ML20031F977
| ML20031F977 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 10/15/1981 |
| From: | Bayne J POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| To: | Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR JPN-81-82, NUDOCS 8110200611 | |
| Download: ML20031F977 (52) | |
Text
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4 POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 10 COLUMeus CincLE NEW YORK. N. Y.10019 t212) 397 6200 GEORGE T. BERRY cranat No oFF7CER TRUSTEES
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PREstOENT --PROCEDURES GEORGE L. ING ALLS JOSEPH R C IEDER vtC E CMalRMAN eaigo,E;racise Riew ARo u.,Lvus October 15, 1981 L7 ','*vfc'E^1. toe, RosERT t wittOuzi o
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THOM AS R FREY s
n AL C UNSEL Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comn;ission k/4/K Washington, D. C.
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Attention:
Mr. Thomas A.
Ippolito, Chief f%
OCT2 9 I987 A Operating Reactors Branch No. 2
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Division of Licensing i
" Q j g u e.,
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Subject:
JamesA.FitzPatrickNuclearPowerPlah.
Docket No. 50-333
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Control of Heavy Loads (NUREG-0612)
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References:
- 1. Letter D. G. Eisenhut (NRC) to all Operating Reactors dated December 22, 1980
- 2. Letter J. P. Bayne (PASNY) to T. A.
Ippolito (NRC) dated September 18, 1980 (JPN-81-73)
Dear Sir:
Reference 1 requested a review of heavy load-handing operations and a two-phase submittal of evaluations of their conformance to the guidelines of NUREG-0612.
The Power Authority has completed the first phase of the review for the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.
The enclosed report, submitted in accordance with the schedule of Reference 2, provides the results of this review and the Power Authority's response to the items in Section 2.1 of to the December 22, 1980 letter.
These responses identify procedure changes which will be made by the Power Authority to meet the NUREG-0612 guidelines.
These procedure changes will be completed prior to the 1981 refueling outage or the first use of the affected procedure.
033 s
I f 8110200611 811015
.PDR ADDCK 05000333 P
T If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Very truly yours, t
7.s).
ge j$enior Vice President Nuclaar Generation
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cc:
Mr. J.
Linville Resident Inspector U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 136 Lycoming, New York 13093 i
i
CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS RESPONSE 20 NUREG-0612 REPORT NO. 1 POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT l
RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION IN SECTION 2.1 OF ENCLOSURE 3 TO DECEMBER 22,1980 LETTER FROM D. EISENHUT ITEM I: Report the results of your review of plant arrangements to identify all overhead handling systems from which a load drop may result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal (taking no credit for any interlocks, technical specifications, operating procedures, or detailed struc-tural analysis).
RESPONSE: A review of plant arrangement drawings and on area survey was conducted to determine handling systems of concern, i.e., those handling systems that could carry heavy ioods over irradiuted fuel in the core, over spent fuel, or over components in systems required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.
The location of such components was determined from reviews of plant arrai.qe-ment drawings, creo surveys and from information contained in the plant fire hazards analysis (which shows location of safe shutdown components). Based on this review, we have found that the ority handling system at the James A.
Fitzpatrick facility that must be addressed within the scope of NUREG 0612 is the Reactor Building Crane.
Reactor Building Crane This bridge crane, designed and fabricated by Hornischfeger P&H, has a main hoist capacity of 125 tons, on auxiliary hoist of 20 tons, and a second auxiliary hoist of 1/2 ton capacity. It is located above the operating / refueling floor (el.
369') with crane rails located at el. 402'. The crane is normally used during maintenance and refueling operations. These operations include handling of the shield plugs, the reactor vessel and drywell heads, the steam dryer and steam separator, and shipping casks. It is also used to raise and lower various pieces of I
equipment through the general purpose equipment hatches in the southeast and northwest quadrants of the Reactor Building and through several special purpose hatches. Table 3 lists the heavy loads that are typically handled by this crone.
The 1/2-ton hoist is used to handle new fuel elements and various lighter loods.
The crane is radio operated, but con be controlled by a detachable pendant in the event of foi!ure of the radio control. The crane is provided with various limit switches to restrict bridge travel for different modes of operation, i.e., normal operation moce, fuel handling mode, and cask handling mode. Operation of these limit switches is discussed in Supplement 20 to the JAFNPP FSAR. The safety concern posed b, the Reactor Building Crone is the movement of loods over or in proximity to: fuel in the core when the vessel head is removed; fuel in the spent fuel pooh the reactor vessel itself; and safe shutdown equipment at lower elevations. The safe shutdown equipment at lower elevations that is of concern when handling heavy loads includes: (1) cabling and equipment in the " crescent crea" (below elevation 272') that is beneath the track floor under the main equipment hatch in the southeast quadrant of the Reactor Building; (2) the suppression cool, portions of which are beneath this equipment hatch; (3) safety-related equiptr.3nt at various elevations that may be located in the vicinity of the equipmen' hatches in the northwest and southeast quadrants; and (4) cabling and equipment (including battery and inverter rooms) at elevation 344' that are below the travel path of heavy loads handled at elevation 369', such as the reactor vessel head, drywell head, shield blocks, and shipping casks.
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2
ITEM 2: Justify the exclusion of any overhead handling system from the above category by verifying that there is sufficient physical separation from any load-impact point and any safety-related component to permit a determination by inspection that no heavy load drop con result in domcge to any system or component required for plant shutdown or core decoy heat removal.
RESPONSE: Table I lists the crones and monorails that have been excluded from consideration within the scope of NU~.cG 0612. The following provides the bases for excluding these handling systr 1.
Screenwell and Water Treatment Building Crone 4
This crane has a main hook capacity of 25 tons and on auxiliary hook capacity of 5 tons. It is used for servicing circulating water pumps and travelling screens in the Screenwell and Water Treatment Building.
There is no safety-related equipment located below or in proximity to this crone that could be impacted by a load drop. Emergency and RHR Service water pumps are located in this building, but are separated from the area where loads are handled by this crone by a reinforced concrete wall. Based on the above, this crane may be excluded from the scope of NUREG 0612 criteria.
2.
Rodwaste Bridge Crone 3.
Pollet Filter Element Hnndling Holst 4.
Centrifuge Hoists 5.
TFE Hoist The obove bridge crane and hoists are located in the Rodwoste Building. These con be excluded from NUREG 0612 evaluations because there is no safety-related equipment or safe shutdown equipment located in the Radwaste Building.
1 l
6.
Screenwell Auxiliary Crone This crone is located in the west end of the Screenwell and Water Treatment Building at on elevation of 297'. Tae crone has a hoist capacity of 8 tons and is used for removal of hatch plugs to provide access to RHR service water pumps and motors and to emergency service water pumps. The crane would be used to service these pumps only when the pump is already out of service for mainte-nonce or repair. RHR motor-operated volve cabling is routed in the conduit along the wall of the Screen House, but the limit of book travel is four feet from the wall. Therefore, o load drop would not demoge this cabling. The pumps are separated so that the Division A and B RHR Service water pumps are in separate rooms, with the pumps separated by 25 feet. The emergency service water pumps are separated by 10 feet with a wall in-between. Based on the above, a lood drop when servicing these pumps would not offect operable safe shutdown equipment.
7.
Turbine Room Crane The Turbine Room Crone has o main hoist capacity of 200 tons and on auxiliary hoist of 25 tons. It is located in the Turbine Building at on elevation of 345'.
There is no safe shutdown equipment located in the Turbine Building. Safety-related cables are routed to the Diesel Generator Building and Screenwell and Water Treatment Building in electrical tunnels which run alongside the Turbine Building. The tunnels do not pass beneath the Turbine Room Crone. Thus, this crone may be eliminated from further NUREG 0612 consideration since o load drop would not impact any equipment that would be required for safe shutdown.
8.
Diesel Generator Monorails and Hoists Two separate monorails run over each of the four diesel generators in the Emergency Generator Building. Two generators are required for safe shutdown as each is copoble of carrying 50% of the load. The remaining two generators 4
oct as the redundant system.
These monorail systems are not the primary hoisting equipment for the diesel generators components. "A" frame type lif ting devices, which are portable and capable of being disassembled, are used to service the diesel generators. The monorail and the "A" frame device would only be used when a diesel generator is already out of service for maintenance or repair, so that a lood crop would not result in damage to operable safe shutdown equipment. Based on the above, these monorails and hoists may be excluded from the scope of NUREG 0612 criteria.
9.
Screenwell and Tempering Gate Hoist This hoist may be eliminated since it does not handle any loads over safety-related equipment. It is located at the 272' elevation of the Screenwell and Water Treatment Building and is only used for raising and lowering of the tempering gate.
10.
Monorail Over RHR & Emergency Service Water Pump Strainers This monorail system is located in the Screenwell and Water Treatment Building at on elevation of 260'. It is used only for removal of the strainers it posses over. It can be eliminated from NUREG 0612 requirements since it is used to service strainers for the Service Water Pumps and the RHR pumps when those pumps cre already out of service for maintenance or repair. Thus the impact of a load drop would not render operable safe shutdown equipment or safety-related equipment inoperable.
I 1.
Torus Monorall This monorail is located off the inner wall in the forus and is used only when the reactor is shut down and the forus is drained. It is used for forus modifications only. Since it is located below the reactor vessel and since it is used only during shutdowns, this monorail system con be excluded from further consideration under NUREG 0612.
5
12.
Condenser Boost Pump Hoist 13.
RFP Rotor Removal Hoists (2) 14.
Turbine Oil Tonk Pumps Hoist 15.
RFP Turbine Case & Gear Hoists (4)
I/.
Turbine Oil Tonk Crone 17.
Condenser Waterbox Hoists These various cranes and hoists are all located in the Turbine Building at elevations ranging from 266' to 295'. They are used to lif t and service large pieces of eQJipment for maintenance and repair. No safe shutdown equipment is located in the Turbine Building and safety-related cables to the Diesel Generator Building and the Screenwell and Water Treatment Building are routed in electrical tunnels alongside the Turbine Building. Therefore, o load drop would not impact safety-related equipment.
Based on the above, these handling systems may be excluded from the scope of NUREG 0612 criteria.
18.
CRD Service Room Crane This hoist has a 1-ton capacity and is used for servicing and repair of control rod drives that have been removed. This crone can be eliminated from the scope of NUREG 0612 since there is no safety-related equipment in proximity or below the crane.
19.
Motor Generator Set Crane This 20-ton crane is used for servicing the re-irulcotion pump motor generator sets at elevation 300' of the Reactor Building when the reactor is shut down. It 6
.. -.. ~. -.,.. _
is also used for removal of hatch plugs to the steam tunnel to service MSIV's.
There is no safe shutdown equipment or cabling in tha MG set crea. Addition-a!!y, no safe shutdown equipment or cabling, such as for the RHR system, are located in the steam tunnel below the M-G set area. Safety-related cabling and equipment are located in the northeast and northwest quadrants of the Reactor Building at the elevation immediately below the MC Set oom (272' el.).
The heavy loods of principal interest that could be handled by the MG Set Crone at the 300' el. are major MG Set components such as the motor, generator, or fluid drive units. These foods con weigh as much as 16 tons. The concern is the possibility of damage to the safety related equipment at the 272' el. below the MG Set room floor if one of these large loads were dropped on the floor at the 300' el. For the reasons given below, we have concluded that the potential for damage to equipment below is small and, therefore, this crone may be excluded from the scope of NUREG 0612.
(1)
Major MG Set components will not be moved unless the plant is in a cold shutdown condition.
(2)
The frequency of movement of major MG Set components is srnali. Removal or replacement of major components is not anticipated car the life of the plant.
(3)
Evaluation of a postulated typical lood drop indicates that penetration and scabbing of the floor are not expected.
(4)
The effect on safe shutdown capability of loss of all equipment in the northeast and northwest quadrants of the Reactor Building at the 272' el was evaluated in 7
conjunction with the plant fire hozords analysis (see Safe Shutdown Analysis - James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant - September 1978 -Revised October 1980 -~Sec-tion 5.0, Fire Zones RBl3A and RBl3D). This evoluotion indicated that with the implementation of certain actions, safe shutdown could be achieved and maintained even if all equipment in these areas were lost. Those actions have been implemented. Accordingly, there is reasonable assurance that if a load drop were to demoge equipment at the 272' el., safe shutdown and core cooling could be maintained.
20.
Drain Cooler Hoists (4) 21.
Drain Cooler and Heater Hoists (4)
These hoists are located in the heater boy creo adjacent to the Turbine Building. These hoists are used for servicing drain coolers and feedwater heaters. There is no safety-related equipment in the areas served by these hoists or in rooms that are below the hoists.
Based on this, the e handling systems may be excluded from the scope of NUREG 0612 criterio.
22.
Escape Hatch Removo! Hoist This 25-ton hoist is located on a monorail and is used for removal and replacement of the personnel emergency drywell escape hatch which is located at the northwest crea of the drywell. The hatch would be removed to provide access for equipment removal and replacement as on alternate to the normal drywell equipment hatch located in the southeast quadrant of the drywell. There is no sofety. elated cabling or equipment in proximity to the escope hatch that could be impacted
-8
-~ _
if the hatch were r.nved. Based on the above, this hoist may be excluded from the scope of NUREC 0612 criteria.
23.
Refueling / Service Hoists (3) 24.
Jib Cranes (3)
These handling systems are located at the 369-foot elevation of the Reactor Building and are used for handling various loads over the spent fuel pool or over the reactor. These may be used to handle fuel channels, control rod blades, LPRMs, or various tools. No loads greater than the weight of a fuel asssembly were identified that are routinely handled by these hoists. However, since these hoists are rated at 1,000 lbs., they could be allowed to handle loads greater than the weight of a fimi.aembly which is approximately 750 lbs. Because of this, these hoists e
. g derated to 750 lbs. and will be clearly marked with the lower rating. If it becomes necessary to lif t a load greater than 750 lbs., but less than 1,000 lbs., c.cfety evaluation will be preportd to assure that the criteria of NUREG 0612 ore satisfied for the lift. This is not expected to be necessary, however, since the Reactor Building Crane auxiliary hook could be used for such a lift. These hoists may be excluded from the NUREC 0612 criteria since they will not be allowed to handle loads greater than 750 lbs.
25.
Recirculation Pumo Monorail This handling system is designed to lift recirculation pump motors and place them on a cart for removal from the drywell or for handling other recirculation pump components. These handling operations would only take place when the reccior is shutdown and on long-term decay heat cooling. Equipment located in the drywell to support this function are the instrument lines for reactor vessel level and RHR supply and letdown lines. None of this equipment is located below the recirculation pump monorails.
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TABLEI HAtOLING SYSTEMS EXCLUDED l
FROM NUREG 0612 CRITERIA HANDLING SYSTEM CAPACITY (TONS)
LOCATION 1.
Screenwell and Water 25/5 Screenwell House 272' Treatment Building Crane 2.
Rodwoste Bridge Crane 15 Rodweste Building 270' 3.
Pollet Filter Element 5
Rodweste Building 270' Handling Hoist 4.
Centrifuge Hoists (2) l Radweste Building 270' 5.
TFE Hoist l
Rodweste Building 270' 6.
Screenwel! Auxiliary Crane 8
Screenwell House 272' 7.
Turbine Room Crane 200/25 Turbine Building 300' 8.
Diesel Generator Monorails 2
Emerg. Generator Building and Hoists 272' 9.
Screenwell & Tempering 5
Screenwell House 272' Gate Hoist 10.
Monorail over RHR & Emergency 4
Screenwell & Water Treat-Service Water Pump Strainers ment Building 272' I1.
Torus Monorail 3
Reactor Building 260' 12.
Condenser Boost Pump Hoist 12 Turbine Building 252' 13.
RFP Rotor Removal Hoists (2) 2 Turbine Building 252' 14.
Turbine Oil Tank Pumps Hoist i
Turbine Building 272' 15.
RFP Turbine Case & Gear 5
Turbine Building 252' Hoists (4) 16.
Turbine Oil Tank Crane 2
Turbine Building 295' 17.
Condenser Waterbox Hoists (2) 5 Turbine Building 270' i
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i TABLEI 4
(continued) 1 1
HANDLING SYSTEM C APACITY (TONS)
LOCATION 18.
CRD Service Room Crone i
Reactor Building 270' 19.
Motor Generator Set Crane 20 Reactor Building - 300' 20.
Drain Cooler Hoists (4) 16 Heater Boy 252' 23.
Drain Cooler & Heater 25 Heater Boy 308' Hoists (4) 22.
Escape Hotch Removal Hoist 25 Reactor Building 272' 23.
Refueling / Service Hoists (3) 750 lbs.
Reactor Building 369' 24.
Jib Cranes (3) 750 lbs.
Reactor Building 369' 25.
Recirculation Pump Monorail 20 Reactor Building Drywell 4
4 II
ITEM 3:
With respect to the design and operation of heavy load-handling systems in the reactor building and those food-handling systems identified in I, above, provide your evaluation concerning compliance with the guidelines of NUREG 06l2, Section 5.1.1.
The following specific.. formation should be included in your reply.
ITEM 3.a Drawings and sketches sufficient to clearly identify the location of safe lood paths, spent fuel, and safety-related equipment.
As indicated by the heavy loads listed in the reponse to NRC Information Request item 3.c, there are many different load handling situations encountered by the Reactor Building Crane. Defining safe load paths in the manner described in NUREG 0612, Section S.I.l(l), is neither required nor prudent for every situation. To do so would unnecessarily restric+ plant operation and maintenance activities. To address this problem, the possible load handling situations that could be encountered have been identified in Table 2 below. Each load handling situation has been assigned a safety class designation, roughly in order of safety significance. Safe load path and load handling procedural requirements have been defined for each safety class as indicated below.
TABLE 2 LOAD SAFETY CLASSES AND SAFE LOAD PATH ACTIONS Heavy Load Handling Situation Safe Load Path / Procedural Actions Required Safety Class I. Load must be 1.
Procedurally limit time and height food carried directly over (i.e.,
is car-ied over the area of concern.
there are no intervening struc-l tures such as floors) spent fuel, the reoctor vessel or safe shut-down equipment.
I 12 1
TABLE 2 (continued)
Heavy Load Handling Situation Safe Load Path / Procedural Actions Required Safety Class 2. Load could be 2.
Procedurally define on area over which corried directly over spent fuel, loads shall not be corried so that if the reactor vessel, or safe shut-load is dropped, it will not result in down equipment, i.e., load con be damage to spent fuel or operable safe handled during the time when shutdown equipment or compromise spent fuel or the reactor vessel is reactor vessel integrity.
exposed or safe shutdown equipment is required to be operable and there are no physical means (such as interlocks or mechanical stops) available to restrict load move-ment over these objects. For Fitzpatrick, the crea over the spent pool is protected by elec-trical interlocks. Therefore, the concern with Class 2 loads mited to the potential for carrying these loads directly over the reactor vessel or safe shutdown equipment.
Safety Class 3. Load can be 3.
See 3A and 3B below.
coraed over spent fuel or safe shutdown equpment, but the fuel ar equipment is not directly exposed to the load drop, i.e.,
intervening structures such as floors provide some protection.
Safety Class 3A.
3A. No load travel path is required at this Preliminary evaluation indicates time. General precautions limiting i
that intervening structures will load travel height to the extent practical protect spent fuel or safe shut-should be specified.
down equipment.
Safety Class 3B.
- 38. Define safe load paths that follow, to Preliminary evoluotion con not the extent practical, structural floor l
l conclusively demonstrate that members. Limit load travel height intervening structures will to minimum he:ght practical, protect fuel or safe shutdown equipment.
l Safety Class 4. Load cannot be 4.
No safe load path or special carried over spent fuel or over procedural actions required.
l safe shutdown equipment when such equipment is required to be operable, i.e, design or opera-tional limitations prohibit movement.
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Each of the heavy loads listed in the response to item 3.c has been assigned to one or more safety classes (see Table 3). In some cases, more than one safety class assignment is required because more than one of the food handling situations described in Table 2 could be encountered when handling the load.
For each of the heavy loads listed in Toble 3, the safe lood path / procedural requirements corresponding to the assigned safety classes will be included in the oppropriate plant procedures. These are summarized in Table 3.
The loads of principal concern are those that have been assigned to Safety Classes I,2, or 3B. The actions that will be taken to oddress each of these loads are summarized below.
Safety Class I Loads - The Safety Class I loads of principal interest because of their weight are the Reactor Vessel Head, the Steam Dryer, the Shroud Head / Steam Separator, and the Drywell Head. They have been assigned Safety Class I because they must be corried directly over the reactor vessel during reactor assembly and disassembly operations. In oddition, the Vesse! Service Platform may be corried over the vessel when the head is removed. The Stud Tensioners/ Rig and the Head Thermal Insulation are only corried over the Vessel when the head is in place. T he general arrangement of the refueling floor (369' el) is indicated in Figure 1. With regard to these loods, steps will be included ii their handling procedures that minimize both the time and height that these loods are carried directly over the vessel.
Sofety Class 2 Loads - A number of the foods listed in Table 3 have been assigned to Safety Class 2.
This is because there are no physical or design restrictions that prevent them from being corried directly over the reactor vessel.
A procedural restriction will be included in the appropriate plant procedures, that prohibits movement of these loads directly over the reacter vessel when irrodicted fuel is in the vessal.
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1 With regard to the possibility of carrying Sofety Class 2 loods over the spent fuel pool, interlocks are provided that physically restric' crane travel such that heavy loads cannot be corried over the pool. These interlocks are described below.
The interlock mode for each heavy lood is indicated in Table 3.
Travel limit switches are utilized to restrict movement of the bridge or'd trolley from the spent fuel storage pool creo. Key switches are provided to allow crane bridge and trolley occess to the fuel pool for fuel and cask handling operations os described in the following sections. Two separate key switches are provided on both the radio control console and the control pendant.
The keys required for specific operations of the reactor building crone (i.e., fuel handiing or cask handling) are stored in a locked key cabinet located in the plant shif t supervisor's office. Release of these keys is controlled by the plant shif t supervisor to authorized personnel only. Upon completion of a specific opero-tion, the key is returned to the plant shift supervisor who places it in the key cabinet which is then locked. The two keys are not wieased at the some time and are logged accordingly.
Normal Operation Mode The crone is normally used for maintenance operoflons which include moving of items or equipment from the track floor at 272' elevation floor to the refueling floor. In this mode of operation, all three hooks are prevented from entering the fuel pool crea by means of limit switches which interrupt power to the bridge and trolley.
Bridge movement (east or west) over the spent fuel storage pool is unrestricted when the trolley is located north or south of the total pool area.
Trolley movement north and south is unrestricted when the bridge is located outside of the total pool creo.
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Fuel Handling Mode The key which energizes the h-ton auxiliary hoist in the fuel handling mode and locks out the bridge and trolley travel limit switches is obtained from the plant shif t supervisor. To octivate the fuel handling mode, the 125-ton and 20-ton hoist must be rais:a to their highest elevation so that their respective upper limit switches are tripped. This mode allows movement of the b-ton auxiliary hoist over the entire refueling floor and fuel pool area. The 125-ton and 20-ton hoist are not energized.
Cask Handling Mode The key which octuates the "cosk handling mode" is provided by the plant shif t supervisor to the Maintenance Foremon. This key switch on either the radio-control console or control pendant energizes the 125-ton hoist in the cask handling mode and limits the crane motion to o I it. by 4 f t. creo of the spent fuel pool by means of a roller lever switch and com assembly. To octuate the cask handling inode, the 20-ton and h-ton books must be raised to their highest elevation so that their upper limit switches are tripped.
Safety Class 3 Look - The principal concern with Safety Class 3 loods is the potential for impacting equipment required to maintain shutdown that is located below the refueling floor at the 369' el, below the spent fuel pool floor at the 330' el or below the track floor at the 272' elevation directly under the equipment hatch in the soi tost quadrant of the Reactor Building (see Figures l-10 for general arrangement of the Reactor Building).
As indicated by th' oction statement for Class 3A loods, no specific safe load paths are judged to be necessary at this time based on a preliminary evoluotion of the potential for damaging equipmen' below the refueling floor. Procedures will require that these foods be corried the minimum height necessary above the refueling floor to accomplish the lif t.
16
=
With regard to Safety Class 3B loods, requirements will be included in the plant procedures governing the lifts of these loads that will limit the height each is carried. Procedural instructions for moving these foods also define paths that provide the most direct routes to their respective loydown oreos. The Reactor Cavity Shield Plugs, for example, are corried south from the reactor cavity and j
then west to their loydown locations, shown on Figure i1. Specific load paths I
have not been defined for movement of these loc is across the refueling floor.
This is because the dimensions of these heavy loads are such that any load drop would likely span several of the major floor support beams. This is also displayed on Figure i1.
For the Reactor Building Crane Load Block, the Shipping Casks, Fuel Channel Crates and New Fuel Containers, the concern is dropping these loads the full length of the equipment hatch in the southeast quooront. For these lif ts, the crane wih % oriented such that the crone hoist is directly over the main structural members for the track boy floor of the 272' el when moving these loods up or down the equipment hatch. This will assure the maximum ovoilable resistance to impact in the event of a load drop.
In addition, safe lood paths will be defined for movement of shipping casks on the refueling floor prior to their use. The load paths will be defined in specific procedures and will be for movement of the cask to and from the evipment hatch, spent fuel pool, and cask washdown (head storage) creo (see Figure 1).
The food paths will be defined by establishing a boundary around the floor oreo over which the cask con travel. This boundary will be shown on a drawing that will be included in the procedure. It will also be marked v ith tape on the refueling floor. Within these boundaries, the cask will be moved at a height not to exceed 6 inches above the floor or small floor obstructions such as curbs, and will, to the extent practical, follow structural floor members.
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ITEM 3.b:
A discussion of measures taken to ensure that food-handling operations remain within safe load paths, including procedures, if any, for deviation from these paths.
RESPONSE
As indicated in the response to item 3.o obove, measures have been included in a number of plant procedures utilized in performing the heavy lif ts identified in the response to item 3.c.
Each such heavy lift will be controlled by a designated individual who will be responsible for enforcing the procedural requirements. Any deviation from these requirements would consti-tute o deviation from the procedure requiring either a revision or a Temporary Procedure Change. Revisions and Temporary Procedure Changes are controlled by Plant Administrative Procedures as described below.
Original procedures and revisions that change the intent must be reviewed by the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC). Temporary Procedure Changes that do not change the intent of the original procedure may be made provided such changes are approved by two (2) members of the plant staff, at least one of whom shall hold a senior operator's license. Within one business day, the ch"nge shall be reviewed by the appropriate department superintendent, if he was not one of the originators.
Within 14 days, it shall be reviewed by PORC and approved by the resident manager.
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ITEM 3.c.
A tabulation of heavy loads to be handled by each crane which includes the load identification, load weights, its designated lif ting device, and verification that the handling of such loads is governed by a written procedure containing, as a minimum, the information identified in NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.l(2).
RESPONSE
The requested information is provided in Toble 3.
19
TABLE 3 I
REACTOR BUILDING CRANE HEAVY LOADS APPROX.
APPLICABLE SAFET3 WEIGHT LIFT LIFTING INTERLOCK HANDLING LOAD CLASS (TONS)
PROCEDURES EQUIPMENT MODE RESTRICT!ONS 1.
Reactor Vessel Head 1/3B 73 MP4.l &4.2 Head Strongback Normal Corry to minimum
& Strongbock (7)
Turnbuckles height necessary
& Shackles above vessel and refueling floor 2.
Drywell Head 1/3B 48 MP4.l &4.2 Head Strongback Normal Carry to minimum
& Strongbock (7)
Turnbuckles he%ht necessary
& Shackle obeve vessel and refueling floor 3.
Steam Dryer &
I/3B 39 MP.4. l &4.2 Dryer / Separator Normal Carry to minimum Sling Assembly (7)
Lif ting Sling height necessary above vessel 4.
Shroud Head / Separator I/3B 43.5 MP4.l &4.2 Dryer / Separator Normal Carry to minimum
& Sling Assembly (7)
Lif ting Sling height necessory above vessel S.
Reactor Covity Shield 3B l 10 eo.
MP4.l A4.2 Slings, Turn-Normal Corry to minimum Plugs (S)& Shockles (7) buckles &
height necessary Shockles above refueling floor 6.
Internals Storage Area 3B 40-50 eo.
MP4.l &4.2 Slings &
Normal Corry to minimum Shield Plugs (3)
(7)
Shockles height necessary chove refueling floor 7.
Refueling Slot 3A S.S eo.
MP4. l &4.2 Slings &
Normal Corry to minimum Plugs (3)
('t; Shockles height necessary oix>ut refueling floor a
TAHLE 3 (continued)
APPROX.
APPLICABLE SAFETj WElGHT LIFT LIFTING INTERLOCK HANDLING LOAD CLASS (TONS)
PROCEDURES EQUIPMENT MODE RESTRICTIONS 8.
Reactor Vessel Head 1/3A 10 MP4.l &4.2 Reactor Head Normal Corry to minimum Thermal Insulation (7)
Insulation height necessory Lif ting Rig obove vessel and refueling floor.
9.
Reactor Vessel Head 1/3A 6
MP4. l &4.2 Reactor Head Stud Normal Carry to minimum Tensioners & Rig (7)
Tensioner Rig height necessary above vessel and refueling floor.
10.
Spent Fuel Pool 2
1.3 MP4.1 &4.2 Sling & Chain N/A Lif t with Chainfall.
Gates (2)
(7)
Fall i1.
Portable Rodiation 2/3A 14 MP4.l &4.2 Slings & Shockles Normal Do not carry over Shield (Cottle Chute)
(7) reactor vessel.
Carry to minimum height necessary obove refueling floor.
12.
Vessel Service I/3A 7
MP4.1 &4.2 Service Plotform Normal Corry to minimum Platform (7)
Slings height necessary above vessel and refueling floor.
13.
Clean Up Filter 2/3A 6.3S eo (7)
Slings & Shockles Normal Do not carry over Demineralizer reactor vessel.
Hatch Covers (2)
Corry to minimum heiret necessary above refueling floor.
J TABLE 3 (continued)
APPROX.
APPLICABLE SAFETY WEIGHT LIFT LIFTING INTERLOCK HANDLING LOAD CLASS (TONS)
PROCEDURES EQUIPMENT MODE RESTRICTIONS i
i j
14.
Skimmer Surge Tonk 2/3A 3.7 eo (7)
Slings & Shockles Normal Do not carry over Tonk Hatch Covers (2) reactor vessel.
Carry to minimum height necessory obove refueling floor.
i iS.
RHR Heat Exchanger 2/3A 4.IS eo (7)
Slings & Shackles Normal Do not corry over l
Hotch Covers (2) reactor vessel.
Corry to minimum I
height necessary obove refueling floor.
1 16.
New Fuel Storage 2/3A 3.7S (7)
Slings & Shockles Normal Do not carry over i
Vault Hatch Covers (3) reactor vessel.
Corry to minimum height necessory l
obove refueling
]
floor.
j 17.
Equipment Hatch 2/3A 0.5 eo (7)
Slings & Shockles Normal Do not carry over NW quadront) reoctor vessel.
Hatch Covers (3)
Corry to minimum height necessary above refueling i;oor.
3 18.
Equipment Hatch 2/38 1.3 eo (7)
Slings & Shockles Normal Do not carry over SE quadront) reactor vessel.
Hotch Covers (S)
Cctry to minimum height necessary above refueling floor.
TABLE 3 (continued)
APPROX.
APPLICABLE SAFETY WEIGHT LIFT LIF ilNG INTERLOCK HANDLING LOAD CLASS (TONS)
PROCEDURES EQUIPMENT M. ODE RESTRICTIONS 3
i 19.
Reactor Building Crone 2/3B 3.1 (7)
N/A Normal Do not carry over Load Block & Hook (when reactor vessel.
moving Do not carry over un N.:ed) equipment hatches except to make a lif t through hatch.
if over SE hatch, see footnote 3.
i 20.
Head Stud Rock 2/3A l.S MP4.l &4.2 Slings & Shockles Normal Do not carry over (7) the reactor vessel.
Carry to minimum t
l height necessary above refueling floor.
3 21.
Shipping Cask 2/3B 34 (6) (7)
Lif ting Yoke Normal Lif f {rocedure for See CNS 4-45 Supplied by Chem Cask 4
i Chem Nuclear Handling 3
22.
CNS 4-4S Cask I.iner 2/3A/3B 4
(7)
Sling provided Normal Corry to minimum with liner Cosk height necessary 4
Handling above refueling floor. If over i
SE hatch, see footnote 3. Do not carry over reoctor vessel.
1 1
1 4
w
TABLE 3 (continued)
OTHER APPROX.
APPLICABLE SAFET3 WElGHT LIFT LIFTING INTERLOCK HANDLING LOAD CLASS (TONS)
PROCEDURES EQUIPMENT MODE RESTRICTIONS 2
l 23.
Spent Fuel Shipping 2/38 70-110 (6) (7)
Lif ting Yoke Normal See Progedure for Cask (Non-selected Cosk for LifI 4
as yet)
Handling 3
- 24. Fuel Chonnel Crote 2/38 1.2 (7)
Mesh Slings Normal Carry to minimum l
height necessary obove refueling floor.
ll over SE hatch, see footnote 3.
l Do not carry over reactor vessel.
3 4
2S.
New Fuel Container 2/3B 0.S (7)
Slings Normal Corry to minimum height necessary above refueling floor. If over SE hatch, see footnote 3. Do not carry over reactor vessel.
S 26.
RHR Heat Exchanger 2/3A 7.S (7)
Slings & Shockles Normal Do not carry over Shell reoctor vessel.
Carry to minimum height necessory above refueling floor.
t
TABLE 3 (continued) i APPROX.
APPLICABLE SAFETY WEIGHT LIFT LIFTING INTERLOCK HANDLING LOAD CLASS (TONS)
PROCEDURES EQUIPMENT MODE RESTRICTIONS i
27.
RHR Heat Exchanger 2/3A 20.5 (7)
Slings & Shackles Normo-Do not carry over reoctor vessel.
CC to minimum he Q ecessary bove refueling floor.
4 28.
Hydrolaser 2/3A 2
(7)
Slings & Shackles Normal Do not carry over reactor vessel.
Carry to minimum height necessary above refueling floor.
i 1
NUREG 0612 defines a heavy lood as one that weighs more than the combined weight of a single spent fuel assembly and its i
associated handling too!. For reference, the weight of a fuel assembly, its associated handling tool, and channel at Fitzpatrick is opproximately 750 lbs.
2 Safety Classes are defined in the response to item 3.o.
3 These loads are classified as 3B because of their potential for damaging equipment below the track boy floor at the 272' elevation. These loods must be lif ted over or up through the Reactor Building Equipment Hatch from the 272' elevation to the 369' elevatim. The CNS 4-45 cask and Spent Fuel Shipping casks are also classified 3B because of their potential for damaging equipment below the refueling and spent fuel pool floors,if dropped.
,4 Interlocks restrict movement of the cask to the cask looding area when the cask is over the opent fuel pool. See response to item 3.o.
5 A RHR Heat Exchanger Shell or Tube Bundle, if pulled for maintenance or replacement, must be raised to the 369' elevation from the 272' elesction through the RHR HX Hotches.
6 Cask lif ts will be governed by special lif t procedures that will be prepared in advance of making the lif ts.
7 All lif ts will be addressed in a procedure governing load handling operations by the Reactor Building Crane.
I e
ITEM 3.d Wrification that lif ting devices identified in 2.l.3-3, above, comply with the requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978 or ANSI B30.9-1971 as appropriate.
For lif ting devices where these standards, as supplemented by NUREG 0612, Section 5.l.l(4) or 5.1.l(5), are not met, describe any proposed otternatives and demonstrate their equivalency in terms of lood-handling reliability.
RESPONSE: The lif ting devices that have been evoluoted for the purpose of developing a response to this item ore those for Safety Class I and Sofety Class 3B loads identified in To' ole 3, with the following exceptions. The lifting rigs for the Head Thermal Insulation and the Stud Tensioners were not evoluoted, even though these loods were assigned to Sofaty Class 1. The reason for this is that they are corried over the Reactor Vessel only when the head is in place.
Because they are relatively light loads, o preliminary evaluation indicates that they offer no appreciable threat to the reactor vessel itself or to fuel in the vessel. This will be verified in the next submittal to the NRC.
The lif ting devices listed below have been evoluoted. These are devices specially designated for the Sofety Class I and 3B lif ts they are utilized for.
l.
Head Strongback 2.
Dryer / Separator Lif ting Sling Assembly 3.
Reactor Cavity Shield Plug Slings 4.
Internals Storage Area Shield Plug Slings 5.
Reactor Service Plotform Slings The Reactor Shield Plug Slings, Internals Storage Area Shield Plug Slings and t
Reactor Service Platform Slings have been evoluoted using ANSI B30.9-1971.
This evoluotion found that they complied with ANSI B30.9 with no deviations or exceptions. In addition, slings used for lif ting Fuel Channel Crates, New Fuel l
26
Container, and RHR Heat Exchanger Shell will be selected, maintained, inspected and used in accordance with procedures that comply with ANSI B30.9.
The only other special lif ting device that may be of interest is the lif ting yoke for the CNS 4-45 cask. If this cask is ever utilized at the site, prior to use, Chem Nuclear will be required to demonstrate that the lif ting yoke meets ANSI NI4.6-1978 or that alternative measures are justified.
The dryer / separator sling assembly and the head strongback were evoluoted against ANSI N14.6 as described below.
Description of Dryer and Separator Sling The dryer and separator sling (see Figure 12) is used to remcve and install the dryer and the steam separator ossembly. The device is a cruciform steel frame ottoched to a hook box by four wire ropes with turnbuckles.
The four ends of the cruciform frame are each fitted into o bell-shaped housing which is open and flared at the bottom. A hole posses through two sides of the housing for the lif ting pin travel. Each lif ting pin is actuated by a double-acting air piston. The lif ting pin, in turn, actuates on air volve at the end of the pin's travel. This air valve gives positive indication by way of a pressure gauge, that the lif ting pin is fully inserted into the dryer and separator lif ting lug. A lif ting eye, located on top of each l-beam, is connected to o turnbuckle and a wire rope. The wire ropes are ottoched to the hook box by spelter sockets and pins. The hook box contains a slot at the top which is sized to accommodate the double book of the crane. Two hook pins pass through the hook box to engage the crone book.
27
\\
1 Description of the Head Strongback The head strongback (see Figure 13) is used to hoist the drywell head and the reactor vessel head. The device consists of four lif ting arms mounted at right ongles between top and bottom four-point stor plates. The top plate has a slot through which the double hook of the crane posses to engage the two hook pins. The strongback is attached to lif ting lugs on the drywell head and reactor vessel head, and to lif ting lugs at the end of each arm of the strongbock, by turnbuckles and anchor shock-les.
For the reasons listed below, the detailed comparison of the Dryer / Separator Sling Assembly and the Head Strongback to ANSI NI4.6-1978 was limited to Sections 3.2 and 5 of the standard.
1)
These devices were designed by General Electric Com-pony prior to the existence of ANSI N14.6-1978. In this regard, there are o number of sections in the stondord that are difficult to apply in retrospect. These are the sections entitled, Designer's Responsibilities (Section 3.1);
Design Considerations (Section 3.3); Fabricator's Respon-sibilities (Section 4.1); Inspector's Responsibilities (Sec-tion 4.2); and Fabrication Consideration * (Section 4.3).
Because documentation is not available to assure that all of the subparts of these sections were met, they have not been oddressed item by item for the purpose of identify-ing and justifying exceptions. However, information on the drawings indicate that sound engineering practices were placed on the fabricator and inspector by the designer for the purpose of assuring that the designer's intent was accomplished. On this basis, there is reason-oble assurance that the intent of the sections of the 28
standard listed above was, in fact, accomplished in the design, fabrication, inspection, and testing of these de-vices.
2)
Section 1.0, Scope; Section 2.0, Definitions; Section 3.4, Design Considerations to Minimize Decontamination Ef-fects in Special Lif ting Device Use; Section 3.5, Coatings; and Section 3.6, Lubricants are not pertinent to load handling reliability of the devices and, therefore, have not been addressed for the purpose of identifying and justify-ing exceptions.
3)
Section 6, Special Lif ting Devices for Critical Loads, is applicable to critical loads. A critical load is defined in the stonderd as:
"Any lif ted load whose uncontrolled movement or release could adversely offect any safety related system when such system is required for unit safety or could res >lt in potential off-site exposures comparable to the guideline exposures outlined in Code of Federal Regulo-tions, Title 10, Port 100."
None of the loads lifted by the devices identified above have os yet been determined to be o critical load. Such a determination would require on analysis of the con-sequences of various load drop scenarios.
Since such analyses are not required to be performed until the final report to the NRC, it is premature to designate certain loads os critical loods and, accordingly, to apply Section 6 of ANSI NI4.6-1978 to their designated lif ting devices.
29
I ANSI NI4.6 - Section 3.2 Section 3.2 of ANSI N14.6-1978 estabishes design criteria for special lifting devices. Specific;:ly, it establishes (1) stress design factors for load bearing members (including wire rope slings by invoking ANSI B30.9) and (2) brittle fracture criteria for materials used in lood-bearing members.
Design documents necessary to verify compliance or identify exceptions to these criteria are not available at this time. Nonetheless, it is believed that adequate verification of the wssign safety margins have been demonstrated based on the following:
(1)
Proof Load Tests - The Dryer and Separator Sling Assembly was required to be proof-tested at 200% of its rated copocity. The Head Strongback was required to be proof-tested at a minimum of 125% of its rated capacity.
All lood-bearing welds were required to be magnetic particle inspected prior to and following the proof test.
In oddition, to verify that na permanent deformation occurred during the proof test, the devices were required to be subjected to dimensional examinatiore before and of ter the proof test.
(2)
In Service Examinations - Both devices have been utilized on a number of occasions to perform the lif ts for which they were designed with no evidence of overstress or permanent deformation.
(3)
The devices are utilized only for the two lifts for which each was specifically designed. They have not been and will not be used for any other purpose. Therefore, the possibility of on overload situation is extremely remote.
(4)
As indicated in the discussion below regarding inspection and maintenance, the devices will periodically / prior to use be subjected to necessary visual, dimensional, and nondestructive examination. This should assure that any indication of overstress will be detected and oction taken to repair or replace the domoged components.
30
ANSI N14.6 - Section 5 The comparison of current practices for inspection, testing, and maintenance of the dryer / separator sling and head strongback to Section 5 of ANSI N14.6-1978, os supplemented by NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.l(4), found that certain changes to Fitzpatrick procedures were required in order to satisfy the inspection and test requirements in ANSI NI4.6. These changes will be mode so that the Fitzpatrick inspection program complies fully, with the following two exceptions:
Exception 1: Plant procedures do not specify a visual inspec-tion by maintenance or other nonoperating personnel at inter-vols of three months or less a: required by Section 5.3.7 of ANSI N I 4.6-1978. Between periods of usage, these devices are stored in a specific location under o controlled environment and are not subjected to any other usage except the dedicated and specific usage mentioned in the description of the devices.
Procedures require that the devices be inspected and examined by qualified personnel prior to each refueling. Based on the controlled storage, dedicated usage, and the complete inspec-tion schedule, the equivalency of Section 5.3.7 is demonstrated.
Exception 2: Section 5.3.3 of ANSI N14.6-1978 requires that special lif ting devices be load tested according to Section 5.2.1 to 150% of maximum load following any incident in which any lood-bearing component may have been subjected to stresses substantially in excess of those for which it was qualified by previous testing, or following on incident that may have caused permanent distortion of lood-bearing parts. Since distortion may ofready have occurred or defects may have already de-veloped due to the overstressed condition, it seems more prudent and practical to perform the dimensional examinations for deformation and the nondestructive examinations for de-31
= _ _ -
fects to determine w'1 ether the device is still occeptable for use rather than to subject the device to 150% lood testing. If defects or deformation ore detected, then the device shall be repaired or modified and then tested to 150% load followed by examination for defects or deformation.
This alternative achieves the some objective os Section 5.3.3 of the standard.
t l'
E l
[
32 i
f.-
ITEM 3.e.
Verification that ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-2, has been invoked with respect to crone inspection, testing, and maintenance. Where any exception is taken to this standard, sufficient information should be provided to demon-strate the equivalency of proposed alternatives.
RESPONSE
The procedures for inspection, testing, and maintenance of the Reactor Building Crane are contained in Maintenance Procedure MPl7.1. This procedure has been reviewed and compared to ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-2.
Based on this review, revisions will be made to this procedure and to procedures governing operation of the crane. With these revisions and additions, the criteria of ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-2, will be satisfied.
No exceptions to the standard are token.
33 1
)
nTEM 3.f.
Verification that crane design complies with the guidelines of CMAA Srecification 70 and Chapter 2-I of ANSI B30.2-1976, including the demonstro-tion of equivalency of octual design requirements for instances where specific compliance with these standards, is not provided.
RESPONSE
Reactor Building Crone - The Fitzpatrick Reactor Building Crane was built prior to the issuance of ANSI B30.2-1976 and CMAA 70-1975.
This crane was designed and fabricated by Hornischfeger P&H in occordance with the criteria in a Stone and Webster procurement specification. This specification addressed only certain of the criterio in ANSI B30.2-1976 and CMAA 70-1975. Accord-ingiv, additional information contained on P&H drawings and in P&H Monvols has been reviewed and a detailed point-by-point comparison of the Reactor Building Crane to the criteric in ANSI B30.2-1976 and CMAA 70- 1975 has been performed. This comparison considered only those components that are load bearing or are necessary to prevent conditions that could lead to o load drop. In performing this comparison, it was necessary to calculate stress levels in various components, moments of inertia, gear rotings (strength and durability),
dimensional proportions, factors of safety, and other mechanical chorocteristics in order verify compliance with ANSI B30.2-1976 and CMAA 70-1975.
Based on this evoluotion, we find that the Reactor Building Crone design complies with the guidelines of CMAA 70-1975 and ANSI B30.2-1976, with two exceptions in the areas of welding criteria and bumper deceleration rates.
Justification for these exceptions is provided below.
CMAA 70-1975 requires that welding be in occordance with AWS DI A.I. ANSI B30.2-1976 requires that welding be in accordance with AWS DI.I except as modified by AWS Dl4.1. These welding codes are more recent and were not in 34
J existence at the time of the fabrication of the Fitzpatrick Reactor Building Crane. This crone was, however, fabricated using the AWS welding specification that was current of that time, i.e., AWS D2.0- 1966.
This standard is the l
equivalent of current standards AWS DI.I and AWS Dl4.1 when A-36 steel is used.
t CMAA 70-1975 ond ANSI B30.2-1976 require that bridge bumpers and trolley bumpers be provided that have certain maximum deceleration rates when the bridge or trolley is traveling at a certain speed. At the time of the fabrication of the Reactor Building Crane, the crane standards did not specify maximum 4
deceleration rates. Bumpers were selected based on manufacturer's experience.
Acceptobility of the bumpers has been demonstrated by satisfactory perfor-monce in use.
i I
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1 4
4 35 4
. - - - - - ~.
ITEM 3.g.
Exceptions, if any, taken to ANSI B30.2-1976 with respect to operator training, qualification, and conduct.
RESPONSE
W!th the following exception, operators of the Reactor Building Crane will be trained, qualified, and conduct themselves in accordonce with ANSI B30.2-1976. Section 2-3.1.2 requires that operators pass a written or oral g
examination. Prospective crone operators at JAF ore not presently formally examined. However, no operator is designated as qualified until he demonstrates knowledge of the training course material and operating pocedures and demon-strates proficiency with the crone. Accordingly, measures equivalent to those 3
requirel by the standard are required at JAF.
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Figure 10 REACTON BU:LDING CHOSS SECTIONS 4-4 G S-5 JAMES A Fli2 PATRICK Nt'CLE AR POWER PL ANT POWER AUTHORtiY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
FIGURE II SAFETY CLASS 30 LOADS CARRIED OVER REFUELING FLOOR j
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