants, hands, and ankle. The victims leg was not splinted and when he was transported to the ambulance's gurney, personnel lifted him by his pants with no support for the injury.
Personnel need.to be reminded that the well being of the victim should be first priority, and contamination second.
c.
Containment Purge Valvt Response personnel should verify the exact location and piece of equipment or valve to be* worked on.
Use of a one line diagram and assumed knowledge regarding the location of the valve lead personnel to the wrong valve. Where necessary, engineering diagrams and/or a more thorough description of the piece of equipment in question (eg. Butterfly, 4' diameter #VAC 35 or globe, 4", CCS 41) should be given to avoid confussion by responding personnel.
Response personnel should coordinate and pre-plan response routes in order to minimize radiation exposure.
During, the two trips this team made to the incorrect valve they passed by the post accident sampling station which would have been at high radiation levels.
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Attachment B Licensee identified objectives August 19, 1981 emergency preparedness exercise.
a.
Demonstrate proficiency in classifying the emergency condition.
b.
Demonstrate efficient and effective notification and alerting procedures and methods.
c.
Demonstrate the ability of the PG&E Emergency Response Organiza-tion to maintain connand control.
d.
Demonstrate precise and clear transfer of responsibilities from the Onsite Emergency Organization to the Corporate Emergency Response Organization.
e.
Demonstrate the ability of the PG&E Emergency Response Organiza-tion to maintain continuity of connand control throughout the exercise.
f.
Demonstrate prctective measures considered, determined and used to protect station personnel and the general public.
g.
Demonstrate reliability and effective use of emergency communica-tions equipment, and communications procedures and methods, h.
Demonstrate capability to evaluate and produce public information releases in the best interests of all concerned.
i.
Demonstrate the ability to provide adequate medical care for personnel affected by the emergency conditions.
j.
Demonstrate the ability to perform radiological monitoring and assessments, and offsite dose assessment projections necessary to provide advance warning to local, state and federal agencies, and to the general public.
k.
Demonstrate the ability to conduct a post-exercise critique to determine areas requiring additional capability improvements.
1.
Demonstrate the physical adequacy of the various PG&E emergency response facilities for individual member working space and communications usage.
m.
Demonstrate the primary functional responsibilities and/or problem solving capabilities of the PG&E Emergency Response l
Organization.
n.
Demonstrate recovery techniques in the ability of the PG&E Emergency Response Organization to de-escalate (deactivate) corporate and site emergency response activities and the general public, o.
Demonstrate the ability of the PG&E Emergency Response Organiza-tion to intergrate its activities with those of the other participating emergency response organizations (county, state and federal).
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD in the Matter of
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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
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Docket Nos. 50-275 0.L.
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50-323 0.L.
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Unit Nos. 1 and 2)
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CERTIFICATF OF SERVICE q
l hereby certify that copies of "NRC STAFF'S RESPONSE TO GOVERNOR EDMUND G. BROWN JR.'S SEc0ND SET OF INTERROGATORIES" in the above-captioned proceed-Ing have been serveo on the following by depc: M in the United States mail,_
first class or, as indicated by en asterisk, through deposit >In the Nuclear RegulatoryCommission'sInternalmailsystem,thisjnddayofNovember, 1981:
John F. Wolf, Esq., Chairman
- Richard E. Blankenburc, Administrative Judne Co pubilsher Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Wayne A. Soroyan, News Reporter
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission South County Publishing Company Washington, DC 20555 P.O. Box 460 Arroyo Grande, CA 93420 Glenn O. Bright, Esq.*
v Administrative Judge Mr. Gordon Silver Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Mrs. Sandra A. Silver
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1760 Alisal Street Washington, DC 20S55 San Lui:, Obispo, CA 93'401
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.g Dr. Jerry Kline, Administrative Arthur C. Gehr, Esq.
Judge
- Snell & Wilmer Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 3100 Valley Center U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Phoenix, AZ 95073 Washington, DC 20555 Paul C. Valentine, Esq.
Ms. Elizabeth Apfelberg 321 Lytton Avenue 1415 Cozadero Palo Alto, CA 94302 San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 Bruce Norton, Esq.
Philip A. Crane, Jr., Esq.
3216 North 3rd Street Pacific Gas e, Electric Company Suite 202 P.O. Box 7442 Phoenix, AZ 85012
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San Francisco, CA 94120 Andrew Baldwin, Esq.
Mr. Frederick Eissler 124 Spear Street Scenic Shoreline Preservation San Franc; co, CA 94105 Conference, inc!
4623 More Mesa D Ive Santa Barbara, CA 93105
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Mrs. Raye Fleming Harry M. Willis, Esq.
1920 Mattie Road Seymour & Willis u
S; ell Beach, CA 93449 601 California St., Suite 2iOO San Francisco, CA 94108 Joel R. P,evnolds, Esq.
John R. Phillips, Esq.
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Janice E. Kerr, Esq.
Center for_ Lac in the Pubile Lawrence 0,.
Carcia, Esq.
Interestlw?' -
350 McAllister Street 10951 West Pico Boulevard.
San Francisco, CA 94102 Third Floor Los Angeles, CA 9006h -
Mr. James 0. Schuyler Nuclear Projects Engineer Byron S. Georgiou Pacific Gas & Electric Company Legal Affairs Sec,retary 77 Beale Street Governor 's Of fice '
San Francisco, CA 94106 State Capitol L
Sacramento, CA '95814 - '
Mr. Mark Gottlieb California Energy Commission David S. Fleischaker, Esq.
MS-18 E1. -
P.O. Box;1178-1111 Howe Avenue s.
Oklahoma' C i ty,. OK - 73101 Sacramento, CA 95825 Poichard B. hubbard Atomic-Safety and Licensing Appeal
' MHB Technical Associates Panel (5)*
1723 Hamilton Avenue - Suite K' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission San Jose,tCA 951.25-Washington, DC 20555 C
John Marrv; Ma9 aging Editor Atomic Safety and Licensing Board San Luis Obispo County' Panel
- Telearam-Trib'une U.S. Nuclear Requiatory Commission 1321 Johnson Avenue Washington, DC 20555 P.O. Box'112 Docketing and Service Section (1)*
San Luis Obispo, CA 934.06 m
Office of the Secretary
. Herbert H. Brown U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- Hill, Christopher & Phillips, P.C.
Washington, DC 20555 1900 M Stree,t, N.W.
I Washington,lDC 20036
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