ML20032A575
| ML20032A575 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 10/23/1981 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20032A568 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8110300405 | |
| Download: ML20032A575 (6) | |
Text
f[
o UNITED STATES
=
g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOR e
o
.p WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
%,*..../
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMEf[T NO. 25 TO PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-45 DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR t
DOCKET NO. 50-409 INT'ODUCTION 1.0 R
By letter dated September 12, 1980, Dairyland Power Cooperative (DPC)~
(the licensee), proposed amendments to Appendix A of the Technical Specifications for Provisional Operating License No. DPR-45 for the La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR).
The amendments involve the incorporation of certain of the TMI-2 Lessons Learned Categoiy "A" requirements, revision of the standards used to determine equipment operability, upgrading of certain parts of the Technical Specifications to more closely resemble the Standard Technical Specifications for Boiling Water Reactors, and revisions to the. requirements for calibration of the reactor water level instrumentation.
The request is in response to the NRC staff's letters dated April 10,198C end July 2,1980.
2.0 LESSONS LEARNED 2.1 Backaround By out letter dated September 13, 1979, we issued to all operating nuclear power plants requirements established as a result of our review of the TMI-2 accident.
Certain of these requirements, designated Lessons Learned Category "A" requirements, were to have been completed by the licensee prior to any operation subsequent to l
January 1,1981.
Our evaluation of the licensee's compliance with these Category "A" items was attached to our letter to DPC dated April 25,1980.
l l
In order to provide reasonable assurance,tbat operating reactor facilities are maintained within the limits determined acceptable following the implementation of the TMI-2 Lessons Learned Category "A" items, we requested that licensees amend their Technical Specifications to incorporate additional Limiting Conditions of Operation and Surveillance Requirements, as appropriate. This request was transmitted to all licensees on July 2,1980.
Included therein were model specifications that we had determined to be acceptable.
The licensee's application is in direct response to LEA 288Wofsb8tg, m
., l our request.
Each of the issues identified by the NRC staff and the licensee's response is discussed in_the following Evaluation.
2.2 Evaluation 1.
Emeroency Power Supply / Inadequate Core Cooling t
As applicable to Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs), we indicated that instrumentation is important to post-accident monitoring and that surveillance of this instrumentation should be performed.
The licensee's response to this request stated that their current surveillance requirements for the reactor water level instru-mentation are in adequate agreement with our requirements.
We have reviewed the proposed specifications under Section 4.2.6 and 5.2.15 and have determined that water level instrumentation is included.
The specifications provide action statements for inoperable instrument channels.
Surveillance requirements for instrument checks and calibration are also included.
The frequency of surveillance meets the intent of our guidelines.
Based on this review, we conclude that no changes are required to satisfy our request.
2.
Valve Position Indication Our requirements for installation of a reliable position indicating system for the reactor safety valves was based on the need to pro-vide the operator with a diagnostic aid to reduce the ambiguity between indications that might indicate either an open relief /
safety valve or a small line break.
Such a system did not need to be safety grade provided that backup methods of determining valve positions are available.
The licensee has installed two environmentall'y and seismically qualified limit switches on the stem of each relief valve to separately detect the closed and open position of each safety valve.
Direct position indication is provided to the operator in the control room.
Beckup safety valve indication is provided by temperature sensors downstream of.the safety valves which proside an alarm in the control room when the temperature at the discharge valve of 250*F.
The licensees amendment request would provide monthly check, and calibration at refueling intervals for this valve position indi-cation. We find that these changes satisfy our guidelines and are acceptable.
4 e
~
3.
Containment Isolation We reque ted that the specifications be changed to reflect the diverse signals which cause isolation of systems penetrating the reactor containment boundary. The licensee' has modified Table 1, Operating Limits, to indicate all of the diverse con-tainment isolation signals, and to correlate the signals with the valves which are shut! We have reviewed these changes and we find that they meet our guidelines and are acceptable.
~
' We requested that the licensee include additional provisions in the Technical Specifications to reflect the augmentation of the Shift Technical Advisor. The' licensee has requested an additional change to Section 6, to define the requirement for manning the STA position.
He has nott, however, included the STA qualifications requirements that we requested, on the basis that members of the plant engineering staff are currently being used in the STA function, and they all have extensive experience in the operation of this plant. They work together very closely, and this, coupled witn the relative simplicity of the plant, makes any additional training requirements superfjuous. We have. considered these arguments and find that they have merit. !!e therefore find
~
~
that the proposed specifications meet the intent of our guideliner, and are acceptable.'
5.
Intecrity of Systems Outside Containment Our request indicated that licensees should be required to period-ically conduct a System Integrity Measurements Program to prevent the release of significant amounts of radioactivity to the environ-ment via leakage from engineered safety systems and auxiliary systems which are located outside reactor containment. By letter dated April 14,1980 (LAC-6860) the licensee described his plan for implementing this program.
There are a few plant sy. stems outside containment which might contain highly radioactive fluids during a serious transient or accident.
These systems are the following:
offgas system, component cooling water syttem outside containment and isolation condenser vent to the offgas sys;em. All other systems which would or could conta' high radioactivity during a serious transient or accident are inside containment.
4 The. licensee has an existing leak reduction program to keep leakage:
from all. plant systems containing radioactivity to as low as practical levels. 'This program includes the identification of leakage from visual surveillance by plant personnel and from responses of area and effluent radiation, the maintenance of systems with indicated leakage on an expedited basis and the plant preventative maintenance program.
This program includes integrated leakage tests of the above systems once per refueling period?
The licensee has completed his review of the plant design for potential leakage release paths from plant systems due to design and operator deficiencies as discussed in our letter to the licensee regarding North Anna and Related Incidents dated 0ctober 17 1979.
The licensee concluded that no corrective actions were.needed.
Based on a review of.the licensee's leak reduction program and the commitment made in his letter of April 4,1980, we find that the intent of our guidelines has been satisfied.
6.
Iodine Monitoring We requested that the licensee implement a program which will ensure the capability to determine the airborne iodine concentration in areas requiring personnel access under accideht conditions.
The licensee's program should include training of personnel, procedures for monitoring and provisions for maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment.
By letter dated April 9,1980 (LAC-6853) the licensee provided a description of his inplant iodine 6,onitoring capability.
The licer.see has a single channel analyzer and a charcoal cartridge in the control room dedicated to promptly analyze air samples for radio-iodine during an accident. The licensee has a multi-channel analyzer and a charcoal cartridge in the interim Technical Support Center dedicated to the same purpose. An additional multi-channel analyzer and charcoal cartridge will be added to the interim Technical Support
~
Center.
Initial training of technicians for obtaining and counting
' air samples has been completed, and ongoing training continues.
In our safety evaluation of April 25, 1980, regarding this item, we concluded that the licensee's program was satisfactory. We now find that this commitment meets the intent of our more recent guidelines and no further licensing changes are necessary.
O
).
1
n-3.0 OPERABILITY
3.1 Background
By our letter dated April 10, 1980, we issued to all operating nuclear power plants requirements for changes to the-definition of equipment operability in the technical g,pecifications..The purpose of these changes was to clarify the meaning of the tern OPERABLE as it is applied
.at licensee facilities, IE Information Notice No. 79-35 " Control of Maintenance and Essential Equipment". also contained.1nformation on this subject.
3.2 Evaluation By letter dated September 12,1E80, DPC proposed changes _to the technical specification for LACBWR which would incorporate the changes we requ2sted.
Because the proposed ' changes 'do not differ from the model technical specifications issued by our April 10,1980. letter, we conclude that the proposed amendment would not reduce the level of safety of the facility and is therefore acceptable.
4.0 MISCELLANEOUS CHANGES 4.1 In the Operating Limitations section, additional definitions have been added for CHANNEL CALIBRATION, CHANNE' 2 HECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, FREQUENCY NOTATION, IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE, LIMITING CONTROL ROD PATTERN, PHYSICS TESTS, PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE and UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE These added definitions are identical to those in the BWR Standard.
Technical Specifications (TS).
Their inclusion in the LACBWR TS does not reduce the level of safety of the facility, and is therefore acceptable.
4.2 A new table has been added on page 27i to describe the frequency notation for equipment surveillance requirements.
It is identical to that in the BWR STS and is acceptable.
4.3 Paragraph 4.1.6 has been del'eted because it refers to the implementation of a periodic inspection program in the fifst year of LACBWR's operation.
Since the program has been implemented, this paragraph is no longer applicable and should be deleted.
i e
=
4.4 All other changes were to eliminate ambiguity and to make the LACBWR TS conform more closely to the BWR STS.
Because these. changes result in more conservative limitations and surveillance requirements, they do not reduce the level of safety of the facility and are therefore acceptable.
5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
We have determined that this amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact.
Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involvesan action which is insigni-
' ficant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 551.5(d)(4), that an environmental inpact statement, or negative declaration an'd environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
6.0 CONCLUSION
We have concluded, based on the. consideration discussed above, that:
(1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the pro-bability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the hea,lth and safety of the public will not endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities'will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public, bated:
October 23, 1981 g
4
.